Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Administrative Appeals Tribunal

The Tribunal's reasons 66 The Tribunal noted that there were two elements of the Commission's argument concerning the deferred tax asset. First, the Commission submitted that the deferred tax asset fell within the definition of an intangible asset and therefore could not be taken into account in calculating net tangible assets. Second, the Commission submitted that some doubt existed as to whether sufficient profit would be earned by Opus so as to utilise the deferred tax asset, with the result that it could not be recognised as an asset on the balance sheet. 67 The Tribunal considered whether the deferred tax asset should be recognised as an asset before turning to the question of whether the deferred tax asset was an intangible. 68 In considering whether the deferred tax asset should be recognised, the Tribunal referred to AASB 112 and, in particular, to para 34 which we have set out above. The Tribunal observed that this paragraph of AASB 112 deals explicitly with recognition of a deferred tax asset. 69 The Commission submitted that it was not probable that Opus would have future taxable profits. The effect of this submission was that there was reason to doubt the view of Mr Palmer, that the company would return to profitability, so that the requirements for recognition under para 34 of AASB 112 were not satisfied. 70 However, the Tribunal observed that there was no evidence to the contrary of that given by Mr Palmer who expressed a view about the likelihood of future profit which was supported by calculations put forward by officers of Opus. The Tribunal held at [27]-[28] that it had no reason to doubt Mr Palmer's opinion. 71 The Tribunal was therefore satisfied, at [29], that it was proper to recognise the deferred tax asset as an asset for the purposes of calculating the value of total assets. 72 In considering whether the deferred tax asset was an intangible, the Tribunal commenced its discussion, at [30], by noting that the definition of an intangible asset in the licence is similar in content to the definition of an intangible asset in AASB 138. 73 Notably, the Commission said at [31] that it is open to doubt the extent to which definitions in AASB 138 (and some other standards) can govern the meaning to be given to a term in Opus' licence. However, the Tribunal accepted the Commission's submission that the standards perform that task. 74 The Tribunal accepted, at [32], the Commission's submission that the deferred tax asset was "without physical substance". But the Tribunal went on to consider whether the deferred tax assets were a "non-monetary asset" within AASB 138. 75 The Tribunal accepted that there were only two possible alternatives. A deferred tax asset was either a monetary asset, as defined in AASB 138, or a non-monetary asset. The Commission argued that a deferred tax asset was not a monetary asset because it was not an asset to be received in a fixed or determinable amount of money. The Tribunal, at [32], rejected the Commission's argument on this question. 76 The critical reasons why the Tribunal found that the deferred tax asset was a monetary asset (that is to say, on the Tribunal's approach, not a non-monetary asset) were set out in [33] as follows: We accept that the reference to "money held" is a reference to currency however we think the Commission's argument reads "received" too narrowly. There will be no physical receipt of money: the Commissioner of Taxation will not ever be paying the amount of the deferred tax asset to Opus. But where a judgment has been made that it is probable that there will be future taxable profits, on which income tax would otherwise be payable, the amount required to be paid will be reduced by the amount of the deferred tax asset. The deferred tax asset will reduce the liability that would otherwise exist to pay income tax. The amount to be received in this way is determinable; the amount of the losses has been determined and the value of the asset is calculated by applying the company tax rate to the amount of those losses. 77 The Tribunal went on to refer to other portions of AASB 138 to support this conclusion. It referred, inter alia, to the examples of intangible resources set out in para 9 of AASB 138 including scientific or technical knowledge and intellectual property. It said that these assets fall within the definition of intangible assets, in part because they lack precise value. But by contrast, a deferred tax asset [has] a precise and determinable value once the judgment has been made that there is a probability of future taxable profits. A deferred tax asset is, in our opinion, a monetary asset and, thus, not an intangible asset required to be excluded from the calculation of net tangible assets. 78 The Tribunal went on at [37] to say that it was comforted in reaching this conclusion by the opinion of an experienced chartered accountant, Mr David Holland, who gave evidence for Opus. 79 Mr Holland's evidence was that a deferred tax asset was not an intangible, although he recognised that other minds might reasonably come to a different conclusion. The Tribunal preferred Mr Holland's evidence to that of the Commission's expert accountant, Mr Niven. 80 Mr Niven would not regard a deferred tax asset as an amount receivable in a fixed or determinable sum (see definition of "monetary assets" in AASB 138), because it is contingent upon the entity having future taxable income against which the asset can be utilised. As to this, the Tribunal said at [37]: That contingency, in our view, determines whether the asset is recognised. Once recognised, that is, once it is determined that it is probable that there will be future taxable profits that can be set off against the losses carried forward, we accept Mr Holland's view that it can legitimately be regarded as a monetary asset. 81 Having concluded that the deferred tax asset was not an intangible, the Tribunal did not find it necessary to consider the proper characterisation of sales and performance fees.

Question of fact or law 82 It is well established that the jurisdiction of the Court under s 44 of the AAT Act is not enlivened unless the decision of the Tribunal involves a question of law: TNT Skypak International (Aust) Pty Limited v Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 82 ALR 175 at 178; Birdseye v Australian Securities & Investments Commission (2003) 76 ALD 321 at [11] and [16]; Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Saxby Bridge Financial Planning Pty Ltd (2003) 133 FCR 290 at [42] and [107]. 83 In our opinion, the Tribunal's decision that the deferred tax asset was not an intangible involves a question of law. This is because the Tribunal's decision raises the question of whether, upon the proper construction of Condition 9 of the licence, the deferred tax asset, as found by the Tribunal to exist, is properly to be characterised as a tangible asset. 84 This can be seen from the structure and content of the Tribunal's reasons. What must be borne in mind is that no challenge is made to the Tribunal's finding that it was proper to recognise the deferred tax asset as an asset for the purpose of calculating the value of Opus' total assets. 85 That was a finding of fact which was based upon the Tribunal's acceptance of Mr Palmer's evidence that it was probable that Opus would have future taxable profits against which the unused tax losses could be applied. 86 But the ultimate question which the Tribunal determined was that the deferred tax asset formed part of Opus' net tangible assets because it was an "adjusted asset". What was required to make that determination was to calculate the value of Opus' assets as they would appear on its balance sheet and to deduct from this the value of "excluded assets", that is to say, intangible assets. 87 The calculation was therefore a two-step process which was reflected in the Tribunal's reasoning process. The first step was the factual finding that the deferred tax asset was an asset which would appear on the balance sheet made up in accordance with Chapter 2M. The second was that the deferred tax asset was not an intangible. 88 It was the second step which involved a question of law, namely whether the asset which the Tribunal found to be properly recognised on the notional balance sheet was to be characterised as an intangible. 89 This step involves a question of whether the facts fully found by the Tribunal fell within the definition of an "excluded asset" in Condition 9 of the licence, when properly construed. This is a question of law: Vetter v Lake Macquarie City Council (2001) 202 CLR 439 at [24] ("Vetter"). 90 As Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Callinan JJ said in Vetter at [24], whether facts as found answer a statutory description will very frequently be a question of law. Or, as their Honours went on to say "whether the facts found by the trial court can support the legal description given to them by the trial court is a question of law". 91 This proposition is subject to the qualification that the process of construction may, in some cases, involve a question of mixed fact and law, but where on the facts as found, only one conclusion is open, the question is exclusively one of law: Vetter at [27]; see also Commissioner of Taxation v Cooper (1991) 29 FCR 177 at 194-195 (Hill J) and the review of the authorities by McKerracher J in Commissioner of Taxation v Swansea Services Pty Limited (2009) 72 ATR 120 at [47]-[58]. 92 That is the position in the present case. It is not, as was submitted by Opus, a question of the meaning of an ordinary English word or phrase used in a quasi-statutory enactment. Nor is it a question of whether, on the facts found by the Tribunal, different conclusions were reasonably open as to whether the deferred tax asset was an intangible. 93 Opus sought to support its submission by pointing to the Tribunal's construction of the word "received" in the passage at [33] of its reasons which we have set out above. In Opus' submission, this shows that the question is one of the meaning of an ordinary English word because the Tribunal concluded that the deferred tax asset was received; although not received physically, the amount of tax otherwise required to be paid will be reduced by the amount of the deferred tax asset. 94 There are three answers to Opus' submission. First, the question of whether the deferred tax asset was "received" was merely a step in the Tribunal's process of determining the ultimate question, namely, whether the asset was an intangible. That question did not involve the meaning of an ordinary English word or whether the facts as found fell within the ordinary meaning of the word "received". 95 The Tribunal construed the word "received" as part of the process of determining whether the deferred tax asset was an intangible. It adopted that approach because it accepted the Commission's submission that the meaning to be given to the term "intangible" could be governed by the terms of AASB 138. But this does not detract from the conclusion that the ultimate question which the Tribunal considered was whether the deferred tax asset was an intangible. 96 That question was one of law, because it involved the meaning of a technical legal term, or because it involved a judgment about whether the deferred tax asset was an "intangible", and therefore an excluded asset under the licence, having regard to the regulatory purpose for which that term was included in Condition 9 of the licence: Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Limited (1993) 43 FCR 280 at 287 (see proposition 3), 288-289 ("Pozzolanic"). 97 The technical legal nature of the term is revealed by the requirement of the licence that the starting point for calculating the value of net tangible assets is the value of assets as they would appear on a balance sheet made up in accordance with Chapter 2M of the Act. This includes the requirement of s 296 that the financial report must comply with accounting standards. Any consideration of the meaning of an intangible asset is therefore, on the Tribunal's approach, to be seen in light of the relevant accounting standard, AASB 138, by virtue of the provisions of s 296 of the Act. 98 The terms "intangible", "monetary asset" and "received", in so far as they are made applicable through AASB 138, therefore involve a consideration of those terms in a technical legal sense. 99 The regulatory purpose for the exclusion of intangible assets from the calculation of "adjusted assets" in determining the value of Opus' net tangible assets under Condition 9 of the licence is explained by the provisions of RG 166 to which we referred above. 100 What is revealed by the relevant provisions of RG 166 is that a licensee must have sufficient financial resources to conduct its business and that there is a financial buffer that decreases the risk of disorderly winding up if the business fails. It is those underlying purposes which show that what is an intangible asset is not a process of fact finding but a value judgment about the meaning of that term to be made in light of the policy and purpose of the regulatory provision expressed in condition 9 of the licence. 101 Second, the question which the Tribunal determined was not the construction of the word "received" considered in isolation. Rather, what the Tribunal did was to determine whether the deferred tax asset constituted an intangible by considering the component elements of the definition of an intangible asset in AASB 138. 102 The Tribunal approached this question by looking at the definition of "monetary asset" because it considered that if the asset was a monetary asset, as defined in AASB 138, it could not be a non-monetary asset, and hence, not an intangible within the definition of the term "intangible asset" in AASB 138. 103 Thus, in determining whether the deferred tax asset was an intangible asset, the Tribunal asked itself whether the deferred tax asset fell within the composite expression comprised in the definition of "monetary assets" in AASB 138; that is to say, whether it was money held or an asset to be received in a fixed or determinable amount. 104 It is true that in [38] of its reasons the Tribunal said that the Commission's argument reads the word "received" too narrowly. Also in [34] of its reasons the Tribunal stated that support for a broad approach to the meaning of "received" is to be found in AASB 138. 105 However, those observations of the Tribunal are to be read in their full context. This may be seen in the conclusion reached by the Tribunal at [36] that the deferred tax asset was a monetary asset, and hence not an intangible. 106 The Tribunal's decision therefore meets the test stated by Heerey J in AMI Toyota Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of Customs (2000) 43 ATR 743 at [53] as follows: there is a question of construction as to the meaning of the compound expression in the context of the Act. This case did not turn on a single ordinary English word susceptible of a range of meanings and its application or otherwise to proved facts, such as the word "insulting" considered in Brutus v Cozens. 107 The error in Opus' submission may be summed up by referring to the observations of Lord Hoffman in R v Brown [1996] 1 AC 543 at 561. His Lordship there said that lawyers often fall into the fallacy of treating the words of a statement as building blocks whose meaning cannot be affected by the rest of the sentence. But this is not the way language works because the unit of communication is the sentence and not the parts of which it is composed: see also Collector of Customs v Agfa-Gevaert Ltd (1996) 165 CLR 389 at 397 ("Agfa-Gevaert"). 108 Opus also submitted that the Tribunal's decision involved a question of fact because it concerned the meaning of the words "intangible assets" and "received". In putting this submission, Mr Sofronoff QC, who appeared for Opus, relied upon the remarks of Isaacs J in Life Insurance Co of Australia Limited v Phillips (1925) 36 CLR 60 at 78 (citing Lindley LJ in Chatenay v Brazilian Submarine Telegraph Co Ltd [1891] 1 QB 79 at 85) and the fourth proposition stated by the Full Court in Pozzolanic at 287. 109 Opus' submission, based on those two authorities, was that the meaning of an expression is a question of fact but its effect is a question of law. 110 However, in Agfa-Gevaert, the High Court (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ) said at 396-397 that this distinction is artificial, if not illusory and that it is one which is difficult to support: see also HP Mercantile Pty Limited v Commissioner of Taxation (2008) 143 FCR 53 at [84] per Stone J. 111 It seems to us therefore that we should not adopt the distinction between meaning and effect. The better, and more recent view, is as was pointed out by Stone J in HP Mercantile, to be found in the observations of the High Court in Vetter and in Hope, as well as in the observations of Fullager J in Hayes v Commissioner of Taxation (1956) 96 CLR 47 at 51 ("Hayes"). 112 The effect of those authorities is that the distinction to be drawn is between the factum probandum (that is, the ultimate fact in issue) and the facta probantia (the facts adduced to prove the ultimate fact). Where the factum probandum involves a term used in a statute (or a quasi-statutory instrument) the question whether the accepted facta probantia establish the factum probandum will generally be one of law. 113 This was the distinction drawn by Wigmore which was stated by Fullager J in Hayes at 51 and cited with approval by Mason J in Hope v Bathurst City Council (1980) 144 CLR 1 at 7 and by the plurality in Vetter at [25]. 114 The decision of the Tribunal in the present case raises a similar question to that which arose in Hayes. There the question raised on an appeal under the Income Tax and Social Services Contribution Assessment Act 1936-1950 (Cth) concerned the determination by the Taxation Board of Review that the receipt of a number of shares by the taxpayer constituted income. Fullager J explained at [51] that this determination raised a question of law. For the same reasons, in the present case, the Tribunal's determination that the deferred tax asset was not an intangible involves a question of law. 115 It follows in our view that the jurisdictional threshold for an appeal to the Federal Court under s 44 of the AAT Act is satisfied. 116 Nothing turns upon the submission made by Mr Sofronoff that the grounds of appeal are stated in terms which draw attention to the Tribunal's finding that the deferred tax asset was "received". We accept the submission of Dr Bell SC that the grounds of appeal are to be considered in light of what we said above about the composite nature of the expression in question. 117 That is to say, a proper reading of the grounds of appeal shows that the Commission contends that the error is not merely as to the construction of the word "received" but as to the construction of the composite phrase, considered in the light of the ultimate question which was whether the deferred tax asset was an intangible.

Whether the Tribunal erred 118 In our opinion, the Tribunal erred in coming to the view that the deferred tax asset was not an intangible asset and that it therefore formed part of Opus' net tangible assets. 119 It seems to us that the error arose from the failure of the Tribunal to adopt an approach to the construction of the licence which promoted the regulatory purpose for which the licence was issued. 120 Instead, the Tribunal applied a literal approach to construction which led it into error by focusing upon the meaning of the word "received" in AASB 138. Not only did the Tribunal adopt a construction of that word which was contrary to the underlying purpose and object of the relevant statutory or quasi-statutory instruments, it also construed the word "received" as a single word without considering it as part of a composite phrase, and shorn of the context in which it appeared. 121 Before turning to the particular errors revealed in the Tribunal's reasons, we should say that we have come to our conclusion without wishing to suggest any disrespect to the Tribunal which produced its reasons speedily, clearly and efficiently. 122 As we have said, the licence issued to Opus was an important regulatory tool in the hands of the Commission as the regulator of managed investment schemes. The Commission is not a prudential regulator but the terms of the licence are to be considered in light of the regulatory purposes revealed in the relevant instruments. 123 Whether or not the deferred tax asset constituted an intangible depended upon the proper construction of the licence and, in particular, the definitions contained in it, including the definition of "excluded assets" and "intangible assets" so far as the latter concept was defined in the terms of the licence, as well as the context in which those expressions appeared in the licence. 124 The proper approach to construction in matters such as this is stated by McHugh J in Kelly v The Queen (2004) 218 CLR 216 at [103] ("Kelly"). His Honour observed that the function of a definition is not to enact substantive law but to provide an aid in construing the statute. His Honour continued by saying: Nothing is more likely to defeat the intention of the legislature than to give a definition a narrow, literal meaning and then use that meaning to negate the evident policy or purpose of the substantive enactment…I think the only proper - course is to read the words of the definition into the substantive enactment and then construe the substantive enactment - in its extended or confined sense - in its context and bearing in mind its purpose and the mischief that it was designed to overcome. To construe the definition before its text has been inserted into the fabric of the substantive enactment invites error into the meaning of the substantive enactment. 125 McHugh J was in dissent in Kelly but the approach to construction which he stated is unexceptional. It was referred to with approval by Basten JA in Hastings Co-operative Ltd v Port Macquarie Hastings Council (2009) 171 LGERA 152 at [16] ("Hastings"). 126 The majority judgment in Kelly (Gleeson CJ, Hayne and Heydon JJ) at [43] accepted the purpose or object of the relevant statute but pointed out that the legislative response to the case showed that the object could be achieved in a number of ways. Thus, the identified purpose or object did not compel any particular construction of the detailed language of the statute and "the correct construction must depend on the particular words used." 127 The caveat stated by the majority in Kelly must therefore be borne in mind in addressing the question of construction in the present case. 128 As Basten JA (with whom Allsop P and Handley AJA relevantly agreed) said in Hastings at [35], generally speaking, the purpose of an instrument will be promoted by giving effect to the definitions of defined terms. His Honour also warned against abstruse and complex arguments of construction which tend to depart from the purpose and ease of application of a statutory instrument. 129 In the present case, the purpose and object of the terms of the licence may be gleaned from RG 166. It is true that this is a policy statement and, as French and Drummond JJ observed in Minister for Immigration v Gray (1994) 50 FCR 189 at 208 ("Gray"), policies are not statutory instruments; they prescribe guidelines in general and not always very precise language so that to apply them with statutory nicety is to misunderstand their function. 130 In Gray at 208, French and Drummond JJ went on to say: On the other hand, where the existence and content of such a policy is to be regarded as a relevant fact which the Tribunal is bound to consider, a serious misconstruction of its terms or misunderstanding of its purposes in the course of decision-making may constitute a failure to take into account a relevant factor and for that reason may result in an improper exercise of the statutory power. 131 Their Honours also pointed out at 208 that the jurisdiction to review decisions of the Tribunal is to be exercised with restraint, citing Pozzolanic at 286-287. We have taken this into account in the exercise of our jurisdiction.

The purpose and object of the licensing regime 132 It is clear from the terms of RG 166 that the financial services licence issued to Opus is a standard form document applicable to the responsible entities of managed investment schemes. Indeed, as pointed out above, the relevant terms of Condition 9 of the licence are virtually identical to the terms of the requirements stated in RG 166.63. 133 What must therefore be borne in mind in construing Condition 9 is the Commission has imposed the requirement that a licence holder have a stipulated minimum level of net tangible assets so as to achieve a number of purposes. In particular, as stated in RG 166.12, the financial requirements imposed on a licensee are to help ensure that it has sufficient financial resources to conduct its business and that there is a financial "buffer" to decrease the risk of disorderly wind-up if the business fails. 134 Also, in setting licensing conditions for financial requirements, the Commission seeks to set minimum standards that are framed clearly and simply, so as to provide certainty: see RG 166.13. 135 In addition, as stated in RG 166.68, the financial requirements for responsible entities of managed investment schemes take into account, amongst other things, the need for investor protection. 136 It should also be noted that the stated object of Chapter 7 of the Act, under which the licensing regime exists, includes the reduction of systemic risk: see s 760A of the Act. 137 The Tribunal referred to this provision at [16] but does not appear to have taken it into account in its reasoning process. 138 Reference may also be made to s 912A(1)(b) which, as stated above at [13], requires a licensee to have available adequate resources, including financial resources, to provide the financial services covered by the licence.

Failure to take account of object and purpose 139 In our view, the principal error in the Tribunal's reasons is its failure to have regard to the object and purpose for which the financial requirements as stated in Condition 9 were included in the licence. 140 It is clear that the minimum level of net tangible assets required by Condition 9 was intended to achieve the purposes stated above including in particular "adequate resources", a "financial buffer" in case the licensee's business fails, and "investor protection". 141 Of course, the definitions in the licence must be construed and applied. But it is plain that the starting point in the determination of net tangible assets is to calculate the value of "adjusted assets" which requires the value of "excluded assets" to be deducted. 142 "Excluded assets" include intangible assets but that term is not defined other than by reference to the words in parenthesis, that is, "non-monetary assets without physical substance". 143 The Tribunal accepted that the deferred tax asset was without physical substance but it came to the view that the asset was a monetary asset. It did so not by reference to the terms of the licence but by reference to a definition of "monetary assets" in AASB 138. 144 What is immediately striking about this is that deferred tax assets are specifically excluded from the application of AASB 138. Indeed, para 3 of AASB 138 treats deferred tax assets as an intangible asset and provides for them to be covered by AASB 112. 145 It is true, as Opus pointed out, that para 3 of AASB 138 also excludes "financial assets" as defined in AASB 132, and thereby appears to treat financial assets as intangibles. 146 AASB 132 defines "financial assets" to include cash, shares, deposits and derivatives. Mr Sofronoff submitted that the matters included in the definition in AASB 132 are not intangible assets. Accordingly, in his submission, nothing turns upon the apparent treatment of deferred tax assets in para 3 of AASB 138 as intangibles which are excluded from the operation of that standard. 147 Plainly, cash, shares and deposits are not intangibles, but derivatives take many shapes and forms. It is not surprising that they are the subject of a different accounting standard. 148 It therefore seems to us that the exclusion of deferred tax assets from AASB 138, and the reference to it in that standard as an intangible asset, is a strong contextual indication that a deferred tax asset is an intangible. 149 In any event, to construe the meaning of an intangible asset by reference to a definition in a standard which specifically excludes deferred tax assets appears to us to be an incorrect approach. It may well be that the Tribunal was led into this error by the Commission which sought to rely on AASB 138 to govern the terms in Opus' licence. Indeed, the Tribunal said at [31] that this approach was open to doubt yet it proceeded upon the basis that the Commission's submission was correct, at least insofar as AASB 138 governed the meaning of the terms of Opus' licence. 150 The effect of the Commission's approach to the meaning of a monetary asset was, in our view, to depart from the language of Condition 9 of the licence, and to detract from a consideration of the object and purpose sought to be achieved by that condition. 151 Condition 9 contains no definition of an intangible other than as a non-monetary asset without physical substance. But what is important is that intangibles are "excluded assets" and their value must be excluded from the value of total assets as they would appear on a balance sheet. 152 An intangible asset will be included on a balance sheet but Condition 9 of the licence requires its value to be deducted from the total value of assets on the balance sheet. The purpose of this is revealed in RG 166. An intangible will not provide, inter alia, "a financial buffer" that decreases risk of a disorderly wind-up if the business fails, "certainty" or "investor protection". 153 The language of Condition 9, and in particular the concept of an intangible asset, insofar as it was defined, was to be interpreted in light of the object and purpose stated above. 154 The fact that a deferred tax asset was without physical substance went part way toward the conclusion that it was an intangible. All that was left was to determine whether it was a non-monetary asset. 155 It may be accepted that a non-monetary asset is the opposite of a monetary asset. The most obvious example of a monetary asset is cash. In Foody v Horewood (No 2) [2004] VSC 222 at [183]-[185] ("Foody"), Hansen J accepted expert evidence as to the nature of a deferred tax asset. His Honour accepted that it was not able to be exchanged into cash or a cash equivalent. 156 In our view, this approach to the characterisation of a deferred tax asset is correct. It fits comfortably within the proper construction and application of Condition 9 and has the effect that a deferred tax asset is an intangible, and therefore an excluded asset, the value of which must be deducted from the value of total assets as they would appear on Opus' balance sheet. 157 The deferred tax asset in Foody represented timing differences in the accounting and tax profits of the business. This is a different form of deferred tax asset from that which is the subject of the present case. It is nevertheless within the definition of a deferred tax asset in AASB 112. In our view, nothing turns upon the difference. Both forms must be characterised as intangibles. 158 The essence of a deferred tax asset as defined in AASB 112 is that it may be used to off-set the amount of tax payable in future tax years if and when a profit is made. Its accounting treatment as an asset is dependent upon an assessment by the directors that it is probable that the entity will earn taxable profits in future years. 159 Although the deferred tax asset is recognised, as in the present case, once the necessary opinion is formed, a deferred tax asset does not entitle an entity to a payment from the Australian Tax Office, either when it is recognised or when, in some future year, it is able to set off the relevant amount against taxable profits. 160 A deferred tax asset is therefore an accounting concept which is entirely dependent upon the relevant opinion being formed as to future profits. It cannot be converted into cash or its equivalent. It cannot be used to acquire goods or services. It is not a chose in action that is capable of assignment, or to adopt the language of accounting treatment, a "receivable" which is capable of being factored. 161 It follows in our view that the deferred tax asset in the present case was a non-monetary asset without physical substance. It was therefore an excluded asset which was to be deducted from the value of Opus' total assets in calculating the value of its net tangible assets.

Deferred tax asset not "received" 162 Even if the meaning of a non-monetary asset was to be determined by reference to the meaning of "monetary assets" in AASB 138, it seems to us that the Tribunal adopted an incorrect construction of that term. 163 As stated above, the Tribunal focused upon the meaning of the word "received" but what was required was for the Tribunal to consider the meaning of the composite phrase set out in the definition. Thus, the question was whether the deferred tax asset was money held and assets to be received in fixed or determinable amounts of money. 164 The Tribunal concluded that, whilst there will be no physical receipt of money, once the necessary opinion is formed for the accounting treatment of the losses, the amount of tax required to be paid in future years will be reduced by the amount of the deferred tax asset. 165 In our view, this approach to construction is not correct. It wrongly characterised a deferred tax asset as a monetary asset. A deferred tax asset is an item which exists on a company's balance sheet at a particular point of time for accounting purposes. It is not an asset to be received in the future, whether in a fixed or determinable amount of money, or at all. 166 The essence of the definition of monetary assets in AASB 138 is that there will be money or assets, that is to say, new assets, to be received by the entity in a fixed or determinable amount. Examples would be receivables or goods purchased. 167 By contrast, a deferred tax asset is an economic benefit which may be realised at a future point of time. It is not money or a new asset to be received. Instead, it represents the accounting treatment of a set-off against future income tax upon an assumption that the entity will make a profit in the relevant tax year. 168 The Tribunal considered that a deferred tax asset was to be contrasted with the examples of intangibles, such as technical knowledge, listed in AASB 138 at para 9. In the Tribunal's view, those assets lacked precise value but a deferred tax asset has a precise and determinable value once the opinion has been formed as to the probability of future taxable profits. 169 For the reasons set out above, we cannot agree with this analysis. The accounting treatment of the value of a future set-off is dependent upon the accuracy of the opinion as to future profits. It is of no different character than the value of technical know-how which is dependent upon the opinion of the directors as to the value of the economic benefit to be achieved. 170 In any event, for reasons set out above, to treat a deferred tax asset as a tangible asset, in contrast to the character of intangibles such as know-how, would be contrary to the purposive construction of Condition 9 of the licence. 171 We do not think that anything turns upon the Tribunal's preference of the expert evidence of Mr Holland over that of Mr Niven. As the Tribunal observed, Mr Holland recognised that other minds might reasonably come to a different conclusion to his opinion that a deferred tax asset is not an intangible asset. 172 In any event, the question is one of law, not a question to be determined by expert evidence as to the character of a deferred tax asset. 173 We should add that although the Tribunal accepted Mr Holland's evidence, it does not follow that the decision of the Tribunal involved a question of fact. The Tribunal merely referred to Mr Holland's evidence to support the view which it reached as to the proper construction of the licence.

Orders 174 We propose to order that the decision of the Tribunal dated 20 September 2010 be set aside. 175 The matter is to be remitted to the Tribunal for further consideration in accordance with law. This order is necessary because the Tribunal did not find it necessary to deal with the question of whether the sales and performance fees were intangible assets to be excluded from the calculation of the value of Opus' total assets. 176 We will order that Opus pay the Commission's costs of the appeal. I certify that the preceding one hundred and seventy-six (176) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justices Stone, Jacobson and Collier.