Proposed in specie distribution of shares owned by the Company
By Interlocutory Process filed on 20 April 2018, Mr Hugh Thomas as liquidator ("Liquidator") of Anne Lewis Pty Ltd (in liq) ("Company") seeks certain directions from the Court, in respect of the distribution of the surplus funds in the Company to the Defendants, who include Mr David Lewis as representative of the estate of the late Mrs Pamela Lewis. Paragraph 7 of that Interlocutory Process raises a question, which had previously been determined, but was to some extent sought to be reagitated today, whether the Liquidator should have leave to make an in specie distribution of the shares held by the Company to the Second and Third Defendants, allowing for adjustments as between all Defendants. I infer that that order is formulated in that way because the Second and Third Defendants, Mr Peter Lewis and Mr Roger Lewis, seek to have an in specie distribution of shares in the Company made to them. The First Defendant, Mr David Lewis, as representative of the estate of the late Mrs Pamela Lewis, has expressed a preference, to which I refer below, not to have an in specie distribution of shares made to the estate of the late Mrs Pamela Lewis, although that is put more widely as a proposition that no in specie distribution of shares should be made to any of the Defendants.
It is not ultimately necessary, or appropriate, for the Court to make order 7 sought in the Liquidator's Interlocutory Process, because that question has previously been determined by the Court, in a manner which remains operative and which does not require a further direction to be made. I will explain, below, the way in which that determination has come about, how it is that it remains operative, and I will also note the sensible way in which the Liquidator has indicated that he proposes to approach the different views of the contributories as to the form of the distribution.
Previously, by an Amended Originating Process filed on 7 July 2016, the Liquidator sought orders as to a range of matters, including an order granting leave under s 488(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) to distribute the surplus in the liquidation of the Company to the Defendants, who then included Mrs Pamela Lewis, prior to her death in February 2017. The Amended Originating Process also sought leave for an in specie distribution of shares to the Defendants. By my judgment delivered on 9 November 2016 ([2016] NSWSC 1860) ("2016 Judgment"), I dealt with the question whether a direction should be given to the Liquidator that he was justified in making an in specie distribution of shares, and made a direction under s 479 of the Corporations Act that he would be justified in distributing the surplus, including by way of an interim distribution, by making an in specie distribution of the shares held by the Company. It will immediately be noted that that judgment, and the order which gave effect to it applied to the distribution of the surplus as a whole and were expressly inclusive of the interim distribution. I also noted in paragraph 13 of the 2016 Judgment that the order sought by the Liquidator was framed in terms that invited me to approach the question of a distribution in specie generally, and not only for the purposes for the interim distribution, and I expressed the view that it was appropriate that I do so, so that the matter need not be addressed again in respect of a third distribution, unless there is any change in circumstances. The reference to a change in circumstances was, of course, to the principles which govern the circumstances in which a judgment, and consequential order, which was strictly interlocutory in character, could be revisited.
I there noted that the question of an in specie distribution, in a case where a company was subject to Table A to the Companies Act 1936 (NSW), involved a matter of legal complexity. Mr Golledge, who appears for the Liquidator, has today submitted that the matter may have been simpler than I then apprehended. Mr Golledge has drawn attention to the Company's memorandum of association which expressly conferred a power upon the Company to distribute in kind any property of the Company among its members, and in particular any shares or securities of other companies belonging to the Company, or of which the Company may have the power to dispose. That, of course, is what the Company now proposes to do, by its liquidator, at least in respect of the Second and Third Defendants. Mr Golledge also draws attention to s 124 of the Corporations Act, which relevantly provides that a company has the legal capacity and powers of an individual, and also has all the powers of a body corporate, including the power to, relevantly, distribute any of the company's property among the members in kind or otherwise. As Mr Golledge recognises, that section applies to all companies, not only companies incorporated under the present Act, so far as it displaces the operation of the ultra vires rule in its narrower sense.
I did not in the 2016 Judgment have to determine the question whether the Company had the power to make such a distribution, under its memorandum of association or under s 124 of the Corporations Act, and I noted that it was sufficient that the unanimous consent of the members to an in specie distribution was then established. I also referred to authority, which is well-established, that the Court can make an order for an in specie distribution, where there was consent to that process, in an insolvency. On that basis, I made an order, which was strictly interlocutory in character on 9 November 2016, which was entered on 10 November 2016, which directed, pursuant to s 479 of the Act:
"That the liquidator would be justified in distributing the surplus, including the interim distribution the subject of order 1, by making an in specie distribution of the Share Portfolio."
It will again be noted that that order extended to an in specie distribution of the surplus as a whole and was inclusive of the interim distribution which the Liquidator then proposed to be made.
Since that date, it appears that there has been no change in the position of the Second and Third Defendants, who continue to wish to receive an in specie distribution of shares owned by the Company. There has, however, been a change in the view of the late Mrs Pamela Lewis as now expressed by Mr David Lewis as her representative. Mrs Lewis had previously herself consented to the making of an in specie distribution, at the time of the earlier hearing, but Mr David Lewis has expressed a different position. That change was indicated shortly after Mrs Lewis' death in February 2017, by a letter dated 21 June 2017 from the solicitors there acting for Mr David Lewis, described as the sole executor in the late Mrs Pamela Lewis' will. That letter referred to Mr David Lewis' opinion, given changing market value in shares, that the Liquidator should sell the shares and stapled securities, so that a cash fund would be held in the liquidation for distribution, and then pay necessary amounts from that cash fund. That letter noted that Mr David Lewis, implicitly in his capacity as executor to the will, would not give his consent to the "in specie distribution of the shares and stapled securities of the [C]ompany in liquidation". It should be noted, at that point, Mr David Lewis' consent to the in specie distribution, or the late Mrs Pamela Lewis' further consent to that distribution was not required, at least other than so far as the estate might be a recipient of shares to be distributed in specie, because the late Mrs Pamela Lewis had already given her consent to that distribution; the Court had noted it; and the Court had made orders, which remained in effect, that the Liquidator was justified in making such a distribution. By a further letter dated 6 July 2018, Mr David Lewis' solicitor reiterated Mr David Lewis' position and emphasised that he, as the representative of the estate, would not give his consent, and withdrew any consent previously provided by the late Mrs Pamela Lewis, to the in specie distribution of the remaining shares and stapled securities of the Company to the contributories and the Company.
It appears, from the affidavit evidence of Mr David Lewis filed in this application, that his position reflects a concern that there will be difficulties in implementing a transfer to the estate of the late Mrs Pamela Lewis, so far as no person is authorised to sign share transfers as transferee, and concerns that the Liquidator would no longer have the ability to amend share transfers forms after he is ultimately released. Mr Liebhold, who appears for Mr David Lewis as representative of the late Mrs Pamela Lewis in the application, also submitted that, after offsets against the distribution to be made to the late Mrs Pamela Lewis, the value of the shares distributed to her in specie will be worth $191,600, and Mrs Pamela Lewis was survived by four sons and seven grandchildren, and that it would be a burden, not a benefit, to the estate to distribute in specie shares worth that amount. That submission, although not directly supported by Mr David Lewis' evidence, provides an explanation why the estate may prefer to receive funds in cash, which can be readily divided amongst beneficiaries, rather than by an in specie distribution. It does not, however, provide any explanation as to why the estate takes the view that other contributories of the Company, who prefer to receive shares in specie, should not be entitled to do so. It is important to note, in that respect, that Mr Thomas's evidence, given both in his affidavit dated 18 April 2018 and in an updating affidavit dated 22 August 2018, is that he is able to comply with both a request to make an in specie distribution to the Second and Third Defendants and to make a distribution to the estate of Mrs Pamela Lewis in cash, by selling some of the shares and managed securities to make a cash distribution to the estate. That sensible suggestion of Mr Thomas did not, it appears, lead the estate to recognise that the simplest way in order to address this question would be for each party to obtain a distribution in the form they respectively preferred.
A further question was raised, in the course of submissions, whether there would be additional costs incurred in an in specie distribution. Mr Golledge fairly recognised that there would be some costs, by way of the Liquidator's remuneration, in administering an in specie distribution. Equally, he fairly pointed out that some costs would be saved, including the costs of brokerage upon a sale of the shares. It is impossible to determine whether there are any additional costs involved in an in specie distribution, because there is no evidence as to the quantum of the costs likely to be incurred and likely to be saved. So far as the estate may be motivated by a concern that such costs will occur, there is no evidentiary basis to establish that that concern is well-founded.
I have referred to the evidence as to these matters, which goes to the merit of the respective parties' position. It ultimately seems to me that the matter should be resolved on a narrower basis, although I will return to the merit of the position shortly below. The order made on 9 November 2016, as explained by the reasons for the 2016 Judgment, gave a wider direction to the Liquidator that he was justified in making an in specie distribution, in respect of the entirety of the surplus, and not merely in respect of the interim distribution. That direction remains in place and Mr Thomas is entitled to act upon it. Mr Golledge fairly recognised, and it is important to note, that that direction does not require Mr David Lewis to take a distribution in that form, particularly in respect of the estate which does not wish to receive a distribution in that form.
Although that order was interlocutory in character, in the sense that it did not finally resolve the proceedings, the authorities establish that it should only be revisited where there has been a material change in circumstances. In Brimaud v Honeysett Instant Print Pty Ltd (1988) 217 ALR 44 at 46, distinguished equity judge McLelland J observed that:
"The ordinary rule of practice is that an application to set aside, vary or discharge [an interlocutory order] must be founded on a material change of circumstances since the original application was heard, or the discovery of new material which could not reasonably have been put before the Court on the hearing of the original application."
That approach has been repeatedly followed in the authorities, with recent examples including the Court's decisions in Cody v Live Board Holdings (No 2) [2017] NSWSC 308 at [190]; Ballard v Brookfield Australia Investments Ltd [2013] NSWCA 82 at [11] and Maxiwealth Holdings Pty Ltd v The Mill Goulburn Pty Ltd [2018] NSWSC 290.
It seems to me, and Mr Liebhold ultimately came close to accepting, or accepted, that there has been no material change of circumstances since the original application was heard and there is no suggestion that any new material has been discovered which could not reasonably have previously been put before the Court in 2016. There is no suggestion, for example, that the tax position in respect of an in specie distribution is different from that which it was when the Court previously determined the matter or that the costs of an in specie distribution have increased since that point. Mr David Lewis' evidence goes no further than to establish that, in effect, Mrs Pamela Lewis, when deciding her own position, consented to an in specie distribution, and Mr David Lewis, after her death, takes a different view. In these circumstances, it seems to me that there is no occasion to reopen the 2016 Judgment or the orders there made. To the extent that leave would be required to reopen that question, I would not grant that leave in these circumstances.
I should note that, in the result, even if leave to revisit that earlier interlocutory order had been granted, it may be unlikely that it would have been varied. The evidence, as it stands, indicates that the approach that is most likely to benefit all parties, particularly where it is by no means clear that an in specie distribution is more costly than the sale of the shares, is that which the Liquidator sensibly proposes. That involves his making an in specie distribution of shares to the Second and Third Defendants, to the extent that they seek to receive such a distribution, and not making an in specie distribution to the estate of the late Mrs Pamela Lewis, but instead realising sufficient securities and other investments as are necessary to pay the amount due to the estate in money. That approach will advance the parties' respective interests in a manner that is consistent with the 2016 Judgment, so far as it indicated that the Liquidator was justified in making, but not required to make, an in specie distribution.
[3]
Claim for costs by the late Mrs Pamela Lewis and Mr David Lewis
Mr David Lewis, as representative of the estate of the late Mrs Pamela Lewis, also seeks an order that the late Mrs Pamela Lewis, or Mr David Lewis as her representative, be paid costs of the proceedings since, it appears, April 2016, or possibly prior to that date. That application partly involves a question of construction of an order that was previously made by the Court, and partly a question whether an order could, and should, now be made by the Court in August 2018, extending to costs on applications heard over two years ago.
The first question, then, is a question of construction of an order that I made on 11 November 2016, which read:
"The costs of this application are to form part of the costs of the winding up."
That application was an application brought by the Liquidator seeking several directions and orders in respect of the conduct of the winding up. It seems to me that, as a matter of the objective construction of that order, it extends only to the Liquidator's costs of the application. There are several reasons for that, and I emphasise they do not depend on my subjective intention in making the order, as distinct from the proper construction of that order in the circumstances.
The first is that the order was made, as Mr Golledge points out, in circumstances that the relevant application had been brought by the Liquidator. The costs of the application are, in the ordinary, course, the Liquidator's costs in bringing the application. If it was intended that the costs order be extended to costs of third parties, or persons joined to the application, then a specific order would likely have been made in that respect.
Second, the order was made in circumstances that I delivered an ex tempore judgment in which I observed that:
"An order is sought that the costs of the application form part of the costs of the winding up. The order was not opposed by Mrs Lewis and is plainly appropriate, where this application advanced the winding up in the interests of contributories, by ensuring that assets are made available to them by way of the interim distribution."
That observation could have made clearer that an order was sought by the Liquidator that his costs of the application form part of the costs of the winding up. However, that was plain enough in the context where, in fact, the Liquidator then sought that order and, as Mr Golledge points out, Mrs Pamela Lewis did not then seek an order for costs in her favour. That reading of that judgment, and of the order that gave effect to it, is supported by the second sentence which noted that the order was not opposed by Mrs Pamela Lewis, which would have been an unnecessary observation if that order extended to payment of Mrs Pamela Lewis's costs. Third, the matter to which I pointed in respect of the appropriateness of the order is a matter directed to the Liquidator's application and whether that application had advanced the winding up in the best interests of contributories.
Accordingly, as a matter of construction, the order made on 9 November 2016 did not extend any further than the Liquidator's costs of the application. I should add, since it appears there was a dispute as to this between the parties in correspondence, that that order in any event could have had no effect as to costs incurred after 9 November 2016, when the order was made. In the ordinary course, the costs of an application are the costs of the preparation and hearing of the application, and not of other steps taken over a long period subsequent to the application.
Mr Liebhold submits that, even if the Court takes that view as to the question of costs, it is nonetheless appropriate that an order now be made that the late Mrs Pamela Lewis's costs, since about March 2016, and Mr David Lewis's costs since he was appointed as Mrs Pamela Lewis's representative in or about June 2018, of relevant applications be paid as costs of the winding up. No doubt, the Court can in a proper case order than an applicant's costs be costs in the winding up, as is sometimes done in respect of creditor's costs of bringing a winding up application. However, there is no reason to make that order now, so far as it relates to matters prior to this application where the Court has dealt with the question of costs of previous applications in its previous judgments and in previous orders giving effect to those judgments. Although Mr Liebhold contends to the contrary, it seems to me that Mr David Lewis now seeks to reopen those earlier judgments, and have the orders then made amended so as to introduce an additional order for costs in favour of the late Mrs Pamela Lewis which was not then sought and was not then made. It does not seem to me that either a change in circumstances has been shown, or any new matter has been established that would not have been available to be raised at that time, so as to support such an order.
Second, in making an order for costs, the Court exercises a judicial discretion as to how costs should be paid. In order for Mr David Lewis to establish that an order should now be made in favour of the late Mrs Pamela Lewis in respect of applications prior to this application, it would have been necessary for him to lead evidence, and make submissions, that would have established a proper basis to exercise that discretion. The evidence led by Mr David Lewis does not, on any view, place the Court in a position now to exercise its discretion to order costs in favour of the late Mrs Pamela Lewis, where the merit of the position which she then adopted would be relevant to whether such an order should be made either in her favour, or indeed against her. That question was not raised at the time and the evidence now before me does not allow it to be now addressed.
Third, it is, on one view, premature to address the costs of Mr David Lewis's participation in the application today, and in preparatory works for that application since June 2018, when he was appointed as legal representative of the estate of the late Mrs Pamela Lewis. Ordinarily, an application for Mr David Lewis's costs of today's application would be made at the end of it, rather than in the midst of it. Having said that, I should observe that it seems to me that Mr David Lewis is not presently in a particularly strong position to pursue the costs of that application, although I should not and do not express any final view, and I will allow an opportunity for Mr Liebhold to be heard, at the conclusion of the application in the ordinary way. One difficulty which Mr David Lewis may face is that, although he may be a necessary party to the application, any party to an application has a choice as to the position that he or she takes in the application. The choice that Mr David Lewis has in fact made is to pursue, this morning, an unsuccessful application to reverse an earlier direction that the Liquidator would be justified in distributing shares in specie to the Second and Third Defendants, notwithstanding that the Liquidator had made clear throughout the application that he was prepared to make a distribution to the estate in money, in accordance with its wishes. The application which Mr Lewis has pursued this afternoon is an unsuccessful application, both as to construction of the costs orders that I previously made, and as to the exercise of the discretion as to costs, in respect of matters determined two years ago. No doubt, Mr David Lewis has been properly joined to the application as representative of the estate of the late Mrs Pamela Lewis, but it was open to him to support the Liquidator's application, or simply submit to an order of the Court other than as to costs. Where he has instead chosen to take two positions which have so far been unsuccessful, he may not be in the strongest position to pursue the costs of the application to date. Whether the same position arises in respect of other issues to be addressed today will emerge in due course.
I should indicate, however, that these are preliminary views. I have noted them at this point to give Mr David Lewis and his Counsel the opportunity to engage with them. I will, if time permits, or otherwise by written submissions, allow a further opportunity to address this matter when the proceeding today concludes.
[4]
Liquidator's remuneration and other orders
I now turn to the third issue to be determined in respect of the application brought by the Liquidator. The parties have reached agreement as to a range of orders to be made, but those orders nonetheless require the exercise of a discretion by the Court, and I should give reasons for the exercise of that discretion, which I am satisfied should be exercised as the parties propose.
First, the Liquidator seeks leave under s 488(2) of the Corporations Act to distribute the surplus funds in the liquidation of the Company to the estate of the late Mrs Pamela Lewis and the Second and Third Defendants as executors of the estate of the late Mr Geoffrey Lewis after payment of certain amounts, including outstanding tax liabilities and costs and expenses of the winding up, including the Liquidator's remuneration payable in accordance with these orders. The Liquidator has led evidence previously in these proceedings, and leads evidence again in this application, to indicate the manner in which the surplus has been calculated, including by realising the Company's assets and dealing with proofs of debts by creditors, who have all now been paid out. I reviewed the circumstances in which the Court can grant special leave for distribution of a surplus in the 2016 Judgment at [10]ff and I need not repeat that review. I am satisfied now, as I was satisfied then, that appropriate inquiries have been made to determine and meet the claims of creditors and that the amount that will now be payable, after the relevant expenses, can properly be treated as a surplus available for distribution, on this occasion likely being the last such surplus, after two interim distributions were made.
A second order, which is not contentious, provides that the distribution payable to the estate of the late Mrs Pamela Lewis will be paid into Court in probate proceedings, unless an administrator or executor has then been appointed to the estate. That order is appropriate, where it appears there is a contest in other proceedings as to the identity of the administrator or executor to be appointed.
Third, the parties have reached agreement as to certain adjustments as between them to determine the amounts to be payable to the contributories. This does not require any exercise of an active discretion by the Court, which can and should give effect to the agreement reached between the parties, where they each had access to legal advice in respect of that order.
Next, an order is sought for the purposes of reg 5.6.71 of the Corporations Regulations 2001 (Cth) that the Plaintiff need not annex a schedule in accordance with Form 551 to that order. Such an order is often made where a distribution of a surplus will be made to a small number of persons, and I previously made such an order in the 2016 Judgment. I am satisfied that such an order can properly be made on this occasion.
Fifth, an order is sought dealing with the books and records of the Company, by providing that a copy of them will be delivered to the Second and Third Defendants, as executors of the estate of Mr Geoffrey Lewis, or their nominated solicitor, and the original of those books and records to Mr David Lewis on his undertaking, by his Counsel, to preserve and retain possession of those books and records subject to any further order of the Court. It appears that that order is appropriate, where books and records may ordinarily be destroyed by a liquidator who will cease to hold office, but may be required in this case for the further proceedings that exist in respect of the late Mrs Pamela Lewis' estate. The proposed order preserves the integrity of those books and records, by ensuring that the originals are provided to Mr David Lewis, who is in one interest in the proceedings and on the basis that he will preserve them, with a copy made by the Liquidator provided to the Second and Third Defendants, who are in a different interest.
Sixth, an order is sought approving the Liquidator's remuneration for the period from 2 November 2016 to 10 August 2018 in a specified sum, and approving a further amount of remuneration, in a modest amount, for the period to completion of the liquidation, subject to an undertaking by Mr Thomas to repay that amount if a lesser remuneration is ultimately earned. The principles applicable to the determination of a liquidator's remuneration have been settled by the Court of Appeal's decision in Sanderson as Liquidator of Sakr Nominees Pty Ltd (in liq) v Sakr [2017] NSWCA 38, and involve questions both of proportionality and of the reasonableness of remuneration, and will often be facilitated by an assessment of that remuneration, referable to the value of property recovered by the liquidation. I reviewed those principles, after delivery of the Court of Appeal's decision, in my judgment in Re Sakr Nominees Pty Ltd [2017] NSWSC 668 and I need not repeat that review.
The Liquidator here leads detailed evidence in support of his claim for remuneration and, in particular, has addressed an issue noted in an earlier judgment, namely that he practices as a sole practitioner, by adjusting the rates that are charged so that a lesser amount is charged for work that would be done for persons of lesser seniority than him, if a larger firm was dealing with the matter. I am satisfied that the Liquidator's evidence establishes that the remuneration involved is reasonable in the relevant circumstances. In reaching that conclusion, I have regard to the factors formerly specified in s 473(10) of the Corporations Act, and now specified in the corresponding provisions in s 60-12 of the Insolvency Practice Schedule (Corporations), which include the extent to which the work performed was reasonably necessary, the period in which the work was performed, and the quality and complexity of the work. The liquidation has continued over a significant period, and has involved dealing with contributories who hold significantly different views, and some issues of complexity as to the manner in which assets should be distributed. There is no suggestion, and nothing emerges from the evidence to suggest that either the time spent or the rates charged by the Liquidator were unreasonable in that respect.
Seventh, an order is sought dispensing with compliance with r 9.4 of the Supreme Court (Corporations) Rules (NSW) ("Corporations Rules") with respect to approval of the Liquidator's remuneration. I am satisfied that that order is properly made, where there is sufficient evidence to support the remuneration claimed; the contributories who have the interest in the surplus have been provided with notice of the application and have had the opportunity to be heard and do not oppose the orders made; and all the creditors have been paid out, so they have no continuing interest in the claim for remuneration.
Eighth, an order is sought that the Liquidator's costs of and incidental to this application be paid from the funds of the Company. That order is properly made, where this application was plainly necessary, in order to resolve continuing differences between the contributories as to the manner in which assets should be distributed, and as to the question of Mrs Pamela Lewis and Mr David Lewis' claimed costs of earlier aspects of the proceedings, as well as to deal with the remaining issues that are addressed in these orders.
Ninth, the Liquidator seeks an order that, following the expiry of the period of 28 days from the completion of certain steps in the liquidation, he be released, and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission deregister the Company. He leads evidence which addresses the matters required by r 7.5(3) of the Corporations Rules in respect of an application for release of a liquidator and also leads evidence of the kind contemplated by r 7.5(4) of the Corporations Rules. There is always a question whether it is appropriate to make an order of this kind where some steps are required to be taken to complete the liquidation. However, Mr Golledge has pointed out that those steps are here not large in number; the principles which are to be applied have now been determined by this application; similar steps have previously been taken by the Liquidator in respect of interim distributions; and appropriate steps have been taken to identify the tax that is likely to be payable by the Company. I have observed, in other judgments, that the Court would ordinarily make an order releasing a liquidator, as Mr Thomas seeks, once appropriate notice has been given to relevant persons, here the contributories which have the continuing interest in the surplus, unless any reason emerges why it should not do so. Mr David Lewis here accepts, and I anticipate that the Second and Third Defendants also accept, that the proposed regime, which will reserve liberty to the contributories to apply if any issue arises, such that the question of release of Mr Thomas and deregistration of the Company should be revisited, will protect their interests. The making of such an order now has the advantage of avoiding further costs in a further application to the Court at a further date. There is no reason to think that the contributories, who have been alert to protect their respective interests to date, would not continue to take that approach going forward.
For these reasons, I am satisfied that, although some steps remain to be done in the winding up, the Court can now make an order for release of the Liquidator and deregistration of the Company, to take effect 28 days after those steps have been taken, and subject to the liberty reserved to the Defendants to apply, if there is any reason that that order should not take effect. I will, for good order's sake, extend the liberty to apply so that the Liquidator is also expressly given the capacity to apply, although he would likely have had it in any event, in case any further issue arises, which requires that his release or the deregistration of the Company be deferred.
Finally, an order is also sought that the requirements of r 7.5 of the Corporations Rules be dispensed with. That rule deals with formal matters in respect of an application of this kind, although some of the relevant matters, including the contents of the relevant affidavit, have been addressed. There would be no advantage from compliance with that order, beyond the extent to which it has already been complied with.
For these reasons, I make orders in accordance with the Short Minutes of Order, initialled by me and placed in the file.
[5]
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Decision last updated: 16 November 2018