201 With respect to the skill and application of the receivers and managers, and their day to day management of the business, it became clear from the evidence that Mr Bride could not accept the reasonableness and appropriateness of any strategy or decision which differed from his own idea of what should have been done. His strategy would have been to continue, as he had over the years until June 1984, to try to achieve the largest possible production from all aspects of the oatmill, muesli plant and the two types of stockfeed production ie maximum shifts and maximum staffing. To his way of thinking, not only should this have been the strategy of the receivers and managers, but to this end they should have continued also to improve and develop the plant to overcome the deficiencies that had been identified by Mr Benschop in his report so that greater production could be achieved. He was, and remains, confident that everything that could have been produced would have been sold, although the reality of that expectation is not established. He still clings to the idea deep down that the business would have traded out of its financial difficulties and that it should have been managed with that objective. Missing, in my finding, from this is any realistic appreciation of the actual trading performance of the business to that time, the actual production levels that had been achieved, the deficiencies in plant design, efficiency and reliability identified by Mr Benschop, and the further capital and operating financial support that would have been required to continue to follow such a strategy. In particular, there was and remains, in my finding, a failure to make any realistic appreciation of the extent of the existing indebtedness of the business, and of the need in any realistic financial planning to take account of the need to service the indebtedness, as well as any further capital and operating funding that was required, and to make provision for the repayment of that indebtedness. In my finding Mr Bride's appreciation of the then financial position of the business in and following August 1984, as it had been before then, focussed on his planned production levels and sales even though he had consistently failed to achieve his expectations, on an over optimistic appreciation of the level of return the business would achieve from such production and sales, and a blind-spot about the need to service borrowings and make capital repayments. In his view interest on borrowings was, it seems, merely something that could continue to be capitalized, and further borrowings should have been accepted by the Bank because that was the way to achieving maximum production, and with maximum production somehow the business would fall into financial health and be able to meet all its obligations.