If it appears that both parties have acted reasonably in commencing and defending the proceedings and the conduct of the parties continued to be reasonable until the litigation was settled or its further prosecution became futile, the proper exercise of the cost discretion will usually mean that the court will make no order as to the cost of the proceedings. This approach has been adopted in a large number of cases.
9 That passage establishes that where litigation is compromised it will often, but not invariably, be appropriate for the Court to refrain from deciding how the costs of the litigation should be borne, and leave them to be borne by each party. As his Honour said, where there has been no hearing on merits, a court is necessarily deprived of a crucial fact to determine whether or not or how to make a costs order. But as his Honour also said, in an appropriate case a court will make an order for costs, even where there has been no hearing on the merits and the moving party no longer wishes to proceed with the action. In some such cases, the court may be able to conclude that one of the parties has acted so unreasonably that the other should receive costs, and in some cases a judge may feel confident that although both parties have acted reasonably, one was almost certain to have succeeded if the matter had be fully tried.
10 The first important consideration in the present case is that Austress has obtained, albeit ultimately by consent, a very substantial part of the relief which it sought at the outset. I bear in mind Mr MacInnes' submission that Austress did not succeed in obtaining a compensatory order of the type which had be sought in the summons; however, any utility in an inquiry as to damages was rendered largely superfluous by Austress' success in obtaining injunctive relief before significant damage could be inflicted on its business.
11 Also of great significance is the conclusion that Austress had an extremely strong prima facie case, as Campbell J found in his Honour's 6 February 2006 judgment, in which opinion, on the material before me, I respectively join. That makes the case one in which the Court is able to feel confident that one party - namely, Austress - was almost certain to have succeeded if the matter had been tried.
12 Mr MacInnes referred to a Calderbank offer made on behalf of Mr Joseph on 28 February 2006. However, there is force in Mr Turner's response that it was made in respect of a motion which had been filed a fortnight previously, on the eve of the hearing of that motion, so that it practically avoided none of the costs which by that stage the plaintiff had been put to in connection with that motion. The offer was made after the Anton Piller order had been executed and does not bear on the costs of obtaining or executing that order.
13 I should record that, in the circumstances and given the evidence that Austress already had, and the reasonable suspicions which it entertained as referred to in Campbell J's judgment (and in particular the passages from that judgment which I have cited above), an application for an Anton Piller order was an entirely reasonable step for Austress to take in the protection of its rights.
14 Although Mr Joseph had a slight measure of success on the application to set aside the Anton Piller order, insofar as the provision for Austress to have a nominated representative present was revoked, I do not think that bears overall on what costs order should be made. The original orders pronounced by Windeyer J provided, in the notice attached to it, that Mr Joseph was entitled to request that nobody be present who could gain commercially from anything that he might read or see on the premises from the time of execution. The supervising solicitor was instructed on behalf of Austress that Austress would consent to not having its own employee in attendance. When the matter was raised before Campbell J, Austress immediately indicated there would be no objection to that variation. It did not form any substantial part of the hearing which took place before Campbell J on 3 and 6 February.
15 In my view, this is a case in which the plaintiff has had to come to Court to obtain relief to which it was entitled, in the face of threatened and actual breaches of confidence by a senior employee which had the potential to occasion it serious damage. I am unable to see why the circumstance that Mr Joseph recognised the inevitable by consenting to the injunctive relief sought a year after the proceedings were initiated, after contesting the interlocutory relief initially, should deprive Austress of the costs to which it would have been entitled had the same relief been obtained over opposition.
16 Mr MacInnes, in his able and helpful submissions, also argued that in view of the circumstance that costs were not being pressed against the second and third defendants, some guidance should be given to the taxing officer so as to limit the costs recoverable against the first defendant.
17 Mr Joseph was a director of the third defendant which, as I understand the case, was said to be the recipient of the confidential information which Mr Joseph was alleged to have misused.
18 I accept that, insofar as costs have been increased by the inclusion of the second and third defendants, Mr Joseph should not be made responsible for those additional costs, and I do not understand Mr Turner to contend to the contrary. But insofar as costs would have been incurred in any event against Mr Joseph, I do not see why they should be reduced simply because of the circumstance that other defendants were joined.
19 Finally, so far as the application for costs of today is concerned, ultimately it seems to me that the application is part of the plaintiff recovering overall justice in these proceedings, it having had to bring this application so as to avoid being seriously out of pocket for legal costs occasioned by the misconduct of its former employee. In those circumstances, it seems to me that the costs of the proceedings payable by Mr Joseph should include the costs of today's application.
20 My order is that the first defendant pay the plaintiff's cost of the proceedings, save insofar as those costs have been increased by the joinder of the second and third defendants.
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