Reasons for approving the convening of a meeting to approve the scheme
7 Generally, leave will not be given to convene a meeting to approve a scheme unless the proposed arrangement is of a kind that falls within the legislative provisions, is fit for consideration by shareholders and is likely to obtain Court approval if passed by the requisite majority and is unopposed when approval is sought: Australian Securities Commission v Marlborough Gold Mines Ltd [1993] HCA 15; (1993) 177 CLR 485 at 504.
8 In considering whether to approve the convening of a meeting of shareholders to consider a particular scheme, the Court exercises a discretion. The evident purpose of the requirement for an approval from the Court is to supervise the circumstances in which shareholders may be invited to consider a scheme and thereby afford some protection for shareholders. The approach to be adopted was described in the following way by Emmett J in Central Pacific Minerals NL [2002] FCA 239 at [9]-[11] (accepted in CSR Limited at [12]):
In exercising its discretion whether to convene a meeting, the Court will have regard to such matters as the acceptability of the documentation of the proposed arrangement, the commercial viability and morality of the arrangement, the likely acceptability of the arrangement, the bona fides of the proposals, whether the proposals could be achieved by another method and any objections or submissions by the Commission. It is always the practice of the Court, at the first stage, to go through the proposed arrangement, to raise matters as to the drafting of the documentation, to ascertain whether the arrangement complies with the substantive requirements of the law and to ensure that the arrangement, if given effect, will not involve any unfair or oppressive result.
In considering whether to convene a meeting, the Court will take into account questions of public policy as well as commercial morality. The Court will have regard to the interests of parties who will be bound by the arrangement and who might be careless of their own best interests. While security holders of a company may be considered to be better judges than the Court could be of what is to their commercial advantage, that does not extend to the technical or mechanical aspects of an arrangement. Security holders are likely to be influenced largely by their understanding of the broad economic consequences of an arrangement. However, they are entitled to rely on the Court's approval as a sufficient safeguard against defects at the technical or mechanical level.
Accordingly, for the purposes of protecting the interests of security holders who have not agreed to an arrangement and yet will be bound by it, the Court will ordinarily seek to ensure that the terms of the arrangement would be enforceable by all persons bound by it against those who are seeking to implement it or obtain benefits from it. The Court will also seek to ensure that the arrangement does not, without sufficient reason, include provisions that may create inroads upon or modify the benefits that a security holder bound by it might legitimately expect to obtain under it. The mere fact that the Court has convened a meeting does not, however, necessarily mean that the Court will approve the arrangement, even if the arrangement is unopposed at the third stage.
9 The role of the Court in considering whether to approve the convening of a meeting is supervisory. It is concerned with the legal effectiveness of the proposed arrangement if approved, the form of disclosure to be given to shareholders and whether the scheme is within the bounds of that which might be approved if unopposed by shareholders. Within those confines, the assessment of the commerciality of the proposal is a matter for shareholders.
10 However, in discharging the statutory role entrusted by s 411, the Court is dependent upon the discharge by counsel for the moving party of the obligation to make disclosure and to draw matters of significance to the attention of the Court.
11 The matters to be considered were summarised recently by Vaughan J in Re Wesfarmers Ltd; Ex parte Wesfarmers Ltd [2018] WASC 308 at [60]-[63]. I deal with those matters below.
12 Barrick Mining is a Part 5.1 body. As there is only one shareholder of Barrick Mining no issue arises as to separate classes of shareholders.
13 The proposed scheme is an arrangement between Barrick Mining and Barrick Admin as its sole shareholder. It will afford some benefit to shareholders in the form of efficiency gains in circumstances where the undertaking of Barrick Mining is confined to being a holder of the royalty interests. All of the undertaking of Barrick Mining as the holder of the royalty interests will be transferred to Barrick Admin which will carry on that undertaking. The ultimate shareholders of the two companies are the same.
14 The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) was notified of the proposed scheme and given the required opportunity to consider the terms of the scheme and the explanatory statement and to make submissions to the Court. It did not seek to appear and make submissions.
15 There was a waiver of the need for an independent expert's report.
16 The explanatory statement provided a proper disclosure of the proposed scheme which was accurately summarised in written submissions provided in support of the application. The key information as to the assets and liabilities of Barrick Mining and the financial circumstances of Barrick Admin was verified by affidavit by those familiar with the financial circumstances of the companies. A checklist was provided which confirmed that the statement contained the information prescribed by Part 3 of Schedule 8 to the Corporations Regulations 2001 (Cth).
17 Having regard to the stated purpose of the scheme which I have described, it was bona fide and properly proposed. No oppression issue could arise. There was nothing to suggest that it was advanced to defeat the interests of creditors. Any unknown creditors would be able to proceed against an entity which holds the same assets to which there may be resort to meet a liability. Further Barrick Admin has other financial resources of about $2,500,000 and is currently supported by a cross guarantee. Also, there were benefits to creditors being able to proceed against Barrick Admin rather than have to seek to reinstate Barrick Mining and proceed in that way if arrangements were made for the voluntary liquidation of Barrick Mining.
18 No issue arose as to whether the purpose of the scheme was to avoid the application of Chapter 6 of the Corporations Act.
19 The procedural requirements concerning a chairperson and alternative chairperson for the meeting of shareholders were met. Although updated company searches were not provided with the application, they were provided before the hearing of the application for approval to convene the meeting.
20 There is no prohibition in the constitution of Barrick Mining that would prevent the scheme.
21 In all the circumstances, the scheme was one which, if it was approved, would be likely to be approved by the Court in the absence of any opposition.
22 In those circumstances, I concluded that it was appropriate to approve the convening of the meeting to approve the scheme.