IDENTITY OF THE RECEIVER AND MANAGER
32 ASIC and the Letten interests agreed that two persons should be appointed as joint and several receivers and managers. That was not surprising. Given the number and location of the schemes, assets and investors, it is appropriate that two persons be appointed. However, the parties did not agree on who should be appointed.
33 Mr Letten sought that Mr Templeton and Mr Hennessy, both of KPMG, be appointed as the receivers and managers of the property of the corporate defendants and of the property of the schemes. ASIC opposed the appointment of Mr Templeton and instead sought the appointment of Mr Crosbie and Mr Martin of PPB.
34 ASIC did not raise any issue or concern about the probity or competence of Mr Templeton. On the contrary, as the summary of facts will demonstrate, ASIC had selected him as an investigating accountant. Moreover, ASIC accepted that there was no actual conflict of interest that would affect Mr Templeton if he was appointed to act as a receiver and manager. Instead, ASIC expressed concern that a reasonable and informed person may perceive a conflict of interest affecting Mr Templeton because of his previous engagement by Mr Letten.
35 The relevant principles concerning conflicts of interest and independence relating to the appointment and removal of liquidators are established and well known: see, for example, Re the Mutual Stock Financial Agency Company Ltd (1886) 12 VLR 777 at 782; Re National Safety Council of Australia [1990] VR 29 at 32-34. Of course, a liquidator must be and must be seen to be independent and impartial: Re Allebart Pty Ltd (1971) 2 NSWLR 24 at 28-30. That is not surprising given the nature of the duties of the liquidator as described by Marks J in Commissioner for Corporate Affairs v Harvey [1980] VR 669 at 696:
When a winding up occurs, the financial outcome for creditors and contributories is dependent, amongst other things, on honest administration. It is the trust which those persons are obliged to place in the liquidator to preserve the assets and act faithfully and fairly that defines the weight of the duties owed and the strictness with which his conduct must be considered by the Court.
36 These same principles have been held to be equally applicable to voluntary administrators: Bovis Lend Lease Pty Ltd v Wily [2003] NSWSC 467 at [133]; Commonwealth of Australia v Irving & Anor (1996) 19 ACSR 459 at 462. Further, as Santow J said in Re St George Builders Hardware Pty Ltd (1995) 18 ACSR 451 at 452, a case concerning the appointment of a person as administrator:
In giving leave in applications of this kind, the court should have regard to analogous principles to the removal of a liquidator on the ground of actual or perceived conflict of interest. In Advance Housing Pty Ltd (in liq) v Newcastle Classic Developments Pty Ltd (1994) 14 ACSR 230, the relevant principles are set out and may be summarised as follows:
(1) The cases show that there must be a real and not merely theoretical possibility of conflict and that the guiding principle in the appointment by the court of a liquidator is that he must be independent and must be seen to be independent.
(2) Those who assert that a liquidator should be removed are under a duty to establish at least a prima facie case that this is for the general advantage of the persons interested in the winding up and the onus of proof will not be easy to discharge if the liquidator has become well acquainted with the business and affairs of the company.
(3) A liquidator may act as a liquidator of a company even if there is a prior involvement with the company in liquidation provided that involvement is not likely to impede or inhibit the liquidator from acting impartially in the interests of all creditors or give rise to a reasonable apprehension that the liquidator might be so inhibited or impeded.
37 In my view, analogous principles should apply equally to the appointment of receivers and managers by the Court. In the present case, the application of those principles to the facts do not preclude Mr Templeton's appointment but, in my view, favour it.
38 First, the facts surrounding his appointment and subsequent engagement require examination. Mr Templeton was engaged by Mr Letten in December 2009 to act as an investigative accountant. However, Mr Letten did not in fact select him. Mr Templeton was one of three investigating accountants nominated by Mr Letten to ASIC. It was ASIC that selected Mr Templeton. Secondly, the terms of his engagement were shown to and commented on by ASIC. Put another way, ASIC played a critical role not only in his appointment but also in the terms of his engagement.
39 Thirdly, Mr Templeton spent in excess of 500 hours at a cost of some $70,000 familiarising himself with the two schemes on which he reported but also 10 other schemes he considered but in respect of which he did not prepare a report. In that context, it is accepted by both ASIC and the Letten interests that following his engagement, Mr Templeton properly obtained information from Mr Letten about the schemes for inclusion in the Templeton Report. The work he undertook included detailed discussions with Mr Letten to understand the background and current status of each of the relevant schemes, preparing summaries of historical financial statements, understanding the current financing arrangements of the schemes, reviewing valuations for the properties, and preparing lists of investors. Mr Templeton anticipates that it would take a new appointee approximately three weeks to develop the same level of knowledge about the schemes and the circumstances surrounding them. Mr Templeton has become well acquainted with the business and affairs of a number of the corporate defendants and the schemes. To not appoint Mr Templeton would mean that that knowledge would be lost and would need to be repeated at additional cost. At the very least, that would be unfortunate.
40 Fourthly, the report prepared by Mr Templeton for two of the schemes (SY21 and 211 Wellington Road) were submitted to the Letten interests and to ASIC and raised significant issues concerning the management of those schemes and, in particular, the conduct of Mr Letten.
41 Fifthly, as noted earlier, the cost of the work undertaken by Mr Templeton was in the vicinity of $70,000. I was informed by Counsel for the Letten interests that Mr Templeton of KPMG has been paid for this work, albeit by interests associated with Mr Letten.
42 Sixthly, the appointment as receiver and manager is a joint and several appointment by the Court. Such an appointment carries with it two important aspects. Mr Templeton is an officer of the Court, must report to the Court and is subject to the supervision of the Court: s 423 of the Act; Artistic Builders Pty Ltd v Tuthill (Mortgages) Pty Ltd & Anors (2002) 10 BPR 19,565 at [136] and GE Capital Australia v Davis (2002) 180 FLR 250 at [63]-[65]. Secondly and no less importantly, in the unlikely circumstance that events transpire which are of concern to Mr Hennessy, then I would expect Mr Hennessy to apply to the Court, a course he can adopt at any time under the general liberty to apply.
43 Finally, Mr Templeton and Mr Hennessy have informed the Court that they are willing to accept appointment as the receivers and managers of the property of the corporate defendants and of the property of the schemes on the same terms proposed by ASIC, namely without security for their fees.
44 In relation to fees, the draft order submitted by ASIC provided that:
[T]he Receivers shall be entitled to reasonable remuneration and reasonable costs and expenses properly incurred in the performance of their duties and the exercise of their powers as receivers and managers over the Property of each Scheme, to be calculated on the basis of the time reasonably spent by the receivers and managers, their partners and staff in accordance with the Insolvency Practitioners Association scale of fees or such other scale as the Registrar may decide, such fees to be paid out of the assets of the Scheme …
(Emphasis added.)
45 There is no Insolvency Practitioners Association scale of fees. Such a scale has not existed for about 10 years. Mr Templeton and Mr Hennessy proposed charge out rates specified in a schedule. In my view, the rates proposed by Mr Templeton and Mr Hennessy are appropriate. The Receivers will be entitled to reasonable remuneration and reasonable costs and expenses properly incurred in the performance of their duties and the exercise of their powers as receivers and managers. That remuneration and those costs and expenses are to be calculated on the basis of time reasonably spent and will be subject to Court approval. Any assessment by the Court would involve consideration of the complexity of the tasks and the efficient use of appropriate staff in relation to the tasks.
46 For those reasons, I reject ASIC's submission and will appoint Mr Templeton and Mr Hennessy as joint and several receivers and managers of the property of the schemes listed in Schedule 1 (except that numbered 12) and the property of the corporate defendants (except that of SY21 Retail Pty Ltd). I do not consider that a reasonable and informed person may perceive a conflict of interest affecting Mr Templeton because of his previous engagement by Mr Letten.
47 In my view, the receivers are entitled to reasonable remuneration and reasonable costs and expenses properly incurred in the performance of their duties and the exercise of their powers as receivers of a scheme as may be fixed by the Court on the application of the Receivers, such sum to be calculated on the basis of the time reasonably spent by them and their staff at the rates specified in an Annexure to the Order and such remuneration, costs and expenses should be paid out of the assets of the relevant scheme.