50 His Honour's conclusion is plainly wrong. Clause 5 of the Dwyer agreement contemplated that if a grade 4 was to be introduced, the salary would be equivalent to the wage differential then agreed between the other grades - a differential then increased to 7% as between each of the three existing grades. It seems to us that in considering the Union's case, and its reference to work value was a mere 'red herring', it cannot be overlooked that these were significant wage increases, agreed for the existing classification structure, after the Union had refused Railcorp's offer of a Grade 4 classification. These increases were implemented immediately before the Grade 4 classification was raised again.
51 The idea that work value considerations would be irrelevant to a determination of whether some grade 3 positions should be regraded as grade 4, a 'splitting' of the grade 3 classification, as contemplated by the Jade system, with a further resulting wage increase of 7%, in that context, would appear to have been quite an extraordinary approach for these industrial parties to have taken. That there was no necessity to mention work value, in that context, in the Dwyer agreement, was undoubtedly because the trigger point for any re-evalution of any position under the Jade system, even as between existing grades, was, expressly a decision 'that the work value of a position appears to have changed'. That a mere claim for a Grade 4 classification was not enough to lead to a re-evaluation under the Jade system was entirely understandable, given that this claim for a Grade 4 classification had been one pursued by the Union since 2000. During that time, Area Controllers had received two rounds of negotiated wage increases, even though the Grade 4 classification was not achieved.
52 In the circumstances, given the difficulties with the approach adopted by the working party, that its recommendation that a grade 4 be introduced, was not accepted by Railcorp, does not seem surprising. Likewise, it was unsurprising on the evidence, that Ms Novakovic and Ms Lipski's' further reviews, led them to similar conclusions.
53 As Sams DP observed, the parties had agreed that the Jade system could not result in any change, unless a recommendation was accepted by Railcorp. Here, for good reasons, on the evidence, that did not occur. It follows that a further matter overlooked by his Honour, in the conclusions which he reached, was that even if Railcorp's reasons for refusing the working party's recommendation had not been good ones, that fact alone would have precluded the question posed by the Union, being answered positively, as a matter of interpretation of the Dwyer agreement.
54 It is necessary to deal with one further matter. There was evidence that Mr Caine, the Manager (metropolitan), responsible for the reliability and 'ontime' running of trains, had overheard a telephone conversation which Mr Wright, the General Manager Operations, was having. Mr Caine wrongly understood from what he overheard, that Railcorp had agreed to the Grade 4 classification and passed that information on, by telephone, to one of his friends, Mr Field, one of the Union's members, at Strathfield. Shortly afterwards, when he told Mr Wright what he had done, Mr Wright informed Mr Caine of his error. Mr Caine then telephoned Mr Field to advise him of his error and Mr Wright wrote to the Union, to advise it of what had occurred. In cross examination, Mr Kessey of the Union explained that it was accepted by the Union that there had been a miscommunication as to this matter.
55 His Honour observed at [114] that Mr Caine's actions 'on one view was, in reality, the decision approving the regrading. When it was rescinded, understandably it caused major grief for all concerned'. On a proper analysis of the evidence that observation was plainly incorrect.
56 There was no dispute between the parties that the decision as to the introduction of the Grade 4 classification was not Mr Caine's to make, but that of Railcorp's Group General Manager. Such a decision required positive recommendations by various others, including Mr Caine. On the evidence, there had been no such recommendations made, nor any decision to introduce the claimed grade. It follows that there was no evidence that such a decision was ever made, or rescinded by Railcorp. Mr Caine's advice was entirely incorrect (he overheard a telephone conversation and leapt to a wrong conclusion); it was immediately corrected by he and Mr Wright and the Union did not claim that anything other than a miscommunication had occurred in relation to the giving of that advice. We observe in passing that the criticism by Sams DP [112] - [114] of Railcorp in respect of how it dealt with this aspect of the dispute was, on a proper consideration of the evidence, unwarranted.
57 Sams DP accepted that a recommendation resulting from the Jade process did not have to be accepted by Railcorp. He commented, however, that 'it would be a very courageous management indeed which refused to accept a recommendation of a joint Management - Union group, particularly if the decision was unanimous'.
58 What here occurred was precisely such a decision. Railcorp rejected a unanimous recommendation, made by the working party as the result of a flawed exercise, which did not, from the outset, proceed on the required basis, namely identified work value change. The recommendation was made as the result of an exercise which was not conducted in accordance with the Jade system, as devised. As we have already observed, it did not achieve results which showed any change from the evaluation of the Lidcombe panel in 2002. All that was shown was that it was the most complex panel of those considered in 2006, with the highest ranking, just as it was in 2002.
59 In reaching his conclusions, his Honour gave no consideration to issues such as this, which has led him into error. The question which the Union sought to have decided in the proceedings, was the proper interpretation of the Dwyer agreement, not a consideration of the industrial merits of Railcorp's approach to the claim which the Union had been pursuing since 2000.
60 As the Union put its case on appeal, that question depended on a consideration of clause 5 of the agreement. That was a clause which the Deputy President did not deal with in his decision. On its face, clause 5 required the Union's question to be answered in the negative. The clause does not deal with Strathfield Signalling Complex. Rather, it contemplates that a future re-evaluation of Area Controllers under the Jade system, might indicate that a classification above the existing grade 3 level is warranted. Any re-evaluation can only arise, if work value change has been identified.
61 The exercise which the working party conducted was not a re-evaluation of Area Controllers, generally, as the parties had undertaken when the Jade system was first implemented. It was not even a more limited re-evaluation of Area Controllers at Lidcombe panel, in accordance with the Jade system. In the 2006 exercise, the Jade system was not implemented as it was designed. It contemplated a blind comparison of unidentified signalling complexes, undertaken in a particular way, by particular persons, one panel at a time. That exercise was not undertaken, and it is unsurprising that the recommendation was not accepted by Railcorp. Such acceptance was a critical prerequisite for the introduction of a new classification.
62 It follows that neither the Dwyer agreement, or even the way in which the Jade system was purported to be applied, resulted in the creation of an Area Controller 4 at Strathfield.
63 His Honour observed at [103] of his decision: