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[1997] FCA 250
Federal Court of Australia
1997-04-07
Olney J, Brooking J, Nicholson JJ
Original judgment source is linked above.
rteen day notice and recited: " WHEREAS THE LAW INSTITUTE OF VICTORIA of 470 Bourke Street, Melbourne, Victoria ("Judgment Creditor") has claimed that the sum of $14,571.88 and no more (which amount includes $3,688.08 interest calculated on the sum of $10,883.80 at the rate applicable pursuant to the Penalty Interest Rates Act 1983 (Vic) from 13 November 1992 to 17 August 1995) is the amount due by you under a final order for costs obtained by it against you in the Supreme Court of Victoria at Melbourne in proceeding no. 7865 of 1991 on 24 September 1991, which order was taxed by Master Bruce of the Supreme Court of Victoria by order dated 13 November 1992, being an order the execution of which have not been stayed: ..." In proceedings V7865 of 1991 in the Supreme Court of Victoria between the appellant and the Law Institute of Victoria as respondent, Brooking J made an order on 24 September 1991 that: " The appeal is dismissed with costs including reserved costs." Mr Komesaroff sought to appeal to the Full Court of the Supreme Court from that decision but his appeal was found to be incompetent and was struck out with costs. On 13 November 1992, Master Bruce in an order headed: " B E T W E E N: MORRIS KOMESAROFF Appellant
" None other than appears in my affidavit", being a reference to the affidavit sworn 26 October 1995. Finally, notwithstanding the absence of any material during the course of submissions to challenge the conclusion as to the non-satisfaction of the existence of a cross claim, Mr Komesaroff seemed to indicate that he took issue with the rejection by the primary judge of the existence of the cross claim based on the lack of evidence as to quantum of such a claim. It is convenient to deal with the quantum point first. The appellant referred to s 79 of the Legal Profession Practice Act 1958 (Vic) which casts a duty on the Secretary to keep a roll of solicitors and "to issue practising certificates of prescribed classes to persons who are entitled under this division to take out certificates authorising them to practice...." Mr Komesaroff also referred to Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1984-85) 157 CLR 424 and Walsh v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1984) 156 CLR 337. This aspect of the matter was not the subject of further elaboration by the appellant. Accepting that the ordinary principles of negligence apply to persons the subject of the duty in s 79 of the Legal Profession Practice Act 1958, rendering them liable for damage caused by a negligent failure to act when under a duty to act, or by a negligent failure to consider whether to exercise a conferred power in the public interest, the mere existence of a duty to act does not establish any breach of it, nor does it create an entitlement to damages flowing from the breach. There is nothing in the evidence to justify any interference with the finding by Olney J concerning his finding as to the quantum of any cross claim that Mr Komesaroff may have against the Institute. As to the matters (other than the cross claim) referred to by Mr Komesaroff in his affidavit of 26 October 1995, there is the initial hurdle of his Honour's statement that those matters were either not pressed or abandoned. Putting to one side the difficulties of that statement, the evidence does not permit the points numbered 1, 3 and 4 in paragraph 10 of that affidavit to be answered favourably to the appellant. There is nothing to persuade the court that on the evidence before the primary judge, he ought to have determined any of them in favour of Mr Komesaroff. As to the point numbered 2 in paragraph 10 of the affidavit dated 26 October 1995 that "the [bankruptcy] notice was irregular, giving rise to substantial injustice", no particulars of the claimed irregularities of the bankruptcy notice are given. It may be that this complaint relates to the first issue referred to by Mr Komesaroff in his submissions to this court, being the disconformity point. The claimed disconformity between the notice and the judgment is not made out. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Victoria dated 24 September 1991 is unambiguous. The addition of the name of Robert John Connell as one of the respondents named in the heading of the order of taxation of Master Bruce of 13 November 1992 is explicable by the fact that the first of those orders related to the proceedings before Brooking J and the second is in respect of the orders for costs made by the Full Court. The order of Master Bruce is addressed to the respondent in the singular. The proceeding is numbered as number 7865 of 1991. The matter being addressed is taxation pursuant to the orders of Brooking J and of the Full Court previously referred to. The order of Brooking J dismissed the appeal with costs including reserved costs. The bankruptcy notice refers to the amount due under the final order for costs obtained by the respondent against the appellant in the Supreme Court of Victoria in proceeding number 7865 of 1991 on 24 September 1991. The final order relied upon is that of Brooking J. The notice claims payment only of Brooking J's order as quantified. The validity of the notice is unaffected by the naming of an additional respondent in the heading to the order of Master Bruce. Further, this is not a case like AWU v Bowen (1946) 72 CLR 575, where the High Court held that a bankruptcy notice authorised by only some of the joint judgment creditors was invalid. The judgment on which the present bankruptcy notice is founded is a judgment for costs in favour of the Institute. The proceeding in which that judgment was made was a proceeding with two parties only, Mr Komesaroff and the Institute. There was only one judgment creditor arising out of that costs order. The bankruptcy notice is not invalid on this account. In the light of these conclusions, the orders made by Olney J of 8 May 1996 were properly made. It remains to consider the validity of the orders made on 23 May 1996. The appellant disputes the power of the court to extend the time for compliance with the bankruptcy notice, asserting that no application had been made to the court to set aside the bankruptcy notice before the expiration of the time fixed for compliance with the requirements of it. On its proper construction, the affidavit alleging "irregularities" in the notice causing "substantial prejudice", is not fairly to be regarded simply as notifying a view that the bankruptcy notice was null and void and requiring at most nothing more than a declaration of nullity. The terms of the affidavit and the terms in s 306(1) of the Act and r 195(2) assist in this conclusion, which is further reinforced by the complaint about want of authority in the solicitors acting for the judgment creditor, and the complaint concerning disconformity between the judgment and the bankruptcy notice. The affidavit which Mr Komesaroff filed on 26 October 1995 was thus both an affidavit pursuant to s 41(7) asserting a cross claim, and an affidavit which sought to set aside the bankruptcy notice on the ground of irregularities causing substantial prejudice. As earlier noted, Olney J said in his reasons for judgment of 23 May 1996: " The debtor did not file a formal application pursuant to Rule 10 of the Bankruptcy Rules but, nevertheless, the filing of the affidavit was treated as an application for the purposes of that rule, and for the purpose of the debtor's application to set aside the bankruptcy notice on the grounds of invalidity." It follows that there was then an application to the court to set aside the bankruptcy notice made before the expiration of the time fixed for compliance with the requirements of the bankruptcy notice, and the court therefore had power, pursuant to s 41(6A), to extend the time for compliance with the bankruptcy notice. This conclusion does not rely on any finding that any affidavit filed pursuant to s 41(7) amounted to an application to set aside the bankruptcy notice. The observation in James v Abrahams (1981) 34 ALR 657, later referred to, suggests that an affidavit filed under the previous s 41(7) is not an application to set aside a bankruptcy notice. This is to be contrasted with the terms of the amended s 41(7), which suggests that the assertion of a relevant cross claim is "an application to set aside a bankruptcy notice". However, the statement of the primary judge on 23 May 1996: " The effect of my decision was that the deemed extension of time pursuant to s 41(7) did not apply, and accordingly the debtor committed an act of bankruptcy upon the expiration of 14 days from the service of the bankruptcy notice namely 30 October 1995" involves a mistaken application of s 41(7). The effect of s 41(7), where an affidavit to the effect of s 40(1)(g) of the Act is filed, is to extend the time for compliance with that bankruptcy notice until the court determines whether it is so satisfied of the counter-claim, set-off or cross demand alleged. In Re Brink; Ex parte The Commercial Banking Company of Sydney Ltd (1980) 30 ALR 433 at 439 Lockhart J said: " The initial affidavit filed under s. 41(7) operates to extend time for compliance with the requirements of the bankruptcy notice until the court determines whether it is satisfied that the debtor has the requisite counterclaim, set-off or cross demand. Although the mere filing of the requisite affidavit brings the statutory extension automatically into play, the court thereafter controls the matter." His Honour continued at 439: " In my opinion the affidavit cannot merely contain an assertion that the debtor has a counterclaim, set-off or cross demand which he could not have set up in the action in which the judgment or order was obtained. The affidavit must show a counterclaim, set-off or cross demand which equals or exceeds the amount of the judgment debt and which the debtor could not have set up in the action in which the judgment or order was obtained: see Vogwell v Vogwell (1939) 11 ABC at p 85; Ebert's case (1960) 104 CLR at p 350; Re A Debtor per Slesser L.J. [1935] 1 Ch 347, at p 352." In James v Abrahams (supra), Deane and Lockhart JJ said at 661: " The filing, within the time specified in s 41(7), of an affidavit to the effect that a debtor has a counter-claim, set-off or cross demand of the type mentioned in s 40(1)(g), does not constitute an application to set the bankruptcy notice aside. It operates as an automatic extension of time for compliance with the bankruptcy notice until the court can determine whether it is satisfied by the debtor that the debtor has a counter-claim, set-off or cross demand of the type referred to in s 40(1)(g). If the court is so satisfied, it is neither required nor empowered to make an order setting aside the bankruptcy notice. The result of the court's being so satisfied, within either the time originally fixed by the bankruptcy notice for compliance or the extended time resulting from the operation of s 41(7), is that failure to comply with the requirements of the bankruptcy notice does not constitute an act of bankruptcy. After the court has been so satisfied, the bankruptcy notice is spent. After the expiry of the time which the bankruptcy notice itself fixed for compliance with its terms and up until the day on which the court determined whether it was satisfied that the debtor had a counter-claim, set-off or cross demand of the type referred to in s 40(1)(g), any order purportedly extending time for compliance would be either otiose or futile. If the affidavit filed by the debtor was to the required effect, the time for compliance with the requirements of the bankruptcy notice was automatically extended by the provisions of s 41(7). If the affidavit was not to the required effect, the time for compliance had expired and the act of bankruptcy had been committed." The position therefore is that on the filing of the affidavit by Mr Komesaroff in October 1995 pursuant to the then provisions of s 41(7), the time for compliance with the bankruptcy notice was extended until the court determined whether it was satisfied or not as to whether Mr Komesaroff had such a counter-claim, set-off or cross demand. When on 8 May 1996 the court determined that it was not so satisfied, the bankruptcy notice required compliance with its terms by and including 8 May 1996. When, on the expiration of that day, there had not been compliance with the requirements of the notice, an act of bankruptcy by the appellant was committed. After 8 May 1996, there was no power (except perhaps subject to the slip rule, as to which see Elyard Corp v DDB Needham Sydney (1995) 18 ACSR 807) to extend time for compliance with the requirements of the bankruptcy notice. The orders of 23 May 1996 were based on a misconception of the effect of s 41(7) of the Act and should be set aside. It is therefore unnecessary to consider whether, had they been within power, the requirements of "natural justice" required a longer period within which to comply with the requirements of the notice. As to costs, the costs order made on 23 May 1996 will be set aside. There seems to be no reason why Mr Komesaroff should not have his costs of what in the ultimate, was an unsuccessful application for extension of time for compliance with a bankruptcy notice. As to the costs of the appeal, Mr Komesaroff has had some success but has failed on his principal challenge. In all the circumstances, an appropriate order as to the costs of the appeal is that there should be no order as to costs of the appeal. For the above reasons, the court makes the following orders: 1. The orders of Olney J of 23 May 1996 are set aside. 2. The judgment creditor pay the debtor's costs of and incidental to the application filed 20 May 1996 to extend the time to comply with the bankruptcy notice, to be taxed if not agreed. 3. The appeal otherwise be dismissed. 4. There be no order as to costs of the appeal. I certify that this and the preceding nineteen (19) pages are a true copy of the reasons for judgment herein of the Court. Associate Date: The appellant appeared in person. Counsel for the respondent : Mr S Gardiner instructed by : Tress Cocks & Maddox Date of hearing : 2 October 1996
AWU
Bowen
(1946) 72 CLR 575
(1981) 34 ALR 657
(1980) 30 ALR 433
(1981) 53 FLR 91
(1980) 40 FLR 423
(1984) 156 CLR 337