Beazley v Steinhardt
[1999] FCA 447
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Federal Court of Australia
Decision date
1999-04-14
Before
Deane J, Brennan CJ, Dowsett J
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Judgment (11 paragraphs)
The Application 1 This is an application by Barry Albert Beazley and Doreen Beazley to review the decision of Wayne Michael Steinhardt, a police officer, to seize, pursuant to a search warrant, certain documents in respect of which they claim legal professional privilege. The respondent alleges that the documents were made in furtherance of a criminal or illegal purpose, namely to defraud the Commonwealth of Australia and that privilege does not attach thereto. Alternatively, the appellants seek appropriate declarations as to their claim, relying on s 39B(1A)(c) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). Numerous observations made by the majority of the High Court in Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501 suggest that proceedings for declaratory relief are more appropriate than are proceedings for judicial review. As I understand it, the parties agree that I should dispose of the matter pursuant to s 39B(1A)(c).
Legal Professional Privilege 2 Legal professional privilege protects from disclosure confidential communications made solely for the purpose of contemplated or pending litigation or for obtaining or giving legal advice. See Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674. However, in Carter v Northmore Hale Davy and Leake (1995) 183 CLR 121, Deane J said at 134-135:- "… the privilege does not extend to communications or documents made or brought into existence for the purpose of, or as part of the process of, crime, fraud, abuse of statutory powers or, in some circumstances, defeating or frustrating the administration of justice by the Court. For present purposes, a critical characteristic of those 'exceptions' is that they are exclusions from the reach of legal professional privilege rather than exceptions to the scope of the protection which it affords. They are directed to circumstances in which the privilege does not attach with the result that the particular communication or document is not protected by legal professional privilege at all. They are not directed to circumstances in which, notwithstanding that legal professional privilege does attach, the Courts will override the privilege and order that the privilege document be produced for inspection or that the privilege communication be disclosed." 3 In Propend, the High Court considered the onus assumed by a party who disputes a claim of privilege upon the basis of ulterior purpose and the admissibility of hearsay evidence in discharge of that onus. The facts of the case were relevantly similar to those of the present matter. At 514, Brennan CJ said (referring to Attorney-General (NT) v Kearney (1985) 158 CLR 500 at 514-5, where his Honour held that it was necessary to show reasonable grounds for believing that the relevant communication was made for some illegal or improper purpose):- "I state the criterion as 'reasonable grounds for believing' because (a) the test is objective and (b) it is not necessary to prove the ulterior purpose but there has to be something 'to give colour to the charge', a 'prima facie case' that the communication is made for an ulterior purpose." Brennan CJ concluded (at 513-4) that this question was to be resolved upon the basis of admissible evidence, excluding hearsay, because his Honour considered that the issue for determination was the substantive claim of privilege. 4 Dawson J said at 521-2:- "The cases make it plain that those seeking to exclude legal professional privilege do not have to prove that the communication in question was in furtherance of a crime or fraud … . In requiring less than proof of an allegation of crime or fraud to displace legal professional privilege, the law has made a compromise in the public interest between the competing principles which require, on the one hand, the availability of all relevant evidence and, on the other, the protection of professional confidence. It has done so in favour of the availability of all relevant evidence by placing the threshold for the displacement of the privilege a considerable distance short of proof of the allegation of crime or fraud. No doubt this is so because it is in the public interest that the law should not countenance even the possibility of legal professional privilege being raised as a cloak to hide criminal or fraudulent activity. Proof - that is to say, admissible evidence of the existence of the crime or fraud - is not required … ." 5 At 523-4 his Honour characterized the proceedings at first instance as a review of the decision of the police officer's decision to seize documents. It followed that they should be determined upon the material on which the officer acted. This might properly include matters not admissible in evidence. Toohey J (at 532-4) appears to have taken a similar, if not the same, view. This approach differed from that taken by Brennan CJ who, as I have said, considered that the issue for determination was the claim of privilege. Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ took approaches similar to that of Brennan CJ. Kirby J considered that hearsay evidence was admissible, a conclusion based upon his Honour's characterization of the proceedings as interlocutory. The present question is the same as that considered in Propend, and it arises in the same way. The view of the majority in Propend dictates that I determine it upon admissible evidence, excluding hearsay. However, for reasons which appear hereafter, that is not a significant issue for present purposes.