BP Australia Ltd v Brown
[2025] FCA 107
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Federal Court of Australia
Decision date
2025-02-21
Before
Owens J
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Judgment (7 paragraphs)
- Pursuant to s 588FF(3)(b) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), the time for making an application under s 588FF(1) of the Act be extended until 18 July 2025.
- The first plaintiffs' costs of this application be costs in the liquidation of the second plaintiff. Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
OWENS J: 1 By Originating Process dated 10 July 2024, Messrs Brereton and Wengel, in their capacity as joint and several liquidators of ICT Century Pty Ltd (in liquidation) (I will refer to the first plaintiffs as "the liquidators" or the "ICT liquidators", and the second plaintiff as "ICT" or "the company"), seek an extension of the period within which they may make an application under s 588FF(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). They do not identify any particular application that they wish to make, nor even specific transactions they seek to impugn. They ask for what is commonly referred to as a "shelf order"; permitting them, by a specified date, to make any application that commends itself to them following further investigation. 2 Absent an extension, the liquidators would have been required to make any application under s 588FF(1) by 18 July 2024. That is because, in the circumstances of this case, the operation of s 588FF(3)(a) would fix the relevant date at three years after the "relation-back day" (which, here, is the date that the liquidators were appointed to the company by a resolution of members; namely, 19 July 2021: Corporations Act, ss 9, 91, 513B(b) and 513C). They have sought, pursuant to s 588FF(3)(b), an extension of one year, to 18 July 2025. 3 The scope of the power to grant extensions of this kind, and the principles in accordance with which applications to exercise it are to be determined, are settled, such that there is no issue that: (a) An order extending time may be made after the expiry of the period calculated in accordance with s 588FF(3)(a), provided that the application for an extension was filed within that period: McGrath v National Indemnity Company [2004] NSWSC 391; 182 FLR 309 at [18], per Barrett J. (b) Section 588FF(3)(b) authorises the making of a shelf order: Fortress Credit Corporation (Australia) II Pty Ltd v Fletcher (2015) 254 CLR 489 at [24], per French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ. (c) Because an order extending time is capable of adversely affecting the interests of third parties, ordinarily they should be given an opportunity to make submissions before the order is made: John Alexander's Clubs Pty Ltd v White City Tennis Club Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 1 at [131], per French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Kiefel JJ. If that is not possible (and in the context of an application for a shelf order there will be obvious limitations on the ability to provide such an opportunity to all persons who may ultimately be affected by the order), then, upon application, the third party must be put in the same position as he or she would have been in had such an opportunity been provided: BP Australia Ltd v Brown (2003) 58 NSWLR 322 at [133]-[134], per Spigelman CJ (Mason P and Handley JA agreeing); see generally John Alexander v White City at [137]. (d) The discretion conferred by s 588FF(3)(b) is to be exercised having regard to the scope and purposes of Pt 5.7B (Fortress Credit v Fletcher at [24]), and the fundamental question is whether it is "fair and just in all the circumstances" to grant the extension: BP v Brown at [187]. Another way of viewing the question, is to ask whether the extension would represent an unreasonable prolongation of the state of uncertainty faced by those who entered into transactions with the company during the periods in respect of which designated transactions may be voidable: Fortress Credit v Fletcher at [24]; Parker, in the matter of Worldwide Specialty Property Services Pty Limited (in liq) v Worldwide Specialty Property Services Pty Limited (in liq) [2017] FCA 687 at [15], per Lee J. (e) In most cases, the centrally relevant considerations will be (see, eg, Taylor v Woden Constructions Pty Ltd [1998] FCA 1228, per Finn J, synthesised and crystallised in many later cases, including Green v Chiswell Furniture Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 608 at [15], per Austin J): (i) the liquidator's explanation for the delay in commencing proceedings; (ii) a preliminary assessment of the merits of the foreshadowed proceedings, directed to determining the fairness of prolonging the exposure of third parties to the uncertainty of possible litigation (although, where the purpose of the extension of time is simply to put the liquidator in a position to decide whether or not to bring a proceeding, a preliminary inquiry into the merits may not always be necessary); (iii) whether the likely prejudice resulting from the grant of an extension is sufficiently substantial to outweigh the case for granting an extension. (f) The particular nature of shelf orders may give rise to a number of additional considerations, including (Fortress Credit v Fletcher at [25]-[26]): (i) disadvantage to potential defendants not identified in the shelf order; (ii) the encouragement to liquidators not to identify potential defendants, thereby reducing the prospect of opposition at initial application; (iii) the risk of a multiplicity of litigation by successive defendants applying to reagitate extension applications of which they had not been given initial notice; (iv) the risk of inconsistent outcomes on applications to set aside extension orders by respective defendants; (v) no finality, as claims by defendants that they were identifiable, but not identified, might cause ongoing challenges to any extension granted; (vi) want of certainty for liquidators and prospective defendants who might seek to have leave revoked after it had been granted and after proceedings had commenced; (vii) the potential for wasted costs to be incurred contrary to the interests of creditors; and (viii) the determination of applications by reference only to evidence that the liquidator elected to put before the court. 4 The distinctive feature of this case, finding no analogy in any authority discovered by either counsel or by me, is that the primary basis upon which the extension of time is sought, is not to enable the liquidators to complete their investigations and commence any proceedings that might be available, or obtain funding to do so, but rather to allow a third party to undertake its own investigations and form its own view about any proceedings it may wish to bring (in its own right, or by way of assignment).