34. In Stingel(13) this Court quoted with approval an observation by Viscount Simon in Holmes v. Director of Public Prosecutions(14) that the wrongful act or insult must have been capable of provoking an ordinary person not merely to some retaliation but "to the degree and method and continuance of violence which produces the death". Reliance was placed by the respondent upon the use of the word "continuance", it being suggested that an ordinary man would not have continued to stab the deceased repeatedly as the appellant did. But this, we think, is to place a wrong interpretation upon the word "continuance" in the particular context. In that context, the word was not, in our view, intended to indicate more than that the conduct in question must have been capable of provoking an ordinary person to retaliation of the like nature and extent as that of the accused. The question is not whether an ordinary person, having lost his self-control, would have regained his composure sooner than the accused nor is it whether he would have inflicted a lesser number of wounds. It is whether an ordinary person could have lost self-control to the extent that the accused did(15). That is to say, the question is whether the provocation, measured in gravity by reference to the personal situation of the accused, could have caused an ordinary person to form an intention to kill or do grievous bodily harm and to act upon that intention, as the accused did, so as to give effect to it. The associated question whether, in the sequence of events, an accused, having lost his self-control, had regained it so that the continued infliction of injury was in fact no longer provoked, is not a question to be answered by reference to the ordinary person. It is to be answered by reference to the conduct of the accused himself and to common experience of human affairs. It is the nature and extent - the kind and degree - of the reaction which could be caused in an ordinary person by the provocation which is significant, rather than the duration of the reaction or the precise physical form which that reaction might take. And in considering that matter, the question whether an ordinary person could form an intention to kill or do grievous bodily harm is of greater significance than the question whether an ordinary person could adopt the means adopted by the accused to carry out the intention.