37 Counsel for the shipbuilder nevertheless referred to three other pieces of evidence, with a view to supporting the primary judge's finding that the invoices had been sent. One was an answer, given by Mr Swaddle in the course of cross-examination, to the effect that he had heard from someone from the shipbuilder's parent company that the shipbuilder's financial controller was 'supposed to stop sending invoices' (ts 153). Counsel said that the statement to 'stop' sending invoices is evidence that some other invoices must have been sent. In my view, the evidence is second-hand hearsay, and has no probative force on the fundamental issue in the shipbuilder's case, which was always an issue on the pleadings, namely, proof of the delivery of the invoices to justify the claimed debt. The second matter referred to by counsel was the judge's finding that, although the customer had not discovered any invoices from the shipbuilder in its discovery, the customer had failed to make adequate efforts to locate documents (reasons [78(d) and (e)]). Whilst that point may have assisted in the drawing of an inference if there were otherwise some reliable evidence from which the inference might be drawn, it cannot, in my view, supplant the absence of such evidence. Thirdly, counsel for the shipbuilder referred to the evidence of Mr Abdullah, a director of the shipbuilder at the relevant time, who was called at the trial by the customer. The evidence was in connection with certain information that Mr Abdullah had provided to the Australian Taxation Office, to the effect that the shipbuilder was owed $4.747 million by the customer for shipbuilding in respect of the progress claims. Mr Abdullah, however, made the declaration as a director of the shipbuilder, and not as an agent for the customer. It is not an admission against interest and the evidence does not, in my view, assist the shipbuilder on the issue of whether it proved the dispatch of the invoices.