Order 3
46 The Court's power to make an order in terms of order 3 of the application is challenged by Target.
47 The order that the Court proposes to make in terms of order 2 of the application will remedy the error of Blaze in not personally lodging the SBS with ASIC on 5 June 2009. The time for lodging the notice will be extended to 8 June 2009, the date the notice was actually lodged with ASIC. Nothing further need be done then in relation to the physical lodgement of the SBS.
48 If nothing more were done than the Court make an order in terms of order 2, then the SBS would contain a new offer that is open for 14 days after the offer is varied - that is until either 19 June (14 days after 5 June) or 22 June 2009 (14 days after 8 June 2009). The better view is, I think, that 19 June is the relevant date, as the extended lodgement date does not, I consider, extend the close date for accepting the initial bid. Counsel for the parties do not suggest otherwise.
49 In essence, counsel for Target contends that any further variation under s 650D, such as that purportedly made on 11 June 2009 to extend the offer period to 17 July 2009, can only be effected if made during the period that the pre‑existing offer was in fact open and it is not now within the Court's power to facilitate the lodgement of a variation in terms of that purportedly lodged on 11 June 2009 after 19 June. Consequently, Target contends that any proposed variation extending the offer period to 17 July was required to be the subject of a notice, or a court order, made prior to 19 June 2009.
50 Target does not contend that s 1322(4)(d) of the CA does not empower the Court to make order 2. It concedes that it is probable that s 1322(4)(a) applies to the defective act of Mr McHenry in posting the SBS notice. However, it contends Blaze has not sought for a declaration to be made pursuant to s 1322(4)(a) of the CA that the act of Mr McHenry in posting the notice was valid for the purposes of s 650D(1)(b) of the CA.
51 Counsel for Target refers to Re Centennial Coal Co Ltd [2006] NSWSC 62, where the Court relied upon s 1322(4)(a) of the CA, not s 1322(4)(d), to achieve what counsel says was a similar end, namely, to declare that the extension of an offer period under s 650C of the CA was valid despite a defective act purporting to be done under s 650D(1)(c)(ii), 80 minutes after the expiry of the offer period, the defect being only as to timing of a step that should have been taken before the end of the offer period: Barrett J at [2], [13], [16] and [24].
52 Counsel for Target contends that by contrast to both Re Centennial Coal and order 2, order 3 as sought by the plaintiff does not simply seek the validation of a defective step in the process of varying an offer. Instead, it seeks that the Court validate a whole new process to vary an offer, well after the expiry of the offer period chosen by the plaintiff in the SBS that expired on 19 June 2009.
53 Counsel says this is evidenced by the terms of the orders sought. Order 2 is framed such as to validate something that already occurred when it states:
"The time for lodgement [under s 650D(1)(b)] … is extended …"
(emphasis added).
By contrast, order 3 is framed in terms intended to validate something that is yet to happen, namely:
"The time to lodge a notice [under s 650D(1)(b)]… is extended … "
(emphasis added).
54 Counsel submits this intention was confirmed in the plaintiff's oral submissions to the Court on 24 June 2009, where the plaintiff indicated that order 3 was not being sought to validate the notice (revised offer extending the acceptance period) issued on 11 June 2009, but something different again, no copy of which has been put before the Court or provided to the defendant.
55 Target therefore contends that, while the Court's powers under s 1322(4)(d) of the CA are wide, there are limits to it, as also demonstrated in Community Life Ltd v Kilmory Developments Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 943, where the Court held that the power did not permit the re-establishment of the period prescribed under s 263(1) of the CA for the purpose of lodging a charge after that period had expired, the charge having been discharged well after that period expired.
56 By analogy, counsel for Target contends, assuming that order 2 is made, s 1322(4)(d) of the CA does not permit the re-establishment of the offer contained in the SBS when that offer expired because of the very terms of the SBS. In effect, counsel contends the plaintiff relies on s 1322(4)(d) of the CA as conferring power on the Court to, first, effectively validate all of the terms of the SBS by the making of order 2, but then to invalidate or delete the date of 19 June 2009 inserted in the SBS by the plaintiff, and to insert another date instead, on behalf of the plaintiff, such that the offer is still on foot until 17 July 2009. Target contends this is not an exercise in extending any period at all and there is no power in s 1322(4)(d) of the CA permitting it.
57 Furthermore, Target contends there is no defective act as such, akin to Mr McHenry's defective act of posting the notice instead of lodging it personally, that can be declared valid in accordance with s 1322(4)(a) of the CA.
58 Counsel says that, as noted in Re Centennial (Barrett J at [5] and [7]), the requirement that some action be taken to extend before the end of the offer period, has been recognised for a long time. The prescribed steps represent the only effective way of varying unaccepted offers.
59 Target finally says that, in this case, even if order 2 is made, the offer contained therein expired on 19 June 2009. That being the case, s 1322(4)(d) of the CA does not empower the Court to re-establish the offer.
60 In response, counsel for Blaze submits it is well established that:-
Section 1322(4) is a source of power for making remedial orders where there has been a contravention of the bid variation provisions of the CA: Pinnacle at [17] - [19] and [25]; and see the decision of Mullins J in the Supreme Court of Queensland in Barondene Pty Ltd v Breakfree Ltd (2003) 22 ACLC 910 at 912. So is s 1325D: Pinnacle at [17] - [19].
Primelife Corporation Limited v Aevum Ltd (2005) 53 ACSR 283, Hamilton J, particularly at [8]; Re McMahon Holdings Limited [2008] FCA 1079.
61 Counsel says order 3, in contrast with Kilmory, is truly remedial in character. There is no reason to consider that it is outside the scope of orders empowered by s 1322(4) or outside the general expressions of principle referred to above. In Kilmory the plaintiff had lodged a charge, given a perfectly valid notice of the charge to ASIC, and then consciously and deliberately discharged the charge. The order sought was not to remedy some form of irregularity e.g. a failure to give notice of the charge in the time permitted by statute, but rather directed to "eradicating the effect of the plaintiff having given notification of discharge" of the charge: see [40]. Plainly what was sought was not a remedial order - and for that reason it was in excess of power. The order sought in this case is remedial in character.
62 Contrary to Target's contention, Blaze contends the effect of proposed order 3 is to firstly extend the time for the service of the notice under s 650D extending the offer period and, secondly, to impose conditions on the grant of relief. It is the conditions which affect the form of the notice which will be given if an order is made, and make it different, in form, from that given on 11 June 2009, that is, the substance of the notice, extending the offer period, to 17 July 2009 will be the same. The substance of the order, is reflected by the following words:-
The time to lodge a notice of variation as required by Section 650D(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Notice) with ASIC is extended to 4pm on the date of these orders. (Emphasis in original)
and is essentially the same as the order made in, for example, Re Emerald Capital Ltd [2008] FCA 1739 and the same form of words as used in order 1 in Re Emerald Capital and could, if the Court thinks appropriate, be adopted. In Re Emerald Capital, the order permitted the plaintiff to serve a:
new notice under sections 650D(1), 630(2) and 630(3) of the Act.
(Emphasis supplied)
63 Blaze contends that the plaintiff:
(a) attempted to do that which would have extended the offer period by a notice dated 5 June 2009 - but failed;
(b) attempted to further extend the offer period by a notice dated 11 June 2009, which was appropriately served and lodged, but failed to achieve the extension because, and solely because, of the failure of the 5 June 2009 notice to achieve an extension (under s 624 of the CA).
64 Blaze also submits there is no warrant for Target's submission that an offer cannot be re‑established by court order and contends it is contrary to the well established principle that:-
The use of the words 'may only' in s 650A(1) does not evince an intention to exclude the operation of the remedial provisions in ss 1322(4) or 1325D or an intention that the constructional approach in David Grant & Co Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corp (1985) 185 CLR 265 is to be taken: Pinnacle at [17] and [19].
Primelife (supra):McMahon (supra).
65 Blaze emphasises that s 1322(4) indeed provides for:-
an order extending the period for doing any act, matter or thing or instituting or taking any proceedings under this Act or in relation to a corporation (including an order extending a period where the period concerned ended before the application for the order was made)…"
(Emphasis supplied)
which is this case.
66 Counsel for Blaze finally contends the defendant's submission would confine s 1322(4)(d) to a case where there was no invalidating consequence of the failure to do the act matter or thing referred to in time, so the thing purported to be done was despite the irregularity, effectively done. This would deprive s 1322(4)(d) of much of its utility and severely curtail its field of operation and there is no warrant for such an approach.
67 In my view, Kilmory Developments [2007] NSWSC 943 is helpful, but distinguishable from the present case. It concerned a fixed and floating charge which on 24 October 2006 the plaintiff company took from the defendant company. Notice of the charge was lodged under the Corporations Act 2001 and the charge was registered on 25 October 2006. However, on 22 November 2006 the plaintiff lodged a memorandum or notification of discharge or release of charge. The plaintiff company then applied to the Supreme Court of New South Wales for an order that the period within which it may lodge notice of the charge be extended to a future date or, in the alternative, that the register kept under the CA be rectified by the charge being re‑registered. The application in both forms relied in part on s 1322(4)(d) of the Act.
68 At [37] - [40], Hammerschlag J noted that:
[37] Section 1322(4)(d) permits the Court to extend the period for doing an act, matter or thing under the Act.
[38] It accordingly presupposes that the act, matter or thing has not occurred at all or that it has occurred late.
[39] Once again that is not this case. The act, matter or thing here, namely notification of the charge, occurred. No relief is directed to that act.
[40] It seems to me that the substance of what is sought is directed not towards late notification of the charge but rather to eradicating the effect of the plaintiff having given notification of discharge. In my view s 1322(4)(d) is not capable of bringing that result about and therefore also not available to the plaintiff.
69 At [41], Hammerschlag J considered that in any event, even if s 1322(4)(d) had been available discretionary factors would count against relief being granted. Further, His Honour considered at [45] that to re‑register the charge could not be said to be without substantial injustice caused, or likely to be caused, to any person.
70 Section 650D(1) CA provides as follows:
650D Off‑market bids - method of making variation
Variation to be made by notice to the target and holders
(1) To vary offers under an off‑market bid, the bidder must:
(a) prepare a notice that:
(i) sets out the terms of the proposed variation; and
(ii) if the bid is subject to a defeating condition and the proposed variation postpones for more than 1 month the time by which the bidder must satisfy their obligations under the bid - informs people about the right to withdraw acceptances under section 650E; and
(b) lodge the notice with ASIC; and
(c) after the notice is lodged, give the notice to:
(i) the target; and
(ii) everyone to whom offers were made under the bid.
Note: Sections 648B and 648C provide for the manner in which documents may be sent to holders.
71 This provision covers all off‑market bid variations. Accordingly as noted above, it applied to the SBS. It would also have applied to the notice of variation that Blaze purported to lodge with ASIC on 11 June 2009, if the notice of the SBS had been regularly lodged.
72 Unless the Court has the power effectively to permit the late lodgement of the purported notice lodged with ASIC on 11 June 2009, Blaze is simply out of time and unable to lodge a notice in accordance with s 650D(1). In that event, it would be obliged, as counsel for Target contends it should, to restart the takeover process.
73 What Blaze now asks the Court to do is make an order permitting it to lodge a notice under s 650D(1) that would achieve, in substance, what the purported notice of variation lodged with ASIC on 11 June 2009 would have achieved if the SBS had been regularly lodged.
74 The fact is that, without any valid Court order, any attempt by Blaze to lodge a notice along the lines of that it lodged on 11 June 2009, in consequence of an order in terms of para 2 of the current application, would be ineffectual. The question is whether the Court has the power to extend the time for lodging the proposed variation, on the conditions proposed in order 3.
75 Blaze relies upon the express wording of s 1322(4)(d) of the CA for the making of such an order. In my view, the Court does have the power to make such an order in a case such as this. This is because the making of an order in terms of order 3 of the application would be:
• An order
• extending the period for doing any act, matter or thing (being the lodgement of a notice of variation)
• under the Act (the CA)
• extending a period where the period concerned ended before the application for the order was made (being the period created by the CA for lodging a notice that ended on 19 June 2009).
76 While counsel for Target contends there is no relevant "period" in respect of which the Court may make an extension order for the purposes of lodging a notice under s 650D(1) of the CA, I disagree, for the reasons just explained.
77 Once the Court makes an order extending the period for lodging notice of the SBS in accordance with order 2 of the application, as a matter of law, Blaze, if it wishes to lodge a further notice in order to vary by extending the offer period, is obliged to do so before the 14 day period during which the SBS remained effective, expired by force of s 624(2) CA. That period, in the usual circumstances of this case, has now passed. In my view, the Court has the power under s 1322(4)(d), to extend the 14 day period to enable Blaze to lodge a further notice of variation. The Court should take a liberal approach to the exercise of the power in such circumstances.
78 It would, as counsel for Blaze suggests, be an odd thing if the Court's power to extend time did not permit it to do so in a case such as this.
79 So far as discretionary factors are concerned, they are very much the same as those that led me to consider that it is appropriate to make an order in terms of order 2.
80 All parties, including Target, and the market generally through the ASX, have acted to this point on the basis that the SBS, and the further notice lodged on 11 June 2009 extending the revised offer until 17 July 2009, are effectual. To make an order in terms of order 3 would, in substance, confirm what the market currently understands the position to be.
81 In this regard, counsel for Target notes that the plaintiff contends that if the orders sought are not made, any acceptances of the original takeover offer are void by reason of s 650G of the CA, because the original offer was subject to the defeating conditions in cl 10.8 of the original bidder's statement.
82 Counsel contends that if that is the effect of s 650G, then it is difficult to determine any prejudice one way or the other to those shareholders who accepted the original offer. This is because they did so knowing about, and on the basis of, the defeating conditions and can be taken to know the consequences of that.
83 Furthermore, if there acceptances are void because of s 650G, then it simply means that they are left holding their shares in the defendant for the value they are worth, which shares they may still trade if they wish.
84 In response, counsel for Blaze points out that the CA empowers a takeover offeror to move defeating conditions under s 650F of the CA by notice given to the target company and lodged at ASIC or ASX (s 650F(1) and (3)). Notice to shareholders is not required. The acceptors doubtlessly thought, and were entitled to think, that the defeating conditions would be removed or likely be removed and if they had thought otherwise they would not have accepted the offer.
85 Thus, the acceptors will, unless a remedial order is made, lose the benefit of a bargain which may, in all the circumstances, prove to be a very good one for them, and which it was their commercial judgment to make.
86 In my view, while the merits of these arguments may be debated, no substantial injustice has been demonstrated and I find it difficult to discern how any has been or is likely to be caused to any person by making an order in terms of order 3.