General matters
106 From about October 2008, Mr Gnanananthan was employed by the respondent as a spot trader. He holds degrees in Commerce and Arts from Griffith University, the former with First Class Honours. Prior to his employment with the respondent he had been employed in a policy role in a state government department. He has subsequently returned to policy work in another department. His evidence in chief and cross-examination extended over several days. Given the relatively short periods of time during which he was involved in incidents relevant to this case, it is surprising that his evidence should have taken so long. He gave evidence of his understanding of the bidding system. That understanding differed to some extent from the descriptions given by Mr Thorpe and Dr Rose, no doubt reflecting differences in perspective. He also gave evidence concerning the physical layout of the respondent's trading facilities and of the circumstances in which he made the impugned bids for which he was responsible.
107 In the trading room, large amounts of information were displayed on numerous video screens. The information included forecast and actual spot prices, dispatch prices, weather information and levels of demand. This information was provided on a national basis, but the focus in the Brisbane trading room was on Queensland and New South Wales. Traders also had access to information concerning current operations at the respondent's power stations, and the flow of power between Queensland and New South Wales. The traders used a computerized bidding programme. Some of the displays on the video screens could also be displayed on the trader's screen. Forecasts of dispatch prices were renewed every five minutes. Forecasts of spot prices were renewed every half hour. Conditions at the power stations were displayed on a white board. Also on the white board was information concerning the respondent's hedge contracts. As I understand it, traders aimed to maximize the respondent's revenue. One aspect of that process was to ensure that the respondent's exposure under its hedge contracts was "covered". The other was to exploit opportunities to dispatch electricity at higher prices. As I understand the hedge contracts, such exposure arose as follows:
• the respondent and the other party to the contract sought the certainty offered by the advance sale and purchase of a fixed volume of electricity at a fixed price;
• such electricity would be supplied through the distribution grid so that the respondent did not actually supply electricity to the purchaser, but rather to the grid as a whole, from which the purchaser acquired it;
• the respondent would receive, from the Operator, the spot price for electricity supplied to the grid, and the purchaser would pay a similar price to the Operator; and
• the hedge contract would require payment by the respondent to the purchaser of any amount by which the spot price exceeded the contract price, or by the purchaser to the respondent of any amount by which the spot price fell below the contract price.
108 The trader would have a target volume to sell at or above a target price, calculated by reference to all of the respondent's hedge contracts. If that target were not achieved, and the spot price was above the contract price, the respondent would, in effect, have to pay the difference to the purchasers, although the respondent would not, itself, have been paid at that price. Further, if prices were high, and the respondent's contract position was covered, it would enjoy the benefit of high prices. If its contract position was not covered, it would have to share the high prices, which it received for the electricity which it had sold, with its hedge contract purchasers. For present purposes, it is also relevant to note that if a trader tried to push up the Dispatch Price by moving dispatch volume to a higher band, he or she ran the risk that it would not be sold. This would occur if there was sufficient capacity in lower bands to meet actual demand.
109 On 22 February 2008 Mr Gnanananthan started work at about 6.30 am when he attended a handover briefing. He started trading at about 7.00 am and probably continued until 7.00 pm. In the half hour between 6.30 and 7.00 am, he was briefed by the outgoing night trader as to market activity and technical information. Mr Gnanananthan thought that on 22 February, he probably would have been told that it was going to be a hot day, that demand would be high and other information of that kind. Traders were expected to assess available information as to price, demand, weather and technical information. There were telephone links to the power stations for the exchange of technical and market information. Mr Gnanananthan said that early in the day he would have focussed on the forecast figures for the next two hours or, perhaps, for the whole of his shift, with a view to assessing how weather might affect demand. He would have considered the available information concerning the previous day's trading, analysing competitors' conduct and seeking to understand it. He would also have considered information as to price and demand sensitivity.
110 The respondent issued a daily document described as a "spot trading daily strategy and weather report" which prescribed parameters for the day's bidding activity. There were also monthly and weekly documents of this kind. The daily documents would reflect the weekly and monthly documents. At p 267A et seq in Court Book 1/4, there is a weekly strategy document for the week described as "20080222", presumably 22 February 2008. It deals with the week from Saturday, 23 to Friday, 29 February 2008. It contained forecasts as to demand which, Mr Gnanananthan said, were probably based on material provided by the Operator, and modelling carried out by the respondent. It also included forecast spot prices for the week. There was a large amount of confidential information concerning price, demand and output, together with revenue forecasts. There was also a "bidding strategy". Broadly speaking it reflected many of the considerations to which I have already referred, including the need to cover the contract position so as to be able to respond appropriately when prices went above certain levels.
111 Mr Gnanananthan stressed the importance of covering the contract position by ensuring that a sufficiently high volume of electricity was sold at an appropriate price. A trader might seek to trade off volume in order to produce a higher price. There was an inevitable tension between achieving high volume and achieving a high price. A trader's decision would be influenced by the data available in the trading room, his or her experience and historical information. A trader would generally have some knowledge of the price bands used by other generators and could infer from price movement that:
… there's something happening in the market. You know on a hot day generators are more likely to decrease their dispatch level at lower prices and offer more volume in a higher price with their rebids. You know that information. You know what's likely to happen around certain prices. One of the contract which is offered is called a $300 cap contract. Cap contract is basically an option. It's like an insurance, so you pay a premium to buy it and with the $300 cap basically what happens is if the spot price exceeds $300 the person who sells that cap contract, generally a generator with a peaking generation, would pay the difference between $300 and the spot price. So when you get around to a price near $300, or a bit below $300, what you will see if you get up to that price as the day progresses on a hot day, then it may stay for a little while because generators who have sold that cap contract say for 200 or 300 MW, would want to increase their generation by 200 or 300 MW. So as a trader, what you're looking to do is you know there are certain generators who will sell these contracts. For example, in Queensland, Tarong has got a peaking generation capacity with Wivenhoe, so the price goes around to say, $250 or $290, or just under $300, you know Tarong may be likely to increase the volume. So you know all those kind of patterns. (ts 396.)
112 Knowledge of other generators' past conduct would influence decisions. Information as to actual dispatch by other generators was not available until the next day. Nor would an operator know the actual price bands being used by other generators until the next day, although such information might be inferred from earlier experience. Generators did not change their price bands frequently. Whilst Mr Gnanananthan was trading he would primarily focus on the next half hour, looking at "every half an hour in pieces". Where the market was volatile, as it was on 22 February 2008, he would tend to make his rebids:
… toward the, just on the end of the half-hour to impact the next half-hour. The reason is because the market information was changing rapidly … . It seems like it was changing rapidly in a significant way, so I wait to get the most latest information before I make a rebid. I know I reacted like that in the first part of the day, then toward the end, you know, I made rebids which encompass several half-hours.
113 In making such decisions he considered price, including forecast price, dispatch levels compared to contract levels, temperature and demand. During Mr Gnanananthan's shift on 22 February 2008 certain technical activities affected supply. There were "a couple of back-flushes at Gladstone". That power station takes its water from the sea and so tends to collect debris which is removed by back-flushing. Back-flushing was not generally performed during the day. One of the Stanwell generating units was leaking, and one of the Gladstone units was off-line. The trader's log indicates that some disruption was also caused by the need to start up a mill fuelling one of the generating units at Stanwell. Each of these incidents, at least potentially, created a need for rebalancing of the respondent's portfolio. Mr Gnanananthan seems not to have been particularly concerned with initial Dispatch Offers previously made for 22 February. He was more concerned with changes in circumstances on the day in question.
114 Rebidding was done by computer, using drop-down boxes with a selection of identified, apparently standard, reasons for rebids. It was possible to enter different reasons. This mechanism generated the "Portfolio optimisation::change MW distrib" reason which is referred to above. The witness said that, "Portfolio optimisation basically means you're acting in the commercial interest of your corporation, trying to optimise the portfolio. So you're trying to maximise the revenue, maximise the profit, in effect". He said that following the communication of a rebid to the Operator, he would usually make an entry in his trader's log. However, on occasions he made the entry before the rebid. He explained some of the terminology which he used in his log entries. Use of the letter "R" indicated a rebid. The annotation "GPS 1-6" referred to the six power stations at Gladstone. The term "Port opt" was short for "Portfolio optimisation". The letters "VoLL" described the maximum price of $10,000 per MW.
115 I formed the impression that the applicant's February request and the s 28 notice inevitably led the respondent's employees, including Mr Gnanananthan, to reconstruct the thought processes which led to the impugned rebids. I do not use the word "reconstruct" in a necessarily pejorative sense. The case concerns numerous decisions based upon a wide range of information and taken in very short time frames. Such decisions inevitably reflected the weight given by individual traders to particular aspects of the information available to them and the dual, and, to some extent, conflicting objectives of maximizing the volume of electricity supplied and the price at which it was supplied. Such decisions, no doubt, also reflected the particular personalities and experiences of the traders, some being more risk-averse than others. The difficulties inherent in testifying after the event concerning such thought processes should not be under-estimated. Mr Gnanananthan was involved in preparation of the June response but not the s 28 response. By that time he had left the respondent's employ.
116 In cross-examination, Mr Gnanananthan said that he had not approved of the content of the June response. He had been consulted in the course of its preparation. He said that the February request had been sent to him by email, and that he may have "scanned over it" but did not read it in detail. He said that had he been responsible for preparing the June response, his approach would have been different from that actually adopted. On 23 June 2008 he received a draft of the response and was invited to indicate whether he was "happy with the reasons given for each rebid". He assumed that annexure B (which deals with the rebids on 22 and 23 February 2008) was supplied to him at that time. He said that he did not look at it in detail. However he agreed that in an email dated 24 June 2008, he responded to the inquiry concerning the draft. In it, he suggested inclusion of Spot Price information and commented on the relevance of the interstate connector between Queensland and New South Wales. He also indicated that he was satisfied with the reasons given for his rebids.
117 He said that he was dissatisfied with the response itself, not with annexures A and B which he had prepared. He said he looked at them in detail but not at the body of the response. He said that at the time he prepared the annexures, he did not have a particularly good relationship with the respondent's trading management, although he had a good relationship with Mr Wallace who had sent him the draft.
118 He said that shortly after 22 February 2008, he had considered his conduct on that day, making reference to his trader's log. In connection with preparation of the June response Mr Schutte asked him to consider the matter in terms of pre-dispatch price and pre-dispatch demand. He did not approve of that approach, thinking that it was "ingenuine". He said that any response to the applicant's request for reasons for the rebids should have reflected his trading methods. He said that he did not always look at pre-dispatch demand or pre-dispatch price, and that they were not always key aspects of rebidding. Although he disagreed with the approach, he prepared the schedules in accordance with Mr Schutte's request. The outcome of all of this was that he did not "bother too much about the logic or reasons" provided in the June response.
119 Mr Gnanananthan was referred to certain telephone conversations with other employees of the respondent on or about 22 February 2008. Such conversations were routinely recorded. He had previously seen transcripts of conversations between himself and Lana Stockman. It was suggested to him that he had also spoken to Mr Wallace, another trader and witness in this case. He said that he remembered seeing a transcript of a conversation with Ms Stockman but was not sure about any conversation with Mr Wallace.
120 He was shown a transcript of a conversation with somebody called "Brett", an operator at the Stanwell power station. The conversation occurred on 21 February 2008. Brett told Mr Gnanananthan that there was a leak in a condensing unit in generating unit 3 at Stanwell. The witness assumed that this led to a reduction in the generating capacity of the unit. This was probably the reduction in capacity at Stanwell to which he referred in evidence-in-chief. It seems that the NEMDE programme would respond to such a reduction in capacity by treating bids in the lower bands, up to the reduced capacity, as valid, so that any bids in higher bands were ignored. The witness was then referred to another conversation on 22 February 2008, concerning the Stanwell leak and bidding strategy for the day. In that conversation the witness indicated that he proposed to reduce cheap generation by transferring it into higher bands, so effecting a price/volume trade off. However he did not want generating unit 3 at Stanwell to become unserviceable. He was therefore happy to "sit at 180", presumably 180 MW. In effect, he was accepting technical advice that the particular unit should be kept at 180 MW. He agreed that he was happy to accept the reduction in generating capacity because it fitted into his strategy for the day. That strategy involved reducing generation, or taking generation from lower bands to higher bands.
121 In a further conversation logged at 11:41 on 22 February 2008, a Gladstone operator informed him that he needed to perform a back-flush on generating unit 5. This is the back-flush referred to in connection with Rebids 19 and 20. As a result the output from that unit was reduced to about 150 MW. He was also referred to a conversation on 23 February 2008 with Mr Wallace. The conversation concerned the revenue derived by Stanwell from trading on the previous day, said to be about $7.5 m. The witness said to Mr Wallace, "Thanks mate. I wanted to push a bit more in hey, but nobody else was playing the game." He agreed that he was saying that he could have made more money if other generators had "played the game", by transferring capacity from lower bands into higher bands. He said that he formed the view on 22 February that other generators were not seeking to adopt similar tactics. On the following day, he performed an analysis and concluded that they had not done so.
122 The witness was then referred to a conversation with Ms Stockman which took place on 23 February 2008. It concerned his successful trading on Friday 22 February. He told her that he had been reviewing his actions and had identified some errors of judgment. He also referred to "a couple of messages" which he had "sent". The messages seemed to be that the respondent's strategy was to reduce the volume of generation moved in order to produce price increases. He said that he always tried to move the minimum volume necessary in order to raise prices so as to maximize both volume and price. There was always the risk that such a relocation would result in a loss of dispatch volume. A number of other generators had lower Band 10 prices than did the respondent, so that it was reasonable to expect that a lot of the MW in the respondent's Band 10 would not be dispatched. The message was that other generators would have to assist by moving generation from lower to higher bands, thus sharing the risk that some generation would not be dispatched. The witness told Ms Stockman that he would write an account of his actions and send it to her.
123 Mr Gnanananthan's attention was drawn to the fact that he had said that the matter was "pretty sensitive". He said that he knew that the applicant would conduct an investigation as a result of the spot price having gone above $5,000.00. It was then put to him that such sensitivity was "because you were conscious at the time because of the high prices which had been achieved that there would be an investigation by the regulator?". He replied, "I was conscious that - well, I know the regulator had to investigate it if the price goes above $5,000.00." He was aware of that fact by virtue of his previous employment with the Department of Mines and Energy. He then said (at ts 493 ll 39-41):
In relation to what you say about sensitive, when I say its pretty sensitive, I was actually referring to the mistakes I made. It was kind of embarrassing. I was referring to the things I thought I made mistakes.
124 In my view the witness did not actually agree with the suggestion that the sensitivity to which he referred arose out of the possibility that there would be an investigation. He seems to have been saying that whilst he was aware that there would be an investigation, such knowledge was not the basis of his assertion of sensitivity. The sensitivity rather related to his own errors.
125 The witness was asked questions concerning the supply of electricity from New South Wales. As I have said, the Operator's policy was to use part of the supply available from New South Wales as a reserve, the reserve being calculated by reference to the generating capacity at the Kogan Creek power station. The witness was aware that there was such a limitation upon utilization of electricity from New South Wales.
126 The witness was further questioned concerning his reference to sending messages to traders employed by other generators. Counsel for the applicant seems to have wanted him to agree that such messages were meant to be immediately understood by those traders. The witness thought that they might have understood them at the time, but that it was more likely that they would have identified them in subsequent reviews of the trading day. As I have said, the messages seem to have been that the respondent was not going to bear the full risk of moving generating capacity into higher bands in order to raise the price, and that it expected that other generators would share the risk. In view of Mr Gnanananthan's telephone conversation with Mr Wallace, in particular his reference to "playing the game", I would infer that he had hoped that other traders would have understood his "message" on 22 February.
127 The witness said that there was a view amongst some of the respondent's staff that, "even a price/volume trade-off would attract the attention of [the applicant]". He considered this to be a "conservative" position. Ms Stockman was not of that view. Another person called "Erin" was more conservative in her views. Ms Stockman also suggested that Mr Schutte was concerned about the possibility of an investigation. She suggested to the witness that he might need to be "a little bit careful".
128 Mr Gnanananthan said that change in price was the key indicator upon which he relied in his rebidding. He also considered the forecast price and that most of the information provided by the Operator:
… in some form flows into price. If demand increases that has an impact on price. If the weather is, you know, temperature is high, it impacts demand which eventually impacts price. So price is a key thing. (At ts 509 ll 17-20.)
129 The witness said that he understood that, "some changes need to occur to make a rebid. I couldn't make a rebid without any changes." He also said that he understood that, "… you can't collude, slight basic economic principle with competition, economics … and, you know, yes, basically anti-competitive behaviour, we can't engage in kind of anti-competitive behaviour." He agreed that he had distinguished in his evidence between a change in data and the situation in which anticipations or expectations had not been fulfilled. It was suggested to him that he was drawing that distinction rather more clearly than he had in 2008. He denied this, saying that, "trading is both responding to changes in the data and also relying upon educated instinct". He said that he would not make a rebid on the basis of a change in data which was of no consequence or little consequence, and that the identification of a relevant change was a matter of assessment. He also considered that if he had made a mistake in the inferences which he had drawn, and upon which he had based a rebid, he would correct it in order to maximize revenue for the respondent. He considered that he was entitled to correct errors of judgment.
130 The witness was shown a document which he had prepared for Ms Stockman shortly after the events of 22 February 2008, probably on 25 February. He agreed that in it he said:
Over the past year, [the respondent] has supported price by pulling MWs but lately with the commissioning of Kogan Creek and water problems there is more incentive for Energy and Tarong to support the price as they have more exposure to the pool.
131 His meaning was that the Kogan Creek generator had a greater incentive to push prices higher than did the respondent because of the substantial exposure which it had in the market as a result of the size of its generating unit or units. He considered that its interests would have led it to move more capacity from lower bands to higher bands. He recognized this incentive by shifting less in terms of volume from lower to higher bands. He was asked if he meant that the Kogan Creek generator was not protected by hedge contracts to the same extent as was the respondent. He said that he would not exactly put it that way. However he went on to say that he was comparing the respondent's exposure in the market to that of the Kogan Creek generator, and suggesting that it was a matter of comparing the extent by which generating capacity exceeded contract volume. The witness described this as the "dispatch margin". He said that to the extent of a generator's commitment under its hedge contracts, any profit from high sale prices had to be shared with the other parties to the contracts. To the extent that power was dispatched in excess of its total contractual volume, at very high prices, the generator derived the whole of the benefit of those prices. The witness seems to have understood that both the Kogan Creek and Tarong operators had greater dispatch margins than other generators, and therefore greater incentives to achieve higher prices. In this context he said, in the document dated 25 February 2008, that:
As such, the duty trader was keen to send the message to the market that [the respondent] will only pull certain amount to support the price and it will compete to get more generation when the price is high.
132 The last clause meant that the respondent would take capacity from a lower to a higher band only to the extent that it was required to raise the price. This seems to have meant that the witness would sell large volumes of energy from the lower bands but, at the same time, seek to provoke an increased price through transferring small amounts to higher bands, the effect being that a large volume would be sold at a higher price. He also said in the document that, "this tactic led to two instances where the price collapsed to less than $100 for a short period of time." This was one of his errors of judgment, as he thought at the time. He also said, "but overall, these collapses did not seem to have a significant impact on Stanwell's bottom line as we ended up getting more generation."
133 In addition to the data provided during a trading day, the Operator provided actual data for the day, including details of bids which had been accepted, on the following day. The witness was shown a version of this information in a format used by the respondent. It is at Tab I2 in Court Book 4/4. It shows Dispatch Price and actual demand for each Dispatch Interval, the generators whose bids were accepted and individual volumes supplied. In the far right-hand column, the witness has added his analysis of trading, some entries being in red. Those entries concern transactions which, as the witness thought at the time, had involved errors on his part. I shall return to this document at a later stage.
134 Counsel also drew Mr Gnanananthan's attention to the information appearing in the Supplementary Court Book. For each impugned bid there are three separate documents. The first and second documents provide details of the rebid and of any other arguably relevant rebid, with the reasons given to the Operator at the time and the reasons given in the trader's log. The third document is designed to display the data which was available to the relevant trader at the time of each rebid. In one or two cases, the parties do not agree that all of the information shown was known to the trader at a relevant time. This is the result of some uncertainty as to the precise times at which the Dispatch Price for a particular Dispatch Interval and the Spot Price for a particular Trading Interval actually became available, together with adjusted forecasts which, I infer, in some way reflected those actual figures. Mr Gnanananthan considered that the Dispatch Price for a particular Dispatch Interval was available less than a minute after the commencement of that interval. Shortly thereafter, forecasts of 5 minute pre-dispatch prices became available. 30 minute pre-dispatch prices were also published at the beginning of each Trading Interval. Other evidence suggests a slightly different sequence and time frame. The differences are of little consequence. A 5 minute pre-dispatch price is a forecast price for an identified future Dispatch Interval. A 30 minute pre-dispatch price is a forecast Spot Price for an identified future Trading Interval.
135 In re-examination, the witness was asked to resolve an anomaly concerning the timing of, and reasons for Rebids 27, 28 and 29. In the data in the Supplementary Court Book, the reasons for each of the three rebids are identical, and each is said to have been submitted at 16:37. In fact the rebids were made at 16:38:40, 16:42:40 and 16:53:20. The anomaly arose out of the fact that there was a facility in the bidding programme for the repetition of reasons given for the previous rebid. This function picked up both the standard form reasons and the time, unless steps were taken to change it.
136 The witness was offered an opportunity to comment upon his evidence concerning the compilation of the applicant's June response. He said:
Initially, in the start of the process, I was asked to write reasons for my rebids, and I did that based on the log book and the analysis I prepared a couple of days after the trade in 22 February. Now I prepared that and, then, Walter asked me to look at, in terms of pre-dispatch price and pre-dispatch demand. And I didn't approve that approach. I thought that approach was ingenuine, and so on.
137 He was then asked to describe the incidents of his involvement in the matter, commencing with reference to Court Book 4/4 at Tab J1, which is an email to him from Ms Forrest saying:
[The applicant] have officially approached us about the 22nd of February, we're having a meeting on Thursday to try and sort out our reply. By Wednesday night can you please get together:
i. All of the initial conditions and circumstances upon which the initial offers were made
ii. All of the specific changes in these conditions that prompted each rebid
iii. The time these changes occurred
(emphasis in original)
138 The witness said that he may have been approached "verbally" before he received the email, but it was pointed out to him that the email dated 3 June 2008 followed a request received pursuant to a letter from the applicant dated 2 June. He thought that he had been asked to assist in responding to the applicant's request on the first day on which he was at work following its receipt. He was then taken to Tab J2, an email from him to Mr Schutte dated 5 June 2008 entitled "Bid Reasons with Details". Attached to it was the document at Tab J3 described as an "Analysis of bid on 22 Feb by every bid". He referred to these documents in preparing his reasons for rebid. He was then taken to Tab J4 and Tab J6. Tab J4 contains an email to Mr Schutte from Mr Gnanananthan dated 12 June 2008. It states:
See the attachment. Note that QNI was not a factor on the day, because the actual flow into QLD was higher than predicted in the pre-dispatch.
139 The document at Tab J6 is described as "rebid explanation". It provides data concerning pre-dispatch prices and pre-dispatch demand. The witness produced this document in response to Mr Schutte's request. It was the approach in this document with which he disagreed, as he told Mr Schutte. Such disapproval was of Mr Schutte's focus on pre-dispatch prices and demand. The witness considered that the actual Dispatch Price was a key consideration, as was forecast price. He considered that forecast demand was reflected in forecast and actual price. He said:
So you look at many things, and you do look at many things, but my focus of it being five minutes dispatch price and the forecast price, forecast demand and so forth in that kind of order, and dispatch, the actual level of dispatch comparison to the contract level and so forth. So that's the mode I was trading in. To give a response just in terms of pre-dispatch price and pre-dispatch demand, which I thought was - genuinely wasn't really reflecting on what I was doing, and that wasn't the approach I would have taken if I was responsible for preparing a response and approving it.
140 The witness was then taken to Court Book 1/4 at Tab B4. This document is annexure B to the June response. He said that the document reflected the approach with which he disagreed. He gave as an example the reasons for Rebid 5 which suggest that relevant information was "demand materially greater than pre-dispatch (both initial forecast and period before forecast)". He said:
So that's something which was drawn from by looking at pre-dispatch demand. So I don't believe pre-dispatch demand was one of the key things, although I would have looked at pre-dispatch demand throughout the period I was trading and it was one of the key things, its not - I wouldn't have set out my reasons for rebids on those bases.
141 He considered this document, when it was sent to him for comment, only to see whether it contained significantly different information from that which he had provided.
142 Many of the rebids upon which the witness was cross-examined are no longer relevant. I shall therefore summarize the evidence which specifically relates to the currently impugned rebids. It is a little difficult to present relevant data in a form which is easily understood. The Supplementary Court Book is most useful, but it can be misleading. In considering the traders' evidence concerning their rebids, I shall first provide relevant Dispatch and Spot Prices surrounding the rebids. Spot Prices appear in bold type in order to distinguish them from Dispatch Prices. Rebids are separated from price information by spacing. Rebids follow the Dispatch Price for the Dispatch Interval in which they occurred, highlighting the fact that, in general, they followed publication of those prices.