The legal context
12 A consent determination like this is a very important proceeding. It establishes for the whole Australian community that an indigenous people has legally enforceable native title rights and interests over the land and waters that it covers. I have summarised some of the important matters for all of those involved in a consent determination in earlier decisions and will draw on those in what I now say (see Lampton on behalf of the Juru People v State of Queensland [2014] FCA 736 at [4]-[6]).
13 The recognition and protection of native title by our nation's common law in the landmark decision of Mabo v State of Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 and by the Parliament of the Commonwealth when it passed the Act enabled Indigenous Australians and their descendants to satisfy the very human desire to identify with, enjoy and feel a part of their cultural heritage on land and waters with which they have, and feel, a spiritual and emotional connection. When the Court makes an order for a determination of native title, it exercises the judicial power of the Commonwealth, on behalf of the whole of the Australian community, to recognise the indigenous claimants' rights and interests as having the force of law in both social systems: cf Long v Northern Territory of Australia [2011] FCA 571 at [6] per Mansfield J.
14 A determination by the Court that native title exists serves many important purposes, as the preamble to the Act acknowledges. These include the recognition of the entitlement of Indigenous Australians to enjoy rights and interests in their land and waters, in accordance with their peoples' traditional laws and customs. Those rights and interests were not previously recognised, following European settlement and the displacement and frequent dispossession of Indigenous Australians. However, from today, the rights and interests of the Bandjalang people in the 52 parcels will be protected by the force of law so that the current and future descendants of the original indigenous inhabitants before the 1840s will enjoy rights and interests that their ancestors had.
15 The different land councils held all of the 52 parcels under the Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (NSW). Because there are differences between the rights under that Act and the rights of native title holders under the Native Title Act, some difficult issues arose when the parties were negotiating for the 2013 determination. As a result, those parcels could not be included in the 2013 determination. The land councils and their legal representatives have engaged co-operatively with the applicant and the State in arriving at the terms of the s 87 agreement and today's consent determination.
16 The Court has not had a hearing of the applicant's claim on its merits. Even so, the Court has an important power to make a determination that native title over land and waters exists under s 87 of the Act once all of the parties have signed a written agreement, and provided that certain other conditions are met. In these proceedings, the Attorney-General of New South Wales, as the responsible Minister of State, has consented to the making of the determination of native title. Before the Court can make the orders recognising native title, it must be satisfied that the consent determination has been reached after proper consideration by the parties, particularly the State, of all of the matters that the Act requires be established. This consensual process depends upon the executive government of each State and Territory in whose jurisdiction the claim is made taking an active role in the litigation. The government must scrutinise carefully any claim for native title in order to seek to protect the interests of the whole community that it represents: Munn (for and on behalf of the Gunggari People) v Queensland (2001) 115 FCR 109 at 115 [29] per Emmett J.
17 I will now deal with the legal and factual issues that I must decide in order to make the consent determination. Under ss 87(1A) and (2) of the Act, the Court has a special power to make an order to recognise native title rights and interests in, or consistent with, the terms of the parties' agreement if it appears to the Court to be appropriate to do so. The power must be exercised having regard to the beneficial purpose of the Act and its moral foundation that is declared in the words of its preamble: Northern Territory of Australia v Alyawarr, Kaytetye, Warumungu, Wakaya Native Title Claim Group (2005) 145 FCR 442 at 461 [63] per Wilcox, French and Weinberg JJ.
18 In making a determination that native title exists, even by consent and without a hearing, the Court must set out details of the matters mentioned in s 225 (s 94A). Accordingly, if the Court is asked to make a consent determination, it must be satisfied that there is sufficient evidence before it that would make it appropriate to do so. However, it is not necessary for the parties to tender evidence as if they were still contesting the proceedings. That is not the purpose for which such evidence is required. Rather, as a former Chief Justice of Australia explained, it may be necessary to reassure the Court that a proper basis exists for the determination because "… the agreement is rooted in reality" (The Hon R.S. French AC, Native Title - A Constitutional Shift?, published in: H.P. Lee and P. Gerangelos (ed), Constitutional Advancement in a Frozen Continent: Essays in Honour of George Winterton, The Federation Press, 2009, pp 126-154).
19 What evidence will be sufficient will vary from case to case, but it must show that the orders have a substantive and real foundation. Anthropological evidence is often tendered so as to assist the Court in arriving at this degree of satisfaction. Evidence is relevant for the Court to satisfy itself that the parties had a real basis to arrive at their consent. Indeed, in the first place, because of its cogency, the same evidence is likely to have induced the respondents, especially the Government, to consent to the making of the determination of native title.
20 However, I must still be satisfied that the parties' agreement to include the Bandjalang people's native title rights and interests in the old school site in the orders that I am asked to make today would be within the power of the Court (s 87(1)(c)).