3.3 Patent term extension
91 Section 70 of the Act provides that a patentee of a standard patent may apply for an extension of the term of their patent if the requirements set out in subsections (2), (3) and (4) are satisfied. The relevant subsection for the purposes of this interlocutory application is (2)(a) which provides:
one more pharmaceutical substances per se must in substance be disclosed in the complete specification of the patent and in substance fall within the scope of the claim or claims of that specification.
92 The phrase "pharmaceutical substance" is defined in Schedule 1 to the Act as follows:
pharmaceutical substance means a substance (including a mixture or compound of substances) for therapeutic use whose application (or one of whose applications) involves:
a) a chemical interaction, or physico-chemical interaction, with a human physiological system; or
b) action on an infectious agent, or on a toxin or other poison, in a human body;
but does not include a substance that is solely for use in in vitro diagnosis or in vitro testing.
93 The phrase "therapeutic use" is also defined in Schedule 1 to the Act:
therapeutic use means use for the purpose of:
(a) preventing, diagnosing, curing or alleviating a disease, ailment, defect or injury in persons; or
(b) influencing, inhibiting or modifying a physiological process in persons; or
(c) testing the susceptibility of persons to a disease or ailment.
94 The Explanatory Memorandum to the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Bill 1998 (Cth), which inserted the current s 70 into the Act, contained the following explanation:
The extension of term provisions will be available for patents that include claims to pharmaceutical substances per se (provided that the other criteria are met) [i.e. a product claim]. These claims to pharmaceutical substances per se would usually be restricted to new and inventive substances. Patents that claim pharmaceutical substances when produced by a particular process (product by process claims) will not be eligible unless that process involves the use of recombinant DNA technology. Claims which limit the use of a known substance to a particular environment, for example claims to pharmaceutical substances when used in a new and inventive method of treatment, are not considered to be claims to pharmaceutical substances per se.
(Emphasis added.)
95 In Boehringer Ingelheim International v Commissioner of Patents [2000] FCA 1918 (Boehringer), Heerey J traced the history and antecedents of the extension of term provisions. That case involved claims directed to a container comprising an aerosol or spray composition for nasal administration or the use of such a composition when used in the container. Heerey J concluded that the Act draws a distinction between a pharmaceutical substance that is the subject of a patent claim and a pharmaceutical substance that forms part of a method or process claim.
96 Heerey J was assisted by the Patent Manual. Inter alia, the Patent Manual said at the relevant time:
25.2.2 Pharmaceutical Substance per se
Except for substances produced by a process involving the use of recombinant DNA technology, an extension of term is only available in respect of a pharmaceutical substance per se being within the scope of a claim of the patent.
The explanatory memorandum to the Intellectual Property Laws Bill of 1997 noted that, except for substances produced by a process involving the use of recombinant DNA technology, claims to pharmaceutical substances per se would usually be restricted to new and inventive substances. The memorandum also mentioned a number of specific instances where an extension would not be available:
'Patents that claim pharmaceutical substances when produced by a particular process (product by process claims) will not be eligible unless that process involves the use of recombinant DNA technology. Claims which limit the use of a known substance to a particular environment, for example claims to pharmaceutical substances when used in a new and inventive method of treatment, are not considered to be claims to pharmaceutical substances per se.'
This distinction is specifically evident as between the reference in the Act to 'pharmaceutical substances per se', and to 'pharmaceutical substances when produced by a process that involves the use of recombinant DNA technology'. The use of the word 'per se' requires the claim to the substance to be unqualified by process, temporal, or environmental, components.
Thus, in order that the term of a patent be extended, the patent must contain one or more claims in the form:
a) A substance of formula ****
b) Substance X mixed with substance Y
Examples of claims that are not directed to substances per se are:
a) Substance X when used …
b) Substance X for use …
c) Substance X when produced by method Y
d) An antiseptic comprising substance X [unless the label 'antiseptic' was clearly non-limiting on the scope of the claim.]
e) A method of preparing substance X
f) A substance of formula …, where component Y is produced by …
g) [A specified quantum] of substance X
h) 'Swiss' - style claims referring to substance X
i) Use of substance X in the treatment of Y
(Emphasis added.)
97 On appeal from Heerey J in Boehringer, the Full Court in Boehringer Ingelheim International GmbH v Commissioner of Patents (No. 2) (2001) 52 IPR 529, considered the validity of a patent extension based on an ARTG registration for ATROVENT NASAL (ipratropium bromide) said to fall within a claim to compositions for the treatment of a runny nose.
98 The patentee before the Full Court conceded that a container was fundamental to each of the claims, in the sense that absent the container as described in the claim, there would be no infringement. On the patentee's argument, it was enough that the complete specification disclose one or more pharmaceutical substances, whether as the sole element in an invention or in combination with other elements.
99 In a passage which was approved and adopted by the Full Court and set out in full at [17], the trial judge, Heerey J, stated at [14]-[15]:
[14] Broadly speaking, a claim in relation to substance can be made in three ways:
(i) a new and inventive product alone;
(ii) an old or known product prepared by new and inventive process;
(iii) an old or known product used in a new and inventive mode of treatment.
[15] What is clear in s 70 is that only the first type of claim to a pharmaceutical product is to be subject to extension rights…[T]he policy to be deduced in the light of the legislative history is that Parliament has decided that what is intended to be fostered is primary research and development in inventive substances, not the way they are made or the way they are used, with the sole (and important) exception of recombinant DNA techniques, this being an area particularly worthy of assistance for research and development.
(Emphasis added.)
100 The Full Court held at [38] that the patentee's argument "effectively reads out of s 70(2)(a) the words "per se"", noting that if that were the legislative intention, the paragraph could have read: "one or more pharmaceutical substances must in substance be disclosed". There would have been no need for "per se".
101 The Full Court in Prejay Holdings Ltd v Commissioner of Patents (2003) 57 IPR 424 (Prejay) considered the validity of an extension of term based on "Premia", said to be a pharmaceutical substance falling within the scope of a claim (claim 14), being:
a method of hormonally treating menopausal or post-menopausal disorders in a woman, comprising administering to said woman continuously and uninterruptedly both progestogen and oestrogen in daily dosage units of progestogen equivalent to laevo-norgestrel dosages of from about 0.025 mg to 0.05 mg and of estrogen equivalent to estradiol dosages of about 0.5 mg to 1.0 mg.
102 The patentee in Prejay sought to distinguish their invention from that in Boehringer on the basis that claim 14 did not have a physical component.
103 The Full Court upheld the trial judge's decision. In three passages of his reasons at first instance which were quoted by the Full Court, Heerey J said:
[14] In both Boehringer and the present case the claims included integers other than the pharmaceutical substance itself. The fact that in Boehringer the other integer was a particular physical device and in the present case the other integer is a particular method of use is to my mind a distinction without a difference.
….
[16] The fact remains that claim 14 is a method claim and, mere use of the substance otherwise than in accordance with the specified method would not infringe. The reasoning in Boehringer was applicable and correctly applied by the delegate.
….
[26] Where there is a patent for a method, such as "Substance X when used…", it would usually follow that there is more than one reasonable use of X. If that were not so, one would expect the patent to be only for Substance X per se.
104 Justice Allsop (as his Honour then was) agreed with the decision of the majority, Wilcox and Cooper JJ, and made some additional comments which are apposite to the present case at [39]-[41]:
The argument of the appellant turns on the meaning of the definition of "pharmaceutical substance". It requires the definition to be sufficiently wide (because of the presence of the phrase per se in s 70(2)(a) of the Act) to incorporate both the substance and a method integer, as long as the additional method integer is concerned with therapeutic use.
I do not see the definition so widely. The definition refers to a substance, which must have a purpose or use - therapeutic use, and whose application involves the other matters identified in the definition. The definition is of a particular kind of substance, but it is of a substance, and only a substance.
So understood, when one turns to s 70(2)(a) of the Act, the substance (that is the combination of the hormones in the amounts) per se must fall within the scope of the claim. If, as is conceded, use of the substance outside the particular administration regime in the claims is outside the scope of the claim, then it cannot be said that the substance per se falls within the scope of the claim.
105 At [42] Allsop J noted that his construction of s 70(2)(a) at [41] accorded with what appeared to him to be "the burden of the secondary materials, exemplified by the following part of the explanatory memorandum":
The extension of term provisions will be available for patents that include claims to pharmaceutical substances per se provided the other criteria are met. These claims to pharmaceutical substances per se, would usually be restricted to new and inventive substances. Patents that claim pharmaceutical substances when produced by a product by process claims, will not be eligible unless the process involves the use of recombinant DNA technology. Claims which limit the use of a known substance to a particular environment, for example claims to pharmaceutical substances when used in a new and inventive method of treatment, are not considered to be claims to the pharmaceutical substance per se.
(Emphasis added.)
106 The current version of the Patent Manual still lists claims to "substance X for use…" as not being directed to a substance per se. The current version provides the following examples of claims that are not directed to substances per se:
substance X when used .... ;
substance X when produced by method Y;
a method of preparing substance X;
a substance of formula ...., where component Y is produced by .... ;
'Swiss' style claims referring to substance X;
use of substance X in the treatment of Y;
substance X for use .... ;
(a specified quantum) of substance X;
an antiseptic comprising substance X.
(Emphasis added.)
107 Biogen's extension of term application was based on the Propounded Pharmaceutical Substance which it said fell within the scope of at least claims 13 to 17.
108 Pharmacor illustrates its case that the term was wrongly extended by reference to claim 13 of the Patent. Pharmacor contends that claim 13 is not a claim to a pharmaceutical substance per se for at least three reasons which can be summarised as follows:
(a) The claim is not for a new and inventive substance;
(b) The claim is a purpose limited product claim in that it claims an actual achievement of a therapeutic act being a functional technical feature of the claim. It is therefore, not a product claim for a pharmaceutical substance per se; and
(c) Claim 13 requires that the pharmaceutical formulation be in the form of micro-pellets or micro-tablets. Pharmacor submits that this brings additional features in the claim rendering the claim not to a pharmaceutical substance per se.
109 The Patent makes clear that dialkyl fumarates per se are not new and inventive. The specification makes reference to patents for processes for preparing dialkyl fumarates. Pharmacor draws attention to EP 0 312 697 which describes and claims the use of certain fumaric acid monoalkyl ester salts together with a dialkyl fumarate (such as dimethyl fumarate) for the production of a pharmaceutical preparation for the treatment of psoriatic arthritis, neurodermatitis and regional enteritis Crohns.
110 At the provisional level, Pharmacor's arguments at (a) and (c) are weak. As I discuss below, the novelty attack is not made out at a provisional level in relation to the micro-pellet or micro-tablet formulations of DMF for the therapy of auto-immune diseases.
111 Pharmacor submits that claim 13 is a claim of the kind "substance X for use in the treatment of disease Y". In Apotex Pty Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis Australia Pty Ltd (2013) 304 ALR 1, Crennan and Keifel JJ (as the Chief Justice then was) identify such claims as "purpose" claims, as described by Hoffmann LJ in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals In & Ors v HN Norton & Co Ltd (1995) 33 IPR 1.
112 Pharmacor submits that the fact that "for use" in claim 13 limits the use of the claimed pharmaceutical preparation for actual achievement of claimed therapeutic effect is not only apparent from a plain reading of the claim but also when it is read in the context of the specification as a whole including the other claims.
113 Claim 14, for example, claims a pharmaceutical preparation according to claim 13 wherein the autoimmune disease is polyarthritis, multiple sclerosis, juvenile-onset diabetes, Hashimoto's thyroiditis, Grave's disease, systemic lupus erythematodes (SLE), Sjogren's syndrome pernicious anaemia or chronic active (lupoid) hepatitis. If "for use" was non-limiting, Pharmacor submits that claims such as claim 14 to specific diseases or conditions would be redundant because they would not be narrower than the claim from which they are dependent.
114 Pharmacor submits that the limiting effect of the "for use" in the claims has been employed in an attempt to confer novelty and inventiveness over dialkyl fumarates per se. Consistent with this the dependent claims also claim different or specific diseases within the broader class claimed in the independent claims.
115 Pharmacor referred to the discussion of purpose-limited claims by the learned editors of Terrell on the Law of Patents (2021) at 14-109 to 14-110:
14-109
Purpose-limited claims arise in several contexts. First, in respect of claims which are for the use of old products for a new use - sometimes referred to as MOBIL-type claims following the decision of the EPO in MOBIL/Friction reducing additive. (G02/88) EPO Enlarged Board of Appeal decision (G02/88) [1990] E.P.O.R. 73. Secondly, in respect of Swiss-type claims where the claim is for the use of a product in the manufacture of a medicament for a particular therapeutic use. Thirdly, in respect of claims in EPC 2000 format (the successor to Swiss-type claims) where the claim is to a product for a particular therapeutic use (such as "substance X for use in the treatment of Y").
14-110
Each of these claim types is alike in that their novelty resides not in the product per se but in the new use or purpose for that product. The recognition that an old product can have a new and inventive application is the technical contribution of these claims and leads to the conclusion that it would exceed that technical contribution if the word for in such claims was read in the sense of merely suitable for. After all, the old substance was always "suitable" for the new use, it is just that no-one had recognised the benefits of the new use. For this reason, in determining infringement, regard has to be had to the purpose or intent with which the infringer is putting the old product onto the market.
(Emphasis added)
116 Pharmacor submits that the claims should be construed in the same manner as EPC 2000 claims in the UK and EU. Pharmacor referred to the Full Court in Mylan Health Pty Ltd & Anor v Sun Pharma ANZ Pty Ltd & Anor [2020] FCAFC 116 (Mylan) at [111] which noted that the EU Board of Appeal holds that actual achievement of the therapeutic effect is a functional technical feature of the claim, as opposed to a mere statement of purpose or intention.
117 Biogen contends that the words "for use" when followed by "in transplantation medicine or for the therapy of autoimmune diseases or psoriasis, psoriatic arthritis, neurodermatitis or enteritis regionalis Crohn" do not change the character of the claim. It remains a claim to a pharmaceutical product per se, which is a product claim; not a method of treatment claim. The concluding words identify that the substance is useful for the indicated purposes, but do not serve to limit the product itself.
118 Biogen submits that claims to products "for use" in particular context are conventionally construed as product per se claims. Biogen places reliance on the construction of "for use" in the context of mechanical product claims to submit that claims to products "for use" in particular contexts are conventionally construed as product per se claims: Garford Pty Ltd v Dywidag Systems International Pty Ltd & Anor (2015) 110 IPR 30 at [122]-[124].
119 Biogen asserts that claim 13 is not limited by purpose and should be construed as a claim to the product, or pharmaceutical substance per se. Biogen points to the first paragraph of the Patent and two paragraphs on bottom half of page 10 as providing a basis for an unlimited claim to DMF formulated as micro-tablets or micro-pellets.
120 According to Biogen, the patent makes it abundantly clear when it is confining the statement monopoly to the treatment of various disorders, and the asserted claims are not in this category. A comparison of claims 13 and 40 is said to demonstrate the point. The uses described in claim 13 are for "transplantation medicine or for the therapy of autoimmune diseases or psoriasis, psoriatic arthritis, neurodermatitis or enteritis regionalis Crohn". Claim 40 is to a preparation according to, amongst others, claim 13 "when used" for the very same uses identified a claim 13.
121 Biogen further submits the claims 14, 16 and 17 merely refine the substance of claim 13 by the identification of suitable uses (claim 14), particular dialkyl fumarates (including DMF) (claim 16), and the quantity of active ingredient (claim 17), respectively. Each too, on Biogen's analysis, is a claim to a pharmaceutical substance per se, unlimited by therapeutic use.
122 Biogen submitted that Pharmacor's references to UK and EU construction of Swiss claims and EPC 2000 claims were inappropriate, as the separate jurisprudence that has evolved in the UK and EU in relation to the reason for the existence, and the construction of Swiss claims, and the later EPC 2000 claims, is not part of Australian law.
123 Biogen asserted that the use of DMF micro-tablets for another therapy for which they might also be useful, such as to treat infertility or high blood pressure, would fall within claims 13 and 14, as the micro-tablets would also be suitable for the uses given in claims 13 and 14.
124 I have extracted relevant sections from the Patent above. A review of the specification as a whole does not support Biogen's contention that claim 13 (and those other claims dependent upon it) is not limited to the therapeutic purposes referred to in the claim.
125 As can be seen from the extracts above, the emphasis of the disclosure in the Patent is on the use of dialkyl fumarates for pharmaceutical preparations for use in transplantation medicine or therapy of auto-immune diseases. Other than the two paragraphs on page 10 referred to by Biogen, each discussion of the invention, the objectives and aspects are tied to use in transplantation medicine or the therapy of autoimmune diseases.
126 Dialkyl fumarates were known at the priority date of the Patent. At page 8, the Patent states that the dialkyl fumarates to be used according to the invention are prepared by processes known in the art. EP 0 312 697 is given as an example.
127 The Patent has 211 claims. Putting aside the two omnibus claims, each of the remaining 209 claims makes express reference to use in transplantation medicine or for therapy of autoimmune diseases. There is not one claim to a pharmaceutical preparation of dialkyl fumarate micro-tablets or micro-pellets alone.
128 The Full Court in Commissioner of Patents v Abbvie Biotechnology Ltd (2017) 125 IPR 398 considered whether claims in the form of Swiss type claims were claims to a pharmaceutical substance for the purposes of s 70(2)(b). Besanko, Yates and Beach JJ held at [60] and [61] that the pharmaceutical substance, adalimumab, even though produced via recombinant DNA technology, did not in substance fall within the scope of the claim in suit. Method of treatment claims or Swiss type claims cannot support an extension of patent term under s 70.
129 Swiss claims in an Australian patent were the subject of consideration by the Full Court in Mylan. The claim in suit was claim 5, which was dependent on claim 1 which claimed:
Use of fenofibrate or a derivative thereof for the manufacture of a medicament for the prevention and/or treatment of retinopathy, in particular diabetic retinopathy.
130 At [194] the Full Court briefly explained the derivation of Swiss claims, being the need to accommodate and satisfy the particular requirements for patentability under the European Patent Convention. Those requirements are not and never have been part of the Australian legal landscape. Nevertheless, as the Court noted, patentees have sought Swiss type claims in their Australian patents.
131 At [195] the Court said it was important to bear in mind that Swiss type claims are method or process claims and to be distinguished from method of treatment claims.
132 The Court at [196] stated that Swiss type claims are purpose limited claims in the sense that the medicament resulting from the method or process is characterised by the therapeutic purpose for which it is manufactured as specified in the claim.
133 The specification of a therapeutic purpose imposes an important limitation on the scope of the Swiss type claim. At [197] the Court noted that in theory it is this limitation which supports the novelty, and hence the patentability of, the invention. The Court continued:
It is appropriate, therefore, to consider this purpose as one that confines the use of the method or process to the achievement of one end and one end only - a medicament for the specified therapeutic purpose; not a medicament for any other therapeutic purpose. Put another way, a Swiss type claim does not claim the invention in terms of a medicament that is useful for, or can be used for, the specified therapeutic purpose and other therapeutic purposes. In order to support its patent ability and preserve its validity, the invention as claimed through a Swiss type claim, is necessarily more limited in scope.
(Emphasis added.)
134 At [198] the Court stated that the characterisation of the medicament by specification of the therapeutic purpose is, therefore, an essential feature of the invention as claimed.
135 The characterisation of the medicament of the Swiss type claim in suit in Mylan by specification of the therapeutic purpose "for the prevention and/or treatment of …" is not dissimilar to the characterisation of the pharmaceutical preparation in claim 13, as "for the therapy of …".
136 In the context of infringement of Swiss type claims, the Full Court in Mylan at [225] observed that the "mere suitability" of a medicament for a claimed purpose cannot be determinative of the question of infringement. The fact that the patent has been granted on the basis of a second or later therapeutic use necessarily means that there are potentially multiple uses to which the medicament can be put. Use of the medicament for another suitable use (other than the use specified in the claim) would not infringe.
137 Consistent with the disclosure of the invention in the Patent and the reasoning of the Full Court in Mylan, the specified therapeutic purpose in claim 13 is, at least on a provisional view, an essential integer of the claim.
138 On that basis, use of the dialkyl fumarate micro-tablets for a therapy outside the particular therapeutic use in the claims is outside the scope of the claim, and it cannot be said that the substance per se falls within the scope of the claim: see Prejay at [42].
139 My provisional view is that there is a sufficiently strong prospect that the extension of the Patent may have been wrongly granted. That alone is likely to be sufficient to conclude that no injunction should be granted. However, the question of whether or not Biogen has demonstrated a sufficient likelihood of success to justify the preservation of the status quo requires consideration of the basket of discretionary factors which I discuss below: Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O'Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57 at [65].