10 We initially called on Mr Davies to address us on the question of leave. This approach was consistent with the well established practice of the Commission, in relation to interlocutory appeals such as this. (See, for example, Caltex Petroleum Pty Ltd v Harmer (1999) 92 IR 264; Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union, New South Wales Branch v Alan Thomas David & Ors (2006) 154 IR 297; National Australia Bank Ltd v Cassino (2002) 137 IR 1; Direct Home Loan Corporation Pty Limited v Wiltshire (No 2) (2004) 137 IR 166 and Elka Simjanovska and Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales [2008] NSWIRComm 66.)
11 Mr Davies argued that this was not an interlocutory appeal, so that those principles did not apply. Mr Davies was incorrect in that submission. Clearly, Boland J's decision did not finally dispose of the application Mr Davies has made to the Commission, nor was this an appeal from such a decision. His Honour's decision concerned an interlocutory procedural question going to service of documents.
12 It is also well settled that leave to appeal will not be lightly granted. An appeal bench is ultimately concerned with correction of error. (See Knowles v Anglican Church Property Trust (No 2) (1999) 95 IR 380 at 381; Perrott v XcelleNet Australia Ltd (1998) 84 IR 255 at 265; De Simone Consulting Pty Ltd v Ison (2000) 97 IR 478 at 482; Caltex Petroleum Pty Ltd v Harmer (1999) 92 IR 264; Ace Business Brokers Pty Ltd v Phillips-Treby (2000) 100 IR 420 and Strathfield Group Ltd v Hall (2002) 121 IR 158 at [45].) Further, 'some issue of real significance in the interests of justice will need to be identified for such an application to succeed.' (See Austin v NF Importers Pty Ltd & Anor (2005) 146 IR 113 at [4].)
13 In this case, none of these tests were satisfied. There was never any suggestion before Boland J that Mr Davies did not have the documents in question, save for an annexure, he had himself produced. Mr Davies' complaints that service by registered post, did not satisfy the requirements of the Rule, was plainly a complaint of a most technical nature, in the circumstances before his Honour. Such complaints, whether made by a lawyer, or by an unrepresented litigant, are not encouraged by this Commission, particularly in interlocutory appeals. In this case, the documents in question had also been provided by email, other than annexures which Mr Davies had himself created and served on the respondent. On any view, Mr Davies had been provided with the documents in question. Unsurprisingly then, Mr Davies was unable to demonstrate that he had suffered any real disadvantage or prejudice, from the way in which service was effected. His complaints on appeal concerned the time, costs and inconvenience involved in spending an hour as a bankrupt, with no car or assets, in collecting registered mail. This complaint, of course, had to be considered in circumstances where Mr Davies had the documents, albeit, by email. Furthermore, after the proceedings before Boland J on 26 March, Mr Davies, in fact, collected the registered mail in question.
14 The President, nevertheless, dealt with the practical difficulties which Mr Davies wished to raise, given that he was an unrepresented litigant. What his Honour then proposed, in order to accommodate Mr Davies' position, was accepted both by Mr Davies and by the respondent.
15 The approach which the Commission adopts to the question of leave, pays attention to the fact that both single members of the Commission and appeal benches are obliged, in exercising their functions, to observe the requirements of ss 146 and 163 of the Act, which respectively provide: