Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v World Netsafe Pty Ltd
[2003] FCA 159
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Federal Court of Australia
Decision date
2003-03-06
Before
Cooper J, Spender J
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Judgment (9 paragraphs)
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT 1 The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission ("the ACCC") seeks orders committing Mr Terence Butler to prison for his alleged contempt of interlocutory orders made by Cooper J on 27 January 2000 and final orders which I made on 8 December 2000 against Mr Butler for contraventions of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ("the Act"). The ACCC also seeks that Mr Butler pay the costs of this motion to commit, on an indemnity basis. Scheme 2 Both the interlocutory and final orders were in relation to conduct involving the marketing of an electronic card, the WorldNetsafe ATTM card ("the card"). 3 Mr Butler was the sole shareholder and director of World Netsafe Pty Ltd ("World Netsafe"). 4 There were two central aspects of the scheme which World Netsafe marketed, and in which Terence Butler was intimately concerned. Both involved contraventions of the Act. 5 First, the scheme was a clear referral or pyramid selling scheme. The promotional material used to market the scheme made it plain that a particular member could generate income by introducing others. A brochure to promote the card said: "What sets the World Netsafe ATTM card apart from any other system in the world is the ability to generate income for the cardholder. When a member introduced by you, purchases teleminutes on the card and redeems them for goods and services worldwide, the member will receive at the time of the transaction a percentage (paid in teleminutes) paid directly into their account." The evidence before the Court indicated that more than $4,178,000 was paid to World Netsafe in respect of the sales of "platinum cards". 6 The second central feature of the scheme was the misrepresentations about what the card could do. It was said that the card could be used at ATMs and POS terminals worldwide; was associated with an account managed by Chase Bank and Australian banks through which money could be deposited onto it; operated on software soon to be certified by Price Waterhouse; had been cleared or approved by Australian regulatory authorities; that arrangements had been made for members of the World Netsafe scheme to earn income from transactions made by other cardholders who they had introduced to the scheme; that arrangements had been made so that the card could be used to make cheap telephone calls anywhere in the world; and finally, that arrangements had been made so that the card would record "teleminutes", a universal currency which was convertible to any currency. 7 While the respondents may have hoped all of these features would come about, in fact the card did not possess any of these features at the time of its marketing. A large number of people were induced to pay money, both by the pyramid selling income streams and by these features which the card was represented as having. The marketing of the card as part of a scheme whereby participants would gain financial reward by introducing new participants constituted a contravention of ss 52, 53(aa), 53(c), 53(d), 57, 58, 59, and 61 of the Act. 8 On 1 November 2001, the ACCC filed a statement of charge pursuant to O 40 r 6 of the Federal Court Rules. An amended statement of charge was filed on 12 April 2002. 9 Counts 1 to 6 of this statement of charge allege a failure by Mr Butler to make refunds of monies paid by specific persons who participated in the scheme, as required by par 10 of my orders of 8 December 2000. That order was: "The First and Second Respondents refund within 28 days of the making of this order any monies paid to the First or Second Respondents by each person participating or who has participated in the World Netsafe Scheme at any time whether in Australia or elsewhere, after deducting any monies paid to that participant by the First or Second Respondent in respect of their participation in the World Netsafe Scheme." 10 Counts 7 and 8 of the statement of charge set out specific conduct allegedly in contravention of par 1 of the orders of Cooper J of 27 January 2000. That order was: "Until trial of the action or earlier order, the first respondent and the second respondent, by themselves, their servants or agents or otherwise, are restrained from: (a) attempting, in the promotion and operation of a scheme carried on under the name or style of 'World Netsafe' being the scheme as pleaded and particularised in paragraph 7 of the amended statement of claim ('the Scheme'), to induce persons to become members of the Scheme by paying to the first respondent US$1,500 or AUD$2,389 by holding out to those persons the prospect of receiving payments or other benefits of the type particularised in sub-paragraphs 7(i) and 7(j) of the amended statement of claim by the introduction of other persons who become members of the Scheme; (b) representing for the purpose of inducing a person to make a contract to acquire membership of the Scheme or to acquire a card described as a 'World Netsafe ATTM Card' or other goods or services upon becoming a member of the Scheme, that after making such a contract to acquire membership or to acquire the said card or other goods or services upon becoming a member, the person in return for assisting the first respondent to supply goods or services to other persons would be paid a commission payable on the event of those other persons acquiring goods or services from the first respondent." 11 Count 9 of the statement of charge sets out a breach of par 6 of my orders, which breach is admitted by Mr Butler. That order was: "The First and Second Respondents at their expense maintain the websites: a. ; and b. and publish on the whole of the home page thereon the Notice at Schedule B ('the Notice'), as an htm page into the frameset of the homepage of World Netsafe in the same dimensions and layout as specified by the Applicant so that the htm page dominates the whole page of the homepage, providing a hotlink thereon to the web address continuously for 6 months commencing forthwith." 12 Count 10 of the statement of charge is based on par 7 of my orders of 8 December 2000. That order relevantly was: "World Netsafe Pty Ltd and Terence Butler at their expense publish the Notice by forwarding it forthwith: … (b) by the postal service to all past and current members of the World Netsafe Scheme, a copy of the notice and a list of the names and addresses of the persons to whom it was sent being served immediately thereafter upon the Applicant." The essence of the claimed breach of this count is not a failure to send the notice by post to all past and current members of the World Netsafe scheme, but is based on a claimed failure to serve immediately thereafter upon the ACCC a copy of the notice and a list of the names and addresses of the persons to whom it was sent. The ACCC alleges that no copy of the notice or a list of the names and addresses of the persons to whom it was sent had been served upon the ACCC at any time subsequent to 8 December 2000. 13 Count 11 of the statement of charge is based on par 12 of my orders of 8 December 2000, namely that : "World Netsafe Pty Ltd and Terence Butler deliver forthwith to the Applicant particulars of each person participating, or who has participated in the World Netsafe Scheme at any time whether in Australia or elsewhere including: (a) the name and address of the person; (b) the date the person joined the World Netsafe Scheme; (c) the amount the person paid to the World Netsafe Pty Ltd, including any moneys held in trust; (d) the designated number of any card paid for by the person; (e) where World Netsafe Pty Ltd has paid any moneys to the person, the date, amount and purpose of each payment." 14 The breach by Mr Butler of this order is said to be constituted by the fact that he delivered documents purportedly in response to par 12 of the order, which were constituted by a table containing a list of certain World Netsafe members (the "Member List"), bundles of documents entitled "Release and Discharge", and documents relating to alleged payment of refunds by World Netsafe. This bundle was made up of forms entitled "Refund Request Form" and "Cheque Requisition", and bundles of signed pro forma letters of complaint to the ACCC (the "Material"). 15 The second part of the statement of charge deals with Mr Butler's culpability for breaches by the first respondent, World Netsafe, of the orders of Cooper J. The first three counts of this part of the statement of charge relate to conduct and representations made by Mr Lindsay Birth, said to be an agent of World Netsafe, on or about 21 March 2000 at Level 11 of the Christie Centre in Brisbane. The ACCC asserts that Mr Butler is liable for the conduct of World Netsafe by its agent Mr Birch, because he is the sole director and shareholder of World Netsafe, he was aware of the orders made by Cooper J, he was aware of the conduct of agents of World Netsafe and failed to take any reasonable steps to ensure that the orders of Cooper J were obeyed, and he authorised the establishment of facilities for the receipt of monies paid by persons induced to become members of the Scheme. 16 On 13 December 2001, following a successful motion by counsel for the ACCC, an enforcement hearing in relation to refund orders took place before Deputy District Registrar Reynolds. This hearing was limited to an examination of World Netsafe's capacity to meet the orders made by Cooper J and myself. Mr Butler made a blanket claim for immunity from answering questions, on the basis that contempt proceedings had been instituted against him by this time and information given in respect of the enforcement proceedings could be used in the contempt proceedings. 17 It is not disputed by the parties that Mr Butler could claim immunity, or that if Mr Butler had responded to questions relating to his financial position, his answers may have tended to prove that he had or did have the means to comply with order 10 of my orders of 8 December 2000. Similarly, the applicability of s 128 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) was not contested. On this basis, Mr Butler's immunity from self-incrimination was recognised by DDR Reynolds. However, the parties fundamentally disagreed as to the elements that had to be proved in the contempt proceedings with which I am presently concerned. 18 It is common ground that the ACCC must establish that Mr Butler had notice of the terms of the orders and did not comply with them. However, Mr P.L. O'Shea SC, Senior Counsel for the ACCC submitted that that was all that had to be shown, whilst Mr M.M. Stewart SC, Senior Counsel for Mr Butler contended that the ACCC must also establish that Mr Butler had, at the relevant time, assets or means capable of being used to satisfy the orders for refund of monies. Law 19 The Federal Court has power, pursuant to s 31(1) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ("the Federal Court Act") and s 24 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) ("the Judiciary Act"), to punish for civil and criminal contempts: AMIEU v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 98 at 105-106 ("Mudginberri"). 20 Section 31(1) of the Federal Court Act provides: "Subject to any other Act, the Court has the same power to punish contempts of its power and authority as is possessed by the High Court in respect of contempts of the High Court." 21 Section 24 of the Judiciary Act provides: "The High Court shall have the same power to punish contempts of its power and authority as is possessed at the commencement of this Act by the Supreme Court of Judicature in England." 22 We are here concerned with alleged disobedience of civil orders of the Court. However, as proved contempt results in punishment, all contempt proceedings are criminal in nature, with the result that the criminal standard of proof applies (Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525 at 534 and 548). Consequently, the facts relied upon to make out the contempt must be proved beyond reasonable doubt (Consolidated Press Limited v McRae (1955) 93 CLR 325 at 333), the terms of the order said to be breached must be clear and ascertainable (Australian Consolidated Press v Morgan (1965) 112 CLR 483 at 492 and 503; Re Plumbers and Gasfitters Employees' Union of Australia (1987) 72 ALR 415 at 424) and the breach must have been wilful, not accidental or unintentional (Mudginberri at 111-113). 23 In Re Agreement of The Mileage Conference Group of the Tyre Manufacturers' Conference Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 1137 at 1162, it was held that breaches may be wilful: "… even though it were to be shown that they were things done, reasonably and [with] all due care and attention, in the belief, based on legal advice, that they were not breaches." 24 This approach was cited with approval by Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Deane JJ in the High Court in Mudginberri at 112-113, who added the comment: … lying behind punishment for a contempt which involves wilful disobedience to a court order, is the very substantial purpose of disciplining the defendant and vindicating the authority of the court." and: "… a deliberate commission or omission which is in breach of an injunctive order or an undertaking will constitute such wilful disobedience unless it be casual, accidental or unintentional." 25 So too, the House of Lords in Heatons Transport v T.G.W.U. [1973] AC 15 at 109 said: "… the party in whose favour an order has been made is entitled to have it enforced, and also the effective administration of justice normally requires some penalty for disobedience to an order of a court if the disobedience is more than casual or accidental and unintentional." 26 It is convenient at this stage to deal with the extent of requirements as to service of orders in respect of which contempt is alleged, and as to any requirement for a penal endorsement such as is referred to in O 37 r 2(3) of the Federal Court Rules. 27 Order 37 rule 2 of the Federal Court Rules provides: "(1) Subject to the Rules, an order shall not be enforced by committal or sequestration unless: (a) the order or a certified or office copy thereof is served personally on the person bound; and (b) if the order requires the person bound to do an act within a specified time, the order or a certified or office copy thereof is so served before that time expires. (2) Subject to the Rules, where the person bound by an order is a corporation or organisation the order shall not be enforced by committal of an officer of the person bound or by sequestration of the property of an officer of the person bound unless, in addition to service under sub-rule (1) on the person bound: (a) the order or a certified or office copy thereof is served personally on the officer; and (b) if the order requires the person bound to do an act within a specified time, the order or a certified or office copy thereof is so served before that time expires. (3) An order or a certified or office copy thereof served under this rule must bear a notice (naming the persons concerned) that the person served is liable to imprisonment or to sequestration of property if: (a) where the order requires the person bound to do an act within a specified time, the person bound refuses or neglects to do the act within that time; or (b) where the order requires the person bound to abstain from doing an act, the person bound disobeys the order. … (5) Where a person liable to committal or sequestration of his property by way of enforcement of a judgment or order has notice of the judgment or order: (a) by being present when the judgment is pronounced or when the order is made; or (b) by being notified of the terms of the judgment or order whether by telephone, telegram or otherwise, the judgment or order may be enforced by committal of that person or by sequestration of his property notwithstanding that service has not been effected in accordance with this rule." 28 It is accepted by the ACCC that in the case of alleged breaches of the orders of Cooper J, service had not been effected in accordance with O 37 r 2(1) to (3). In the case of alleged breaches of my orders, the ACCC accepts that the order served did not contain the penal endorsement required by O 37 r 2(3). 29 I am satisfied that the Court has jurisdiction under O 37 r 2(5) to order the committal of Mr Butler for breaches of either order, should the Court be satisfied that a relevant contempt had been proved. Mr Butler was present in court in the proceedings before Cooper J on 23 December 1999, on 25 December 1999 was cross-examined upon an affidavit he had sworn in those proceedings, and he was present in court in person on 27 January 2000 when Cooper J pronounced his orders. The orders were also read aloud by the respondents' then solicitor to a group of people, including Mr Butler, at Romeo's Restaurant later that day. 30 Concerning the order I made on 8 December 2000, a copy of that order was served personally on the second respondent by Mr Rodney Dann, the solicitor for the applicant, on or about 22 December 2000, whereupon Mr Butler admitted he had seen the order previously and asked when the time limits for compliance with the order commenced. Further, on 24 February 2001, Mr Butler wrote to Mr Dann saying, amongst other things: "I am well aware of the seriousness of this matter and that I am obliged to comply with all of the Court's orders." 31 It was submitted on Mr Butler's behalf in these respects that O 37 r 2 was invalid, and that the ACCC was bound to comply with O 41 r 5 and O 42 r 31(1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court, as those Rules stood in England in 1903. In the view I take of the matter, s 24 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) conferred on the High Court, and s 31 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) conferred on this Court, the same power as the Supreme Court of Judicature possessed on 25 August 1903 to punish for civil and criminal contempt. The Supreme Court of Judicature had power to punish as a contempt the wilful disobedience of an order of the Court. In my opinion, the power and authority of the Supreme Court of Judicature to punish contempt as at that date does not require that the practice or procedural law of England as at 25 August 1903 also apply. Nothing in any of the judgments of the High Court in Re Kolina ex parte Torney (1999) 200 CLR 386 affects this conclusion, in my opinion. 32 In the course of the proceedings, there were a number of rulings as to the admissibility of evidence and other matters. It is necessary to refer only to some of those rulings. 33 By an amended statement of charge the applicant sought to add further counts. Those counts were based on representations made in an email (the representations being of the same kind as were referred to in Order 1 of the Orders of the Court dated 8 December 2000). However, it was not suggested by the ACCC that it would prove that the representations made in the email constituted false and misleading conduct at the time they were made. In the course of refusing to permit the amendment of the statement of charge on 24 April 2002, I said: "It is one thing to punish a person for engaging in conduct which constitutes a contravention of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (the Act), the contravening of which has been enjoined by the Court. It is quite another to punish a person for conduct which does not, or does not necessarily, involve contraventions of the Act, but merely involves a contravention of one view of what the Orders were. I do not think I have power, for instance, to make an order prohibiting a person from making representations, unless the making of those representations also constitutes a contravention of the Act. Consequently if, as the ACCC contends, independently of whether these statements are correct, true, misleading or deceptive, the making of them constitutes punishable contempts, that would raise, in my opinion, a very real question as to the lawfulness of the injunctions. For these reasons, it seems to me that the better view of the Orders the Court made is the view that puts them within power. On this basis I will not permit the amendments." 34 On 24 April 2002 in Reasons for Ruling on Evidence No. 3, I ruled that certain statements made by the corporate counsel for World Netsafe, Mr Mark McCluskey, were the subject of client professional privilege. On 30 April 2002 in Reasons for Ruling on Evidence No. 5, I ruled that the statement attributed to one Lindsay Birch at a meeting promoting membership of the World Netsafe scheme, namely "I am looking after the interests of World Netsafe in Australia" was not admissible to establish that he was the agent of World Netsafe. The question of any liability for contempt by World Netsafe arising out of admissible statements made by, and conduct of Mr Birch will be considered in detail in relation to a consideration of Counts 7 and 8 of the statement of charge. 35 Finally, on 24 April 2002 in Reasons for Ruling on Evidence No. 2, I permitted the affidavit of Mr McCluskey to be read, and allowed him to be cross-examined by video link. This order was made notwithstanding the wish of the respondent that unless he be present in person to be cross-examined the affidavit evidence should not be received. Mr McCluskey had been made bankrupt on 6 June 1991 and again on 23 November 2001. He left Australia in November 2001 without the consent of his Trustee, and notwithstanding the Trustee's demand that Mr McCluskey return to Australia, Mr McCluskey refused and has failed to provide a statement of his affairs. Mr McCluskey declined an invitation by the ACCC to return to Australia, but indicated that he was prepared to be cross-examined on his affidavit by means of video link. For the reasons which I gave on 24 April 2002, I directed that the evidence of Mr McCluskey be taken by video link pursuant to ss 47(1A) and 47(1C)(4) of the Federal Court Act and O 24 r 1A of the Federal Court Rules. 36 I turn now to consider the several groups of counts. 37 Concerning Counts 1 to 6 of Part 1 of the statement of charge, it was foreshadowed in closing submissions on behalf of Mr Butler that an application would be made based on a contention that the order for refunds made by the Court on 8 December 2000 were made without jurisdiction. However, the foreshadowed motion for declaratory relief and orders for prohibition and certiorari (under s 163A of the Act) or alternatively, an order under O 35 r 7(2)(a) or (d) of the Federal Court Rules setting aside the orders, or in the further alternative an order made pursuant to the Court's inherent jurisdiction to set aside that order, was not prosecuted. I am therefore not now concerned with the invidious prospect of being asked to allow an appeal from my own orders, or to certiorari myself, and the antecedent questions of the competency of such applications. 38 I am satisfied that Mr Butler did not refund within 28 days from 8 December 2000 any monies paid to himself or World Netsafe, concerning participation in the World Netsafe scheme. The evidence establishes, in respect of each of Counts 1 to 5 in Part 1 of the statement of charge, that the relevant person or persons paid monies to World Netsafe or Mr Butler, that the relevant person or persons participated in the World Netsafe scheme, and that no refund had been received by that person or persons in respect of that payment. Similarly in Count 6, the evidence establishes that Mr Butler did not comply with par 10 of the Court's orders of 8 December 2000 in that he did not pay any refunds to persons who were members within 28 days from the making of the order. 39 In a letter dated 30 January 2001 Mr Butler wrote to Mr Dann that: "World Netsafe is not in a position at present to pay refunds." In a letter dated 9 February 2001 Mr Butler again wrote: "We are still awaiting the deposit of funds promised to us by Greenstar to effect the refund requests that have come in.",again in a letter dated 23 April 2001 Mr Butler wrote: "We are still awaiting the payment from Greenstar so that we can pay the refunds to all existing members." And in a further letter of 8 June 2001, Mr Butler wrote: "I am currently working on several plans that will ensure that all members that are owed a refund are paid." 40 The evidence does not establish that all of the people described in Annexure A to the statement of charge as "members" were members, but it is clear that a number of them have been proved to be members, and the evidence is plain that repayments were not made to any member. There is direct evidence that a particular request by a Mr Dryland to have funds paid to World Netsafe refunded to him has not resulted in those funds being paid to him. There is further evidence from a Mr Proffitt that he has not received any refund or indeed any money from World Netsafe or Mr Butler. Mr Proffitt had also became a member and paid funds to World Netsafe. 41 The primary matter concerning the first six counts is the contention by the respondent that it is necessary for the ACCC to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Butler had access to assets capable of being used to satisfy the refund order, before a contempt of that order is demonstrated. However, the ACCC argues that it was not necessary to show that Mr Butler had the means of complying with the order, and the question of means is irrelevant. The letter of 19 March 2001 said in part: "We recently sent you a copy of the contractual arrangements with the Cooperative Greenstar in Western Australia. Under the terms and conditions of that agreement Greenstar owe World Netsafe USD $750,000.00. We would appreciate your assistance in this matter as the ACCC and the Members are the Beneficiaries of this agreement. …" The letter concluded: "I personally don't have any means at present to repay members, however Greenstar should be forced under our agreement to start repaying funds under the trust agreement. Perhaps we could setup a meeting with your client to work these matters out, as I am hopelessly lost at present as to how I can meet all these commitments." 42 The ACCC submits that it is sufficient if his conduct amounts to "conscious non-compliance". It was submitted that any incapacity to pay would go only to penalty. 43 It is submitted on Mr Butler's behalf that regard had to be had to the provisions of the Debtors Act 1869 (England) ("the Debtors Act") in considering whether there was power to commit for contempt. 44 Section 4 of that Act, as at 1903, provided: "With the exceptions hereinafter mentioned, no person shall, after the commencement of this Act, be arrested or imprisoned for making default in payment of a sum of money." Then followed a number of exceptions, none of which is applicable in the present case. 45 Section 5 of that Act, as at 1903, provided: "(1) Subject to the provisions hereinafter mentioned, … any Court may commit to prison for a term not exceeding six weeks, or until payment of the sum due, any person who makes default in payment of any debt or instalment of any debt due from him in pursuance of any order or judgment of that or any other competent Court: Provided… (2) That such jurisdiction shall only be exercised where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the person making default either has or has had since the date of the order or judgment the means to pay the sum in respect of which he has made default, and has refused or neglected, or refuses or neglects, to pay the same. Proof of the means of the person making default may be given in such manner as the Court thinks just; and for the purposes of such proof the debtor and any witnesses may be summoned and examined on oath, according to the prescribed rules." 46 The ACCC submitted firstly that the Debtors Actwas irrelevant on the present application and secondly, that Act did not bind the Crown, relying on Attorney-General v Edmunds (1870) 22 LT 667, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Attorney-General v Randall [1944] 1 KB 709. 47 Randall had been arrested on a writ of capias ad satisfaciendum issued at the instance of the solicitor for Customs, in respect of a sum of Ł3,500 being arrears of purchase tax due to the Crown. Mr Randall applied for an order that the writ of capias be discharged, and that he be forthwith discharged from custody. He was unsuccessful at first instance. On appeal the Court of Appeal held that "if the [Debtors] Act does not bind the Crown, the appeal must fail." The Court held that the Act does not bind the Crown. The ACCC contends that it is an instrumentality or agent of the Crown in right of the Commonwealth, and it is not therefore bound by the provisions of the Debtors Act. In any event, the ACCC contends, that Act is irrelevant on the present application.