The ASIC Act investigation was not intended to be (and could never be) an exhaustive examination of every aspect of all conduct considered by the Cole Inquiry. At all times, the investigation (which is on-going) has focused upon what appears to be the most serious corporations-related conduct capable of proof. Initially, this meant that the investigation was guided almost exclusively by the Cole Report's findings in relation to possible breaches of the Corporations Act.
Despite the wider ambit of the investigation as a whole (as described above), from the outset of the ASIC Act investigation, ASIC was concerned that:
limitation periods in respect of civil penalties contraventions in connection with Oil-for-Food contracts prior to contract A1111 had already expired or would expire before ASIC would be able to commence proceedings;
limitation periods in respect of civil penalties contraventions in connection with contracts A1111 and A1112 might expire in late December 2007;
limitation periods in respect of civil penalties contraventions in connection with contracts A1441, A1670 and A1680 might expire during 2008;
and accordingly, that the ASIC Act investigation should focus in the first instance on civil penalties contraventions in connection with contracts A1111, A1112, A1441, A1670 and A1680 (the five contracts), with a view to filing proceedings by no later than 20 December 2007.
ASIC's investigation of conduct in relation to the five contracts focused on those AWB officers (including Mr Lindberg) who were involved in entering into and carrying out those contracts, who had supervisory responsibility in relation to those contracts, and/or who had involvement in events relating to those contracts, such as the Tigris transaction and the iron filings claim. In light of the looming limitations deadlines, this early phase of the investigation was focused on those persons' conduct in relation to, or arising out of, the five contracts, and did not examine those persons' conduct more broadly.
In any event, as of late 2007, ASIC had no reason to think that there might be reason to investigate Mr Lindberg's conduct beyond the five contracts. In particular, while those involved in the ASIC Act investigation were aware of Project Rose, Project Water and the Volcker Inquiry in a general way, those matters were not a priority in terms of investigation, and ASIC had no spare resources available to investigate them. In this respect I refer to the tasks that ASIC was required to undertake in preparation for the first proceeding and the other five civil penalties proceedings, as referred to below.[27]