Consideration
23 ASIC has sought an order that its costs of the Interlocutory Application and Winding Up Application be paid by Merlin and taxed and reimbursed in accordance with s 466(2) of the Corporations Act. While that order was formally opposed by the Opposing Shareholders, they offered no submissions or argument as to why ASIC should not receive its costs as contemplated by that section. In my view, there is no good reason why the order should not be made, and I will make that order.
24 The further orders sought by ASIC are that the Opposing Shareholders and the Interested Parties indemnify Merlin for the amounts payable to ASIC on account of its costs of the Interlocutory Application and the Winding Up Application respectively or, in the alternative, the additional costs incurred by ASIC resulting from their opposition to the Interlocutory Application and the Winding Up Application respectively. ASIC does not contend that Merlin will be unable to meet ASIC's costs of the proceeding. I infer that the purpose of the further orders sought by ASIC is to shift the burden of paying ASIC's costs of the proceeding away from Merlin (and indirectly all members and creditors of Merlin) to the Opposing Shareholders and the Interested Parties respectively, either wholly or partially. Subject to questions concerning the Court's power to make the further orders sought by ASIC (which have been raised by the Opposing Shareholders), the question becomes whether it is just in all the circumstances for the Opposing Shareholders and the Interested Parties to bear the whole or part of ASIC's costs of the Interlocutory Application and the Winding Up Application respectively, in addition to their own costs.
25 ASIC's suggestion that the Opposing Shareholders and the Interested Parties should bear the whole of ASIC's costs of the Interlocutory Application and the Winding Up Application respectively can be dismissed immediately. No justification for such an order has been offered by ASIC. The Interlocutory Application and the Winding Up Application would have required preparation and court hearings on the part of ASIC regardless of any opposition from the Opposing Shareholders and the Interested Parties. The mere fact that the Opposing Shareholders and the Interested Parties appeared and made submissions in opposition to the applications provides no justification for an order that they bear the whole of ASIC's costs (in addition to their own costs).
26 The real questions are whether the Court has power to order that the Opposing Shareholders and the Interested Parties bear the additional costs incurred by ASIC resulting from their opposition to the Interlocutory Application and the Winding Up Application respectively, and whether it is just in all the circumstances for such an order to be made.
27 I reject the submission of the Opposing Shareholders that the Court does not have power to make an order in the form sought by ASIC because the order is not a costs order. While the order sought by ASIC may not be a traditional costs order, in my view it is properly seen as a costs order and within the powers conferred on the Court by s 43 of the FCA Act and r 2.13(2) of the Corporations Rules. The effect of the order is to require the Opposing Shareholders and the Interested Parties to pay to Merlin the additional costs incurred by ASIC resulting from their opposition to the Interlocutory Application and the Winding Up Application respectively. The payment would reimburse Merlin for the same costs payable by Merlin to ASIC pursuant to s 466 of the Corporations Act. The fact that the payment of ASIC's costs by Merlin is made by force of s 466 of the Corporations Act rather than s 43 of the FCA Act does not alter the character of the amounts paid. The payment is for ASIC's taxed costs of the proceeding. The effect of the order sought by ASIC is to adjust that cost burden as between Merlin (as defendant to the proceeding) and the Opposing Shareholders and Interested Parties (as interveners).
28 I also reject the submissions of the Opposing Shareholders and the Interested Parties that ASIC has not established that it incurred additional costs by reason of their intervention in the proceeding. While ASIC has not sought to quantify the amount of the additional costs, it submitted that it incurred the following additional costs:
By reason of the Opposing Shareholders' participation, ASIC incurred additional costs including, numerous telephone and email communications with the solicitor for the Opposing Shareholders, perusal and consideration of the Affidavit of Mr Dale sworn 1 August 2019 and Opposing Shareholders' Submissions dated 1 August 2019 (16 pages in length), drafting and settling submissions in reply dated 12 August 2018 and an additional day of hearing: Transcript Opposing Parties' oral submissions Day 1 - T100 L33 (at around 3pm) to T112 L43 (adjournment of Day 1 at 4.03pm); and Day 2 - T1 L3 (at 10.14am) to T44 L42 (at around 11.45am).
By reason of the Interested Parties' participation, ASIC incurred additional costs including, numerous telephone and email communications with the solicitor for the Interested Parties, perusal and consideration of the Jarvis Affidavit, the Feilich Affidavit, the First and Second Mitchell Affidavits and the Interested Parties' Outline of Submissions and ASIC's written and oral submissions in reply and a further 1/2 day of hearing.
29 Without seeking to determine finally the categories of additional costs incurred by ASIC, I am satisfied that, by reason of the attendance of the Opposing Shareholders and the Interested Parties at the hearings of the Interlocutory Application and the Winding Up Application respectively, ASIC incurred additional costs. However, my overall assessment is that the additional costs reflect a modest proportion of ASIC's overall costs of the proceeding.
30 Rule 2.13(1) confers a broad power on the Court to grant leave to a creditor, contributor or officer of a corporation, or other interested person, to intervene and be heard in a proceeding under the Corporations Act without becoming a party. Rule 2.13(2) confers a further discretion on the Court to award costs against such a person if the attendance of the person has resulted in additional costs for any party. The discretion is confined to the award of the additional costs.
31 There appears to be very limited judicial guidance concerning the award of costs under r 2.13(2). In Pan Pharmaceuticals and Grocon Constructors, Barrett J considered the award of costs in favour of an intervener (as opposed to the award of costs against an intervener). His Honour concluded that such an award would only be made in exceptional circumstances. That conclusion is consistent with the principle, as stated by Branson J in Johnston v Cameron [2002] FCAFC 301 (at [19]):
Although intervenors are commonly said to have the benefits and the burdens of parties, there is no "usual practice" of ordering costs in their favour when the outcome of a proceeding accords with the arguments advanced by them (see Ruddock v Vadarlis [2001] FCA 1865; 188 ALR 143 at [53]).
32 Nor is there a usual practice of ordering costs against interveners when the outcome of a proceeding is contrary to the arguments advanced by them. In O'Toole v Charles David Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 232 (O'Toole), the Commonwealth had intervened before the Federal Court and the High Court in support of an unsuccessful party. The successful party sought costs against the Commonwealth pursuant to s 78A(2) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), which provided that:
Where the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth or of a State intervenes in proceedings in a court under this section, the court may, in the proceedings, make such order as to costs against the Commonwealth or the State, as the case may be, as the court thinks fit.
33 The High Court (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ) said (at 311) that:
It is only in special circumstances that it is appropriate for the Court to make an order for costs against an intervener or, at all events, an order which would have the result that an intervener pay to one of the parties more than the amount by which the costs of that party have been increased by the intervention.
34 In O'Toole, the High Court awarded costs against the Commonwealth as intervener because it was the Commonwealth which obtained the removal of the cause into the High Court.
35 Similarly, in Australian Industry Group v Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing & Kindred Industries Union [2003] FCAFC 226, the Union (as a successful respondent) sought costs against the Commonwealth which had intervened and advanced arguments in support of the unsuccessful appellant under s 471(2) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) which provided that:
If the Minster intervenes in a proceeding before the Court, the Court may, despite section 347, make an order for costs against the Commonwealth.
36 The Full Federal Court, applying O'Toole, concluded that costs would not be awarded as special circumstances did not exist to justify such an award (at [11]).
37 While r 2.13(2) does not expressly require the existence of special circumstances before the award of additional costs against an intervener, in my view the authorities referred to above, applying analogous statutory powers to award costs against interveners, support the conclusion that the Court would require the existence of circumstances that are out of the ordinary to justify the award of costs against an intervener.
38 In so far as it is necessary to consider s 43 of the FCA Act as a separate source of power to award costs against an intervener, the same principles are applicable: see for example Ruddock v Vardalis (No 2) (2001) 115 FCR 229 at [53] and the other cases cited above. ASIC's submissions made reference to the principles stated in Knight. However, Knight concerns the award of costs against a non-party who stands behind a party, not the award of costs against an intervener.
39 In my view, the circumstances of the present case do not justify the award of costs against the Opposing Shareholders or the Interested Parties. The proceeding was instigated by ASIC for the protection of the members and creditors of Merlin and the public more generally. The named defendant was Merlin. The Opposing Shareholders and the Interested Parties, as members and creditors of Merlin, had a financial interest in the proceeding; they sought, and were given leave under r 2.13, to appear in the proceeding, adduce evidence and make submissions. While they opposed the orders sought by ASIC, they were not the defendant to the proceeding. They did not conduct the case for Merlin and they did not control Merlin. They were interested persons who merely exercised their right to be heard.
40 None of the circumstances relied on by ASIC would ordinarily cause the Court to order the Opposing Shareholders and the Interested Parties to reimburse ASIC for the additional costs of the proceeding caused by their participation. The fact that the Opposing Shareholders and the Interested Parties had an interest in the proceeding is unexceptional as it explains why they sought and were granted leave to be heard under r 2.13. The fact that the Opposing Shareholders and the Interested Parties did not contest many aspects of ASIC's case is a beneficial factor, not an adverse factor. While the Opposing Shareholders and the Interested Parties were unsuccessful in their arguments, the arguments were not untenable and, in my view, there was nothing improper in the arguments advanced. Having failed in their arguments, the Opposing Shareholders and the Interested Parties must bear their own costs of participating in the proceeding.
41 As already noted, to the extent that the Opposing Shareholders and the Interested Parties caused ASIC to incur additional costs in the proceeding, those additional costs will be borne by Merlin by reason of the order I will make requiring Merlin to reimburse ASIC for its costs. There is no suggestion that Merlin will be unable to pay ASIC's costs and, accordingly, ASIC will not suffer any disadvantage by reason of the participation of the Opposing Shareholders and the Interested Parties in the proceeding. The persons who might be said to suffer some disadvantage are other members and creditors of Merlin who, to the extent of additional costs incurred, will receive less from the winding up of Merlin. However, I consider that the Opposing Shareholders and Interested Parties advanced arguments that they considered were for the benefit of members and creditors generally, and the arguments were not advanced for the individual interests of the Opposing Shareholders or the Interested Parties. I am not persuaded that the circumstances of the case justify an order that the Opposing Shareholders and the Interested Parties indemnify Merlin for ASIC's additional costs.