Brisbane City Council v Amos [2019] HCA 27 | Case summary

KIEFEL CJ AND EDELMAN J. Introduction The appellant, the Brisbane City Council ("the Council"), is responsible for the local government of Brisbane. The respondent, Mr Amos, was the registered owner of rateable land on which the Council levied various rates and charges. The Council acted pursuant to its statutory duties and powers to levy rates and charges. Legislation also provides that "overdue rates and charges are a charge on the land". The Council brought this proceeding relevantly to recover overdue and unpaid rates, with interest, levied upon Mr Amos' rateable land by rates notices issued in the period 30 April 1999 to 9 January 2012. Mr Amos resisted the Council's claim for a number of different reasons. Only one remains in this Court. It is which of two potentially applicable limitation periods, a six year limitation period or a 12 year limitation period, applies to the Council's claims. If the Council is correct that the only limitation period that applies is a provision that creates a 12 year limitation period, then there is a second question concerning the manner of operation of that provision in relation to the Council's claim for interest. The question of statutory interpretation on this appeal arises from two provisions in the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) ("the 1974 Limitation Act"). The first provision is s 26(1), which contains a 12 year limitation period that applies to an action "to recover a principal sum of money secured by a mortgage or other charge on property". This provision applies to a wide range of debts including debts created by simple contract and secured by a mortgage or other charge, or vendor's lien, whether over realty or personalty and debts created by covenant and secured by charge or mortgage; and historically it also applied to judgment debts, which were treated as charges upon land and "payable out of any land". The provision also encompasses, relevantly to this appeal, debts created by statute and secured by charge. The second provision, which overlaps with s 26(1), is s 10. Section 10 creates overlapping limitation periods for a number of the debts relevant to s 26(1): a six year limitation period for an action founded on a simple contract; and a 12 year limitation period for an action on a specialty, including a covenant, and also for an action upon a judgment. And, relevantly to this appeal, s 10(1)(d) provides a six year limitation period for "an action to recover a sum recoverable by virtue of any enactment". The correct approach to the overlap between s 26(1) and s 10(1)(d) of the 1974 Limitation Act cannot be understood without an appreciation of the history of interpretation of the predecessor provisions and the late nineteenth century solution to the issue of overlap, which had been settled for a century when the 1974 Limitation Act was enacted. As the reasons below explain, until the late nineteenth century the overlap between the provisions was resolved by confining the first limitation period, namely for sums of money secured by charge, to real or proprietary claims. The second group of limitation periods applied only to personal claims. This approach of separate pigeonholes was ameliorated from the late nineteenth century when it was held that the limitation period for sums of money secured by charge would also bar personal claims. In 1899, in Barnes v Glenton, it was effectively held that the application of both limitation periods to personal claims meant that a defendant could plead the shorter limitation period. In oral submissions, the Council accepted that its claim was a personal claim. It was not "in rem" or a real claim. The Council urged this Court to depart from the decision in Barnes v Glenton. That submission should not be accepted. Barnes v Glenton has been consistently followed by judicial authority and textbook writers, and hence practitioners, for more than a century. It was part of the understood fabric upon which the 1974 Limitation Act was enacted. It is a coherent approach. It was followed by a majority of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland. The appeal must be dismissed. The overlap between s 10 and s 26 of the 1974 Limitation Act Section 10 of the 1974 Limitation Act relevantly provides as follows: "Actions of contract and tort and certain other actions (1) The following actions shall not be brought after the expiration of 6 years from the date on which the cause of action arose - (a) subject to section 10AA, an action founded on simple contract or quasi-contract or on tort where the damages claimed by the plaintiff do not consist of or include damages in respect of personal injury to any person; ... (d) an action to recover a sum recoverable by virtue of any enactment, other than a penalty or forfeiture or sum by way of a penalty or forfeiture. ... (3) An action upon a specialty shall not be brought after the expiration of 12 years from the date on which the cause of action accrued. (3A) Subsection (3) does not affect an action in respect of which a shorter period of limitation is prescribed by any other provision of this Act." Although s 10(1) is expressed in terms that the action "shall not be brought", this has long been understood as barring the "remedy", that is, as permitting a good defence to be pleaded but not as extinguishing the underlying rights. It has been accepted throughout this litigation that the Council's "action", defined in s 5(1) of the 1974 Limitation Act as "any proceeding in a court of law", for unpaid rates will fall within s 10(1)(d), and thus permit a good defence to be pleaded by Mr Amos after the expiration of six years, unless that provision is excluded. The issue is whether s 26, where it applies, excludes the operation of each of the limitation periods in s 10. Section 26 of the 1974 Limitation Act relevantly provides as follows: "Actions to recover money secured by mortgage or charge or to recover proceeds of the sale of land (1) An action shall not be brought to recover a principal sum of money secured by a mortgage or other charge on property whether real or personal nor to recover proceeds of the sale of land after the expiration of 12 years from the date on which the right to receive the money accrued. ... (5) An action to recover arrears of interest payable in respect of a sum of money secured by a mortgage or other charge or payable in respect of proceeds of the sale of land or to recover damages in respect of such arrears shall not be brought after the expiration of 6 years from the date on which the interest became due." It is also common ground that s 26(1) and (5) of the 1974 Limitation Act apply to the Council's claim for overdue rates and charges, which are a charge on the land. The treatment of the overlap between the antecedent provisions before 1874 Historically, there were two areas of apparent overlap between the antecedent provisions to ss 10 and 26. The first area of overlap was in relation to an action to recover the principal sum of money in respect of a debt secured by a charge and created by specialty. The limitation provision for a specialty included not merely covenants but also, until 1939, a debt created by statute. The second area of overlap arose where arrears of interest were sought in respect of a debt created by covenant or specialty and secured by a mortgage or other charge. Prima facie, the antecedent provisions to ss 10 and 26 both appeared to be applicable to a claim for principal or interest, since the claim in each case appeared to be both an action to recover money on a covenant or specialty and an action for a sum secured by a mortgage or other charge. The apparent overlap in relation to claims to the principal The origins of the limitation period for an action to recover a principal sum of money secured by a mortgage or other charge lie in s 40 of the Real Property Limitation Act 1833 (UK) ("the 1833 Limitation Act"), which prescribed a 20 year limitation period for a mortgage debt from the time that the cause of action arose. This limitation period was the same period as that for actions of ejectment and was based upon the previous judicial assumption that if a mortgagor remained in possession of the land for more than 20 years without acknowledging the mortgage then that mortgage was deemed to have been satisfied. If a debt was created by simple contract there was some overlap between the 20 year limitation period in s 40 of the 1833 Limitation Act and the six year limitation period in s 3 of the Limitation Act 1623 (21 Jac I c 16) in relation to claims to the principal sum of money. In those cases, the overlap was resolved by recognising a difference between a "real" claim and a "personal" claim. As Lightwood observed, "[w]ith respect to sums charged on land, there may be a real remedy against the land, and at the same time a personal remedy against the debtor". The real claims to recover money were by sale of the land or by rent obtained from occupation of the land. It was held that the shorter six year limitation period applied to any personal action, with the longer 20 year limitation period applying to any real claims. In the most common scenario of possible overlap, namely a debt created by covenant and secured by charge or mortgage, there was no issue before 1874. This was because a 20 year limitation period applied to both a claim to recover a principal sum of money secured by a mortgage or other charge under s 40 of the 1833 Limitation Act and a claim on a covenant under s 3 of the Civil Procedure Act 1833 (UK). The apparent overlap in relation to claims to arrears of interest In the nineteenth century the issue that arose from the apparent overlap in relation to arrears of interest was that there was a six year limitation period for real claims - that is, claims "against the land" - in s 42 of the 1833 Limitation Act and a 20 year limitation period for personal claims on a covenant in s 3 of the Civil Procedure Act. This overlap was again resolved by treating the different provisions as concerned with different remedies. The six year limitation period for those claims in s 42 of the 1833 Limitation Act applied to real claims in Chancery. By contrast, the 20 year limitation period in s 3 of the Civil Procedure Act, passed by Parliament only three weeks later "to deal with ... the personal action only", applied to personal actions on the covenant or specialty. Those actions were brought at common law and were not available in Chancery. The leading case that recognised the different universes in which the two provisions operated was Hunter v Nockolds. The issue arose in that case in relation to a real action brought against an alienee of the land. The Lord Chancellor recognised that the generality of the words "action or suit" in s 42 of the 1833 Limitation Act was capable of encompassing both common law actions and Chancery suits, which suggested that the provision concerning claims to recover sums charged on land was a "general enactment" covering both real and personal claims. But the Lord Chancellor held that it was well established, in England and in Ireland, that s 42 of the 1833 Limitation Act was concerned only with a real claim, and that the separate limitation period in s 3 of the Civil Procedure Act applied to a personal action. Hence, the real claim in Hunter v Nockolds was subject to the six year limitation period. By contrast, any personal action on a covenant or specialty would be subject to a 20 year limitation period. The treatment of the overlap in relation to claims to the principal after 1874 In 1874, s 8 of the Real Property Limitation Act 1874 (UK) ("the 1874 Limitation Act") reduced the limitation period for actions to recover a sum secured by a mortgage or other charge, previously in s 40 of the 1833 Limitation Act. The reduction was from 20 years to 12 years. In Jay v Johnstone, Lindley LJ said that one "key" to the 1874 Limitation Act was to be found in the preamble, which provided that "it is expedient further to limit the times within which actions or suits may be brought for the recovery of land or rent, and of charges thereon". This was consistent with the object of the 1833 Limitation Act to "relieve land from arrears of charges beyond six years". Nevertheless, despite this view of the limited change effected by s 8 of the 1874 Limitation Act, within a decade of the passage of that Act the English Court of Appeal revisited the question of overlap in relation to claims to the principal within s 8 of the 1874 Limitation Act. This question of overlap was revisited in Sutton v Sutton. The issue in that case was whether s 8 of the 1874 Limitation Act applied only to real actions to recover a sum secured by mortgage or other charge, leaving other limitation periods to apply to personal actions. The appellant relied upon the 12 year limitation period in a personal action for recovery of a principal sum secured by mortgage or other charge. The respondent demurred to that defence, alleging that the applicable limitation period was the 20 year limitation period for an action on a covenant. The Court of Appeal held that the 12 year limitation period applied. The Master of the Rolls pointed out that the opening words of s 8 of the 1874 Limitation Act stated that "[n]o action or suit or other proceeding shall be brought". This encompassed actions at common law (the personal actions) as well as suits in equity (the real claims). Although this reasoning applied equally to claims for arrears of interest, Hunter v Nockolds was distinguished by Cotton LJ on the basis that the overlapping provisions concerning interest had been, and were still, located in two different Acts that had been passed only three weeks apart. The consequence of the decision in Sutton v Sutton for claims to a principal sum, as Cotton LJ later explained, was to expand the operation of s 8 to personal claims. The decision in Sutton v Sutton was said to have come as "a surprise to the profession generally". As the trial judge in Sutton v Sutton later observed, one reason why no appeal was brought to the House of Lords may have been that the respondent was nevertheless able to obtain payment of the money due under the covenant by way of amendments to the statement of claim. Although the decision in Sutton v Sutton might have been controversial in applying a provision such as s 8 to personal claims, it would have been far more controversial if it had also disapplied any other, shorter, limitation period. It did not do this. In the words of Stirling J, the decision did not interpret s 8 as though it said that "an action or suit or other proceeding to recover money charged on land may be brought up to the end of twelve years, but not afterwards". If a shorter limitation period applied to the personal claim then, as Monroe J said in In re Conlon's Estate, "the mere fact that the personal claim cannot be enforced does not deprive the creditor of his remedy against the land". Section 8 would apply a 12 year limitation period to that real claim. This limited effect of Sutton v Sutton was confirmed in Barnes v Glenton. In that case, a loan was given by simple contract and secured by a charge on land. No action was brought during the six year limitation period under the Limitation Act 1623 for a simple contract without specialty. However, the lender argued that the limitation period that governed the simple contract was the 12 year limitation period for actions to recover a sum secured by charge. The Court of Appeal unanimously rejected this submission. Each of A L Smith and Collins LJJ explained that Sutton v Sutton was concerned with a covenant (so that s 8 of the 1874 Limitation Act would provide a shorter limitation period) rather than a simple contract (which had a shorter limitation period than s 8 of the 1874 Limitation Act). This difference was material because the limitation period for an action on a covenant (20 years) was longer than the limitation period for an action to recover a sum secured by mortgage (12 years). The shorter limitation period of 12 years had been applied. As Collins LJ said in Barnes v Glenton: "The words of the section debar the creditor from proceeding after twenty years; they do not confer any right of suit upon him which he did not before possess. The statutory prohibition against taking proceedings after the period named is not a statutory permission given to take them within that period". The same point was made by Romer LJ in Barnes v Glenton, who added that the two Acts did not conflict: the shorter limitation period of six years applied to personal actions to enforce a simple contract debt and the limitation period of 12 years applied to any claims against the land or on a covenant for a sum of money secured by a mortgage or other charge on land. The effect of the decision in Barnes v Glenton was thus to confirm that in personal claims to recover a sum secured by mortgage or other charge there could be overlapping limitation periods, but any longer limitation period would not extend a shorter limitation period. However, the potential application of both the shorter and the longer limitation periods to a personal claim to recover a principal sum secured by a charge did not mean that the longer limitation period was redundant. The longer limitation period would still apply to a real action "against the land", such as an action for an order for sale of the land. It might also apply if an exception such as disability or acknowledgement of the debt applied to the shorter limitation period but not to the longer limitation period. As A L Smith LJ had observed in Barnes v Glenton, the concurrent operation of shorter limitation periods for personal claims was supported by the textbooks as well as judicial authority. And for more than a century after Barnes v Glenton, until this litigation, judges and academic authors consistently took the same view. The effect of the decision in Barnes v Glenton was stated judicially in 1899, 1929, and 2004. And prior to the 1974 Limitation Act it was reiterated by all the leading authors, including: in 1899 by Williams and Crowdy, and also by Jackson and Gosset; in 1904 by Edwards, and also by Whitcombe and Cherry; in 1906 by Brown; in 1909 by Harnett, and also by Lightwood; in 1910 by Davidson and Wadsworth; in 1911 by Webster, and also by Williams; in 1912 by Stephenson; in 1927 by Law, and also by Ramsbotham; in 1931 by Lightwood; in 1936 by Ball; in 1959 by Franks; and in 1973 by Sykes. The 1974 Limitation Act When Parliament enacts legislation by adopting words that have an established and understood meaning in predecessor provisions, then it will generally be assumed that Parliament has intended the words to have that meaning. This is particularly so if the legislation adopts a model in which those words have been given an established meaning, and other provisions, or other parts of the provision, are amended but the relevant words are not. Section 26(1) of the 1974 Limitation Act re-enacted in Queensland, in relevantly identical form, s 24(1) of the Limitation Act 1960 (Qld). In turn, s 24(1) of the Limitation Act 1960 (Qld) had re‑enacted s 18(1) of the Limitation Act 1939 (UK). And, with one substantive change to the expression concerning a "sum of money secured by any mortgage ... or otherwise charged upon or payable out of any land", the 1939 provision was in essentially the same terms as that part of s 8 of the 1874 Limitation Act and s 40 of the 1833 Limitation Act and its colonial Queensland derivative. The change was that prior to 1939, s 8 had been applied only to charges on land; an extension by analogy had been denied to charges over personalty. The provision was extended to personalty in 1939 following a recommendation by the Law Revision Committee, which had noted the anomaly of excluding personalty, particularly since charges were sometimes given over a mixed fund of land and personalty. The consistent interpretation and understanding of s 8 of the 1874 Limitation Act and its successor provisions over nearly a century formed part of the fabric upon which s 26(1) of the 1974 Limitation Act was enacted with amendments that did not affect that understanding. It was understood that although s 26(1) applied to both real and personal claims, it did not extend other applicable limitation periods for personal claims. Indeed, the Law Revision Committee recommended a change to the predecessor provision to s 26(5) so that this provision would operate in the same way. Prior to 1939, the decision in Sutton v Sutton had not been applied to the predecessor provision to s 26(5). Hence, the six year limitation period under s 42 of the 1833 Limitation Act for actions to recover arrears of interest payable in respect of a sum of money secured by a charge was confined only to real claims, with the longer limitation period of 20 years under s 3 of the Civil Procedure Act applying to personal claims to arrears by an action on the covenant. The Law Revision Committee described this as an anomaly and recommended that a six year limitation period should apply to both the real and the personal claim. That was the origin of the provision that became s 10(3A) in the 1974 Limitation Act. The interpretation consistently adopted since Barnes v Glenton is also reflected in the decision concerning the overlap between s 10(3) and s 26(1) of the 1974 Limitation Act by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland in Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Douglas Morris Investments Pty Ltd. In that case, a building construction company owed money to the bank. The building construction company became insolvent. Douglas Morris Investments had undertaken to pay, on written demand by the bank, the balance owing or unpaid by the building construction company or itself. The debt of Douglas Morris Investments was secured by instruments described as scrip liens, executed by Douglas Morris Investments in favour of the bank. The bank demanded payment from Douglas Morris Investments. When Douglas Morris Investments did not pay, the bank brought an action for various declarations including declarations that the scrip liens were valid and that the bank was entitled to possession of share certificates and a cash sum, which were consideration for a takeover of some of the secured shares by the third defendant. The trial judge declared that the scrip liens were effective to charge the shares and that the bank was entitled to possession of the share certificates. When the Full Court considered whether the declarations should have been made, an issue arose as to whether "the bank's right to the share scrip is statute-barred". The expression of this issue by the Full Court, the terms of the declarations sought, and the joinder of the third defendant make it plain that the bank's underlying claim was a proprietary claim on the charge, to enforce its entitlement to the scrip. The bank was seeking to recover a principal sum of money, and interest, secured by a charge as a "real" claim to the share scrip. Following the approach consistently recognised in relation to land since at least 1850 in Hunter v Nockolds, and undisturbed by Sutton v Sutton, such a "real" claim would fall within the antecedents to s 26(1) but not within the antecedents to s 10, which were concerned with personal claims. This was the conclusion of the Full Court. In the Full Court, McPherson J, with whom Connolly and Williams JJ agreed, held that the relevant limitation period provision for "an action on the scrip lien" was s 26(1), "to the exclusion of those [provisions] specified in s 10(1) and s 10(3)". The reason the personal claims in s 10(1)(a) (simple contract) and s 10(3) (covenant) were excluded was that the claim was a real claim: McPherson J referred to the first instance decision in Barnes v Glenton, in which Lord Russell of Killowen CJ had characterised the claim as a real claim "payable out of land". Although that decision was overturned by the Court of Appeal, which characterised the claim as a personal claim, the Court of Appeal did not cast any doubt upon the long-standing position that real claims were governed only by the equivalent of s 26. The character of the claim in Douglas Morris Investments as a real claim was made even plainer when McPherson J described the consequences of a lapse in time barring actions for the principal or interest. His Honour said that because the limitation period barred the personal action but not the underlying right: "[t]he barring of proceedings to recover the debt which the charge was intended to secure does not touch that [equitable proprietary] interest". Later, he concluded that the action "is more akin to an action for recovery of possession, or for specific performance of an agreement that the bank shall have possession". The more recent English authorities The Council relied upon the decision in Douglas Morris Investments and two English decisions that were said to be directly applicable. The first English decision is Bristol and West Plc v Bartlett. In each of three cases heard together, borrowers defaulted on loans. The loans were secured by charges over their houses so that upon default of payment the lender obtained possession of and sold the properties. Although there was a shortfall, the lenders delayed in service of claims for the outstanding amounts. In the lead case in the Court of Appeal, that of the Bartletts, the delay was for more than six years. The limitation period for an action to recover a sum of money secured by a charge, in the equivalent of s 26(1), was 12 years. The limitation period for an action on a specialty, including a debt created by deed, in the equivalent provision of s 10(3), was 12 years. And the limitation period for a simple contract, in the equivalent provision to s 10(1)(a), was six years. The Court of Appeal, in reasons delivered by Longmore LJ, rejected the submission that the sale of the land meant that the debt became only a simple contract debt. So the remaining question was whether the relevant limitation period was that for an action upon a specialty or that for a sum of money secured by a charge. Although both provisions contained a limitation period of 12 years for the principal, the limitation period for an action to recover interest in respect of money secured by a charge, in the equivalent of s 26(5), was only six years. The lenders argued that the equivalent of s 26(5) did not apply because the money was no longer secured by a charge. The Court of Appeal rejected that submission, concluding that the shorter limitation period in s 26(5) applied to the claims for interest because the limitation period for an action in respect of a sum of money secured by a mortgage or other charge applied to charges existing at the date when the right accrued, not the date when the action was brought. The Court of Appeal applied the limitation period in the equivalent of s 26(5) rather than the limitation period with respect to specialties because it considered that the "specific" limitation period in respect of a sum of money secured by a mortgage or other charge took "precedence over the general provisions relating to specialties". This assumption was precisely the opposite of the position that had prevailed before 1874, where the "general enactment" concerning a sum of money secured by charge did not apply to the circumstances of a personal claim based upon a covenant or specialty, which was said to be "so express and clear in its language" and "so plain and unequivocal that it must prevail". But this point had not been argued in the Court of Appeal, was not in issue, and was therefore not necessary for the conclusion. The same result would have ensued whether the limitation period in respect of interest on a sum of money secured by a charge (six years) took precedence over the limitation period in respect of a specialty (12 years) or whether they both applied so that the action was limited by the shorter period. The other English decision relied upon by the Council was West Bromwich Building Society v Wilkinson. In that case, the Wilkinsons defaulted on a loan from the West Bromwich Building Society. The loan was secured by a mortgage over their property so the building society obtained possession and sold the property. Although there was a shortfall, the building society did not serve a claim for the outstanding amount for more than 12 years. The Wilkinsons relied upon the 12 year limitation period for a sum of money secured by a mortgage. The building society submitted that the applicable limitation period was the 12 year period for a specialty and its main submission, repeating the unsuccessful argument from Bristol and West Plc v Bartlett, was that the period ran only from the time when the property was sold. The House of Lords unanimously rejected this submission. Lord Hoffmann, with whom the others agreed, observed that it might make little difference whether the limitation period is that for a claim to a debt secured by mortgage or a claim upon a specialty. In both cases the limitation period was 12 years. Consistently with Sutton v Sutton, Lord Hoffmann approached the submissions on the basis that either limitation period might apply. In either case, he rejected the submissions of the building society. Lord Hoffmann also rejected the submission of the building society that sought to overturn Bristol and West Plc v Bartlett. He said that if the cause of action "when it arose was a claim to a debt secured on a mortgage" then the lender cannot "stop time running by his own act in exercising the power of sale". There was no issue, and nothing was decided, about whether the limitation period for a specialty also ran from that time. The decisions of the primary judge and the Court of Appeal in this case At the heart of the reasons of the majority of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland (Dalton J, with whom Philippides JA agreed) was the statutory history of s 26(1) of the 1974 Limitation Act. As explained above, the history of s 26(1) is one in which the provision and its antecedents have been understood for a century as applying concurrently with limitation periods for personal claims in s 10 and its antecedent provisions. This means that, where both limitation periods apply, it is open to the defendant to plead the shorter period. In this way, the provisions operate consistently with their historical foundations and coherently. The contrary view was expressed clearly in the judgments of the primary judge (Bond J) and Fraser JA in dissent in the Court of Appeal. Their Honours relied upon the decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland in Douglas Morris Investments to conclude that s 26(1), as the more "specific" provision, had excluded s 10(1)(d), which is the more "general" provision, in the sphere of operation of s 26(1). The Douglas Morris Investments decision was properly afforded considerable weight. In the Court of Appeal, the submissions had treated that decision as turning upon the difficult question of how to apply the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant, a general language convention that applies to resolve an inconsistency by preferring the specific provision to the general provision. However, it had not been argued before the Court of Appeal that, as explained above, the description by McPherson J of s 26(1) as the "specific" provision should be better seen not as an invocation of the maxim but as a reference to the operation of s 26(1) in the specific circumstances of a "real" claim to the exclusion of the personal claim in s 10(3). Understood in that way, the Council is not assisted by either the maxim or the Douglas Morris Investments case. A related submission, also contrary to the approach of the majority of the Court of Appeal, was urged by the Council in oral submissions on this appeal. The Council submitted that ss 10(1)(d) and 26(1) should be interpreted to apply to actions that meet different descriptions even if the same facts were pleaded, in the same way that although the same pleaded facts could constitute an action for negligence or trespass those actions could have different limitation periods. This attempt to create wholly distinct spheres of operation for ss 10 and 26(1) is the same as the approach that was taken to the antecedents to ss 10 and 26(1) before the decision in Sutton v Sutton. At that time, the antecedents to s 26(1) were confined to real claims and the antecedents to s 10 applied to personal claims. The Council sought to draw a different, but novel, division between personal actions that involved a mortgage or other charge and other personal actions. Whatever the merit of this approach, it is too late now to turn back the clock. The 1974 Limitation Act was enacted against a long history of acceptance that both sections apply to personal claims. That approach is coherent. Conclusion The Council's submission that s 26(1) excludes the operation of s 10(1)(d) is not supported by the language of s 26(1). Nor is there anything in the history of the provision to support such a proposition. The proposition would contradict almost every decision and every text that has considered the point for more than a century. The one suggestion to the contrary is a sentence of obiter dicta in Bristol and West plc v Bartlett which was not the subject of argument. The appeal must be dismissed with costs. In light of this conclusion it is unnecessary to consider the second issue, concerning the claim for interest.

GAGELER J. The determinative question in this appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland is whether the majority in that Court was correct to hold that an action in debt by Brisbane City Council against a registered owner of land to recover overdue rates and charges levied under the City of Brisbane Act 2010 (Qld) is subject to the limitation period of six years applicable under s 10(1)(d) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) to "an action to recover a sum recoverable by virtue of any enactment". The contention of the Council that the majority was incorrect reduces to the proposition that the circumstance that overdue rates and charges are made a charge on rateable land by s 97 of the City of Brisbane Act has the result that the limitation period of 12 years applicable under s 26(1) of the Limitation of Actions Act to "[a]n action ... to recover a principal sum of money secured by a ... charge on property" applies to the exclusion of that imposed by s 10(1)(d) of the Limitation of Actions Act. To support the proposition that the 12‑year limitation period under s 26(1) of the Limitation of Actions Act applies to the exclusion of the six‑year limitation period under s 10(1)(d), the Council relies on two mutually reinforcing arguments. First, it argues that the structure of the Limitation of Actions Act requires that for any action there can be only one applicable limitation period. Second, it argues that the category of actions that are subject to a 12‑year limitation period under s 26(1) is a more specific category of actions than those referred to in s 10(1)(d). The first argument sits uncomfortably with the traditional understanding that a limitation period of the kind imposed by the Limitation of Actions Act operates only as a defence to an action and only if invoked at the option of the defendant. Nothing said in Williams v Milotin, on which the Council principally relies, supports the argument. The question asked rhetorically in that case was "Why should the plaintiff's action be limited by any other period of time than that appropriate to the cause of action on which he sues?". The question was framed to emphasise the ability of a plaintiff, on a given set of facts, to choose from the range of available causes of action to rely on a cause of action to which a shorter limitation period is inapplicable. The framing of the question within the context of Williams v Milotin cannot be taken to suggest that only one limitation period can ever be applicable to one cause of action. What Williams v Milotin usefully illustrates is that a plaintiff is free to choose to rely on that cause of action which is most advantageous to the plaintiff. In the event that more than one limitation period is applicable to the cause of action on which the plaintiff chooses to rely, a defendant is correspondingly free to choose to invoke by way of defence that limitation period which is shortest and therefore most advantageous to the defendant. The reasons for judgment of Kiefel CJ and Edelman J demonstrate that the second argument is belied by an understanding of the scope of the actions to which ss 10(1)(d) and 26(1) respectively refer. Just as the actions founded on simple contract, quasi-contract and tort to which s 10(1)(a) refers and the actions on specialties to which s 10(3) refers are personal actions as distinct from real actions, so the actions to which s 10(1)(d) refers are confined to actions to recover sums recoverable by virtue of enactments that are personal actions. The actions to which s 26(1) relevantly refers extend to actions that are either personal or real actions to recover a principal sum of money secured by a charge on property. The actions referred to in s 26(1) overlap with the actions referred to in s 10(1)(d); neither category of actions is a mere subset of the other; neither is more specific. Significantly, both arguments are contradicted by the holding in Barnes v Glenton to the effect that the English progenitor of s 10(1)(a) was available to be invoked as a defence to a personal action to recover a debt that was secured by a charge over property notwithstanding that the English progenitor of s 26(1) was in terms applicable. As the reasons for judgment of Kiefel CJ and Edelman J again demonstrate, the holding in Barnes v Glenton appears never to have been the subject of significant criticism, and nothing in the legislative history of the Limitation of Actions Act gives the slightest hint of a legislative intention to depart from it. Although I had initially thought otherwise, the reasons for judgment of Kiefel CJ and Edelman J and of Keane J combine to persuade me that the result in Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Douglas Morris Investments Pty Ltd is not inconsistent with Barnes v Glenton. The relevant claim in Douglas Morris having been real as distinct from personal, the case was one to which s 26(1) in terms applied and to which ss 10(1)(a) and 10(3) in terms had no application. The stability of the law demands that re‑enacted statutory provisions ordinarily be taken to retain judicially settled meanings absent some judicially cognisable indication that some different meaning was legislatively intended. None is here present. The limitation periods under ss 10(1)(d) and 26(1) are capable of concurrent operation in relation to the same action. Both provisions apply to the Council's action. The result is that the registered owner of rateable land who is the defendant to that action, Mr Amos, is free to invoke by way of defence that limitation period which is shorter and more advantageous to him. The appeal must be dismissed with costs.

Brisbane City Council v Amos

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