Issues on the application
99 The applicant seeks a declaration in the following terms:
By the respondents making representations in:
(i) an email sent by the fourth respondent to the applicant's suppliers on 5 May 2011;
(ii) advertisements placed on the Google search facility between 8 June 2011 and 25 October 2011,
that the products available from the respondents are "30% to 50% cheaper" than those of the respondents' competitors, when such representation does not take into account the cost of:
(a) freight;
(b) delivery to store;
(c) removal of the old tyre;
(d) fitting of the new tyre, including a new valve;
(e) wheel balancing;
(f) disposal of the old tyre,
the respondents have engaged in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive in contravention of s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law.
100 The applicant seeks injunctions and other orders:
(1) The respondents (and each of them) be restrained from, whether by themselves or by their servants or agents or howsoever otherwise, selling, supplying, offering for sale or supply, or advertising or promoting for sale or supply, in Australia:
(a) tyres for motor vehicles;
(b) wheels for motor vehicles;
(c) batteries for motor vehicles;
(d) accessories for auto motive vehicle parts (including tyres and wheels);
(e) services relating to the installation and fitting of vehicle wheels, tyres, batteries and other vehicle parts and fittings,
(the "respondents' goods and services"),
bearing or under or by reference to the following marks (or any of them):
(f) the mark "BOB JANE";
(g) the mark "BOB JANE GLOBAL";
(h) the BOB JANE device depicted in Section 1 of Annexure A hereto or any other mark substantially identical with or deceptively similar to the BOB JANE device;
(i) the device depicted in Section 3 of Annexure A hereto,
(the "respondents' marks")
or bearing or under or by reference to any other trade mark that is substantially identical with or deceptively similar to either of:
(j) trade mark No. 929097 for the mark "BOB JANE",
(k) trade mark No. 919561 for the mark "BOB JANE T-MARTS" and device,
(the "applicant's trade marks").
(2) The respondents (and each of them) be restrained from, whether by themselves or by their servants or agents or howsoever otherwise, selling, supplying or offering for sale or supply or advertising or promoting for sale or supply, in Australia, the respondents' goods and services, bearing or under or by reference to the following marks (or any of them):
(a) the mark "JANE TYRES";
(b) a mark that includes the term "JANE TYRES";
(the "respondents' JANE marks"),
or bearing or under or by reference to any other trade mark that is substantially identical with or deceptively similar to either of:
(c) trade mark No. 1102780 for the mark "JANE FLEET" and device;
(d) trade mark No. 1124705 for the mark "JANE FLEET" and device,
(the "applicant's JANE FLEET trade marks").
(3) The respondents (and each of them) be restrained, whether by themselves or by their servants or agents or howsoever otherwise, from trading as a business under any name that is (or includes) JANE or a name that is substantially identical with or deceptively similar to the respondents' marks or the respondents' JANE marks, or under or by reference to any other trade mark that is substantially identical with or deceptively similar to the applicant's trade marks or the applicant's JANE FLEET trade marks.
(4) The second respondent and sixth respondent forthwith change its company name to a name that does not include JANE or any of the applicant's trade marks or the applicant's JANE FLEET trade marks and which is not substantially identical with or deceptively similar to any of applicant's trade marks or the applicant's JANE FLEET trade marks.
(5) The first, fourth and seventh respondents forthwith change the signage of the premises located at 509 King Street, West Melbourne, Victoria so as to cease using as a trade mark any of the applicant's trade marks or the applicant's JANE FLEET trade marks, or any mark that is substantially identical with or deceptively similar to any of the applicant's trade marks or the applicant's JANE FLEET trade marks.
(6) The respondents (and each of them) be restrained from, whether by themselves or by their servants or agents or howsoever otherwise, representing that the products available from the respondents are "30% to 50% cheaper" than those of the respondents' competitors, when such representation does not take into account the cost of:
(a) freight;
(b) delivery to store;
(c) removal of the old tyre;
(d) fitting of the new tyre, including a new valve;
(e) wheel balancing;
(f) disposal of the old tyre.
(7) The respondents forthwith deliver up on oath to the applicant all of the respondents' goods and advertising and promotional material bearing the respondents' marks or the respondents' JANE marks or bearing or under or by reference to any other trade mark that is substantially identical with or deceptively similar to applicant's trade marks or the applicant's JANE FLEET trade marks.
(8) The respondents forthwith transfer to the applicant registration of the:
(a) bobjaneglobal.com domain name; and
(b) janetyres.com domain name,
and any other domain name that is substantially identical with or deceptively similar to the applicant's trade marks or the applicant's JANE FLEET trade marks.
(9) The cross-claim commenced by Notice of Cross-Claim dated 2 August 2011 be dismissed.
(10) The respondents pay the applicant's costs of the proceeding (including reserved costs) on an indemnity basis from 2 February 2012, and otherwise on a party/party basis.
101 Section 1 in Annexure A is the Bob Jane device (at [41]). Section 2 in Annexure A is the Jane Fleet device (at [47]). Section 3 in Annexure A is the Bob Jane Online Super Store device (at [63]).
102 The basis for the orders sought in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 above is alleged to be the infringement of the applicant's trade marks, passing off and contraventions of the Australian Consumer Law (ss 18 and 29(1)(g)). I now address the legal principles relevant to those causes of action.
103 I start with the alleged infringements of the applicant's trade marks.
104 Section 120(1) of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) provides as follows:
120 When is a registered trade mark infringed?
(1) A person infringes a registered trade mark if the person uses as a trade mark a sign that is substantially identical with, or deceptively similar to, the trade mark in relation to goods or services in respect of which the trade mark is registered.
Note 1: For registered trade mark see section 6.
Note 2: For deceptively similar see section 10.
Note 3: In addition, the regulations may provide for the effect of a protected international trade mark: see Part 17A.
105 Section 17 contains a definition of a trade mark in the following terms:
17 What is a trade mark?
A trade mark is a sign used, or intended to be used, to distinguish goods or services dealt with or provided in the course of trade by a person from goods or services so dealt with or provided by any other person.
Note: For sign see section 6.
106 Sign is defined in s 6 as follows:
sign includes the following or any combination of the following, namely, any letter, word, name, signature, numeral, device, brand, heading, label, ticket, aspect of packaging, shape, colour, sound or scent.
107 Section 10 contains a definition of deceptively similar in the following terms:
For the purposes of this Act, a trade mark is taken to be deceptively similar to another trade mark if it so nearly resembles that other trade mark that it is likely to deceive or cause confusion.
108 In their amended defence the first, second and sixth respondents raise the defence in s 122(1)(a) of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth). That paragraph is in the following terms:
122 When is a trade mark not infringed?
(1) In spite of section 120, a person does not infringe a registered trade mark when:
(a) the person uses in good faith:
(i) the person's name or the name of the person's place of business; or
(ii) the name of a predecessor in business of the person or the name of the predecessor's place of business;
109 Section 120 contains a number of elements.
110 First, there is no infringement of a trade mark unless the signs, that is, the signs identified in paragraph 82 above, were and are used as trade marks. This requirement means that the Court must conclude that the alleged infringer was using or proposing to use the signs for the purpose of indicating, or so as to indicate, a connection in the course of trade between the respondent's goods and the respondent: The Shell Company of Australia Limited v Esso Standard Oil (Australia) Limited (1963) 109 CLR 407 at 425 per Kitto J with whom Dixon CJ, Taylor and Owen JJ agreed. In Coco-Cola Company v All-Fect Distributors Ltd (1999) 96 FCR 107 at 115 - 116 [19] - [20] the Full Court of this Court said that use as a trade mark is use of a mark as a "badge of origin" in the sense that it indicates a connection in the course of trade between goods and the person who applied the mark to the goods. The Full Court rejected the proposition that use as a trade mark meant use so as to indicate a connection between the alleged infringer's goods and those of the owner of the trade mark. The approach of the Full Court was approved by French CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ in E & J Gallo Winery v Lion Nathan Australia Pty Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 144 at 163 [43].
111 The following principles in the context of the first element should be also noted. First, insofar as the corporate respondents were using their names, or more accurately, parts of their names, they were doing so as trade marks. Bob Jane named the four relevant corporate respondents after he had left the applicant and in light of the history of the applicant's business, the use of the names would be understood as connoting a particular trade connection with the applicant. The way the names were used also supports their use as trade marks. The use of BOB JANE at the retail outlet at West Melbourne provides an illustration. The words BOB JANE are in different lettering from SOUTHERN MOTORS AUTO EQUIPMENT and there is a noticeable gap between them.
112 Secondly, the use of the Bob Jane Global domain name and the Jane Tyres domain name to access a website which is an online retail store, particularly when infringing marks appear on the website itself, are uses of marks as trade marks. Similarly, the use of such domain names to redirect potential customers to another website operated by the respondents is a use of marks as trade marks (Mantra Group Pty Ltd v Tailly Pty Ltd (No 2) (2010) 183 FCR 450 at 463 [50]; Solahart Industries Pty Ltd v Solar Shop Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 700; (2011) 281 ALR 544 at 560 [63]).
113 Finally, I am satisfied that the use of marks in advertising on internet search engines will amount to use as a trade mark and that the use of marks on business cards, letterhead, email signatures and invoices can involve use as trade marks (Complete Technology Integrations Pty Ltd v Green Energy Management Solutions Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 1319 at [49] - [55]).
114 I have no doubt on the evidence in this case that the respondents were using the signs as trade marks. In my opinion they were using them in precisely the same way as the applicant was using its four trade marks and, in fact, the similarity in use is striking.
115 The second element of s 120 is that the mark used by the alleged infringer must be substantially identical with, or deceptively similar to, the registered trade marks.
116 Whether a mark is substantially identical with a registered trade mark is to be determined by a comparison side by side with the similarities and differences noted and the importance of those similarities and differences assessed having regard to the essential features of the registered mark and the total impression of resemblance or dissimilarity that emerges from the comparison. The Court relies partly on its own judgment and partly on the burden on the evidence placed before it. Whether there is substantial identity is a question of fact: The Shell Company of Australia Limited v Esso Standard Oil (Australia) Limited at 414 - 415 per Windeyer J.
117 Whether a sign is deceptively similar to a registered trade mark is not decided by a side by side comparison. The Court must form an estimate of the effect or impression produced on the mind of potential customers by the registered trade mark. The impression or recollection which is carried away and retained is necessarily the basis of any mistaken belief that the challenged mark or device is the same. In Australian Woollen Mills Limited v F S Walton & Company Limited (1937) 58 CLR 641 at 658 Dixon and McTiernan JJ said:
The usual manner in which ordinary people behave must be the test of what confusion or deception may be expected. Potential buyers of goods are not to be credited with any high perception or habitual caution. On the other hand, exceptional carelessness or stupidity may be disregarded. The course of business and the way in which the particular class of goods are sold gives, it may be said, the setting, and the habits and observation of men considered in the mass affords the standard.
(See also Registrar of Trade Marks v Woolworths Ltd (1999) 93 FCR 365 at 382 per French J (as his Honour then was).)
118 I am satisfied that the respondents infringed the Bob Jane word mark by using the marks BOB JANE, BOB JANE GLOBAL, BOB JANE GLOBAL TYRE, BOB JANE GLOBAL TYRE CORPORATION, the Bob Jane Global device and the variations thereof, the Bob Jane Global Tyre Corporation device, the Bob Jane Online Super Store and Bob Jane Southern Motors. I am satisfied that the respondents infringed the Bob Jane device by using the marks, the Bob Jane Global device and variations thereof. I am satisfied that the respondents infringed the applicant's Jane Fleet marks by using the JANE, JANE TYRES and the Jane Tyres Online Superstore device.
119 In the case of the respondents' use of BOB JANE, infringement occurs because the marks are substantially identical. In all other cases, it occurs because the respondents' marks are deceptively similar when BOB JANE is used in conjunction with other words, or with other words in a device, and it must be remembered that this is done in a market where the applicant has a well established reputation in the Bob Jane word mark. It is also in a context where the similarity between the Bob Jane device and the Bob Jane Global device (and variations thereof) is striking. There is evidence, which I accept, of actual confusion among customers or potential customers. There is the prominence given to the words BOB JANE compared with the other words in the Bob Jane Global Tyre Corporation device and the Bob Jane Online Super Store device and on the signage of the retail premises at West Melbourne. I agree with the applicant's submission that on most, if not all, occasions the reasonable consumer would regard the words used with Bob Jane as purely descriptive.
120 In relation to my conclusion concerning the respondents' infringement of the applicant's Jane Fleet marks, I note that JANE is the significant word in JANE TYRES and the words Online Superstore are in very small print by comparison. There is a car in the Jane Tyres Online Superstore device and the silhouette of a car in the applicant's Jane Fleet marks.
121 The third element in s 120(1) is that the alleged infringer uses the sign in relation to goods or services in respect of which the trade mark is registered. That requirement is satisfied in this case.
122 Two points about the defence in s 122(1) of the Trade Marks Act should be noted. First, the defence extends to corporations but, although the corporation may delete abbreviations such as "Pty" or "Ltd", the whole of the corporation's name must be used.
123 Secondly, the defence of use in good faith involves a consideration of a person's subjective belief. In Baume & Co Limited v A H Moore Ltd [1958] Ch 907 the English Court of Appeal considered the exception in the case of a bona fide use of one's own name in s 8(a) of the Trade Marks Act 1938 (UK). The Court said that the exception or defence required an honest use by a person of his or her own name and that that meant without any intention to deceive anybody and without any intention to make use of the goodwill which has been acquired by another trader. The Court said that the mere fact that the alleged infringer knew of the registered trade marks did not mean that the use was not in good faith provided that he or she honestly thought that no confusion would arise and had no intention to wrongfully divert business to himself or herself by using the name. An alleged infringer was either honest or dishonest in his or her motives and there was no such thing as constructive dishonesty.
124 In Anheuser-Busch Inc v Budejovicky Budvar, Narodni Podnik and Others (2002) 56 IPR 182 Allsop J (as his Honour then was) adopted, subject to one qualification which is not material for present purposes, the test in Baume & Co Limited v A H Moore Ltd (at 234 [216]). His Honour made the point that in the case before him, no witness from the alleged infringer gave evidence that they considered no confusion would arise. In the result, his Honour said that the alleged infringer had not persuaded him that anybody did hold that view.
125 In Wellness Pty Ltd v Pro Bio Living Waters Pty Ltd and Others (2004) 61 IPR 242 Bennett J noted that in the case of a respondent named Pro Bio Living Waters Pty Ltd, it could use that name with or without the "Pty Ltd". Her Honour noted that the requirement for the use to be in good faith imported an absence of intention to make use of the goodwill which had been acquired by another trader. She noted that the resemblance between the registered trade mark in that case of which the first respondent was aware and the name of the first respondent did not prevent the use being bona fide "provided that there was an honest belief that no confusion would arise and if there was no intention of wrongfully diverting business". Her Honour also noted that evidence of such an honest belief was necessary to establish "bona fide use". In the case before her Honour no evidence was led to establish use in good faith, or the belief or intention of the respondents. Her Honour noted that there had been no submission in the case addressed to the defence other than a mere assertion that there was an entitlement to use the name (at 250 [43]). Her Honour said that there was no basis upon which to conclude that the first respondent in that case had used the name in good faith for the purposes of s 122(1)(a)(i) of the Trade Marks Act.
126 In Nature's Blend Pty Ltd (ACN 126 406 488) v Nestle Australia Ltd (ACN 000 011 316) (2010) 272 ALR 487 the Full Court of this Court made observations which support the conclusion that the matter in s 122(1)(a) is a defence and that the onus of proof lies on the party seeking to rely on the defence (at 497 [51] and [52]).
127 The respondents cannot rely on the defence in s 122(1)(a)(i) in this case. They have not appeared and they have adduced no evidence in support of the defence. In any event, the evidence before me negates such a defence. Bob Jane allowed his name to become part of the trade marks of the applicant and he was aware of the applicant's use of the trade marks. In late 2010 he approached potential suppliers for the respondents. He and Mr Rigon represented that they were involved in a new tyre enterprise, that the company would be structured as a franchise organisation and the proposed name for the company was "bobjanetyresdirect.com.au pty ltd". Bob Jane's conduct after leaving the applicant and prior to the launch of the respondents' Bob Jane Global Website indicated that he harboured significant animosity towards his son and did not have regard to any restrictions on his behaviour. The names of three of the corporate respondents were chosen at the time of or shortly after Bob Jane had left the applicant. Bob Jane, Mr Rigon and the respondents communicated with representatives of the applicant's suppliers which misled at least one of those representatives to believe they were dealing with the applicant. The respondents' marks were used with the intention that consumers would associate the respondents' business with the applicant. A document appearing to be a draft investor presentation prepared by the respondents showed that the respondents intended to leverage off the reputation of the "Bob Jane T-Marts" business and BOB JANE Marks. The respondents only took steps to disavow their association with the applicant after the interlocutory injunction was put in place. This was in the form of a weak and confusing disclaimer on their website. Following the interlocutory injunction the respondents have continued to use the respondents' marks in a number of forms and in or around mid-2013 the respondents returned to the use of the BOB JANE word mark in respect of the respondents' retail outlet at West Melbourne.
128 The various infringements of the applicant's trade marks have been established and it has also been established that unless restrained they are likely to continue in the future.
129 The applicant's further claims of passing off and contraventions of the Australian Consumer Law were described by it as subsidiary to, and subsumed by, the trade mark claims. Nevertheless, I will consider them.
130 The applicant alleges that the respondents have passed off their goods as those of the applicant. In order to establish a claim in passing off, the applicant must prove the following:
(1) there is in the mind of the purchasing public a goodwill or reputation attached to the goods and services supplied by the applicant by association with the identifying "get up" under which the applicant's goods or services are offered to the public such that the conclusion can be drawn that the get up is recognised by the public as distinctive specifically of the applicant's goods;
(2) the respondents have made a misrepresentation to the public (whether or not intentional) leading or likely to lead the public to believe that goods or services offered by them are the goods or services of the applicant; and
(3) the applicant suffers or, in a quia timet action, is likely to suffer damage by reason of the erroneous belief engendered by the respondents' misrepresentation that the source of the respondents' goods or services is the same as the source of those offered by the applicant;
(Reckitt & Colman Products Limited v Borden Inc & Others (No 3) [1990] RPC 341 at 406 per Lord Oliver of Aylmerton.)
131 To my mind, all of these elements are satisfied in this case. I am satisfied that the applicant's trade marks are part of its get up which is recognised by the public as distinctive specifically of the applicant's goods and services. I am satisfied that by using the marks they devised, the respondents have represented to the public that the goods and services they offer are those of the applicant. There is direct evidence of this, but in any event, it is an overwhelming inference. Finally, I am satisfied that the applicant has suffered or is likely to suffer loss (i.e., loss of business) as a result of the respondents' conduct.
132 The relevant sections in the Australian Consumer Law are ss 18 and 29(1)(g). They are in the following terms:
18 Deceptive and misleading conduct
(1) A person must not, in trade or commerce, engage in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive.
29 False or misleading representations about goods or services
(1) A person must not, in trade or commerce, in connection with the supply or possible supply of goods or services or in connection with the promotion by any means of the supply or use of goods or services:
…
(g) make a false or misleading representation that the goods or services have sponsorship, approval, performance characteristics, accessories, uses or benefits;
133 Whether conduct involved a representation is a question of fact to be decided by considering what was said or done against the background of all the surrounding circumstances: Taco Company of Australia Inc v Taco Bell Pty Ltd and Others (1982) 42 ALR 177 at 202 per Deane and Fitzgerald JJ; Campomar Sociedad, Limitada and Another v Nike International Limited and Another (2000) 202 CLR 45 at 84 [100]. There is a difference between a representation made to identified individuals on the one hand and a representation made to the public or a section of the public on the other. In the latter case, the matter is to be approached at a level of abstraction not present in the former case. In the latter case, the Court must identify ordinary or reasonable members of the class of prospective purchasers and in doing this there is an objective attribution of certain characteristics. The Court must identify reasonable members of the class. In the assessment of the reactions or likely reactions of the ordinary or reasonable members of the class of prospective purchasers, the Court may well decline to regard as controlling the application of s 52 those assumptions by persons whose reactions are extreme or fanciful: Campomar Sociedad, Limitada and Another v Nike International Limited and Another at 84 - 87 [101] - [106].
134 Essentially for the same reasons given in relation to the previous causes of action, I think the applicant has established contraventions of ss 18 and 29(1)(g) respectively.
135 The orders sought in paragraphs 1 to 8 inclusive should be made and I note in relation to paragraph 8 that the Court has the power and will, in an appropriate case exercise it, to order the transfer of domain names: Mantra Group Pty Ltd v Tailly Pty Ltd (No 2).
136 I turn now to the declaration and injunction sought in relation to the savings representation.
137 The savings representation was made by the respondents on a number of occasions.
138 I am satisfied based on the evidence of Mr Rodney Jane (affidavit sworn on 31 May 2011 at paragraphs 91 - 93) and Mr Andrew Howard (affidavit sworn on 27 April 2012) that the representation is false because it does not take into account the six matters identified in the proposed declaration.
139 The declaration and injunction relating to the savings representation should be made.
140 I turn to the liability of Bob Jane and Mr Rigon.
141 Bob Jane and Mr Rigon are alleged to be joint tortfeasors with the corporate respondents in the infringements of the applicant's trade marks. They are also both said to be a "person involved" in the causes of action under the Australian Consumer Law. A person involved in conduct may be liable under the Australian Consumer Law (see ss 237(1), 238(1) and 239(2(a)). The definition of involved is contained in s 2 of the Australian Consumer Law and it mirrors s 75B of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).
142 In Keller v LED Technologies Pty Ltd (2010) 185 FCR 449 ("Keller") the Full Court of this Court considered the proper formulation of the appropriate test for liability as a joint tortfeasor. It is fair to say that there were differences in the various formulations. The trial judge had held that two directors were liable as joint tortfeasors in relation to infringements of registered designs. Emmett and Jessup JJ disagreed with the trial judge and allowed the appeals of the respective directors. I disagreed with the trial judge in relation to one director, but agreed with her decision in relation to the other director.
143 Emmett J noted that a company could not act other than through a natural person. In deciding whether a natural person was a joint tortfeasor with a company, it is necessary to show something more than that the company acted through that person. It is necessary to show that the director was doing something more than acting as a director and that that something made the director, in addition to the company, an invader of the victim's rights. Emmett J said that the mere fact that a company was small and that the director had control over its affairs was not of itself sufficient to make the director a joint tortfeasor with the company. Where a director was making use of a corporation or company as an instrument whereby infringement was perpetrated such that the director could be seen to be hiding behind the corporate veil, it may be concluded that the director was going beyond actions performed merely in the capacity of director. Emmett J said that if a company was merely the alter ego of a director such that there was no real difference between the mind of the officer and the mind of the company, there may well be circumstances where it would be appropriate to conclude that the officer was invading the rights of a victim of the company (at 469 [83] and [84]).
144 I said that in considering a director's potential liability as a joint tortfeasor it was necessary to consider carefully the director's involvement in the unlawful or infringing acts and that a close personal involvement in the infringing acts by the director must be shown before he or she will be liable. I concluded that one of the directors was liable because he was aware of the designs and responsible for the design of the various versions of the infringing products. He was directly involved in the manufacturing and sale of the infringing products and he was in effect the driving force behind the acts which gave rise to the infringement of the designs and those acts were carried out at a time when he was aware of the designs (at 512 - 513 [291], [292]).
145 Jessup J said that a director would only be liable as a joint tortfeasor where he had made the tort his or her own. There is a crucial distinction between acts which are done for and in the service of the company and acts which, in addition, are done in the director's own personal capacity or, as Jessup J described it, a "non company capacity" (at 542 - 543 [405] and [406]).
146 Another matter considered in Keller was the liability of directors under s 75B of the Trade Practices Act. I take the liberty of repeating what I said at 520 [334], [335] and [336]:
In order to establish accessorial liability under s 75B(1)(c), it must be shown that the relevant person had knowledge of the essential elements of the contravention. In Yorke v Lucas, Mason ACJ, Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ said (at 670):
In our view, the proper construction of par (c) requires a party to a contravention to be an intentional participant, the necessary intent being based upon knowledge of the essential elements of the contravention.
For present purposes, knowledge may be considered to include wilful blindness. However, it does not include recklessness or negligence.
In a case concerning representations, the essential elements of the contravention are the fact that the representation was made and that, in a case such as the present, it was misleading or deceptive, or likely to mislead or deceive (s 52) or was false (s 53(a) and (c)). To establish accessorial liability it must be established that the relevant person knew the representation was made and the facts which made it misleading or deceptive, or likely to mislead or deceive, or false. It need not be shown that the relevant person actually drew the conclusion that the representation was misleading or deceptive, or likely to mislead or deceive, or was false.
147 I do not think there can be any doubt about Bob Jane's liability as a joint tortfeasor. He set up companies to carry out the same business as the applicant carried out and his Bob Jane Global device was clearly based on the applicant's Bob Jane device. All the matters referred to earlier (at [7], [10], [38] - [98]) make the conclusion about Bob Jane's liability quite plain.
148 As far as Mr Rigon is concerned, I think he is also liable as a joint tortfeasor. In the amended defence Mr Rigon admitted that he was the controlling mind of Bob Jane Global, Bob Jane China and Bob Jane Hong Kong. Mr Rigon identified himself as having joined with Bob Jane in his new enterprise in the key position of "Sales Director" in the letter sent to potential suppliers dated 15 December 2010. Prior to the launch of the respondents' Bob Jane Global Website, Mr Rigon attended at least one meeting with a supplier of the applicant at which the suppliers' representative formed the mistaken impression that he was dealing with representatives of the applicant. Mr Rigon issued instructions in relation to the critical aspects of the respondents' operations, including its websites, domain names and search engines. On 2 June 2011 Mr Rigon issued the instruction that the Bob Jane Global domain name be transferred from the third respondent to an overseas entity who was not at that stage a party to this proceeding. On 9 June 2011 Mr Rigon issued the instruction for the establishment of the respondents' Jane Tyres Website as the new site for the Bob Jane Global domain name. Mr Rigon is listed as the administrative contact in respect of the Bob Jane Global domain name and Jane Tyres domain name. Mr Rigon had oversight of the respondents' Google AdWords accounts, and dictated the form and content of their sponsored advertisements.
149 These then are the principal orders sought by the applicant. The applicant also sought a number of other orders. I turn to address those other orders.
150 The cross-claim should be dismissed.
151 According to a company search of the first respondent, Mr Rigon ceased to be a director of that company on 27 November 2012. Although he did not appear and defend himself at the hearing, there is an issue as to whether orders should be made against him, and if so, the nature of those orders.
152 Before dealing with that issue, I will address the issue of the costs of the proceeding against the other respondents. The applicant has been successful in obtaining the orders it sought and should have an order for costs. It seeks costs on an indemnity basis from 2 February 2012 which was the date upon which a judge of this Court set aside the final judgment previously entered. The applicant seeks indemnity costs on the basis that since 2 February 2012 the respondents have made no real attempt to defend the proceeding. I agree with that submission.
153 It is a big step to set aside a final judgment of the Court. That was done on the basis that the respondents would defend the proceeding and had arguable grounds to do so. Since 2 February 2012 the respondents have done very little to defend the proceeding. They have purported to comply with discovery obligations and they have been involved in an argument about the taxation of costs. They filed an affidavit of Mr Rigon sworn on 12 June 2012. They did not appear on the directions hearing on 8 August 2013 and, as far as I can see, an earlier directions hearing before another judge of this Court. Significantly, they did not appear at the trial. In the circumstances, I think indemnity costs from 2 February 2012 should be ordered.
154 In my opinion, the orders, including the order as to costs, should be made against Mr Rigon. The mere fact that he ceased to be a director of the first respondent on 27 November 2012 is not sufficient to persuade me otherwise. If Mr Rigon wished to contend that he no longer had any involvement with Bob Jane and orders should not be made against him and that he should not have to pay costs after a certain date, then he could have issued an interlocutory application or appeared at the trial and put evidence forward in support of his contention. He chose not to do that. The fact that he communicated with the applicant's solicitors in May and July 2013 does not alter my conclusion. Those solicitors told him, correctly in my view, that he remained a respondent in his personal capacity and that he should seek independent legal advice.
155 The applicant seeks three orders which each involve changing the name of a respondent. Those orders should be made.
156 Finally, the applicant seeks leave to proceed against the third respondent which is in liquidation. The liquidators of the third respondent do not oppose leave being granted to proceed against the third respondent. They do not oppose the various injunctions sought against the third respondent and they do not oppose an order for delivery up of the respondents' goods and advertising and promotional material bearing the respondents' marks or the respondents' JANE marks. They do not oppose an order that the third respondent, together with the other respondents, pay the applicant's costs of the proceeding including reserved costs on an indemnity basis from 2 February 2012, and otherwise on a party/party basis. I think it is appropriate to grant leave. The applicant commenced this proceeding on 19 May 2011 and the third respondent went into liquidation on 26 June 2013. The injunctive orders will not impact upon the dividend available to creditors and the applicant needs an order for costs before it can pursue the company for its costs (see generally Lifeplan Australia Friendly Society Limited v Woff [2013] FCA 1092).