176 The fact that an applicant might have a cause of action for injury to reputation under the tort of defamation, or for recovery of financial loss at common law, in a breach of contract case, is also not a basis for concluding that no money order should be made, in exercising the statutory discretion. The discussion of Kirby P, as he then was, in Walker is apt to recollect. His Honour observed at pp134-135:
It is by no means unusual in our legal system for the one set of circumstances to give rise to a number of remedies which the person affected may pursue, sometimes in the one court, sometimes in differing courts, to the full extent of that person's entitlement. The commonest example is the entitlement of an injured worker to bring proceedings for benefits under the Workers Compensation Act , and to maintain a claim for damages at common law. The ingredients of the various entitlements may be different. But the existence of alternatives has never excluded a person from pursuing rights expressly conferred by statute. Unless those rights are expressly, or by necessary implication, excluded by the alternative claim, or controlled an obligation to elect or by time limits, the beneficiary of the statutory right can pursue any, or all, or no entitlement.
The High Court of Australia, and this Court, have repeatedly stressed the very wide discretion conferred by s 88F upon the former Industrial Commission (and now the Court). Once s 88F(1) attaches, the remedies which are then at the disposal of the Commission (now the Court) are also extremely wide. There is no warrant for confining this very large power, or for narrowing the circumstances of its exercise, except as the statute provides. See Stevenson v Barham (1977) 136 CLR 190 at 195,199, 201.