Antwan Barich applies by motion for an order that Parramatta City Council (the Council) pay his costs of successfully appealing to the Court under s 526 of the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW). That appeal was brought to the Court following the Council's deemed refusal of an application made by Mr Barich to change the rating subcategory of his land known as 83 Marion Street, Harris Park (the property). The property is within an area that is relatively close to the Parramatta City Council Business District.
The appeal by Mr Barich fell within Class 3 of the Court's jurisdiction: s 19(d) Land and Environment Court Act 1979 (NSW) (the Court Act). The application for costs made by Mr Barich therefore engages the provisions of r 3.7 of the Land and Environment Court Rules 2007 (LECR). By subrule (2) of that rule, the Court is enjoined from ordering the payment of costs unless it "considers that the making of an order as to the whole or any part of the costs is fair and reasonable in the circumstances".
[2]
Background
The facts of the case and the reasons for decision are recited in a detailed judgment delivered by the Senior Commissioner on 16 December 2014 (Barich v Parramatta City Council [2014] NSWLEC 1259). I do not repeat the matters set out in the judgment except to the extent necessary to provide a background to the dispute and to refer to those facts emerging both from the judgment and supplementary evidence to which I have been referred for the purpose of deciding Mr Barich's motion.
The property had first been categorised as "Business-CBD" for rating purposes in July 1995. That rating subcategory continued to apply to the property when the Council adopted rates for the 2013/14 financial year.
On 3 January 2014, solicitors acting for Mr Barich made an application to the Council to change the rating subcategory of the property from "Business-CBD" to "Business-General". That application was made under the provisions of s 525 of the Local Government Act. When determining the application, the obligation imposed upon the Council under s 525(3) was expressed in the following terms:
"(3) The council must declare the land to be within the category nominated in the application unless it has reasonable grounds for believing that the land is not within that category."
By subsection (5) of the same section, the Council is required to notify an applicant for re-categorisation of its decision while by subsection (6) a Council is taken to have declared the land to be within its existing category if it fails to notify an applicant of its decision within 40 days after the application is made. The latter position pertained in the present case, thereby entitling Mr Barich to exercise the right of appeal to this Court under s 526(1) of the Local Government Act.
The appeal to this Court was filed on 14 March 2014. The orders sought included a declaration that the property be categorised as "Business-General" for rating purposes, and that the declaration of subcategory "to take effect as of 1 July 2013."
There are several facts or events that need to be noticed for the purpose of determining the present motion. The Council responded on 17 January 2014 to Mr Barich's application to change the rating subcategory of the property. In that response it indicated that it was "reviewing" the property, along with a number of other properties that were the subject of a similar application, and that its decision would be provided "within the next 30 days". No decision was, in fact, notified to Mr Barich or his solicitors within that time.
Although the evidence in the following regard is unsatisfactory, it would seem that the "review" referred to in the Council's letter of 17 January 2014 may have had its origin in a Mayoral Minute tabled at a meeting of the Council on 11 November 2013. In that Minute the Mayor asserted that the "charging of CBD-Business Rates" for properties in Harris Park "was an administrative error". Although his Minute sought to have "correct rating notices" issued, it is apparent that his recommendation was not adopted by the Council. The Minute does record that the rating subcategory topic had been the subject of consideration at a meeting of the Council on 14 October 2013 but that consideration of the matter was deferred "for a meeting with affected land owners". The Minute also records that a meeting with affected rate payers was subsequently convened but there is no evidence recording the resolution of the Council following the meeting of 11 November 2013.
A further Mayoral Minute was tabled at a meeting of the Council on 14 April 2014. Among the recommendations in that Minute was one that the Business-CBD rate on affected properties "in the Harris Park neighbourhood shops precinct" be replaced with a "Business-General Rate effective from 1 July 2014". The Mayoral Minute also recommended the imposition of an infrastructure levy for persons paying the proposed Business-General Rate.
Again, the evidence does not reveal the terms of the resolution passed by the Council on 14 April 2014 in response to the Mayoral Minute. However, it is apparent that the Mayoral recommendation was not adopted at that time. It was not until the Council meeting of 23 June 2014 that the Council resolved to impose rates and charges for the 2014/15 rating year and in so doing to change the rating subcategory of properties at Harris Park that were formerly subject to the "Business-CBD" rate to a "Business-General" rate. The Council then also resolved to impose the infrastructure levy that had been the subject of the April Mayoral Minute.
As will be apparent, the two Mayoral Minutes to which I have referred and the Council resolution to change the rating subcategory from "Business-CBD" to "Business-General" were events that all occurred during the 2013/14 rating year, being the year during which Mr Barich, in his Class 3 application, had sought to have the "Business-General" categorisation take effect. Notwithstanding these events, the Council maintained in these proceedings that for the year in respect of which Mr Barich had sought that changed categorisation, the "Business-CBD" subcategory should be maintained. For his part, Mr Barich places considerable reliance upon the position taken by the Council, having regard to the Mayoral Minutes and the decision made by the Council during the 2013/14 year, in support of his claim for costs. It will be necessary to refer further to these matters in due course.
A further matter of importance in the arguments addressed to me was the decision of Pearson C in Barrak Corporation Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council [2014] NSWLEC 1077 (Barrak No 1). By that decision, delivered on 9 May 2014, the Commissioner determined another appeal brought to the Court under s 526 of the Local Government Act, relating to land in Wigram Street, Harris Park and located about 430m from the property. The Wigram Street land had the same zoning history as well as the same history of rating categorisation of "Business-CBD" as each applied to the property. As in the present case, Barrak Corporation, as owner of the Wigram Street land, appealed from the Council's refusal to change the rating subcategory to "Business-General" for the 2013/14 rating year.
That appeal was dismissed by the Commissioner, with the consequence that the "Business-CBD" category remained applicable for the year in question. An appeal by Barrak Corporation under s 56A of the Court Act was dismissed by Biscoe J on 18 November 2014 (Barrak Corporation Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council [2014] NSWLEC 177 (Barrak No 2). The Council places some reliance upon the decisions in the Wigram Street litigation as supporting its position in opposing Mr Barich's appeal.
For the purpose of determining the present appeal, the Senior Commissioner identified the requirement imposed by s 529(2) of the Local Government Act that for a subcategory of a "business" rate to be determined, it was necessary to do so "according to a centre of activity". Thus, in order to apply the provisions of s 525(3) that I have earlier set out, the Senior Commissioner focused upon a determination as to whether, in his assessment, there were reasonable grounds to conclude that the property was within the centre of activity identified by the "Business-CBD" area as defined on a Council map. If he was not so satisfied, it was accepted by both parties, consistent with the subsection, that the "default" subcategory would apply, namely that of "Business-General".
Although the result reached by the Senior Commissioner differed from that reached by Pearson C in Barrak No 1, the Senior Commissioner placed significant reliance upon both the approach taken by her to the application of the statutory provisions, as well as what he described as "the careful and comprehensive analysis of the common framework history of the site with which [Pearson C] was dealing and that which is the subject of these proceedings" (at [11]). Indeed, the Senior Commissioner obtained the agreement from counsel for the parties in the present proceedings that the "non site-specific elements of Pearson C's analysis up to and including [58] of her decision applied equally in these proceedings" (at [12]). While acknowledging the difference in ultimate result reached in his decision, the Senior Commissioner identified that result as having been reached applying the same "analytical processes" as had been applied in Barrak No 1 and sustained as not revealing legal error in Barrak No 2 (at [18]). There was one variance that the Senior Commissioner described as "minor" to which I will come in due course.
Having identified the principles and analytical process to be undertaken in order to decide the matter, the Senior Commissioner then proceeded to identify in some detail the factual matters relevant to his ultimate decision. Apart from the land use zoning and rating history of the property, the factual considerations appear to have turned largely upon observations made by the Senior Commissioner in the course of a site inspection held on the first day of hearing. Having recorded those observations, the Senior Commissioner then set out at [109] what he described as the "broad hierarchical framework" that informed his decision, involving:
"● acceptance that there is a centre of activity comprising the Parramatta Central Business District;
● adopting the analytic framework discussed by Pearson C of there being a core, middle and fringe for the Central Business District but that the CBD is not and cannot be homogenous;
● noting that the scale of built form in Marion Street finds many equivalents in the CBD;
● analysing issues of separation and connectivity;
● noting that centre of activity encompasses a range of uses that include (or can include) the uses in the Marion Street strip;
● consideration of the purposes to which uses in the Marion Street strip and those in the CBD are put; and
● then considering the position of 83 Marion Street within this framework."
He then concluded that on the various indicators that were considered relevant, "there were not reasonable grounds to conclude that the 83 Marion Street should be included in the Central Business District rating subcategory". Clearly, that determination was made on the basis of the merit considerations applied to the framework that I have quoted from [109].
[3]
Application to amend operative date
Notwithstanding the terms in which Mr Barich's Class 3 application was framed, in the course of the hearing Mr Barich's counsel indicated that he sought to have the determination made that the change of subcategory should take effect from 2001 (cf s 526(3) of the Local Government Act). Subsequently, an application to amend the Class 3 application to achieve that end was foreshadowed.
This course was opposed by counsel for the Council on the basis that the case had been prepared in the belief that it related only to the 2013/14 rating year. In the result, the Senior Commissioner indicated that he would determine the case as so prepared but defer consideration of any application to amend until after he had made his determination of what he described as "the foundational proposition" (at [38]). An entitlement to make the application for amendment was, in substance, reserved to Mr Barich when judgment was delivered by the Senior Commissioner on 16 December 2014. However, the solicitors acting for Mr Barich subsequently indicated that no such application would be pursued.
This circumstance has relevance to the present application for costs. The result of the Senior Commissioner's decision is that rates approximating $4,600 levied on the property were overpaid for the 2013/14 year. As I have earlier recorded, the rating subcategory sought by Mr Barich was determined by the Council to apply for the 2014/15 rating year.
As a consequence, both the substantive hearing and the hearing on costs have, at a practical level, involved a dispute about the sum of $4,600. Undoubtedly the costs incurred by the parties in running a two day case, with solicitors and counsel appearing before the Senior Commissioner, as well as running the costs hearing before me, with the same level of legal representation, were disproportionate to the primary sum at stake in the proceedings. This is a lamentable situation.
[4]
The relevant costs principles
Both parties accepted that the determination of the present application for costs is governed by r 3.7 of the LECR. Subrule (2) relevantly provides:
"(2) The Court is not to make an order for the payment of costs unless the Court considers that the making of an order as to the whole or any part of the costs is fair and reasonable in the circumstances."
Subrule (3) of r 3.7 identifies circumstances in which the Court "might consider the making of a costs order to be fair and reasonable" (added emphasis) to include, without limitation, a number of circumstances identified in the subrule. Mr Barich relies upon two such circumstances:
1. defending the appeal when it was unreasonable to do so, there being no reasonable prospects of success (r 3.7(3)(d) and (f)); and
2. the Council delayed unreasonably in providing documents that it was obliged to provide (r 3.7(3)(b)(i)).
Rule 3.7(2) has been described as a "presumptive rule", that is, it is to be presumed that costs are not ordered in proceedings to which the rule is expressed to apply (Arden Anglican School v Hornsby Shire Council [2008] NSWLEC 103; 158 LGERA 224 at [6]). In considering the exercise of a discretion against the presumption identified in the subrule, all relevant circumstances must be considered in order to determine whether, in their totality, they are sufficient to displace the presumption. As Pepper J observed in Hillsong Church Ltd v Council of the City of Sydney (No 2) [2012] NSWLEC 118 at [42], the particular circumstances identified in subrule (3) are neither prescriptive nor exhaustive of those circumstances that may justify the exercise of discretion against the presumption. So much must follow from the opening words of the subrule referring to circumstances that the Court "might" consider the making of an order to be fair and reasonable.
The circumstance that Mr Barich was successful in his appeal is not, of itself, sufficient to displace the presumption reflected in r 3.7(2) (Maygood Australia Pty Ltd v Willoughby City Council [2013] NSWLEC 142 at [40]). As Pepper J also observed in that case, if success, of itself, was sufficient to override the presumption, the provisions of r 3.7(2) would be rendered otiose.
[5]
The applicants submissions
In supporting this application for costs, Mr Barich principally relies upon the Mayoral Minutes to which I have already referred as well as the resolution of Council on 23 June 2014 to change the rating subcategory applicable to the property. Without intending any disservice to the detailed submissions made on behalf of Mr Barich, the circumstances and events identified in his submissions are these:
1. the decision of the Council to change the rating subcategory was made before the hearing of the appeal, thereby rendering it "obvious" that the "Business-CBD" subcategory was no longer sustainable;
2. while that decision was expressed to take effect for the 2014/15 rating year, it was a decision made in the rating year to which the appeal related, a circumstance that could not reasonably justify any difference in the subcategory applicable to the property between the 2013/14 year and the 2014/15 year;
3. the reasoning of the Senior Commissioner "demonstrates" that the basis for the "Business-CBD" subcategory ceased in 2001 when the property ceased to be zoned under the relevant planning instrument in the same manner as the Parramatta CBD area was zoned;
4. in response to "public outcry" concerning the rating of business land at Harris Park, the Council had convened a public meeting in November 2013 as a consequence of which the first of the two Mayoral Minutes was tabled during that same month, recommending that the rating subcategory was in error and that it be changed to "Business-General" - a recommendation reiterated in the Mayoral Minute of 14 April 2014, tabled one month after the present appeal had been commenced;
5. these circumstances demonstrate that "the Council had itself recognised, during the currency of this appeal, that the categorisation was wrong", rendering it unreasonable for the Council to continue to defend the appeal over two days of hearing.
These, in summary, reflect the essence of the submissions made by Mr Barich by reference to r 3.7(3)(d) and (f).
A second topic that was the subject of submissions by reference to r 3.7(3)(b)(i), although "not as a stand-alone ground" to sustain the application for costs, was the failure of the Council to produce documents that were the subject of a Notice to Produce served upon the Council in mid-October 2014, a little over three weeks prior to the hearing of the appeal. That notice sought documents "coming into existence between 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014" relating to reviews undertaken by the Council of rates applicable to Harris Park and the removal of the "Business-CBD" rate on affected properties in that area to be replaced by the "Business-General" subcategory. Initially, the Council resisted production of those documents and the reasons for so doing are reflected in an exchange of correspondence with the solicitors acting for Mr Barich.
However, those documents were produced on the day prior to the hearing. The only document of relevance that is identified for present purposes and which was then produced was the Mayoral Minute of 14 April 2014. It is not contended on behalf of Mr Barich that the late production of the documents, including that Mayoral Minute, affected the conduct of his case. However, it is suggested that had he known of the existence of that Minute, it would have been used prior to the hearing to found representations to the Council that it should no longer continue to defend the appeal.
In a letter dated 20 August 2014, the solicitors for the Council had noted that the practical effect of the appeal involved a debate about the difference in rates applicable to the property for the 2013/14 year, depending upon the rating subcategory to be applied. In light of the relatively small sum that Mr Barich could recover by way of refund in the event of success, he was invited to consider the practical utility of proceeding, having regard to the quantum of costs likely to be incurred by the parties in the event that the appeal was prosecuted to conclusion. In their response by letter dated 27 August 2014, the solicitors acting for Mr Barich, invited the Council to "cease and desist from defending [the] appeal" and to consent to the orders sought in the Class 3 application that had been filed.
Neither party capitulated to the requests made by the other in this regard. Each party makes reference to this exchange of correspondence as relevant to the determination to be made on the costs application.
[6]
Consideration
I am not persuaded that this is an appropriate case in which to override the presumption that no order for costs be made in the proceedings. The decision of the Senior Commissioner involved an evaluative judgment made upon the facts that he found. That exercise involved nothing more than is commonplace - indeed essential - to the determination of a merit appeal brought in proceedings that fall within Classes 1, 2 and 3 of this Court's jurisdiction. The presumptive rule as to costs is directed to such an exercise.
In so concluding, I rely, as I must, upon the reasons for judgment of the Senior Commissioner, together with such further evidence as was tendered before me that is relevant to the conduct of the proceedings, but only so far as that conduct bears upon the claim that the presumptive rule should not be applied because it is fair and reasonable that an order be made in favour of Mr Barich. I frame the matter in this way because of the reliance placed by Mr Barich upon the Mayoral Minutes to which I have referred and the Council's resolution of 23 June 2014. Those Mayoral Minutes together with the Council's resolution were known to the Senior Commissioner. So much is apparent from his historical context summary at [32], substantially taken from Barrak No 1. Yet the reasoning of the Senior Commissioner discloses no reliance upon either those Minutes or the Council's resolution as informing his decision. The essence of that decision is reflected in the conclusion expressed at [101] - [110] of the judgment with [109], earlier quoted, identifying "the broad hierarchical framework" involved in the matters that were considered.
The submission by Mr Barich that the reasoning of the Senior Commissioner "demonstrates that the basis for sub-categorising the property as Business-CBD" ceased in 2001 because of the changed statutory planning regime then implemented is inconsistent with the judgment. On the contrary, the Senior Commissioner was at pains to make clear at several points in his judgment that his decision was reached having regard only to contemporary facts. His position is encapsulated at [54] where he said:
"54 Before continuing to set out what I consider to be the relevant factors leading to the conclusion that I have reached, it is important to note that this conclusion has been reached on the confined facts and circumstances that define the context of 83 Marion Street as at the date of my site inspection. Nothing is to be inferred from this determination that I have reached any tentative conclusion (let alone some firm position) that would infer that any substantial degree of retrospectivity was appropriate to be applied to my determination that the re-subcategorisation sought by the applicant should prevail."
I can accept, based on the first Mayoral Minute, that from October 2013 the subcategorisation of business rates to be applied within the Harris Park business precinct was being considered by the Council. Clearly, there was pressure from ratepayers so to do. However, I am unaware of any provision of the Local Government Act that gives any particular or special status to a Mayoral Minute and no such provision was identified to me on behalf of Mr Barich. In the absence of evidence of the resolution of the Council following the tabling of the November 2013 Mayoral Minute, it cannot be assumed that the Council, as a collegiate body, accepted the assertion by the Mayor that the "Business-CBD" rate upon properties in Harris Park, including the property, was the consequence of "administrative error" requiring immediate adjustment and credit adjustment of overpaid rates.
Moreover, the fact that the then rating subcategory was being considered and the new "Business-General" rating category determined to be applied in the resolution of 23 June 2014 does not logically support the submission by Mr Barich that the "Business-CBD" subcategory was not sustainable for the 2013/14 rating year. In the language of s 525(3) of the Local Government Act the decision of the Council to change the subcategory in one year does not, without more, establish that it did not have "reasonable grounds" to adopt or maintain the "Business-CBD" subcategory in the previous year. As the Council submitted, the nature of the decision maker must also be born in mind. The Council is a body politic and the explanation for change may reflect that it yielded to the pressure being brought upon it by lobbying rate payers.
This is certainly a theme that appears to have been embraced by the Senior Commissioner in the course of argument. The transcript of argument was tendered before me without objection. It reveals the following exchange between the Senior Commissioner and counsel for Mr Barich (Tcpt 13/11/14, 45.30-46.9):
"Counsel: The council itself has come to recognise the reality that a neighbourhood shopping centre should be treated like other neighbourhood shopping centres.
Commissioner: I'm not sure that one could draw the conclusion that had been reached on the basis of the analysis required by s 525(3)
Counsel: Maybe, maybe not, we don't know …
…
Counsel: We know as a fact that the Council has changed its mind
Commissioner: We know that the Council has changed its mind. The elected Council is a political body which may often move in mysterious and unrevealed fashions
Counsel: But what I say is that document does disclose some of those reasons.
Commissioner: I understand. It discloses what are stated to be reasons … But I'm simply saying that the Council's reasoning process may not be - and I don't think that I'm obliged to conclude that it is - the statutory reasoning process that I am obliged to apply…"
The absence of any reliance upon either the Mayoral Minutes or the resolution of 23 June 2014 in the Senior Commissioner's reasons for concluding as he did, strongly suggests that the view expressed by him in argument was one he maintained at the time of making his decision. As the Council also submitted, the assignment of ratings subcategories "is a classically polycentric decision made by a political/representative body (a Council) for the purposes of distributing the rates burden across the community".
In these circumstances, it seems to me that the Council was entitled, based on legal advice, to continue to defend its position by applying the statutory test identified in s 525(3) to maintain the "Business-CBD" rating subcategory. The reasonableness of its stance in so doing was, to my mind, reinforced by the decision in Barrak No 1.
Mr Barich submitted that Barrak No 1 had no bearing upon the course of conduct undertaken by the Council in defending its position. As I have earlier recorded, significant reliance was placed upon that decision by the Senior Commissioner, notwithstanding that in the present case he did not reach the same result as that reached by Pearson C. As the Senior Commissioner acknowledged, that difference in result was a consequence of the factual conclusions that he drew in respect of the property which differed from those that applied to the land considered in Barrak No 1.
I have earlier recorded that a distance of about 430m separates the Wigram Street land, the subject of Barrak No 1, from the property. Both properties are located in the Harris Park business precinct and as the Senior Commissioner found by reference to "historical elements", both properties shared the same rating and planning history. The relevant business zoned area in Harris Park is identified in the Senior Commissioner's judgment at [58] as being a contiguous area adjacent to the rail line which represents the boundary between that precinct and the currently zoned area of the Parramatta City CBD. The Wigram Street property lies to the north of the contiguous area while the property is located in the southern section of that same area. In short, there are a number of factors relevant to the fixing of a rate subcategory that are common to both properties.
Although elements of each location needed to be considered for the purpose of making the relevant determination under s 525(3), there were a sufficient number of common elements to justify the reliance placed by the Council upon the decision in Barrak No 1 in its defence of the proceedings. The reasonableness of this reliance was, at least in part, reinforced by an observation made by Pearson C in the course of her judgment.
At [88] of Barrak No 1 she addressed a submission on behalf of Barrak that as the "Business-General" subcategory already applied to properties on the northern side of Marion Street (directly opposite the property) it was anomalous that the Wigram Street land did not fall within the same category. This contention was rejected by the Commissioner who indicated that rather than the anomaly being attributed to the Wigram Street land, it should be attributed to the land on the northern side of Marion Street, with the result that the argument provided no foundation to sustain the change of subcategory sought by the applicant in that case. However, the Commissioner acknowledged that for the purpose of the case being decided by her, she did not need to resolve the position that pertained in respect of the Marion Street land. While her observations in that regard were not germane to her decision, as the Senior Commissioner identified in the present case at [24], and were not embraced by him, those observations by Pearson C did provide a reasonable basis for the Council to contend that for the 2013/14 rating year there were reasonable grounds for believing that the property was not within the "Business-General" subcategory. Such a contention was consistent with the ultimate determination made by Pearson C.
I have earlier made reference to the lamentable circumstance that this litigation has effectively extended over three hearing days with the legal costs incurred appearing to be disproportionate to the sum at stake. While it is apparent from the exchange of correspondence between the solicitors for the parties that they were conscious of this circumstance, both the substantive hearing and the hearing on costs have each proceeded to conclusion. As Mr Barich had contended before the Senior Commissioner that the change of category to "Business-General" should be back-dated to 2001, the Council, understandably, maintained its defence of the appeal, lest any finding made by the Senior Commissioner had implications for the retrospective determination that was foreshadowed. It was not unreasonable for the Council so to do.
Finally, the submission by Mr Barich that the failure of the Council to produce documents in response to a notice to produce that had been issued until the eve of the hearing does not persuade me that, as an additional factor directed to the Council's conduct, it should be ordered to pay his costs. Even assuming, without deciding, that the documents sought had potential relevance, in expressing the conclusion just stated I take account of the following factors:
1. production of those documents was only sought some three weeks before the hearing when, it must be assumed, preparation of the matter for hearing was well advanced by both parties, with the consequence that considerable costs had been incurred to that point in time; and
2. no prejudice was asserted by reason of the late production of documents other than an asserted denial of the opportunity by Mr Barich to make submissions to the Council that, in light of the Mayoral Minute of April 2014, it could not succeed in its defence of the appeal: a proposition that, even in light of the Senior Commissioner's ultimate finding, was contestable.
[7]
Conclusion and orders
Applying the provisions of LECR r 3.7, I do not consider it to be fair and reasonable to order the Council to pay Mr Barich's costs of the appeal. While Mr Barich was successful in his appeal, that circumstance alone does not override the presumption implicit in r 3.7(2). For the reasons I have earlier stated, the Council did not act unreasonably in conducting and defending the proceedings. Nothing in the reasons of the Senior Commissioner supports the submissions of Mr Barich to the contrary.
In the result, Mr Barich's Notice of Motion of 13 January 2015 seeking an order for payment of costs will be dismissed. As his motion has been unsuccessful, I presently see no reason why the Council should not have its costs on that motion.
The orders that I make are therefore as follows:
1. The applicant's notice of motion dated and filed 13 January 2015 is dismissed.
2. The applicant must pay the respondent's costs of that motion unless by 5.00pm on 25 June 2015 he notifies both my Associate and the Council that a different order is sought.
3. The exhibits may be returned.
[8]
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Decision last updated: 18 June 2015