Denial of procedural fairness not established
59The general rule as to matters required to be pleaded specifically is found in UCPR r 14.14, which relevantly provides:
"...
(2) In a defence or subsequent pleading, a party must plead specifically any matter:
(a) that, if not pleaded specifically, may take the opposite party by surprise, or
(b) that the party alleges makes any claim, defence or other case of the opposite party not maintainable, or
(c) that raises matters of fact not arising out of the preceding pleading.
(3) Matters which must be pleaded pursuant to subrule (2) include (but are not limited to) fraud, performance, release, statute of limitation, extinction of right or title, voluntary assumption of risk, causation of accident by unknown and undiscoverable mechanical defect and facts showing illegality."
60The premise of the appellants' complaint that they were denied procedural fairness is twofold. First, that the respondent was required to plead the maintenance issue as an "affirmative" defence, but had not done so. Secondly, that the appellants were taken by "surprise" by this issue not having been pleaded and were prejudiced in the conduct of their case at trial.
61As to the first premise, it was common ground that the respondent had not pleaded the maintenance issue in his defence. Nonetheless the issue had been clearly articulated in the respondent's response to the Scott Schedule. Part 15 of the UCPR dealing with particulars recognises that a Scott Schedule may be used in a building, technical or other matter in which several items of claim are in dispute as to liability or amount (or both): r 15.2. A Scott Schedule serves the function of providing particulars of a pleading in relation to both the claim and defence. Particulars can be included in a pleading or set out in a separate document filed with the pleading: UCPR r 15.9.
62Here pre-trial directions were made for the service of a Scott Schedule and a response by the respondent. Issue had been joined on the pleadings in respect of the allegation of defective design or construction of the works. It was sufficient, in my view, for the respondent to particularise his reliance on the maintenance issue in answer to the drainage problems experienced by the appellants by way of his response in the Scott Schedule.
63The critical issue in terms of procedural fairness is whether the appellants were taken by surprise by the respondent's response in the Scott Schedule which had been served only about five days prior to the commencement of the trial. It is useful to start with a consideration of how the maintenance issue arose at trial.
64The maintenance issue was first raised in the expert evidence which had been exchanged between the parties in November 2012 and January 2013. The respondent's expert, Mr Keighran, expressed the opinion that the drainage problems were attributable to the appellants' failure to maintain the arena, not the design or construction of the arena itself or of the drainage system. The appellants' expert, Mr Walker, provided a report in response. No complaint was made by the appellants at this time about a case not pleaded by the respondent.
65There cannot have been any doubt on the appellants' side from late November 2012 that the respondent intended to meet the appellants' case by pointing to the appellants' alleged failure to maintain the arena. That this was the position is evident from the following matters.
66First, the appellants served an expert's report in reply (by Mr Walker, dated 18 January 2013) which addressed the maintenance issue.
67Secondly, the appellants did not object to the respondent's response to the Scott Schedule dated 10 April 2013 insofar as it particularised the maintenance issue as an answer to the alleged defective works.
68Thirdly, the appellants' written opening submissions expressly acknowledged that it was "anticipated" that the respondent would rely upon the maintenance issue by way of defence.
69Fourthly, the appellants did not object to the respondent's lay and expert evidence addressing the maintenance issue, other than formal objections.
70Fifthly, the appellants' counsel at trial acknowledged in closing argument that the appellants were not taken by "surprise" by the raising of the maintenance issue, but that the way in which the issue had been raised was relevant to costs, as it had led to a protracted trial.
71Thus, so far as the maintenance issue was the subject of competing lay and expert evidence, which her Honour resolved, it cannot be said that the appellants were taken by surprise or were disadvantaged by the absence of this matter having been expressly pleaded by the respondent in his defence.
72If, contrary to the view I have reached, the maintenance issue was required to have been specifically pleaded by the respondent in his defence, beyond what was particularised in his response to the Scott Schedule, the present case is one in which the parties have deliberately chosen a different basis for the determination of the respective rights and liabilities to that in their pleadings: Banque Commerciale SA, En Liquidation v Akhil Holdings Ltd [1990] HCA 11; 169 CLR 279 at 287. The procedural fairness complaint is not made out.