The circumstances in which the power is to be exercised
80 The matters referred to in the above discussion are relevant to the exercise of the discretionary power. The receivers, as experienced insolvency practitioners, are capable of looking after their own interests. They can consider appointments offered to them, assay the circumstances, assess the risks involved, and bring to mind the commercial considerations of accepting them. They have the power to accept or reject any offered appointment and are capable of negotiating the terms of their appointment. If that is to include an indemnity from the appointor, they can so require it as a condition. Here, that did not occur. The receivers were aware of the terms of the appointment and of the orders which ASIC intended to seek in relation to the indemnity from the defendants' assets, and they agreed to the appointment on that basis. They were aware of the risks inherent in the appointment and also of the likelihood, as the receivership progressed, that they would be unable to realise sufficient assets to cover their expenses. At no time prior to incurring any of the relevant expenses did they seek any variation or addition to the orders concerning their indemnity. All this, by itself, weighs heavily against the making of an order that ASIC now provide the indemnity sought.
81 It should be undoubted that both Mr Lindholm and Mr Michael are experienced receivers. The evidence showed that the latter has been a registered liquidator since 2005, and has over 33 years' experience in corporate insolvency and restructuring. No doubt it is likely that he was approached by ASIC for this particular receivership by reason of his long experience. It is also not unfair to conclude that Mr Michael and Mr Lindholm were appointed by ASIC as receivers because of their claimed expertise with cryptocurrency, and that KPMG had a technological team which also had expertise in such matters. In communications with Ms Jessica Latimer of ASIC prior to their appointment, either Mr Michael or Mr Lindholm indicated that KPMG had forensic IT support and expertise in dealing with cryptocurrency assets in liquidations and receiverships. Such matters reveal that the receivers were more than capable of looking after their own interests in relation to the subject receivership, and if they were at all concerned about their ability to recover their expenses from the assets under their control, they were capable of negotiating additional security. It is also inconceivable that they would have relied upon the opinions of others when ascertaining the viability of the receiverships for their firm.
82 There was some oblique suggestion by the receivers that they were misled by information provided to them by ASIC, such that they believed that there were substantially more assets available in the receivership than it transpired there were. It was said by the receivers in their submissions that:
the financial state of the receiverships is now parlous and bears little resemblance to [the] position which [was] conveyed to the Court (and accorded with the parties' expectations) at the time that the Appointment Orders were made. …
83 To the extent that this submission suggests that ASIC engaged in misleading conduct, there is no substance to it whatsoever. At the time of the receivers' appointment, ASIC was entirely transparent as to the nature of the assets over which the appointment was sought. That included cryptocurrency and it was self-evident that recovering it might be difficult. If that were not apparent to the receivers, as it seems to be now suggested, they were insufficiently skilled for the receiverships and they ought not have accepted the appointment. In truth, the evidence shows that they were provided with the information which ASIC had and, had it been possible to recover all the cryptocurrency that was known about, it would have provided more than sufficient returns. Mr Michael estimated that it would have been $27.5 million. In substance, and assuming that the receivers had the experience which they claimed to have had, it was they who were in the best position to be aware of the processes, the risks, and the costs involved in recovering cryptocurrency.
84 It was also not doubted - indeed it was admitted by the receivers - that it was their inability to recover the cryptocurrency which has resulted in the lack of financial success of the receivership. This was not a case where the assets over which the appointment was made were in doubt or misstated. The cryptocurrency acquired by the defendants existed, but one of the difficulties was that the defendants had ceded control of it to third parties. This, of itself, rendered recovery problematic. In this context, it is relevant that shortly after their appointment, the receivers were informed that the defendants were only able to access a couple of hundred thousand dollars' worth of cryptocurrency at that time, and that the rest of the cryptocurrency was with third parties under commercial agreements. The receivers were aware that this meant that there would be a significant risk that the cryptocurrency would be impossible to recover. That was exacerbated by reason of the fact that the third parties were located in foreign jurisdictions, and were known or believed to be persons who engaged in "scamming" activities in relation to Bitcoin. The receivers were also aware by then that information which was critical to recovering the cryptocurrency had been deleted from the defendants' electronic devices. That ought to have raised additional concerns for the receivers that there may be difficulties in recovering a substantial portion of the cryptocurrency.
85 These matters were confirmed in Mr Michael's third affidavit of 9 June 2022, where he deposed to the difficulties he had encountered in seeking to recover the cryptocurrency following a lack of cooperation by the defendants. He had, however, identified that as at 2 June 2022, cryptocurrency which the defendants previously held and which was valued at $38.06 million had been transferred to unknown third party or external "cryptocurrency wallets".
86 On the basis of the above, by June 2022, there was more than a real chance that the receivers would not be able to recover the cryptocurrency which had been acquired by the defendants and it is likely that they were cognisant of that. Despite that, and without warning ASIC of the risks, they continued to incur expenses and costs in the pursuit of the cryptocurrency. From mid-2022, they engaged in what they said was "particularly complex, technical and time consuming" work, including reconstructing certain cryptocurrency exchange accounts by investigating some 27,000 transactions. They did this, in part, by using "specialist cryptocurrency software to trace transactions through exchanges". Indeed, the evidence indicates that in the period between June 2022 and April 2023, they incurred costs in the sum of $123,176 on work accessing the defendants' devices and accounts, reviewing them and attempting to recover cryptocurrency. This is some of the expenses in respect of which they now seek an indemnity from ASIC.
87 It is to be accepted that Mr Michael and Mr Lindholm were not required to believe what they were told by the defendants about the accessibility of the cryptocurrency. Indeed, their role requires them to be sceptical about such matters. They were correct to take those steps which were reasonably available to them to satisfy themselves about the recoverability of assets. These matters were the subject of Mr Michael's cross-examination in the course of the hearing. In that respect, the steps taken by the receivers until mid-2022 were appropriate and reasonable for the purposes of ascertaining the availability of assets. Indeed, vis-à -vis the defendants, the steps taken after mid-2022 were also reasonable, in that the defendants were not forthcoming with information, and from this distance, it seems that they were doing their best not to assist the receivers in any substantial way. There is no reason why the receivers should not have been persistent in their pursuit of the assets acquired with the funds obtained from those who invested in the defendants' schemes.
88 However, in the context of whether there is any justification for imposing the costs of so doing on ASIC, necessarily different considerations apply. In this respect, it is sufficiently clear that the receivers were aware, or should have been aware, from at least mid-2022, that there was a real risk that the recoveries from the receivership would be limited compared to the total amount of their costs, expenses and remuneration. Certainly, it was possible that they could have recovered a sufficient amount to cover their expenses, as there were outstanding recoveries to be pursued which were not cryptocurrency. That included the realisation of real property and the pursuit of debts through litigation. However, those steps were not certain to generate any, or any substantial, returns to the receivership. Ultimately, it was the receivers who were best positioned to evaluate the risk of there being a shortfall in respect of any expenses they incurred and they were able to take what action they considered appropriate.
89 It can be safely concluded that the receivers were sufficiently aware by mid-2022 of the perils of proceeding further with the receiverships. They were aware of the nature and scope of the property under their control and, in relation to the cryptocurrency, they were aware that almost all of it had been transferred to third parties or, at least, that it was under the control of third parties. They were also aware that cryptocurrency can be easily transferred and that the ability to recover it can be very limited unless one is possessed of all the necessary information. Further, they were aware of the risk that there might be a shortfall in recoveries to meet their expenses. Despite all of that, they were prepared to continue to incur substantial costs and expenses. Importantly, prior to doing so, they did not ask for, or obtain, any indemnity in respect of any shortfall in the recoveries. It was not until November 2022 that they asked ASIC whether it would provide an indemnity in respect of any shortfall. Again, these matters strongly weigh against requiring ASIC to indemnify them in respect of any shortfall.
90 Of course, in circumstances such as the present, the receivers might find themselves in a position whereby they are effectively continuing the receivership for the purposes of hoping to secure the recovery of funds for meeting their own expenses. As ASIC submitted, the evidence in this matter supports the inference that from, at least, November 2022, much of the receivers' work was directed to that objective. From then until April 2023, work in progress of approximately $130,474 accrued on: preparing the present application for remuneration and an indemnity; an application filed by the receivers in December 2022 seeking an order for them to have priority in relation to the realisation of assets; responding to ASIC's concerns about the existence of any benefit for the aggrieved investors in continuing the receiverships; and, finally, on asset recovery.
91 The legal fees and disbursements incurred between late October 2021 and April 2023 were in the order of $600,000. On 1 March 2023, the receivers conceded that the recovery proceedings were then being pursued to create a fund to meet their remuneration, costs and expenses. Again, it is counterintuitive to suggest that ASIC should bear the costs incurred by the receivers in protecting their own interests.
92 Whilst in December 2022, Mr Michael deposed that, for reasons which he identified, the receivers had concluded in the past eight weeks that they "cannot reasonably take into account the prospect of recovering any further Cryptocurrency Assets when considering the financial position of the Receivership", for the reasons identified above it is likely that they were aware of the risks well prior to that and, at least, as early as mid-2022.
93 The receivers suggested that there was some delay in the conduct of investigations by ASIC and that contributed to the increased cost of the receiverships. There is, in fact, no relevant evidence to support that proposition. Whilst it may be that some time was taken for ASIC to gather sufficient information for the purposes of passing it to the prosecuting authorities, that had very little, if anything, to do with the receivers' obligations to gather in the defendants' assets. In addition, when ASIC indicated to the receivers that it intended to finalise the current proceedings by seeking the winding up of A One Multi, they indicated their opposition to that course until such time as the recovery proceedings brought in the name of the company had been completed. Clearly, that stance was solely for the purposes of affording them the opportunity to complete proceedings which might provide them with funds with which to meet their claim for remuneration, costs and expenses.
94 The refusal of the Court to make an order requiring ASIC to indemnify the receivers will not have any chilling effect on the ability of ASIC, or any other regulator, to secure consents from insolvency practitioners to act as receivers. There has been no accepted right to an indemnity to date, and neither the evidence nor experience suggests any general reluctance by practitioners to take appointments as receivers. Indeed, the receivers did so in this case, being aware of the terms of their appointment and despite the absence of any indemnity from ASIC.
95 The evidence also showed that ASIC does not offer indemnities to the receivers whom they seek to appoint, and has not done so previously. Mr Hugh Copley, a long-standing ASIC officer who is well known and well regarded by the Court, deposed to his experience as to the absence of indemnities provided by ASIC and that it did not offer or agree to them, even in cases where it was apparent that there would likely be a shortfall of assets to meet the receivers' costs. It would be surprising if it were not the case that insolvency practitioners will undertake appointments where there is a risk that they will not recover all their expenses as part of developing goodwill. One expects that it is part of the business model of insolvency practitioners that any unrecovered expenses will be made up by the profit derived from other appointments. Experience reveals this to be the case in relation to liquidations.
96 It should also be noted that this is not a case where there were few assets in the receivership. The evidence shows that the receivers have realised almost $3.5 million from the assets under their control. From that they have paid $718,458 to secured creditors, $600,778 in respect of their legal fees and disbursements, and $850,427 to themselves in fees. It may be that there will be a shortfall, but that does not arise from the mere absence of assets under their control. It arises from the amount which they have expended in the course of the receiverships, and the manner in which they have been conducted.