Resolution of the Appeal
25In the present case, there was no engagement by the trial judge with the jury for the purposes of s 55F until after 12.15pm on 28 September 2012. There has been no suggestion that the trial judge gave the jury any direction following receipt of the note bearing the time "11.10am". In particular, there has been no suggestion that the jury was directed not to deliberate further. Thus, the present case can be distinguished from a case in which the judge directs the jury to cease deliberations.
26There can be no enquiry as to what occurred in the privacy of the jury room from 11.10am until 12.15pm, when the jury was brought back to the courtroom. Further, there is no basis for drawing an inference that, because the jury sent the note at 11.10am, the jury had ceased deliberating at that point. There had been no mention of the possibility of a majority verdict in the Black v The Queen direction given by the trial judge to the jury on the previous afternoon. That direction did not raise any question as to whether the jury should cease to undertake further deliberations. There was no suggestion in that direction, after the jury had sent its first note, that the jury should cease deliberations.
27There is no reason to draw any inference that the jury was not together in the jury room between 11.10am and 12.15pm on 28 September 2012. That being so, there was no reason to draw an inference that they did not continue to deliberate during that period. The jury had twice before sent a note indicating that they could not agree on a unanimous verdict. In particular, the second note had stated that the jury could see "no possible resolution" that would enable them to reach a unanimous decision. That note is quite adamant.
28Nevertheless, the jury was told to continue deliberating. There is, therefore, no basis for concluding that the third note was an indication by the jury that it had ceased deliberating on the question of the guilt of the appellant. The onus is on the appellant to establish that the trial miscarried because the jurors were not actually deliberating, notwithstanding that they were together during that period in the jury room. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, an inference should be drawn that, while the jurors were confined together in the jury room, they were continuing to deliberate. It follows that the prerequisite of deliberation for an eight hour period was satisfied.
29The Crown contends, in the alternative, that, if an inference should be drawn that the jury had ceased deliberating when they sent the note at 11.10am on 28 September 2012, the period of one hour for lunch on 27 September 2012 should not be excluded from the calculation of the eight-hour period. That question is more difficult. In ordinary circumstances, there would be no reason to conclude that, simply because the jury was eating lunch in the jury room, it was not deliberating. However, the Jury Record is not without ambiguity. It states that at 1pm "jury takes lunch" and that at 2pm "jury finishes lunch and continues deliberation - note sent to Court". Those entries are capable of being construed as meaning that the jury ceased deliberation at 1pm and resumed deliberation at 2pm, although that is not entirely clear. It may simply reflect a working assumption on the part of the compiler of the Jury Record - an assumption that is almost certainly not entirely realistic - that the jury does not deliberate during its lunch period.
30The appellant points to three observations made by the trial judge as giving rise to an inference that the jury would expect that it was not required to deliberate during a lunch break. First, during the trial on 25 September 2012, the trial judge thanked the jury and asked them to take their luncheon break. Secondly, in the course of the summing up on 26 September 2012, the trial judge observed that it was an appropriate time to have the luncheon break and directed the jury to come back at 2pm. Later, on the same day, at the end of the summing up, her Honour observed that, in any trial when a jury commences deliberations, she never anticipates the length of the time the jury can take and that it is totally up to the jury. Her Honour said, however, that in any trial, she does not take a verdict between 1pm and 2pm, because it is the lunch break. The trial judge also observed that, at about 4pm, she almost invariably makes an enquiry as to whether the jury wants to sit on for a bit longer or come back with fresh minds on the following morning.
31The appellant contends that, in the light of those observations, an inference should be drawn that the jury would have understood that they were not expected to continue deliberations during the lunch break. I do not consider that such an inference should be drawn from those observations. In circumstances where the jury was provided with lunch and continued together in the jury room, there is insufficient evidence to justify an inference that they ceased to deliberate during that period.
32If the period between 1pm and 2pm on 27 September 2012 were to be included, there could be no doubt that the prerequisite for eight hours of deliberation was satisfied in the present case. I would be disposed to conclude that that is the position if I had drawn the inference that the jury ceased deliberating at 11.10am on 28 September 2012. However, it is not necessary to form a final view on that question.
33Section 6(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW) relevantly provides that, on any appeal against conviction, the Court may, notwithstanding that it is of the opinion that the point or points raised by the appeal might be decided in favour of the appellant, dismiss the appeal if it considers that no substantial miscarriage of justice has actually occurred. The appellant contends that the proceedings had so far departed as to have ceased to be a trial according to law, such that it was not open to conclude that there had been no substantial miscarriage of justice for the purposes of s 6(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act.
34Having regard to the stance taken by senior counsel for the appellant at the trial, to the effect that the eight hour period of deliberation had expired, and the adamant terms of the second note sent to the trial judge by the jury, I am not persuaded that the eight hour requirement in s 55F was not satisfied. It is thus not necessary to decide whether, if the question of eight hours' deliberation might have been decided in favour of the appellant, a substantial miscarriage of justice would be said to have occurred in any event.
35The appellant has not established that there is a basis for concluding that the jury did not deliberate for at least eight hours before returning their majority verdicts. Under s 5(1)(b) of the Criminal Appeal Act, an appeal on a question of mixed law and fact lies to this Court only with the leave of the Court. The question of whether the jury deliberated for at least eight hours may be one of mixed law and fact, although that is not entirely without doubt. In the circumstances, to the extent that leave is necessary, if at all, I would grant leave to appeal, but would dismiss the appeal.
36HALL J: I agree with the reasons of Emmett JA and the orders he has proposed. I have read Hulme AJ's judgment in draft. Save for his Honour's observation upon whether a jury's time spent listening to redirections and the like should be counted, I agree with his Honour's reasons.
37HULME AJ: In this matter I have had the advantage of reading the reasons for judgment of Emmett JA. His Honour has set out the facts relevant to the determination of the question posed for this Court and I need not repeat them.
38The statutory provision relevant is s 55F of the Jury Act 1977 and in particular ss (2):
A majority verdict may be returned by a jury in criminal proceedings if:
(a) a unanimous verdict has not been reached after the jurors have deliberated for a period of time (being not less than 8 hours) that the court considers reasonable having regard to the nature and complexity of the criminal proceedings, and
(b) the court is satisfied, after examination on oath of one or more of the jurors, that it is unlikely that the jurors will reach a unanimous verdict after further deliberation.
39This provision was enacted in 2006 against the well-known long-standing rule that a court will not enquire into a jury's deliberations and what occurs in the jury room. (There is an exception to that last statement - see Smith v Western Australia [2014] HCA 3; (2014) 88 ALJR 384 - but the exception is of no present relevance.)
40In these circumstances "the jurors have deliberated" must be given a practical common-sense operation. It was never intended that the Court should be concerned with whether the jurors have, minute by minute, been discussing the case rather than e.g. talking about the latest cricket scores or anything else of topical interest.
41On the other hand, if the Court knows that at certain times a jury has not been deliberating, that time must be excluded from the eight hours referred to in s 55F(2)(a) of the Jury Act 1977. Thus, I agree with Emmett JA that the calculation of eight hours must exclude any time when a jury has been sent to overnight jury accommodation or a hotel for sleeping or eating purposes. Although there may well be some discussions between some jurors during such times, the jury as an entity would not be deliberating. This view is supported by R v Young [1995] QB 324; [1995] Cr App Rep 379 and R v Rodriguez [1998] 2 VR 167; (1997) 93 A Crim R 535 at [554].
42Most commonly, at least in New South Wales, a jury is provided with lunch in the jury room. In that situation it is impossible to believe that a jury will immediately cease their deliberations at the commencement of the usual lunch hour (or on the delivery of the lunch) and resume them at the end of that time. It is highly likely that in fact some deliberations will occur within that period. This inability to decide how much of lunchtime is spent in deliberations means that the whole of that time or none of it should be included in the eight-hour calculation.
43It may be assumed that Parliament was aware of the way in which the jury system operated when the relevant provision of the Jury Act was passed. Given that, it is impossible to believe that, although the jury is sequestrated during such lunch periods, Parliament intended that that period should be excluded and accordingly all of it should be included in the calculation of the 8 hours. This view is supported by R v Doherty [1999] VSCA 165; (1999) 3 VR 435 and R v VST [2003] VSCA 35; (2003) 6 VR 569 at [13], [14].
44On the other hand any time the jury spend listening to redirections and the like should not be counted. I appreciate that that approach is contrary to what was said in R v Adams [1969] 1 WLR 106; (1968) 52 Cr App R 588 - I doubt if the different terms of the Criminal Justice Act 1967, viz. that "the jury have had not less than two hours for deliberation", provides ground for distinction. It is also contrary to R v Rodriguez [1998] 2 VR 167; (1997) 93 A Crim R 535 at [555] where Callaway JA, whose judgment was concurred in by Hayne and Charles JJA, remarked that, "I should think that a jury deliberate during even a prolonged redirection". If that is so, logically they are likely to be deliberating during at least part of a summing up but, even independently of the operation of s 55F(2), one would not logically apply the concept of deliberation to that time.
45There will of course be situations not quite as clear. Commonly the time a jury enters or leaves the courtroom are recorded but the court system does not operate on the basis that the jurors are "clocked" in and out of the jury room except for their arrival and departure times of the day. Even those times are often not formally recorded, the sheriff officers simply informing the judge in chambers when the jury have arrived or left. When a jury leaves or returns to a courtroom, some time is inevitably occupied in its movement doing so. That time may be short where a jury room is immediately adjacent to a courtroom or somewhat longer when there is a longer distance between the two rooms. It is virtually certain that in the course of such a movement the jury as a group will not be deliberating but it is impossible to believe that when Parliament fixed the period of eight hours it intended that in a decision as to whether that time had passed, there should be an inquiry into how long it took for a jury to move between the court and jury room (and whether in a particular case there was any delay because, e.g. one of the members of the jury had dropped some papers). Again, practical considerations lead me to the view that it was intended that such movement time should be included in the 8 hours calculation.
46There are also other occasional interruptions. From time to time, one or more members of a jury are permitted to leave a jury room for the purposes of having a cigarette. It has not been the practice to record these times but it is at least reasonably arguable that the jury, as a group, is not deliberating during those periods.
47The above consideration leads to the view that more attention and recording than has been the practice during the past needs to be made as to the times when the full complement of jurors arrive and when any members of it leave a jury room to the intent that one can say with confidence when the jury as a body is present and able to deliberate. It also reinforces the need for a judge to be careful, in circumstances where there is scope for doubt, such as in my cigarette example, to ensure that at least eight hours of deliberations have passed.
48Turning then to the facts of this case, I accept the possibility that given the terms of the jury notes to which Emmett J has referred, the jury may have stopped their deliberations after the sending of those notes. However, one can never be certain for no further enquiry could be made. Be that as it may, the jury remained sequestered for the purposes of deliberation during that time and that time should be counted in the calculation required under s 55F(2).
49Accordingly, in my view, within the meaning of s 55F(2) the jury deliberated for not less than 8 hours being:-
54 minutes on 26 September
51 minutes being 9.35am - 10.25am on 27 September
3 hours 35 minutes being 10.38am - 2.13pm on 27 September
1 hour 17 minutes being 2.17am - 3.34pm on 27 September
2 hours 41 minutes being 9.35am - 12.16pm on 28 September
50These periods total 9 hours 18 minutes.
51There is one further matter to which I should advert. I take the view that compliance with the eight hour period prescribed in s 55F(2) is mandatory if a majority verdict is to stand and that non-compliance means that a substantial miscarriage of justice has occurred in the sense that the Appellant has not received a trial according to law. In those circumstances s 6(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 cannot be used to save the verdict. See RJS v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 241; (2007) 173 A Crim R 100 at [19]; AGW v R [2008] NSWCCA 81 at [23]; Hunt v R [2011] NSWCCA 152; (2011) 81 NSWLR 181 at [189].
52I agree that the Court should grant leave to appeal but dismiss the appeal.