What should be the penalty in the present case?
80 Applying the above principles, in my view an overall penalty of $5 million is appropriate.
81 First, relevant to both specific and general deterrence, CBA is a substantial Australian bank with not insignificant financial resources. But notwithstanding those resources, for a protracted period it failed to ensure that it could fulfil the promises made to customers under the AA+ Packages. And it was also unable to detect that AA+ Package benefits were not being provided. Indeed the processes and systems developed and relied upon by CBA to provide services to customers allowed its failures to go unnoticed by relevant personnel within the CBA for over 10 years. And it was not until CBA carried out a group-wide review of packaged-based arrangements, through which it was revealed that there were issues with fees charged under those arrangements, that CBA became aware of the issues with the AA+ Packages.
82 In terms of general deterrence, the proposed penalty, although relatively modest given CBA's size, should create a disincentive for large financial institutions to fail to maintain adequate processes and systems. As for specific deterrence, there is less of a need for this in the present case given the nature of the contraventions, the relevant remediation that has occurred and the changes to the CBA's systems that have been implemented. I will set out further detail of these matters in a moment.
83 Second, in making my assessment, the nature and extent of the contravening conduct and the circumstances in which the conduct took place is significant.
84 By way of context, during the relevant period a total of 8,659 relevant customers were harmed by CBA's conduct as to the representations on 131,542 occasions, in circumstances where CBA prior to remediation benefited substantially in incorrectly charged fees and interest on loans and underpaid interest on savings. Further, during the relevant period, on 18,679 occasions, CBA accepted payment of AA+ Package fees for provision of the AA+ Package benefits.
85 Further, during the penalty period, CBA sold 123 AA+ Packages to 334 relevant customers and there were 3,905 accepted payments from 6,953 customers totalling $1,704,650.
86 The contraventions were the result of CBA's failure to introduce and maintain adequate systems so as to ensure the adequate provision of AA+ Package benefits. In this sense, the conduct was serious and involved CBA receiving moneys for the supply of services that were not provided to many customers in circumstances where it ought to have known that the services were not being provided.
87 Further, although the AA+ Package was designed for Australian farmers, the AA+ Package was complex and the relevant customers generally were not in a position to recognise the degree to which CBA was not applying AA+ Package benefits to the relevant products. Now some relevant customers did make complaints as to the non-provision of AA+ Package benefits, but as a result of its own systemic deficiencies CBA did not identify those complaints.
88 Let me say something further about CBA's systems relevant to the present context.
89 During the relevant period, several IT systems were used to implement the AA+ Package benefits. Of these systems, the main one used to host the relevant products was the Systems, Applications and Products system (SAP), which is CBA's core banking system. It is used for recording limits and exposures for all AUD and non-AUD loans and is responsible for the accrual and charging of interest rates and fees.
90 At the time, CBA had manual and complex processes in place to identify whether a relevant customer was eligible for the AA+ Package benefits. And the process for identifying the relevant customers and applying the relevant benefits was product specific.
91 For products hosted on the SAP platform, products were manually linked to the AA+ Package. Relevant benefits were automatically applied once linked to the AA+ Package. For products not hosted on the SAP platform, a manual process was required to apply or remove any relevant benefits. The process differed depending on the product.
92 How these manual and complex systems were set up and operated explains the genesis of the present problem.
93 Now on 19 June 2014, following a CBA-wide review of package-based arrangements that identified fee issues with those arrangements, a CBA review of the AA+ Package revealed that a number of AA+ Package benefits had not been properly applied. On identification of this problem, steps were taken immediately to escalate the issue to senior management. The CBA's senior management, being the GM Home Loans and the Executive Legal Counsel - Banking Group Corporate Affairs, first became aware of the issue with the AA+ Package at this time.
94 On 20 June 2014, the CBA took steps to commence its investigation of the issue and staff were engaged to conduct further investigations as a matter of priority.
95 In late June and early July 2014, CBA's Group Audit and Assurance team conducted an internal audit to ascertain the number of potentially impacted accounts and the financial impact on those accounts. Results from the audit conducted at the time indicated that a total of 2,696 customers and 4,677 accounts were potentially at risk and the total estimated impact on a worst-case scenario was $7,378,020.
96 Further investigations into the AA+ Package issue conducted at the time indicated that extensive testing was required to determine actual financial impacts and root causes. It indicated that the Corporate and Commercial Lending team should work with the remediation programs within CBA then underway to share learnings and to ensure that a consistent and thorough remediation was undertaken. And it indicated that a strategic review of the AA+ Package was required which would investigate products offered, customer value propositions and the best path forward. Further, the review would include considering options such as continuing the product offering, product simplification or ceasing the product offering.
97 By 4 July 2014, CBA's initial investigations into the AA+ Package system failings issue found that benefits had not been correctly applied as intended. Issues that had contributed to this occurring included product complexity, with the AA+ Package applying to multiple products, multiple systems hosting a range of products, and a manual process in place to link, maintain and de-link products to the package. The investigations also found that there had been no customer complaints and accordingly that the issue had been undetected for a significant time.
98 On 14 July 2014, CBA made a "potential" breach report to ASIC. At the time of this reporting, CBA informed ASIC that it had 2,655 active AA+ Packages on offer. Also at the time of this reporting, CBA informed ASIC that it had not identified any formal customer complaints with respect to the AA+ Package. However, complaints were subsequently identified by CBA. It would seem that complaints were not identified before this reporting to ASIC due to the then deficiencies in CBA's complaints recording and reporting systems.
99 I should note that since 30 July 2014, CBA has made investments and improvements in its systems relating to monitoring customer complaints. The details of the steps taken and decisions made by CBA, which have also applied to other retail banking products, are set out in one of the many detailed schedules that were provided to me by the parties which I have annexed to these reasons.
100 On 30 July 2014, CBA established Project Combine, a cross-business team designed to review the AA+ Package and to conduct a customer remediation program. The objectives of Project Combine were to:
(a) ensure that relevant customers were receiving benefits that they were entitled to;
(b) prevent risk of future remediation and consequent customer impact;
(c) improve controls for ongoing package management; and
(d) develop strategic product solutions for relevant customers.
101 On 12 September 2014, the AA+ Package was withdrawn from sale to new customers. In October 2014, Project Combine considered whether to further offer the AA+ Package and what changes would need to be made to fix the system problems that had led to the AA+ Package system failings. The estimated cost of implementing controls robust enough to automatically apply the AA+ Package benefits to customers was considered by CBA to be too expensive such that the costs would have outweighed the benefits of making the changes including the revenue generated by the AA+ Package. The AA+ Package was also considered to be too complex and CBA was not expecting much further demand for it. As a result, CBA made the decision to close the AA+ Package. It was ultimately closed for existing customers on 27 November 2015.
102 On 18 September 2014, CBA wrote to ASIC indicating that CBA had reassessed to "significant" the potential breaches identified in its 14 July 2014 potential breach report for the purposes of s 912D of the Corporations Act.
103 From September 2014 to December 2014, CBA took steps to address the AA+ Package system failings by making improvements and addressing issues in relation to processes, IT systems and detection systems. But the AA+ Package system failings continued to occur throughout 2015 and did not stop until CBA closed the AA+ Package.
104 Five controls were developed or applied to the AA+ Package to prevent or detect new errors in applying the AA+ Package benefits, namely:
(a) a Post Origination Control Report (POC Report);
(b) a Weekly New Sales Report;
(c) refunds approved within delegations;
(d) monitoring of customer complaints; and
(e) the AA+ Package Product Training & Awareness.
105 The POC Report was a tool built by Project Combine specifically for the AA+ Package and was aimed at ensuring that customers received the benefits they were entitled to. The other four controls were existing but were modified to have specific application to the AA+ Package.
106 The design and implementation of the POC Report was the strongest control available to ensure that relevant customers received AA+ Package benefits. The POC Report was run and reviewed on a daily basis to identify when an existing customer had entered into or amended an eligible product, to ensure AA+ Package benefits were applied correctly and to provide the customer with a refund where they were not. What has been described to me as Line 1 assurance was undertaken initially on a weekly or fortnightly basis to ensure that the five controls were operationally sound. CBA also prepared a rectification guide titled "Applying Benefits & Refunding Guide" to assist with the POC Report procedures and applying benefits and/or refunding. CBA also undertook stress testing of the POC Report to ensure that the relevant products were accurately appearing on the POC Report and to verify the application methodology.
107 Between 29 September 2014 and 26 August 2015, CBA met with ASIC on five occasions on a quarterly basis. At these meetings, CBA provided general updates to ASIC in the form of updated remediation packs on the progress of:
(a) its investigations into the AA+ Package system failings;
(b) decisions and activities undertaken by the bank in relation to Project Combine and customer remediation;
(c) proposed customer communications; and
(d) testing, review and assurance strategies.
108 In July 2015, CBA engaged KPMG to conduct an investigation of the AA+ Package issues. In conducting its investigation, KPMG:
(a) considered and agreed with the project plan at the commencement of each stage of its investigation;
(b) reviewed individual structured query language queries set up for each relevant product and assessed whether the queries being used reflected terms of reference documents that in turn reflected design decisions approved by Project Combine;
(c) reviewed the suitability of the selection criteria in compiling that data;
(d) cross-referenced steps in the code to functional requirements of the terms of reference documents;
(e) requested Project Combine to run specific queries or views as designed by KPMG on-site to validate or confirm particular aspects which were not clear on the documents which CBA had provided to KPMG as part of their engagement;
(f) reported their findings to CBA as found, along with recommended revisions; and
(g) confirmed any negative findings with Project Combine.
109 The investigation by KPMG concluded in August 2015. During the course of the investigation, KPMG raised 169 queries or issues. These were resolved during the course of the review and KPMG ultimately concluded that the calculation methodology used for each product was accurate and appropriate. These 169 queries or issues were all resolved prior to the commencement of the customer remediation.
110 From October 2014 to August 2015, CBA quantified the financial impact to customers of the AA+ Package benefits being incorrectly applied. Between 29 September 2014 and 26 August 2015, CBA kept ASIC updated on the remediation methodology used by CBA for remediation purposes.
111 The number of AA+ Packages affected was 6,632 AA+ Packages out of a total of 7,077 AA+ Packages established by CBA between May 2005 and September 2014.
112 Between September 2015 and May 2016, of all customers whom CBA had identified at that time as having not received the AA+ Package benefits to one or more relevant products in accordance with the prevailing AA+ Package terms and conditions or were the subject of mischarged AA+ Package fees, CBA paid $7,404,670.15 in remediation to 7,730 customers.
113 CBA attempted to make payments to 8,306 customers. Of that number, CBA remediated 7,261 customers by November 2015 and a further 469 customers by May 2016. 193 customers did not meet CBA's minimum payment threshold of having a current transaction account with CBA and were due a refund of less than $5.00.
114 With respect to these 193 customers, the quantum of the moneys attributable to these customers who did not meet CBA's minimum payment threshold totalled $326.57. On 19 January 2016, a cheque for that amount was donated to the National Rural Health Alliance.
115 Let me move further forward in time.
116 As a result of ASIC's investigation, on 24 February 2020 CBA identified that data from an old legacy system, which was data for package fees for the period prior to 2008, had not been combined and analysed with the post-2008 package fees data for the remediation of AA+ Package fees under Project Combine. CBA investigated the gap in the remediation data and identified a gap in the remediation of mischarged AA+ Package fees that had occurred during the period 2005 to 2008. CBA identified 471 packages which were subject to mischarged AA+ Package fees during the period 2005 to 2008. These impacted packages related to 1,381 customers, of which 353 had not previously been included in the remediation under Project Combine, bringing the total number of customers requiring remediation across all AA+ Package benefits and mischarged AA+ Package fees from 8,306 to 8,659. They also related to additional mischarged AA+ Package fees which had not previously been included in the remediation on 513 occasions during the period 2005 to 2008, bringing the total number of mischarged AA+ Package fees to 2,746 and the total number of occasions that CBA had incorrectly charged fees and interest on loans and underpaid interest on savings over the relevant period to 131,542, and to a value of $438,257.57, raising the total value of the incorrectly charged fees and interest on loans and underpaid interest on savings over the relevant period from $7,649,018.66 to $8,087,726.23.
117 On or around 6 March 2020, CBA took steps to remediate the 1,381 customers who held such an impacted package.
118 What can be summarised generally from the foregoing narrative is that the CBA after identifying the AA+ Package system failings:
(a) ceased offering the AA+ Package to new customers in September 2014 and ultimately withdrew the AA+ Package for existing customers on 27 November 2015;
(b) continued to calculate the AA+ Package benefits up to and including 31 December 2015 on the basis that existing customers were entitled to AA+ Package benefits up to and including that date;
(c) at a group-wide level, undertook measures to improve its processes and controls for the monitoring of its financial products, including those that contributed to the AA+ Package system failings;
(d) introduced measures to improve its customer complaints monitoring systems;
(e) undertook remediation of affected customers; and
(f) engaged KPMG to undertake an independent audit of its remediation methodology.
119 The steps taken by the CBA once it had identified the problem were timely and thorough. Moreover, it brought ASIC into the loop at the earliest opportunity.
120 Third and relatedly, let me deal with the question of corporate culture.
121 ASIC submits that CBA's failure to identify the non-provision of AA+ Package benefits over a 10 year period indicates that CBA's corporate culture was over that time not conducive to compliance. But what I have just set out would indicate more that there was a specific systems deficiency rather than a broader corporate culture problem.
122 Let me say something about the contemporary concept of corporate culture. What does it mean? For the moment I will use the definition in Part 2.5 of the Criminal Code (Commonwealth) which neutrally and therefore usefully defines "corporate culture" to mean:
an attitude, policy, rule, course of conduct or practice existing within the body corporate generally or in the part of the body corporate in which the relevant activities takes place.
123 The context of the CBA's conduct is that it was attempting to provide a benefit to a cohort of customers it considered could be genuinely assisted by its efforts. In context its failures lay in the lack of any robust systems and processes to effectuate those desires, thereby causing loss to the customers it sought to assist.
124 Further, it is well apparent that CBA's conduct in relation to the AA+ Package benefits was neither intentional nor of a kind that was undertaken to generate revenue without seeking to provide meaningful commensurate benefits to customers. Nevertheless, CBA has properly recognised the seriousness of its failings, given that it represented that benefits would be delivered and it accepted the fees it received, without ensuring the conferral of those benefits.
125 Clearly CBA failed to establish and maintain appropriate systems and processes to ensure that it could provide the AA+ Package benefits in accordance with the AA+ Package terms and conditions. Unfortunately, CBA had only highly manual processes in place to administer a complex product. There were no appropriate IT systems to administer the product and CBA did not establish any business unit, team or person who was responsible for ensuring that the AA+ Package benefits were being properly applied. And clearly those significant failings continued for over 10 years, and prejudiced Australian farmers for whom the AA+ Package was specifically designed.
126 But I reject ASIC's contention that the failure of CBA to identify the non-provision of AA+ Package benefits over a 10 year period indicates that CBA's corporate culture was during that time not conducive to compliance.
127 Now it is the case that CBA should have taken care to ensure that its systems and processes would deliver the promised benefits, but the better measure of CBA's prevailing culture is how it responded when the problem was identified. When so assessed by the chronology that I have previously detailed, it does not seem to me that there was a corporate culture problem.
128 Moreover, I accept the submissions of Mr Neil Young QC for the CBA that in a financial institution of the scale of CBA, many financial services are delivered day in, day out, just as they were promised or represented. And it seems from the material that in CBA seeking to assist rural customers, the delivery of those services depended on highly complex manual processes. This was because CBA had created a package that sought to benefit customers from a particular sector, where those customers held transaction and other accounts to which those benefits would be applied, and where such accounts were also held by many other customers not in the relevant rural sector.
129 In my view and contrary to ASIC's submissions and despite the contraventions, at no time during the relevant period did CBA's corporate culture in the context that I am considering condone or positively support non-compliance with statutory obligations. Rather it seems to me that in the present case there were serious system deficiencies.
130 Further, CBA's early potential and significant breach notifications to ASIC, its remediation program and its system changes point against a significant corporate culture problem.
131 In summary, after CBA identified the issue in June 2014, in July 2014 it established a cross business team designed to review the AA+ Package and to conduct a customer remediation program. It kept ASIC informed of its progress in this regard, meeting with ASIC on five occasions between 29 September 2014 and 26 August 2015. I agree with CBA that once the systems failings became apparent to CBA, its engagement with ASIC was swift and co-operative, and urgent steps were taken to remediate the customers fully and to cease the conduct.
132 Between September 2015 and May 2016, to 7,730 customers that CBA had identified at that time as having not received the AA+ Package benefits to one or more relevant products in accordance with the prevailing AA+ Package terms and conditions or were the subject of mischarged AA+ Package fees, CBA paid $7,404,670.15 in remediation.
133 Further, as I have said, in February 2020 from data from a legacy system CBA identified 471 packages which were subject to mischarged AA+ Package fees during the period 2005 to 2008, relating to 1,381 customers. And although outside the penalty period for the purposes of these proceedings, CBA took steps to remediate the 1,381 customers not previously captured by CBA's prior remediation.
134 Fourth, let me deal with the question of the role of senior management. ASIC does not submit that senior management were involved in the contraventions or relevantly aware of the AA+ Package system failings. The CBA's senior management, being the "GM Home Loans" and the "Executive Legal Counsel - Banking Group Corporate Affairs", became aware of the issues with the AA+ Package upon CBA first identifying the AA+ Package system failings in June 2014.
135 Fifth, let me say something about the question of deliberateness and the period of conduct. ASIC does not submit that CBA intended the outcomes derived from the inadequacies of these manual systems. CBA did not intend the AA+ Package system failings.
136 Sixth, as to the number of contraventions and the course of conduct principle, I should make the following observations.
137 ASIC accepts that in the circumstances of the present case there can be no meaningful overall maximum penalty and that the maximum penalty should not be applied mechanically and should instead be treated as one of a number of relevant factors, albeit an important one.
138 But ASIC does say that the contraventions of ss 12DB(1) and 12DI(3) should be viewed as two distinct categories of contravention. By the s 12DB(1) allegations, CBA made a series of false or misleading representations as to its ability to provide certain benefits. The 123 relevant representations were made to 334 customers. By the s 12DI(3) allegations, CBA accepted payments for services notwithstanding objective uncertainty as to its ability to provide those same services. The fees were accepted by CBA on 3,905 occasions from 6,953 customers.
139 Accordingly, ASIC submits that the contraventions of s 12DB(1) ought give rise to a pecuniary penalty of $2,500,000.
140 And it submits that the contraventions of s 12DI(3) ought give rise to a penalty in the region of $3,500,000 as there were a greater number of contraventions. Further, ASIC submits that the conduct was more serious in that it involved CBA taking payment when there were reasonable grounds to believe it could not provide the services.
141 Applying the totality principle, ASIC submits that an overall pecuniary penalty of $5 million is appropriate.
142 But I am more inclined to accept the CBA's characterisation that there is the one foundational systems deficiency that has then caused or manifested the two types of contraventions. Perhaps it may not matter at the end of the day as CBA did not strongly argue for a penalty lower than $5 million in total.
143 Seventh, as to previous contraventions, in another context I found CBA to have engaged in conduct in contravention of the consumer protection provisions of the ASIC Act and I have taken this into account in the present context.
144 In Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (2018) 128 ACSR 289, I considered the penalty appropriate where CBA had admitted to market manipulation and unconscionable conduct concerning trading in prime bank bills in the bank bill market during the period 31 January 2012 to 5 June 2012. On five dates over that period, CBA had engaged in conduct that amounted to an attempted contravention of s 12CB(1) of the ASIC Act. In resolving the case, CBA agreed to enter into an enforceable undertaking to the effect that it would pay $15 million into a fund to be applied to the benefit of the community. It also agreed to pay $5 million as to ASIC's costs including its investigative costs. I imposed a pecuniary penalty of $5 million.
145 In imposing such a pecuniary penalty I observed that a penalty towards the upper end of the available range was warranted because inter-alia:
(a) CBA's conduct was deliberate in the sense that it was engaged in with the intention of achieving an outcome proscribed by the ASIC Act, and was not transparent to counterparties;
(b) there were multiple occasions over a period spanning approximately 5 months;
(c) CBA's conduct involved senior staff;
(d) the conduct was not prevented by CBA policies and systems or by its senior management;
(e) none of the relevant employees or senior executives had been adequately trained about the implications of attempts to influence the bank bill swap rate for their compliance with CBA's policies;
(f) CBA's conduct was engaged in for the purpose of making not insignificant profits in circumstances where CBA knew that if successful, it may have gained at the expense of others who were vulnerable.
146 Of course there are obvious distinguishing features between that case and the present case which I do not need to dwell on.
147 Finally, CBA has co-operated with ASIC in its investigation of the AA+ Package, and assisted with the efficient and less expensive resolution of the proceedings. It has made complete admissions at the first opportunity to all of the allegations contained in the Concise Statement, and has agreed to the declaratory relief sought by ASIC. Further, and as I have said earlier, it had consulted with ASIC on five occasions between 2014 and 2015 with respect to the remediation methodology to be applied to affected customers. More generally, I accept that CBA has shown substantial contrition and accepted accountability for its systemic deficiencies and the admitted contraventions, which contrition and acceptance have been manifested by both its words and, more importantly, its actions.