26 Of some passing relevance is the decision of Hutton v R [2008] NSWCCA 99, although it does not assist the applicant. In Hutton, the applicant had supplied 478 gms of MDMA, just below the large commercial quantity threshold. His role was that of a "bald courier" and he received a sentence of 6 years with a 3 year non parole period after a plea of guilty. Given the applicant's central involvement in a commercial enterprise, Hutton would seem to suggest that the applicant's sentence on the equivalent offence is well within the appropriate range.
27 R v Stankovic [2006] NSWCCA 229, another successful Crown appeal, concerned a sentence for the supply of a large commercial quantity of MDMA and does not therefore provide any basis for comparison. Similarly, R v Sciberras (2006) 165 A Crim R 532 ; [2006] NSWCCA 268 was a successful Crown appeal against the inadequacy of sentences imposed for various offences, including two of supply commercial quantity of methylamphetamine. The Court held that sentences of 6 years and 6 months, comprising non parole periods of 4 years were manifestly inadequate on these counts, particularly where the offences could not be said to be below the mid range of objective gravity. Hulme J observed in passing at [44], with the concurrence of Beazley JA and Hislop J, that penalties are not proportionate to the quantities of drug supplied.
28 True it is that there is nothing in the Judge's remarks that refers to the applicant's good prospects of rehabilitation, although the Judge spent a considerable portion of the remarks addressing the applicant's "psychological anguish and pain" as a factor in his offending. The Judge also referred extensively to the opinions expressed by the applicant's family members and friends, to the effect that the applicant's behaviour appeared to them to be inconsistent with the person they knew. The Judge accepted that the applicant was very remorseful and contrite. Implicit in these remarks and the finding of special circumstances is a recognition of the applicant's good prospects of rehabilitation.
29 The fact that the applicant was addicted to drugs, and was under emotional stress at the time of the offences do not entitle him to any leniency. This Court observed in R v Henry (1999) 46 NSWLR 346 that the motivation of feeding addictions is entitled to, at most, limited weight. There was no relevant delay in sentencing. The applicant remained in custody from the date of his arrest, 8 June 2007. Accordingly, the sentences imposed were to date from that day. The passage of 11 months from the date of arrest to the date of sentence is far from excessive and, given the applicant's pleas of guilty in the Local Court in November 2007, it could not seriously be maintained that he was left in any uncertainty as to his ultimate fate.
30 The applicant has failed to demonstrate that the sentences imposed on individual counts are manifestly excessive by comparison with other decisions of this Court, and that the aggregate sentence and aggregate non parole period are manifestly excessive. The correct application of the principle of totality should result in an aggregate non parole period that reflects the criminality inherent in a number of offences. Here, the Judge was confronted with a deliberate, commercial course of dealing in a variety of drugs. It is not to the point that the applicant's offences all arose out of the execution of a search warrant. It was never contested that the Judge's description of the applicant's conduct was accurate. In these circumstances, I regard a non parole period of 5 years and a balance of term of 4 years as entirely appropriate to the applicant's offending.
31 It was perhaps unfortunate that the method of accumulation drove the Judge to reduce the non parole period for the only offence carrying a standard non parole period to as little as one year, but there can be no complaint about the final result.
32 The extent to which the aggregate non parole period departed from the statutory ratio was also a matter within the discretion of the Judge. The applicant's complaint on this ground is not that an error of the House v The King [1936] HCA 40 ; (1936) 55 CLR 499 variety was committed, but that he would have preferred the discretion to have been exercised differently.
33 For the above reasons, I would grant leave to appeal but dismiss the appeals against sentence.
34 HARRISON J: I agree with Latham J.
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