Children and Community Services Act 2004

**Who it affects

• Directly: children (any person under 18) and their parents/families; carers and special guardians; the CEO and departmental officers; authorised officers and assessors; service providers and non‑government organisations who deliver placement or social services; professionals subject to mandatory reporting (doctors, nurses, teachers, psychologists, police, etc. — see s.124A); employers who might employ children.

• Indirectly: courts (Children’s Court and appeals to Supreme Court), State and local public authorities who are asked to assist, and providers of accommodation, education, health or therapeutic services used in care plans.

**Why it matters (stated purposes and testing them against trade‑offs)

• Stated purpose: the Act "promotes the wellbeing of children, families and communities" and provides for protection and care where parents cannot (s.6 — objects). That is implemented by giving the CEO powers to investigate, intervene and seek court orders, and by setting out the decision‑making principles (best interests of the child is paramount, ss.7–10, and special placement principles for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children, s.12).

• Costs and incentives: the Act concentrates decision‑making power and operational responsibility in the CEO (s.21, s.24 on delegation). That reduces transaction costs of repeated court applications in some cases but increases administrative discretion and the need for departmental capacity (staffing, secure care facilities, case planning). The State (Department) pays for placements, social services and secure care facilities; parents and private carers face behavioural constraints (including criminal penalties where they act without lawful authority, e.g. ss.84–87, 106–109) and some costs can be recovered from parents by court order (s.126).

• Compliance and regulatory burden: service providers and prescribed authorities must respond to information requests, may be required to disclose "relevant information" despite other secrecy laws (s.23, s.28B). Professionals in the mandatory reporter list must report suspected sexual abuse (s.124B) or face penalties — this raises compliance costs for institutions (recording, training, reporting systems) but increases information flow to child protection authorities.

• Bureaucratic discretion and review: the CEO holds broad powers to act (s.21, s.32) and to designate authorised officers (s.25). Those powers are subject to internal procedures, reporting and several review routes: care plan review panels (ss.92–95), the State Administrative Tribunal (s.94), and judicial review/appeals (e.g. ss.162–169). The Act therefore mixes administrative discretion with layered external review, increasing legal complexity and administrative overhead.

• Effects on private choice, markets and enterprises: the Act limits certain private behaviours (e.g. who may care long‑term for infants without approval at s.104; who may be employed under age 15 at s.190; CEO can prohibit employment in a business at s.194A). These rules protect children but also constrain small businesses, family arrangements and parental contract freedom. Non‑government providers who contract with the Department must accept information‑sharing obligations and potential inspection and audit (s.15 agreements; ss.28A–28C). That raises compliance costs and may affect pricing and availability of placement services.

• Speech, publication and privacy trade‑offs: publication and disclosure of identifying information about children under investigation or subject to orders is broadly prohibited (s.237) with specified exceptions and application processes. That protects privacy but imposes constraints on media and researchers; there are also criminal penalties for unauthorised disclosure (ss.124F, 240, 241).

• Concentrated benefits vs diffuse costs: the most concentrated benefits accrue to children placed in care, approved carers, and those who receive services; costs are mostly diffuse (administration, compliance costs for providers, potential restrictions for some employers and parents). There is risk of capture in placement markets if a small number of providers deliver a large share of placement services — the Act allows ministerial agreements (s.15) which could concentrate provision if procurement is not competitive.

**Key implementation risks and trade‑offs

• Resourcing and timeliness: the Act requires rapid court listings (e.g. s.36(3)) and timely care plans and reviews (ss.39, 89, 90). Without adequate staffing, those statutory timeframes create backlog risk and legal exposure.

• Information‑sharing vs confidentiality: broad sharing powers (s.23, s.28B) are paired with tight confidentiality offences and judicial gatekeeping (ss.124F, 124G, 240). Operational policies and IT/records security are necessary to avoid inadvertent breaches and criminal liability.

• Discretion and safeguards: CEO powers are broad (s.21) and delegated extensively (s.24). Review mechanisms exist but are multiple and procedurally complex (care panels, SAT, Supreme Court). That complexity can slow decisions and shift outcomes toward parties with legal resources.

**Behavioural consequences (who decides, who pays, what changes)

• Who decides: the Department CEO and authorised officers make most operational decisions (entries, placements, care plans — ss.21, 31–39, 79); the Children’s Court and judges/magistrates decide orders and warrants (ss.34–36, 44–47, 133); Ministers sign off on some regulatory designations and ministerial body functions (ss.15–20).

• Who pays: the State (Department) funds placements, social services and secure care (s.21). The Court can order parents to contribute to maintenance or reimburse expenses (ss.73, 126). Employers or private persons may face fines and criminal penalties (numerous sections).

• Expected behaviour changes: increased mandatory reporting by listed professionals (s.124B), increased information exchanges between public authorities (s.23, s.28B), more formalised care planning and record‑keeping (ss.39, 89, 128), reduced private placement or informal long‑term care without approvals (ss.104, 104A), and constraints on publication of identifying material (s.237). Service providers will need governance and compliance systems to meet information and inspection obligations (ss.15, 79, 83).

Select statutory references for quick navigation

• CEO functions and duties: s.21, s.32
• When a child is in need of protection: s.28
• Warrant, provisional protection and care: ss.35, 37, 123
• Types of protection orders and court process: ss.43–69B, 133
• Care plans, reviews and cultural support: ss.39, 89–95, 89A–89B
• Mandatory reporting of sexual abuse: ss.124A–124D
• Information sharing and disclosure protections: ss.23, 28A–28C, 124F, 237, 240
• Secure care rules and time limits: ss.88B–88I, 134A
• Enforcement and entry powers (2021 additions): Part 10A (ss.241A–241O)
• Employment of children and CEO prohibition powers: Part 7 (ss.190–196, 194A)

This is a practical, source‑grounded summary of the Act’s core mechanics, who bears costs and choices, and the main trade‑offs that follow from concentrating child‑welfare powers in an administrative agency supported by judicial orders.