The making of an indemnity costs order
10 The December 2018 letter, it may be noted, was not expressed to be given pursuant to Pt 25 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). But that does not preclude the consideration by this Court of a Calderbank offer of settlement: Alpine Hardwood (Aust) Pty Ltd v Hardys Pty Ltd (No 2) [2002] FCA 224 at [18] to [20], (2002) 190 ALR 121 at 124 to 125 per Weinberg J. Nor do the provisions of Pt 3 of the Defamation Act preclude an exercise of discretion in respect to costs the making of a Calderbank offer: Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Vass [2018] NSWCA 259 at [74] to [77], (2018) 98 NSWLR 672 at 692 per McColl JA.
11 Any difference as to the form in which an offer of compromise is made is, as explained by Katzmann J in Moroccanoil Israel Ltd v Aldi Foods Pty Ltd (No 3) [2019] FCA 470 ("Moroccanoil Israel Ltd"), as follows:
[31] The ordinary principle is that costs follow the event. In other words, the Court will order the unsuccessful party to pay the costs of the successful party. The ordinary basis upon which costs are ordered is the party and party basis, which falls short of a complete indemnity. Having regard to the breadth of the Court's discretion, however, indemnity costs may be awarded "where there is some special or unusual feature in the case" which justifies the exercise of the discretion in this way: Re Wilcox; Ex parte Venture Industries Pty Ltd (No 2) (1996) 72 FCR 151 at 152 (Black CJ).
[32] While there is a presumption that a party who betters an offer of compromise made under the rules of court will recover indemnity costs, there is no such presumption where an offer is not made under the rules or does not conform to the rules: CGU Insurance Ltd v Corrections Corporation of Australia Staff Superannuation Ltd [2008] FCAFC 173; (2008) 15 ANZ Insurance Cases ¶61-785 at [75] (per curiam).
Irrespective of any presumption, any difference assumes no importance in the present case. The Calderbank offer communicated by the December 2018 letter remains a sound basis upon which the order for indemnity costs sought by Queensland Newspapers should be made.
12 In summarising the principles to be applied when seeking an indemnity costs order, Sundberg and Emmett JJ in Dukemaster Pty Ltd v Bluehive Pty Ltd [2003] FCAFC 1 ("Dukemaster") observed:
[7] The mere making of an offer of compromise and its non-acceptance, followed by a result more favourable to the offeror, does not automatically lead to an order for payment of costs on an indemnity basis: … The applicant for a more generous award must show that the rejection of the offer was imprudent or plainly unreasonable: …
(citations omitted)
Prior to endorsing this summary of principles, Rares J in Mount Isa Mines Ltd v The Ship 'Thor Commander' (No 2) [2018] FCA 1702 observed:
[9] The Full Court has discussed the principles applicable to determine, at common law, whether an offeree who fails to accept an offer of settlement will be liable to pay costs thereafter on an indemnity basis. Different Full Courts have stated the test as that the rejection of the offer must be either "imprudent or unreasonable" or "imprudent or plainly unreasonable" in order to enliven the discretion to award costs on an indemnity basis. This difference in expression, while unfortunate, does not appear to be substantive.
(emphasis in original)
His Honour thereafter proceeded to extract the summary provided by Sundberg and Emmett JJ. Dukemaster has since been applied by other Judges of this Court: e.g., Moroccanoil Israel Ltd, supra at [34]; Lane v Oakley (No 2) [2019] FCA 488 at [17] per Rangiah J.
13 To this summary of principles, s 40 of the Defamation Act may be added. That section provides as follows:
Costs in defamation proceedings
(1) In awarding costs in defamation proceedings, the court may have regard to -
(a) the way in which the parties to the proceedings conducted their cases (including any misuse of a party's superior financial position to hinder the early resolution of the proceedings), and
(b) any other matters that the court considers relevant.
(2) Without limiting subsection (1), a court must (unless the interests of justice require otherwise) -
(a) if defamation proceedings are successfully brought by a plaintiff and costs in the proceedings are to be awarded to the plaintiff-order costs of and incidental to the proceedings to be assessed on an indemnity basis if the court is satisfied that the defendant unreasonably failed to make a settlement offer or agree to a settlement offer proposed by the plaintiff, or
(b) if defamation proceedings are unsuccessfully brought by a plaintiff and costs in the proceedings are to be awarded to the defendant-order costs of and incidental to the proceedings to be assessed on an indemnity basis if the court is satisfied that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to accept a settlement offer made by the defendant.
(3) In this section -
"settlement offer" means any offer to settle the proceedings made before the proceedings are determined, and includes an offer to make amends (whether made before or after the proceedings are commenced), that was a reasonable offer at the time it was made.
With reference to s 40(2)(a), White J in Hockey v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCA 750; (2015) 237 FCR 127 at 137 concluded:
[46] … I see no warrant for reading into subs (2)(a) an adjective such as "wholly" or "substantially". Mr Hockey had partial success evidenced by the monetary award to be made in his favour in each proceeding. His failure on significant elements of his claim is relevant to other aspects of the costs claims, but not to the first issue arising under subs (2)(a).
There is, similarly, no reason to read into s 40(2)(b) any requirement that an unsuccessful plaintiff to a defamation proceeding must be wholly "unsuccessful" - s 40(2)(b) simply referring to a defamation proceeding which has been "unsuccessfully brought by a plaintiff" and a plaintiff "unreasonably" failing to accept an offer of settlement.
14 In the present proceeding, Queensland Newspapers contend that Mr Bellino's failure to accept the offer made was "imprudent or plainly unreasonable". That submission is accepted.
15 On the facts of the present case, and in very summary form, Mr Bellino did obtain a measure of "success" in that it was concluded:
two of the five pleaded imputations were not conveyed.
But the offer made in the December 2018 letter was otherwise a more favourable result to Mr Bellino by reason of the conclusions that:
in respect to those three imputations which were conveyed and which were defamatory of Mr Bellino, Queensland Newspapers had made good its defence under s 25 of the Defamation Act; and
any damages that would otherwise have been awarded (had the s 25 defence not been made out) would have been minimal.
The offer being made by Queensland Newspapers, moreover, included an offer:
to forego its own entitlement to claim costs that had been incurred;
to publish a "correction", albeit a statement limited in its terms; and
to pay Mr Bellino $80,000.
16 Although any conclusion as to whether a decision to reject an offer of compromise was "imprudent or plainly unreasonable" is not solely to be judged by reference to a confined comparison between the offer being made and the judgment obtained, it was "imprudent or plainly unreasonable" for Mr Bellino to not accept the offer being made in circumstances where:
at least up until 21 January 2019 he was represented by solicitors;
the offer on any view was a sensible "commercial" resolution of the dispute between the parties at the time it was made - Queensland Newspapers on the one hand wishing to limit (inter alia) its own exposure to forthcoming legal costs and, on the other hand, the wish of Mr Bellino to obtain some personal redress with respect to what he viewed as damage to his own reputation by reason of the statements made, these concerns being addressed by the proposed payment of $80,000 and the proposed "correction" to be published in the "For the Record" section; and
the defamatory imputations being made in the matter complained of being statements largely admitted by Mr Bellino in the book titled Time for Truth: Antonio Bellino tells it as it is and in his evidence to the Fitzgerald Inquiry.
If not "imprudent", the failure to accept the offer was "plainly unreasonable".