CONSIDERATION
12 The Court is not bound to make the orders on which the parties have agreed. However, having read the Joint Submissions and heard counsel today, I am satisfied that these orders are appropriate and should be made. The declarations serve the public interest by demonstrating that the impugned conduct contravenes the Act: see Australian Consumer and Competition Commission v Midland Brick Company Pty Ltd (2004) 207 ALR 329 at 333 and Rural Press Limited v Australian Consumer and Competition Commission (2003) 216 CLR 53 at 91.
13 The injunctive relief is designed to make it clear to the respondents what conduct on their parts is proscribed in the three year period during which the injunctions are to be operative: see Australian Consumer and Competition Commission v Francis (2004) 142 FCR 1 at 39 and Australian Consumer and Competition Commission v Digital Products [2006] FCA 1732 ("Digital Products") at [12].
14 The proposed probation order in this case is very like the probation orders made by Merkel J in Humax and by Tracey J in Digital Products. Section 86D contemplates orders of the kind proposed as adverse publicity orders: see orders 8 and 9 in the proposed minute of orders.
15 Section 76(1) of the Act provides that the Court may order the payment of such pecuniary penalty as the Court determines to be appropriate "having regard to all relevant matters", including:
(a) the nature and extent of the act or omission constituting the contravening conduct;
(b) the nature and extent of any loss or damage suffered as a result of the contravening conduct;
(c) the circumstances in which the act or omission took place; and
(d) whether the contravenor has previously been found by the Court to have engaged in similar conduct.
16 The relevant principles governing the imposition of pecuniary penalties are discussed in Australian Consumer and Competition Commission v Dataline.Net.Au Pty Ltd [2007] FCAFC 146 ("Dataline") at [60]-[75]; Trade Practices Commission v CSR Ltd (1991) ATPR 41-076 at 52,151-52, 154; NW Frozen Foods Pty Ltd v Australian Consumer and Competition Commission (1997) 71 FCR 285 at 290-295; J McPhee & Son (Aust) Pty Ltd v Australian Consumer and Competition Commission (2000) 172 ALR 532; and Minister for Industry, Tourism and Resources v Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd [2004] FCAFC 72 ("Mobil Oil") at [51]-[58]. These authorities indicate that further relevant matters include:
(a) the size of the contravening company;
(b) the degree of power the company has, as evidenced by its market share and ease of entry into the market;
(c) whether the conduct was systematic, deliberate, or covert;
(d) the period over which the conduct occurred;
(e) the effect on the functioning of the market and other economic effects of the conduct;
(f) whether the contravention arose out of the conduct of senior management or at a lower level;
(g) whether the company has a corporate culture conducive to compliance with the Act, as evidenced by educational programs and discipline, or other corrective measures in response to an acknowledged contravention; and
(h) whether the company has shown a disposition to co-operate with the authorities responsible for the enforcement of the Act in relation to the contravention.
See also Australian Consumer and Competition Commission v Jurlique International Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 79 ("Jurlique") at [51]; Australian Consumer and Competition Commission v Knight [2007] FCA 1011 ("Knight") at [70]; and Australian Consumer and Competition Commission v Visy Industries Holdings Pty Limited (No 3) [2007] FCA 1617 ("Visy Industries") at [303].
17 Ordinary sentencing principles are relevant, including specific and general deterrence. Thus in Australian Consumer and Competition Commission v Leahy Petroleum Pty Ltd (No 3) (2005) 215 ALR 301 at [39], Goldberg J concluded:
The penalty imposed must be substantial enough that the party realises the seriousness of its conduct and is not inclined to repeat such conduct. Obviously the sum required to achieve this object will be larger where the Court is setting a penalty for a company with vast resources. However, as specific deterrence is only one element and general deterrence must also be achieved, consideration of the party's capacity to pay must be weighed against the need to impose a sum which members of the public will recognise as significant and proportionate to the seriousness of the contravention.
What is known in the criminal law as the "totality principle" is also relevant. That is, the total penalty for related offences ought not to exceed what is appropriate for the entire contravening conduct involved: see Jurliqueat [52]; Trade Practices Commission v TNT Australia Pty Ltd & Ors (1995) ATPR 41-375 at 40,169; Knight at [73]; and Visy Industries at [304]. The "parity principle" is also relevant, namely, all other things being equal, like cases should be treated alike.
18 Further, the fact that the ACCC and the respondents have put forward a penalty that they have agreed as between themselves is relevant, although not conclusive because the Court retains the responsibility for imposing penalties: see Dataline at [59]; Visy Industries at [305]; and Australian Consumer and Competition Commission v ABB Power Transmission Pty Ltd (2004) ATPR 42-011; [2004] FCA 819 at [46]-[56].
19 The parties propose that an appropriate penalty for TEAC would be $235,000 discounted, by 25% for cooperation and early acknowledgment of liability, to $175,000 payable by instalments. They propose a penalty of $20,000 for Mr Allison discounted by 25% for cooperation and early acknowledgment of liability to $15,000 payable by instalments. I consider that those proposed penalties are within the range of penalties which might properly be imposed for the contraventions. I briefly set out my reasons for that conclusion, in the light of the matters discussed in the cases referred to above.
20 The contravening conduct (summarised at [3] above) resulted from the conduct of Mr Allison, who was and remains National Sales Manager. Mr Allison became National Sales Manager on 1 March 2006. Immediately before this, he had been National Accounts Manager.
21 In March 2005, the original TEAC entity was placed into voluntary administration following financial difficulties. A new TEAC business started operations in September 2005. It was purchased by the current holding company, TT International Limited, on 1 November 2006. The contravening conduct occurred in mid 2006 prior to the new ownership of TEAC.
22 I accept that, as the parties submitted, the proposed penalties properly reflect both aggravating and mitigating factors. The primary aggravating factors were as follows.
(i) There was more than one kind of resale price maintenance conduct.
(ii) The contravening conduct was explicit, involved ten acts of resale price maintenance engaged in on three separate occasions and included a threat to cancel the supply arrangement.
(iii) As a result of the contravening conduct, for at least four months Panasales did not advertise the electrical goods supplied to it by TEAC in any newspaper or on television or radio below the "go price" specified by TEAC.
(iv) As National Sales Manager at the time of the contravening conduct, Mr Allison held an important position within middle management at TEAC.
23 On the other hand, there are factors that explain why no higher penalties than those proposed should be set.
(i) All contraventions were in relation to only one retailer, which supplies goods from one location and over the internet.
(ii) The contravening conduct took place over a short period of time (21 June to 4 July 2004).
(iii) The contraventions can reasonably be regarded as having occurred in the one course of related conduct.
(iv) TEAC did not in fact withhold supply to the retailer (Panasales) at any time.
(v) The conduct has not been repeated.
24 The respondents have co-operated with the ACCC and, as the Agreed Facts show, acknowledged their liability at the earliest stage of the proceeding. This has shortened the proceeding, saved costs, and allowed the ACCC to direct its attention to other investigations and proceedings. These are mitigating factors that result in a substantial discount from the penalties that would otherwise be appropriate. I note in passing that there is nothing to indicate that the respondents have contravened Pt IV previously.
25 Whilst Mr Allison's conduct (engaged in on three occasions over a fortnight with effect for about four months) was deliberate in the sense that he intended to prevent Panasales from discounting and undermining TEAC's strategy to re-position itself as a more expensive brand in the electrical goods market, it is agreed that at the time of the contravening conduct (which he has admitted) he had no awareness of its illegality. Under the previous ownership, Mr Allison had not received any training in trade practices compliance and he became National Sales Manger in a difficult period for TEAC. This is not, of course, to deny that he had a responsibility to ensure that he knew the law and observed it.
26 The financial circumstances of TEAC and Mr Allison also indicate that the proposed penalties are within the appropriate range. I have already referred to TEAC's circumstances between March 2005 and mid 2006, when the contravening conduct occurred. The Agreed Facts set out the details of TEAC's approximate market share of various wholesale electronic goods in Australia compared to the entire industry for January 2006 to December 2006. I have had regard to these details. I have also noted the Joint Submissions that:
(a) Whilst TEAC's profit for the year ended 31 March 2007 was approximately $4.5M (a result of accounting adjustments made with the previous owner), its position a year earlier was precarious; as at 31 March 2006 it had a loss of approximately $6.3M. Further, whilst TEAC's net asset position as at 31 March 2007 was approximately $1.2M, its total liabilities exceeded its total assets by approximately $3.3M as at 31 March 2006. TEAC now has a capacity to pay a sizable penalty and the penalty of $175,000 which it has agreed to pay is a sizable penalty in all of the circumstances of this case. … TEAC is still recovering from an unprofitable position. Further, TEAC is presently making payments for long term leases from which it is unable to be relieved.
(b) Mr Allison's income for the financial year ended 30 June 2007 was $185,861 in wages (before tax) with an additional $22,000 car allowance. He is the sole income earner for his family (which includes his wife and three dependant children). It is the joint view of the parties that Mr Allison has the capacity to pay the proposed penalty of $15,000 but that any higher amount would become oppressive to him and his family.
27 In all the circumstances, the proposed penalties are substantial (though not oppressive) and are designed to meet the object of deterrence, especially, in this case, general deterrence. Deterrence (specific and general) is the primary object of the imposition of a pecuniary penalty: see Dataline at [60] and the authorities cited. I accept that the respondents are unlikely to contravene Pt IV of the Act again, having regard to their experience and co-operation with the ACCC in this proceeding, TEAC's voluntary and proactive steps in: (a) issuing a letter to their retailers informing them that they are free to determine their own selling price; and (b) implementing trade practices compliance training. I also note that the contravening conduct took place under different company ownership, the new ownership having commenced on 1 November 2006. As appears from the foregoing, at the time of the contravening conduct, TEAC had no trade practices compliance program. This has now been remedied.
28 I also accept that the proposed penalties are consistent with the proper application of the totality and parity principles: compare Digital Products and Dataline at [64]-[75]. I was referred to a schedule of previous determinations. Whilst I have had regard to it, I have also borne in mind the observations in Dataline, where a Full Court said (at [67]-[68]):
[T]he Court is confirmed in the view that there is little to be gained in undertaking … a detailed comparative analysis of the conduct of each corporation in the identified cases, the extent to which particular officers of those corporations engaged in the contravening conduct or the scale and dimension of the conduct. The constellation of circumstances, essential character of the conduct and the factors to be weighed by the Court are inevitably sufficiently different in each case that previous determinations ultimately provide little utility in precisely informing the appropriate pecuniary penalty to be imposed in any particular contravention.
However, an assessment of previous determinations in relation to resale price maintenance conduct may provide a high level broad range within which an appropriate pecuniary penalty may be imposed having regard to the character and content of the contravention and other considerations reflecting some elements broadly consistent with the evidence in the particular case.
After making these observations, the Court undertook an analysis of several cases with sufficiently similar facts to provide a high level broad range of comparison. The penalties imposed in a number of cases (Australian Consumer and Competition Commission v Dermalogica Pty Ltd [2005] 215 ALR 482 ("Dermalogica"), Humax, Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Tooltechnic Systems (Aust) Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 432, Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Westminster Retail Pty Ltd (in liquidation) [2005] FCA 1299, Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v High Adventure Pty Ltd [2005] FCAFC 247, Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Cambur Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1027, Dataline (upholding the decision in Australian Consumer and Competition Commission v Dataline.Net.Au Pty Ltd (2006) 236 ALR 665), Jurlique, and Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Chaste Corporation Pty Ltd (in liquidation) [2005] FCA 1212) give a high level broad range of comparison for this case.
29 There is no specific evidence as to the amount of loss or damage that resulted from the contravening conduct, but this is not a mitigating factor in the imposition of penalties: see Dataline at [62]; Trade Practices Commission v ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd (1991) 105 ALR 115 at 119; Australian Consumer and Competition Commission v DM Faulkner Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 1666 at [64]; and Dermalogica at [81].
30 I accept that, in the circumstances mentioned above and on the financial material before the Court, it is appropriate to order the payment of penalties by instalments. The parties have agreed to the inclusion in orders of a default provision. The Court made similar orders in Digital Products and Humax.
31 Having regard to the foregoing, I am satisfied that the proposed penalties are appropriate in all the circumstances.
I certify that the preceding thirty-one (31) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Kenny .