Dispensing with the requirement of an application
14 It is well recognised that the Court may dispense with compliance with the procedural requirements of Division 9.6 of the Rules: Hudson at [17].
15 There are many authorities where it is apparent that procedural steps such as service or formal consent to act as a litigation representative have been dispensed with. However, the parties were unable to point to an authority where the Court had dispensed with the requirement of r 9.63(1) that a party, parent or guardian bring an application in the case of a minor.
16 There are a number of ways in which an application might be brought that would seem to comply with the Rules. First, the CEO as guardian could bring the application. The parties seemed to assume that there would be an inappropriate conflict of interests if the CEO brought an application under r 9.63(1), having regard to the CEO's responsibilities towards CYZ, and in circumstances where the proposed action is against the State. I am not sure that would be the case, particularly where the CEO's conduct involves bringing an application where it is intended that a third party be the litigation representative, and where the State has no real reason to oppose such an application being brought. However, it is not necessary to resolve that question at present. The CEO did not offer to bring an application in this case and elected not to be heard on this application.
17 Presumably the CEO would take legal advice as to available options in a circumstance such as this where a protection order is in place. I was told by senior counsel for the State that the CEO might approach the Public Trustee to bring an application. To be fair, senior counsel indicated that she did not act for the CEO and had not taken instructions on the point. It is unclear, without more, how the Public Trustee would meet the definition of a parent or guardian for the purpose of r 9.63(1). I also note that in the circumstances of this case there was information before the Court from the CEO to the effect that the Public Trustee had declined to act as CYZ's litigation representative. It is therefore unlikely that the Public Trustee would have brought any application under r 9.63(1), assuming it could do so.
18 Second, the State as a party could bring the application. It is not uncommon in matters proceeding under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) for the Minister, usually a respondent to such proceedings, to apply for the appointment of a litigation representative in the case of an applicant or appellant who is a minor. A parent is often appointed as the litigation representative. Hudson provides an example of this course. In Hudson the respondent Minister sought an order that the mother be appointed the litigation representative of a 4-year-old appellant child: at [12]. I accept that an argument might arise in this case as to whether a party to a prospective proceeding (as against to a proceeding that has been formally started) is a party for the purpose of r 9.63(1). But at minimum the State is a party to the injunction application.
19 Third, and subject to the same argument that I have referred to in [18], it may be open for another prospective applicant as a party to bring the application with respect to CYZ, by that prospective applicant's duly appointed litigation representative.
20 Fourth, there is the potential for the Court to dispense with the requirement that an application be brought by a parent or guardian (r 1.34) and to exercise the power to appoint on its own initiative (r 1.40).
21 In the end, I have decided in the circumstances of this case to implement this fourth course. I might add that I have done so reluctantly. In a matter involving a minor, great care should be taken before exercising a power where there are persons who could have applied to the Court under r 9.63(1) and who have knowledge of the applicant and contact with him.
22 But in this case I have decided to dispense with the formal requirement that an application be brought by a parent or guardian for the following reasons.
23 First, CYZ is in the sad circumstance of having no parent present in his life. His mother's whereabouts are unknown. His father has been located but has not responded to service of the application. I do not infer from the fact that his father has not responded to communications from CYZ's solicitors that he is opposed to the application or appointment of CYX. The inference is equally open on the facts that the father takes no interest in the application or that he is not in a position to form any view or implement any step.
24 Second, the CEO as guardian, and no doubt aware of the absence of an engaged parent and with knowledge of the State's contention that the proceeding should be dismissed unless a litigation representative is appointed, has not sought to bring an application on his behalf. There is therefore no-one who fits within the description of 'parent or guardian' seeking to bring an application on his behalf.
25 Third, the nominated litigation representative, CYX, is a person who seems suitable to act in that role, and the CEO has indicated that they neither consent to nor oppose her appointment. On that basis the State also indicated at the hearing that it did not oppose the Court dispensing with the formal requirement that an application be brought by a parent or guardian.
26 Fourth, all other procedural requirements with respect to the appointment of CYX have been met. I am satisfied that there has been appropriate service, consents, legal representation and certifications as required.
27 Fifth, r 9.65(1) provides for an application to the Court for removal of a litigation representative. That course could be adopted if any substantive issue arises.
28 Sixth, and of particular significance, CYZ is now 17 years old. I consider that his own views should be given some weight, albeit that the appointment of a litigation representative is clearly required. There was evidence, which I accept, to the effect that he has expressed to his solicitors the desire that CYX act as his litigation representative.
29 Seventh, this is not a case where I need to assess whether or not an applicant is or is not under a legal incapacity, in contrast to where the legal incapacity is said to arise from a mental disability. Under the Rules, CYZ's age determines that he is under a legal incapacity. The Court's decision to appoint a litigation representative is simpler in such circumstances.
30 Eighth, although the Rules of this Court do not expressly provide for the Court of its own motion to appoint a litigation representative, such a power is provided for in the rules of other courts: see for example r 11.07 and r 11.10 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth); and the discussion in Drummond v Canberra Institute of Technology (No 3) [2022] FCAFC 169 at [95]-[102] (Rangiah, Charlesworth and Banks-Smith JJ). I recognise and acknowledge the differences in these statutory regimes, and it goes without saying that I must act in accordance with the Rules of this Court, but it is interesting to observe that that other courts do have the express power to appoint litigation representatives without a formal application from a party, parent or guardian, and the court is expected to consider the exercise of such power in appropriate circumstances: Drummond v Canberra Institute of Technology [2020] FCAFC 131; (2020) 278 FCR 436 at [41]-[47] (Flick, Katzmann and Charlesworth JJ).
31 Accordingly, in the particular circumstances of this case, I consider it appropriate to order that CYX be appointed the litigation representative for CYZ, despite the absence of an application from a parent or guardian under r 9.63(1).
32 I should add that counsel for CYZ submitted that I should interpret 'parent' in the Schedule 1 Dictionary broadly. In this case it was said that the term should include a person with parental responsibilities such as a carer. Without deciding the issue for all purposes, it seems to me that in circumstances where, under the statutory regime for protection orders referred to above, the CEO has responsibility for the day-to-day care, welfare and development of the child 'to the exclusion of any other person', it would not be appropriate to interpret the term 'parent' in the definition of 'interested person' in the Rules in the manner contended for by counsel.