BLR15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

1. The application be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the respondent's costs. Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

BURLEY J: 1 The applicant is a Lebanese national who entered Australia on 24 April 2013 on a subclass 679 sponsored visa. On 13 June 2013 the applicant lodged an application for a protection (Class XA) visa (first visa application). On 18 December 2013 a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Minister) refused the application and on 17 January 2014 the applicant applied to the Refugee Review Tribunal (now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal) (Tribunal) for a review of the delegate's decision. On 4 August 2014 the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate. On 23 June 2016 the applicant made a further application for a protection visa (second visa application). 2 On 26 July 2016 an officer of the Department of Immigration and Border Protection wrote to the applicant and informed him that pursuant to s 48A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act), the second visa application was not valid. In summary, s 48A of the Act provides that, subject to s 48B, a non-citizen who has had his or her application for a protection visa refused may not make a further application for a protection visa or have a further application for a protection visa made on his or her behalf while the non-citizen is in the migration zone. Section 48B provides that the Minister has discretion to determine that s 48A does not apply. 3 The applicant then applied to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA) for orders seeking to reverse the decision set out in the letter of 26 July 2016. On 22 May 2017 a judge of the FCCA dismissed the application and delivered extempore reasons for that refusal. The applicant was represented by counsel before the FCCA. 4 On 4 July 2017 the applicant filed an application for an extension of time within which to file a Notice of Appeal from the decision of the FCCA. The application was not accompanied by a draft Notice of Appeal setting out the grounds upon which the applicant proposes to rely. 5 On 3 July 2017 the solicitor representing the applicant swore an affidavit in support of the application for leave to appeal. He states that the reason for failing to file the Notice of Appeal within time was that the FCCA had not yet published a written judgment setting out the reasons for its decision and that the delay in filing the appeal is relatively short, being approximately 14 days. In fact it appears that no Notice of Appeal has yet been filed. However, as explained below, the basis for the proposed appeal is that the first visa application should be regarded to be a nullity because the wrong protection visa form was used. Accordingly, the second visa application ought not to have been rejected pursuant to s 48A of the Act. 6 The Minister was represented by Mr Andras Markus, a solicitor from the office of the Australian Government Solicitor. He opposes the grant of an extension of time on the basis that the delay in filing the application is not adequately explained and that the proposed appeal has no real prospects of success. 7 Counsel for the applicant, Mr Oliver Jones, filed written submissions on 10 November 2017 and 24 November 2017. The submissions provide a chronology of the relevant events and contend that the critical question relevant to the grant of an extension of time in the present case is the strength of the proposed appeal. The submissions state that the present case is "on all fours" with the decision of this Court in BVJ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1205 (BVJ16). In that decision I rejected an equivalent argument to that proposed to be advanced on appeal in the present case, namely that the first visa application is to be regarded to be a nullity on the basis that it was not made using the same version Form 866 that was in force at the time when the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) were enacted. 8 In that decision, after summarising the arguments and the legislation, I said: [19] The Minster has since October 1999 prescribed different versions of Form 866 from time to time. The appellant's application for the Visa was made using the Completed Form 866 which is a later and different (although I note that the two forms, which are in evidence, are not materially different to each other) to the 1999 Form. The appellant contends that as the Completed Form 866 is not the application form required by the Regulations, it cannot be valid, and the primary judge erred by holding that either the Tribunal or the Delegate had jurisdiction in relation to the appellant's application for review. [20] This ingenious but unattractive argument should be rejected for two reasons. [21] First, in my view s 14 of the Legislation Act 2003 (Cth) is not engaged in the present circumstances. The reference in Schedule 1 Item 1401 to Form 866 simply identifies a type of form that must be completed by an applicant for a Protection (Class XA) Visa. The particular form is not incorporated into the Regulations. Rather, a type or genre of document that must be completed is identified, namely a document identified broadly as Form 866. [22] Subsection 46(1) [of the Act] relevantly provides that an application for a visa is valid if and only if it is for a visa for a class specified in the application and the requirements of s 46 are satisfied. Subsection 46(2) relevantly provides that an application for a visa is valid if it is an application for a visa for the class prescribed for the purposes of that subsection and, under the Regulations, the application is taken to have been validly made. Subsection 46(3) provides that the Regulations may prescribe criteria that must be satisfied for an application of a specified class to be valid. [23] Section 495 of the Act provides: Minister may approve forms The Minister may, in writing, approve a form for the purposes of a provision of this Act in which the expression "approved form" is used. [24] That definition is significant and will apply not only to the Act, but also to the Regulations; Legislative Instruments Act 2003 (Cth) s 13(1). [25] The Regulations also address approved forms. Regulation 1.18 provides: Approved forms (1) The Minister may, in writing, approve forms for: (a) use in making an application for a visa; or (b) any other purpose authorised or required by these Regulations. … [26] Regulation 2.07(1)(a) provides that the "approved form" must be completed by an applicant. That is to be understood to mean such form that the Minister from time to time approves pursuant to s 495 and reg 1.18. [27] Schedule 1, Item 1401 identifies the code number or name to be ascribed to such form, namely the Form 866. [28] Taken together, reg 2.07(1) and Item 1401 identify that an applicant must complete a Form 866 in order to make a valid application, but the form itself is not incorporated into the legislation. Rather, the Regulation has the effect of indicating that such Form 866 as the Minister may from time to time approve, should be completed. [29] Accordingly, the terms of s 14 of the Legislation Act 2003(Cth) are not engaged. Regulation 2.07(1) read with Schedule 1 item 1401 does not provide for the incorporation by reference of a particular form. [30] Secondly, in my view a relevant contrary intention in accordance with s 14(3) Legislation Act would be apparent in any event. For the purposes of s 14(2), a 'contrary intention' need not be found in a single express provision but may be ascertained from the legislative context; Comcare v Broadhurst [2011] FCAFC 39; 192 FCR 497 at 67 (Tracey and Flick JJ). The choice of the defined term "approved form" in reg 2.07(1)(a) signifies that a particular form is not nominated, but rather such form as the Minister may approve, exercising powers pursuant to s 495 and reg 1.18. The language of Schedule 1 Item 1401, in referring to a generic form number supports that view. 9 In his written submissions, counsel for the applicant states that he accepts that, whilst he formally submits that BVJ16 is plainly wrong, for practical purposes it is unlikely that I would reach a conclusion contrary to that which I have expressed above. Accordingly, he accepts that an extension of time should be refused, subject only to the Court recording the formal submission that BVJ16 is plainly wrong. 10 In CTY15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1354, Perry J helpfully summarised the principles relevant to the exercise of discretion to grant an extension of time for an appeal as follows. (1) An extension of time will not be granted unless the Court is positively satisfied that it is proper to do so. (2) The length of the delay is a relevant factor. (3) The appellant must show an acceptable explanation for the delay and that it is fair and equitable in the circumstances to extend time. (4) Any prejudice to the respondent is a material factor militating against the grant of an extension, although the absence of prejudice does not, without more, suffice to justify the grant of an extension of time. (5) The merits of the substantive appeal, if leave were granted, are properly to be taken into account. (See e.g. BAO15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 214 at [19]; Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344 at 348-349) 11 Counsel for the applicant was correct in making the concession that the Court, in considering the prospects of success of any appeal, would consider the decision in BVJ16 to be an insurmountable hurdle for the applicant. I also regard the explanation for the delay provided to be inadequate. In all of the circumstances I do not consider that it is appropriate to grant the extension of time sought. 12 Accordingly the application for leave to appeal must be dismissed with the applicant to pay the respondent's costs. I certify that the preceding twelve (12) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Burley.