REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
1 On 21 December 2011, I made the orders set out above for the following reasons.
2 The applicants are receivers of the Mews Scheme, a scheme defined in the order of Finkelstein J made on 28 November 2006. The Mews Scheme is an unregistered managed investment scheme which involved the establishment of a retirement village on land known as the Mews land. The applicants were appointed receivers of the Mews Scheme by the order of Finkelstein J made 28 November 2006. In that capacity, they now hold some $3,568,838. That money constitutes a fund which is being administered by the court: ASIC v GDK Financial Solutions Pty Ltd (No 6) [2010] FCA 1092 at [19].
3 The applicants applied for orders providing for certain procedural steps preliminary to an eventual hearing to authorise a proposed interim distribution of an estimated $1.5 million.
4 The seventh defendant, Mr Peter Warne, was, by order of Finkelstein J made on 21 March 2007, appointed representative of the cash investors in the Mews Scheme. Neither the seventh defendant nor any other party was represented at the hearing or opposed the orders sought.
5 The applicants relied on the affidavit of Brian Keith McMaster sworn on 21 November 2011. Mr McMaster deposed that the orders were sought in order to permit the interim distribution to creditors of the Mews Scheme, foreshadowed to the Court on 29 July 2011. He exhibited a supplementary report to the Court on the Mews Scheme dated 15 November 2011 which set out a proposed timeframe and methodology. The provisional amount for distribution was about $1,500,000. As the applicants proposed to afford all known and potential claimants a final opportunity to submit claims, no provisional assessment of claims was as yet included. The distribution process proposed was to be substantially in line with the timeframe applicable to dividend distribution in a liquidation under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ("the Act") and Corporations Regulations 2001 (Cth) ("the Regulations").
6 The Act includes provisions governing the procedure a liquidator is to follow on the winding up of a corporation and empowering the liquidator to make a distribution of the available property (see, e.g., s 478 & Division 6 of Part 5.6 of the Act and reg 5.6.37 - 5.6.72 of the Regulations). There are no equivalent statutory provisions applicable on the winding-up of an unregistered managed investment scheme by the court.
7 Accordingly, the applicants required an order of the court to authorise them to make a distribution of the Mews Scheme property, which is under the court's control.
8 Section 601EE(2) of the Act provides:
The Court may make any orders it considers appropriate for the winding up of the scheme.
9 Section 601EE(2) empowers the court to make such distribution orders. In ASIC v Commercial Nominees of Australia Ltd (2002) 42 ACSR 240 at [13], Barrett J stated:
... it must be accepted that the court has jurisdiction to settle or prescribe any aspect or element of the basis for winding up or the winding up process which it is necessary to supply because that element cannot be obtained from any other source.
10 The authorities establish, however, that s 601EE(2) cannot be employed to sanction the release of funds to persons who have no legal entitlement to them: ASIC v Edwards [2009] QSC 360 at [7]-[8]; ASIC v Idylic Solutions Ltd (2009) 76 ACSR 129 at [6]. Nor can it be used to create substantive obligations: ASIC v Piggott Wood & Baker (No 3) (2008) 172 FCR 257 at [13].
11 Therefore, in the present case, as a precondition of authorising a distribution, the court must be satisfied as to the respective legal entitlements of the claimants against the fund. To facilitate such a determination, the applicants proposed a process of: (1) calling for claims; (2) submission of claims; (3) provisional assessment of claims; (4) identification of objections to the provisional assessment of claims; and (5) final adjudication of claims, including any objections to the provisional assessments.
12 Section 601EE(2) confers the power to make orders as to the proposed procedural steps, which are incidental to, or in aid of, the eventual distribution order. (Section 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) provides another source of power for the making of such ancillary orders.)
13 Although the applicants had made a number of reports to the court containing provisional assessments as to certain claims received, including reports dated 14 November 2008 and 16 January 2009, considerable time had since elapsed. The recent supplementary report did not include a provisional assessment of claims.
14 The applicants proposed the following regime for submission and determination of claims, to ensure that all possible claimants received adequate notice before the final determination of claims leading to a distribution.
1. Immediate advertisement & gazettal, together with a circular to all known or potential claimants, calling for any new claims.
2. Details of any new claim to be provided within 28 days.
3. By 14 days thereafter the applicants make a provisional assessment as to any new claim, report on that assessment, and circulate a "claim schedule" with all provisional assessments to all known claimants.
4. Any objector to any part of the provisional assessment would then file and serve a process within a further 21 days. The proceedings would then come back before the court to determine the appropriate procedural steps for dealing with a final adjudication and the interim distribution.
15 The proposed orders and advertisement would thus invite new claims from both claimants generally and "priority" claimants. An advertisement had already been published pursuant to orders made 18 November 2008, calling for priority claims.
16 The applicants informed the court that the solicitors for the seventh defendant did not support re-advertisement in relation to priority claims, on the ground that it would be unnecessary, and could invite baseless claims with attendant wasted costs and time. A copy of an email dated 8 November 2011 from the seventh defendant's solicitors setting out the seventh defendant's concern was exhibited.
17 While the applicants conceded that the concerns of the seventh defendant should be taken into account by the court, they submitted, and I accepted, that it was reasonable to re-advertise as proposed, given the effluxion of time since the last substantive report, the necessity to advertise as to claimants generally in any event, and to consider and determine any new priority claims received, which would be more efficiently achieved under a regime contemplating new priority claims.
I certify that the preceding seventeen (17) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Dodds-Streeton.