Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v SensaSlim Australia Pty Ltd

Contravention by Sensaslim - Foster's involvement 110. By reason of the matters referred to in paragraphs 21, 28 to 31, 75 and 76 above (including matters referred to in the paragraphs referred to therein), by making the representation alleged at paragraph 32, Sensaslim made a representation that was false or misleading in contravention of s 59(2) of the TPA. 111. By reason of the matters referred to in paragraphs 28 and 78 to 80 above (including matters referred to in the paragraphs referred to therein), by engaging in the conduct alleged at paragraphs 78 and 80, Sensaslim engaged in conduct that was misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive in contravention of s 52 of the TPA (in respect of conduct occurring prior to 1 January 2011) and s 18 of Schedule 2 of the CCA (ACL) (in respect of conduct occurring on or after 1 January 2011). 14 It can be seen that the allegation pleaded in para 111 of the statement of claim is directed to paras 28 (also referred to in para 110) and 78-80 of the statement of claim, as quoted above. 15 Paragraph 78 of the statement of claim is a pleading against SensaSlim and the personal respondents as principal contraveners. The case against the personal respondents was that they actively concealed Mr Foster's involvement in the SensaSlim business in the ways particularised in para 78 of the statement of claim. In the case of Messrs Foster, Adams and Boyle, this was by certain representations in telephone and email communications. In the case of Mr O'Brien, this was by permitting Mr Foster to assume his (Mr O'Brien's) identity in telephone and email communications. There is no allegation in para 78 that, in relation to the particularised conduct, the personal respondents were acting other than as principals. The personal respondents could not be acting as both principals and as accessories in relation to the same conduct. 16 No particulars are given in para 78 in relation to SensaSlim's concealment of Mr Foster's involvement in the SensaSlim business. What, then, was its conduct? Paragraph 79 of the statement of claim pleads that Area Managers had a reasonable expectation that Mr Foster's involvement would be disclosed. This allegation is particularised by reference to, firstly, the requirements of the Franchising Code. This can only be seen as an allegation concerning SensaSlim's obligations under the Franchising Code. It cannot be read as concerning conduct of the personal respondents because they were not subject to any relevantly pleaded obligation under the Franchising Code. 17 Secondly, the allegation in para 79 of the statement of claim is particularised by reference to Mr Foster's alleged notoriety. As developed in submissions at trial (see [547]-[552] of the principal reasons), the allegation in para 79 of the statement of claim is directed to a case of misrepresentation by silence, which was brought against SensaSlim, not against the personal respondents. 18 The significance of para 28 of the statement of claim, referred to in both paras 110 and 111, should not be overlooked. That paragraph alleges the facts by reference to which the applicant claimed that Mr Foster was an officer of SensaSlim or a director (and hence an associate) of SensaSlim, and, therefore, a person whose identity and role in the SensaSlim business should have been disclosed by SensaSlim in the Disclosure Document, as required by the Franchising Code. 19 Paragraph 80 of the statement of claim is an allegation of misleading or deceptive conduct, once again by SensaSlim and the personal respondents as principals, not in other capacities. Textually, para 80 refers to two species of conduct: the failure to disclose Mr Foster's involvement in circumstances where, for the reasons given in the particulars to para 79, there was an obligation to disclose, and the conduct of concealing Mr Foster's involvement by reference to the particulars in para 78. Although paras 78 and 80 of the statement of claim refer to SensaSlim and the personal respondents compendiously, it is necessary to tease out of the pleading the conduct for which each respondent is alleged to be liable as a principal. The particulars to para 78 of the statement of claim only identify the conduct of the personal respondents for which it is alleged they are liable as principals. There is no conduct particularised for SensaSlim. And as I have noted, the pleaded failure to disclose Mr Foster's involvement, for the reasons given in para 79 of the statement of claim, is an allegation that could only be made against SensaSlim because, in the circumstances of this case, only SensaSlim was subject to the obligations imposed by the Franchising Code. Thus, it can be seen that the allegation relating to concealment/non-disclosure in the context of the Franchising Code is one that is specific to SensaSlim and simply does not relate to the personal respondents. 20 Thus, so far as para 111 of the statement of claim is concerned, "the matters referred to in paras 28 and 78-80" concerning SensaSlim (as opposed to the personal respondents) were that it concealed from Area Managers and potential Area Managers, Mr Foster's involvement in the conduct of the SensaSlim business (SOC para 78) where Area Managers had a reasonable expectation that Mr Foster's involvement would be disclosed because of SensaSlim's obligations under the Franchising Code and, relatedly, because of Mr Foster's "notoriety" (SOC paras 28 and 79), and that the failure of SensaSlim to make relevant disclosure, was misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive (SOC para 80). Hence, according to para 111 of the statement of claim, SensaSlim contravened, relevantly, s 52(1) of the Act and s 18(1) of the Australian Consumer Law. As this case came to be developed in submissions, SensaSlim's concealment of Mr Foster's involvement by its failure to disclose that involvement in the Disclosure Document, contrary to its obligations under the Franchising Code, and contrary to an alleged obligation arising because of Mr Foster's "notoriety", were aspects of the one case of misrepresentation by silence.

The case advanced at hearing 21 The construction of para 111 of the statement of claim set out in [20] above, is precisely how the applicant put its case against SensaSlim at the time of final submissions. 22 The applicant's written submissions (omitting footnotes) were: Foster's involvement: s 59(2) and s 52 TPA: FASoC [110] & [111] 4. Sensaslim was required, pursuant to ss 6 and 6B of the Schedule to the Trade Practices (Industry Codes - Franchising) Regulations 1998 (Cth) (Franchising Code) to provide certain disclosure in relation to its associates and officers. 5. Foster controlled and directed the business of Sensaslim: see the conduct outlined at [6] - [100] below. In summary, Foster: a. developed and caused to be implemented the system for the Sensaslim Franchise; b. prepared and either placed or arranged to be placed advertisements in various newspapers advertising for area managers to distribute the Sensaslim Solution; c. prepared a DVD for the purpose of promoting the conduct and company to prospective area managers, the Area Manager Proposal, the FAQ and the Disclosure Document that were shown to area managers; d. represented himself in emails and on the telephone to area managers as "Peter O'Brien"; and e. was, in the circumstances, an "associate" of the franchisor pursuant to regulation 3 of the Code in that he was a shadow director of Sensaslim Australia Pty Limited. 6. Sensaslim did not disclose Foster's involvement in its business to area managers, potential area managers or relevant third parties, such as KMB Business Advisors (KMB) and Robinson Legal; see e.g. paras 2.5 and 2.6 of the disclosure document (an example is V7 CB19, Mr Evans' affidavit at p2314). 7. In failing to disclose that Foster was an associate and/or an officer of Sensaslim in the Disclosure Document it represented that Foster: a. was not making or participating in making decisions that affect the whole, or a substantial part of the business; and/or b. was not providing instructions in accordance with which the directors of Sensaslim were accustomed to act; and/or c. was not a director (see definition of director (b) in s 9 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)); and/or d. did not have a relationship with Sensaslim, which was relevant to the system of Sensaslim Franchises and a material aspect of the Sensaslim business. 8. Thus, in making that misleading and deceptive representation that is false in a material particular in that Foster was an associate and/or a director [and/or an officer] and had a relationship with Sensaslim, Sensalim contravened s 59(2) of the TPA. 9. In addition, area managers deciding whether to purchase a Sensaslim area had a reasonable expectation that Foster's involvement would be disclosed. The Franchising Code specifically required it, as did Foster's notoriety, especially in relation to weight loss products. In failing to disclose Foster's involvement Sensaslim contravened s 52 of the TPA. People such as Mr James would not have become involved if they knew Foster was. [Emphasis added] 23 It can be seen that these submissions dealt with the allegations arising under paras 110 and 111 of the statement of claim, together. No distinction was drawn between the case brought under 110 and the case brought under para 111 in terms of the underlying factual substratum, although para 110 alleges a contravention of s 59(2) of the Act and para 111 alleges contraventions under s 52(1) of the Act and s 18(1) of the Australian Consumer Law. Paragraph 9 in the above quote, dealt specifically with the contravention of s 52(1). Plainly, that paragraph referred to SensaSlim's obligations under the Franchising Code and the failure of the Disclosure Document to disclose Mr Foster's involvement. That particular paragraph also referred to Mr Foster's "notoriety". As I have noted, these are the two matters particularised in para 79 of the statement of claim that were developed as a case of misrepresentation by silence. 24 It should also be noted that, so far as para 111 of the statement of claim is concerned, the applicant only pressed a case under s 52(1) of the Act and not under s 18(1) of the Australian Consumer Law, despite reference to the latter provision in para 111 of the statement of claim. I shall return to discuss the significance of the applicant confining its case in that way. 25 At the hearing, the applicant's oral submissions closely followed its written submissions on this question: see T407-416. There was no material departure therefrom. At the commencement of the applicant's oral submissions, I was taken to various provisions of the Act and the Australian Consumer Law. I was also taken to various passages of Miller RV, Miller's Australia in Competition and Consumer Law Annotated (34th ed, Thomson Reuters, 2012) concerning silence as misleading conduct, including references to and quotations from Winterton Constructions v Hambros Australia (1992) 39 FCR 97 and Fraser v NRMA Holdings Limited (1995) 55 FCR 452 (referred to in [551] of the principal reasons). Counsel for the applicant stated (at T410): Now, if I can interpolate there to say that we submit that the Area Manager's proposal and the Disclosure Document are not unlikely prospectus in that they are inviting - certainly the Area Manager's proposal is inviting persons to invest into a business and persons receiving that document would expect and be entitled to receive full and frank disclosure of all material matters pertaining to that investment opportunity and to leave out of it critical matters such as the involvement of Mr Foster and other matters, we submit with respect means that the Area Manager's Proposal is misleading… 26 After dealing with the passages in Miller, counsel said (at T411): …So with that in mind I then just now turn back to the submissions and deal with the contravention that we allege against the first respondent with respect of Mr Foster's involvement. Now, Sensaslim was required, pursuant to the Trade Practices Industry Codes for franchising regulations to provide certain disclosure. Now, your Honour will recall that I took your Honour to the Franchising Code… 27 I was then reminded of various provisions of the Franchising Code (at T411-414). Counsel for the applicant submitted (at T415) that Mr Foster was either an associate or officer of SensaSlim who participated in making decisions that affected the whole or substantial part of the business of SensaSlim, whose identity should have been disclosed. At T415-416 counsel for the applicant submitted: Now, if I can just take your Honour to section 59(2) again, of the Act. Now, we submit that the Disclosure Document is an invitation to a person to engage in a business activity requiring the investment of moneys, and therefore Sensaslim was prohibited from making, with respect to any material aspect of the business activity, a representation that is false or misleading. And there were at least a number of reasons why there was an obligation to speak. It was the Franchising Code itself that impose an obligation to disclose, and speak. But in any event, the relationship between the parties, with respect, we would submit, gave rise to that obligation in accordance with the legal principles that have been set down in the cases that I took your Honour to previously. But in any event, quite clearly the Franchising Code imposed upon the company the duty to make known the involvement of Mr Foster in that document, and therefore gave rise to the obligation, and in our respectful submission constituted a contravention of section 59… 28 Counsel for the applicant then turned to para 9 of the written submissions, quoted above at [21]. He said (at T416): So even absent the Franchising Code, as I say, there was an obligation imposed on Sensaslim to make known his involvement, and its silence on that matter constituted a misleading representation, and contravention of section 52… 29 Counsel then turned to consider another aspect of the case, namely the nature and extent of Mr O'Brien's involvement in the SensaSlim business. 30 From this summary, it can be seen that both in written submissions and oral submissions, the applicant's case against SensaSlim, concerning the concealment of Mr Foster's involvement in the SensaSlim business, was a case of misrepresentation by silence based on SensaSlim's failure, contrary to the requirements of the Franchising Code, to disclose that involvement in the Disclosure Document. Related to this, SensaSlim advanced a case that Mr Foster's "notoriety" also required that disclosure.

Relevant findings with respect to SensaSlim 31 At [518]-[545] of the principal reasons, I identified, in a broad way, the principal allegations that had been made by the applicant. I set out various provisions of the Act and the Australian Consumer Law and discussed a number of legal principles, including those relating to accessorial liability. 32 I also made some general observations concerning the pleading of the statement of claim, including that the statement of claim is not always internally consistent in relation to the allegations pleaded, particularly as to the precise conduct said to constitute the contraventions that have been alleged: see [520] of the principal reasons. At [521] of the principal reasons, I said: 521. I have proceeded on the basis of the pleaded allegations, as I understand them to be. Where there is significant ambiguity in the pleading itself, I have given the pleading its more narrow construction. However, where the applicant's final submissions confined the pleaded case in a particular way, I have proceeded on the basis that the confined case is the one that the applicant seeks to have determined. 33 At [546] of the principal reasons, I turned to consider the case against SensaSlim, and in particular the case concerning the concealment of Mr Foster's involvement. In that paragraph I said: 546. In final submissions, the applicant effectively confined its case against SensaSlim, in relation to Mr Foster's involvement, to SensaSlim's failure to disclose in the Disclosure Document Mr Foster's involvement in the SensaSlim business. This would seem to be the true ambit of its pleading in relation to SensaSlim's conduct in any event: see SOC paras 28-32, 75-76, 78-80 and 110-111. Although paragraph 21 of the statement of claim does incorporate a reference to the Area Manager Proposal, the Frequently Asked Questions document and the SensaSlim DVD, this is only in an incidental way in relation to a subsidiary allegation that each was an 'invitation' for the purposes of s 59(2) of the Act. 34 After dealing with the applicant's submission that Mr Foster's reputation as a conman in relation to weight loss products constituted an independent basis for imposing an obligation on SensaSlim to reveal Mr Foster's involvement in the SensaSlim business (which I rejected), and after dealing with the provisions of the Corporations Act in relation to the definitions of "director" and "officer", I concluded that even if not a director (and therefore not an associate) of SensaSlim, Mr Foster was an officer of SensaSlim, because he was a person who made decisions that affected the whole or a substantial part of the business carried on by SensaSlim. I concluded, therefore, that, based on the provisions of the Franchising Code, the Disclosure Document issued by SensaSlim should have identified Mr Foster as an officer: see [566] of the principal reasons. 35 At [574] of the principal reasons, I gave specific attention to the allegations pleaded in paras 110 and 111 of the statement of claim, noting that, at the time of final submissions, the applicant only advanced contraventions of s 59(2) and s 52(1) of the Act. I said: 574. On this aspect of its case, the applicant alleges that SensaSlim contravened s 59(2) and s 52(1) of the Act: SOC paras 110 and 111. The applicant also pleaded a contravention of s 18(1) of the Australian Consumer Law in relation to conduct on and after 1 January 2011: SOC para 111. At the time of final submissions, the applicant only advanced contraventions of s 59(2) and s 52(1) of the Act. I assume that this position was taken advisedly, given that this aspect of case turns on what was, and what was not, disclosed in the Disclosure Document. I am not aware of any evidence that shows that this document was issued by SensaSlim on or after 1 January 2011. 36 With respect to the contravention of s 59(2) of the Act, I found at [576]-[578] of the principal reasons: 576. There is no doubt that SensaSlim issued the Disclosure Document. I do not think that, by issuing the Disclosure Document in the form that it did, SensaSlim made a positive representation concerning, specifically, Mr Foster's non-involvement in the ways pleaded by the applicant. That said, I am satisfied that, by issuing the Disclosure Document in the form that it did, SensaSlim did represent, in trade or commerce, that no persons other than Mr Boyle and Mr O'Brien were involved as officers (or associates) of SensaSlim. Specifically, I am satisfied that through issuing the disclosure document, SensaSlim represented that no persons other than Mr Boyle and Mr O'Brien were making or participating in making decisions that affected the whole or a substantial part of the SensaSlim business, when in fact Mr Foster was doing just that, and would continue to do so. His involvement in SensaSlim and the SensaSlim business should have been disclosed in the document, at least in his capacity as an officer of SensaSlim. In this sense, SensaSlim represented that Mr Foster was not making or participating in making decisions that affected the whole or a substantial part of the SensaSlim business. It seems to me that this representation falls squarely within the ambit of SensaSlim's case as pleaded and advanced in final submissions. 577. I am also satisfied that, for the purpose of s 59(2) of the Act: • the Disclosure Document stood as an invitation in trade or commerce to persons (prospective franchisees) to engage or participate in a business activity requiring the performance by them of work, or the investment of moneys and the performance of work by them associated with that investment; • the representation that no persons other than Mr Boyle and Mr O'Brien were involved as officers (or associates) of SensaSlim was a representation with respect to a material aspect of that business activity, and • the failure to disclose Mr Foster as an officer of SensaSlim, particularly as a person who was making or participating in making decisions that affected the whole or a substantial part of the SensaSlim business, was, in the circumstances, a material matter. 578. Consequently, I am satisfied that, by failing to disclose in the Disclosure Document Mr Foster's involvement as an officer, SensaSlim made a representation in trade or commerce that was false or misleading in a material particular, in contravention of s 59(2) of the Act. 37 At [579], with respect to the contravention of s 52(1) of the Act, I found: 579. For the same reasons, I am satisfied that, more generally, SensaSlim engaged in conduct, in trade or commerce, that was misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive, in contravention of s 52(1) of the Act.

The applicant's contention 38 The applicant contends, in effect, that I misunderstood para 111 of the statement of claim by treating it as dealing with the same underlying conduct pleaded in connection with para 110 of the statement of claim. The applicant submits that para 110 of the statement of claim deals with SensaSlim's failure to disclose, in the Disclosure Document, Mr Foster's involvement in the SensaSlim business, contrary to the obligations imposed on SensaSlim by the Franchising Code, whereas para 111 of the statement of claim deals with completely different factual matters, namely the active concealment by the personal respondents (and hence by SensaSlim) of Mr Foster's involvement in the SensaSlim business by: Mr Foster representing himself as Mr O'Brien in telephone and email communications; Mr O'Brien allowing Mr Foster to assume his (Mr O'Brien's) identity in telephone and email communications, and Mr Adams and Mr Boyle representing, in telephone and email communications, that "the person that the Area Managers, potential Area Managers, or third parties were communicating with was O'Brien…". 39 Specifically, in relation to para 111 of the statement of claim, the applicant eschews any contravention of s 52(1) of the Act by reason of SensaSlim's failure to disclose, in the Disclosure Document, Mr Foster's involvement in the SensaSlim business, when required to do so because of obligations imposed on SensaSlim by the Franchising Code or because of Mr Foster's "notoriety". 40 In its written submissions in relation to the present question, the applicant submits: 17. The Applicant only alleged that Sensaslim's failure to disclose Foster's role in the Disclosure Document was a contravention of s 59(2) of the TPA. The Applicant's allegations as regards s 52 TPA and/or s 18 ACL were directed towards Sensaslim's conduct in concealing Foster's identity from Area Managers and potential Area Managers. By not making a finding against Sensaslim in relation to s 18 of the ACL (based on the fact that there was no evidence to suggest that the Disclosure Document had been distributed after 1 January), the Reasons again appear to be proceeding on the basis that the allegation at paragraph 111 of the FASOC referred to the same underlying conduct as the allegation at paragraph 110 of the FASOC. 41 The applicant also submits (in the context of the principal reasons dealing with Mr O'Brien's liability): 25. As a result of finding that Sensaslim's conduct in failing to disclose in the Disclosure Document, Foster's role as an officer of Sensaslim was a breach of both s 59(2) and s 52(1) of the TPA, his Honour made a finding in relation to an allegation that the Applicant had not in fact pleaded, namely that: (a) Sensaslim had engaged in a contravention of s 52(1) by failing to disclose in the Disclosure Document that Foster was an officer of Sensaslim; and (b) O'Brien was knowingly concerned in Sensaslim's contravention of s 52(1) of the TPA.

Relevant findings with respect to the personal respondents 42 At this point, it is convenient to return to the principal reasons and to my findings with respect to the personal respondents concerning the concealment of Mr Foster's involvement in the SensaSlim business. 43 With respect to Mr Foster himself, the applicant alleged in para 126 of the statement of claim: 126. By reason of the matters referred to in paragraphs 28 and 77 to 80 above (including matters referred to in the paragraphs referred to therein), the conduct by Foster alleged at paragraphs 78 and 80 was misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive in contravention of s 52 of the TPA (in respect of conduct occurring prior to 1 January 2011) and s 18 of the ACL (in respect of conduct occurring on or after 1 January 2011). 44 At [678] of the principal reasons, I found: 678. The applicant also alleges that Mr Foster contravened s 52(1) of the Act and s 18(1) of the Australian Consumer Law, as a principal: SOC para 126. This allegation was not developed in submissions apart from the applicant's stated reliance on the extended operation of the Act under s 6(3) thereof. The statement of claim particularises Mr Foster's conduct to be his communications by telephone and email with Area Managers, potential Area Managers and others in which he represented himself to be Mr O'Brien: SOC para 78. The applicant's case is that, by misrepresenting himself as Mr O'Brien, Mr Foster was concealing his own involvement in the SensaSlim business. This is undoubtedly true. But this conduct was inextricably part of SensaSlim's conduct of the SensaSlim business. It was a fundamental aspect of its modus operandi. When engaging in this conduct, Mr Foster was acting as the company, just as he was acting as the company in, for example, preparing or directing the preparation of the Disclosure Document and causing it to be issued to prospective franchisees: Hamilton v Whitehead (1988) 166 CLR 121 at 126-129. In my view, this conduct is properly attributable to SensaSlim and would have constituted contraventions by SensaSlim of s 52(1) of the Act and, in relation to such conduct occurring on and after 1 January 2011, s 18(1) of the Australian Consumer Law, had those contraventions been pleaded. However, those allegations do not appear to have been pleaded. I should add that I am satisfied that Mr Foster was knowingly concerned in and party to that conduct although, once again, that allegation also does not appear to have pleaded. Therefore, I am not satisfied that the contravention pleaded in paragraph 126 of the statement of claim has been established. 45 The substance of the applicant's present contention is that it did in fact plead and advance a case that Mr Foster's email and telephone communications, representing himself as Mr O'Brien, were SensaSlim's conduct (as opposed to Mr Foster's conduct) and that the allegation under para 111 of the statement of claim was directed to that case (including corresponding conduct by Messrs O'Brien, Adams and Boyle), and only that case. Its contention is that I failed to consider that case. 46 However, this case was not put to me at trial. I did consider the question of Mr Foster's accessorial liability in relation to the contravention I found against SensaSlim arising under para 111 of the statement of claim, based on the case put to me at trial. 47 In this connection, the applicant pleaded in para 127 of the statement of claim: 127. Further and in the alternative, Foster was knowingly concerned in or a party to the contraventions of s 52 of the TPA and/or s 18 of the ACL by Sensaslim alleged at paragraph 111 (for the conduct alleged at paragraphs 78 and 80) within the meaning of s 75B(1)(c) of the TPA, the definition of "involved" in s 2 of the ACL and s 232(1)(e) of the ACL. Particulars (i) The applicant relies on the matters pleaded at paragraphs 28 and 77 to 80 above (including matters referred to in the paragraphs referred to therein). (ii) Foster's knowledge can be inferred from the matters referred to at paragraph 3(a) above (including in the particulars to that paragraph). 48 At [674]-[677] of the principal reasons, I found: 674. The applicant alleges that Mr Foster was knowingly concerned in or party to the contraventions I have found at [578]-[579] above: SOC paras 125 and 127. 675. I am satisfied that Mr Foster caused SensaSlim to issue the Disclosure Document. Further, as stated at [569], I am satisfied that the Disclosure Document was prepared by Mr Foster or under his direction. It was his decision not to disclose in that document his involvement in the SensaSlim business. 676. I am satisfied that Mr Foster knew that: • the Disclosure Document stood as an invitation in trade or commerce to persons (prospective franchisees) to engage or participate in a business activity requiring the performance by them of work, or the investment of moneys and the performance of work by them associated with that investment; • the Disclosure Document represented that no person other than Mr Boyle and Mr O'Brien were involved as officers (or associates) of SensaSlim; • this was a representation with respect to a material aspect of SensaSlim's business activity, and • the failure to disclose Mr Foster as an officer of SensaSlim, particularly as a person who was making or participating in making decisions that affected the whole or a substantial part of the SensaSlim business, was, in the circumstances, a material matter. 677 I am therefore satisfied that Mr Foster was knowingly concerned in, and party to, each contravention found at [578]-[579] above. 49 In oral submissions on the present application, the applicant eschewed reliance on those findings to ground declaratory relief against Mr Foster: see T23. This would seem to have been the logical consequence of its submission that the case it put under para 111 of the statement of claim was not the one I considered, but a different case based on the active concealment by the personal respondents of Mr Foster's identity. However this approach is contrary to a declaration sought by the applicant (draft declaration 3). I shall return to discuss the declaratory relief sought by the applicant in that regard: see [70]-[71] below. 50 With respect to Mr O'Brien, the applicant alleged in para 145 of the statement of claim: 145. By reason of the matters referred to in paragraphs 28 and 78 to 80 above (including matters referred to in the paragraphs referred to therein), the conduct by O'Brien alleged at paragraphs 78 and 80 was misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive in contravention of s 52 of the TPA (in respect of conduct occurring prior to 1 January 2011) and s 18 of the ACL (in respect of conduct occurring on or after 1 January 2011). 51 At [727] of the principal reasons, I noted: 727. The applicant alleges, alternatively, that, in this regard, Mr O'Brien contravened s 52(1) of the Act and s 18(1) of the Australian Consumer Law as a principal: SOC para 145. The applicant did not actively pursue this aspect of its case in final submissions: Transcript 448-449. It was correct not to do so. In any event, in my view, Mr O'Brien's liability, in relation to this aspect of the case, arises as an accessory, not as a principal. 52 I did consider the question of Mr O'Brien's accessorial liability in relation to the contravention I found against SensaSlim arising under para 111 of the statement of claim, based on the case put to me at trial. 53 In this connection, the applicant pleaded in para 146 of the statement of claim: 146. Further and in the alternative, O'Brien was knowingly concerned in or a party to the contraventions of s 52 of the TPA and/or s 18 of the ACL by Sensaslim alleged at paragraph 111 (for the conduct alleged at paragraph 78 and 80) within the meaning of s 75B(1)(c) of the TPA, the definition of "involved" in s 2 of the ACL and s 232(1)(e) of the ACL. Particulars (i) The applicant relies on the matters pleaded at paragraphs 28 and 77 to 80 above (including matters referred to in the paragraphs referred to therein). (ii) O'Brien's knowledge can be inferred from the matters referred to at paragraphs 4, 77 and 78 above (including in the particulars to those paragraphs). 54 At [722]-[726] of the principal reasons, I found: 722. The applicant alleges that Mr O'Brien was knowingly concerned in or party to the contravention I have found at [579]: SOC para 146. 723. As stated, I am satisfied that Mr O'Brien signed the solvency statement. As the solvency statement is an integral part of the Disclosure Document, I am satisfied that Mr O'Brien also knew that the Disclosure Document disclosed his and Mr Boyle's involvement in the SensaSlim business, but not Mr Foster's involvement. 724. Further, I am satisfied that Mr O'Brien knew that: • SensaSlim would issue the Disclosure Document to prospective franchisees; • the function of the Disclosure Document was to provide information that a prospective franchisee would need in order to make an informed decision about whether to enter into a franchise agreement with SensaSlim, and • by signing the solvency statement in the Disclosure Document, he was participating in providing such information. 725. Further, I am satisfied that Mr O'Brien knew that: • the Disclosure Document stood as an invitation in trade or commerce to persons (prospective franchisees) to engage or participate in a business activity requiring the performance by them of work, or the investment of moneys and the performance of work by them associated with that investment; • the representation in the Disclosure Document that no person other than Mr Boyle and Mr O'Brien were involved as officers (or associates) of SensaSlim was a representation with respect to a material aspect of SensaSlim's business activity, and • the failure to disclose Mr Foster as an officer of SensaSlim, particularly as a person who was making or participating in making decisions that affected the whole or a substantial part of the SensaSlim business, was, in the circumstances, a material matter. 726. I am therefore satisfied that Mr O'Brien was knowingly concerned in and party to the contravention I have found at [579]. 55 Once again, in the present application, the applicant eschewed reliance on those findings to ground declaratory relief against Mr O'Brien: see paras 24-29 of the applicant's written submissions in relation to its 29 April 2014 letter and [40] above. 56 With respect to Mr Adams, the applicant alleged in para 151 of the statement of claim: 151. By reason of the matters referred to in paragraphs 28 and 78 to 80 above (including matters referred to in the paragraphs referred to therein), the conduct by Adams alleged at paragraph 78 and 80 was misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive in contravention of s 52 of the TPA (in respect of conduct occurring prior to 1 January 2011) and s 18 of the ACL (in respect of conduct occurring on or after 1 January 2011). 57 At [744]-[747] of the principal reasons, I found: 744. Separately, however, the applicant alleges that Mr Adams contravened s 52(1) of the Act and s 18(1) of the Australian Consumer Law as a principal by concealing from Area Managers Mr Foster's involvement in the SensaSlim business: SOC para 151. The statement of claim particularises Mr Adams' conduct to be his communications with Area Managers, potential Area Managers and third parties in which Mr Adams represented that the person with whom these Area Managers, potential Area Managers and third parties were communicating as "Peter O'Brien" was Mr O'Brien whereas, in fact, they were communicating with Mr Foster: SOC para 78. The applicant alleges, therefore, that, in this way, Mr Adams concealed Mr Foster's involvement. 745. In submissions, the applicant relied on Mr Adams' specific and direct denial of Mr Foster's involvement in the SensaSlim business in the email he sent to Mr and Mrs James on 4 February 2011. Plainly however, this is not a communication with respect to a misrepresentation as to the identity of Mr O'Brien. It was a denial of Mr Foster's involvement in the SensaSlim business in the context of an email that did not have any reference to Mr O'Brien. In its pleaded case, the applicant did not rely on this communication with Mr and Mrs James as constituting conduct alleged against Mr Adams. 746. The applicant also relied on Mr Adams answering a telephone call from Mr Bubb, who wished speak to Mr O'Brien. Mr Bubb's evidence was: I recall on one occasion, on a date … that I cannot recall, I telephoned Mr O'Brien and Mr Adams answered his phone. He said "Peter's on another call. I'll ask him to call you back". A short while later, Mr O'Brien rang me back. 747. I accept that, more likely than not, the person returning Mr Bubb's telephone call was Mr Foster. I also accept that, more likely than not, Mr Adams passed on Mr Bubb's call to Mr Foster, who then returned the call. However, I regard this event to be no more than an incident in the conduct by SensaSlim of its business and that Mr Adams was acting as the company. In this regard, I repeat the observations I have made at [678] above. It follows that Mr Adams' conduct, properly characterised, is conduct that is attributable to SensaSlim as a principal. I would accept that Mr Adams was knowingly concerned in and party to that conduct. However, that allegation does not appear to have been pleaded. Nor does it appear that the applicant has pleaded a discrete allegation of contravention by SensaSlim in this regard. Therefore, I am not satisfied that the contravention pleaded in paragraph 151 of the statement of claim has been established. 58 I did consider the question of Mr Adams' accessorial liability in relation to the contravention I found against SensaSlim arising under para 111 of the statement of claim, based on the case put to me at trial. 59 In this connection, the applicant pleaded in para 152 of the statement of claim: 152. Further and in the alternative, Adams was knowingly concerned in or a party to the contraventions of s 52 of the TPA and/or s 18 of the ACL by Sensaslim alleged at paragraph 111 (for the conduct alleged at paragraph 78 and 80), within the meaning of s 75B(1)(c) of the TPA, the definition of "involved" in s 2 of the ACL and s 232(1)(c) of the ACL. Particulars (i) The applicant relies on the matters pleaded at paragraphs 28 and 78 to 80 above (including matters referred to in the paragraphs referred to therein). (ii) Adams' knowledge can be inferred from the matters referred to at paragraphs 5, 77 and 78 above (including in the particulars to those paragraphs. 60 At [741]-[743] of the principal reasons, I found: 741. The applicant alleges that Mr Adams was knowingly concerned in or party to the contraventions I have found at [578]-[579]: SOC paras 150 and 152. 742. The applicant's case against SensaSlim in this regard is based on the publication and provision of the Disclosure Document to prospective franchisees. There is no evidence that Mr Adams was involved in the publication or provision of the Disclosure Document to prospective franchisees. Moreover, I am not satisfied that it has been shown that he knew its contents. In this connection, I am not persuaded that I should infer that he had knowledge of the contents of the Disclosure Document simply because he was, from about June 2010, involved in the day-to-day conduct of the SensaSlim business as "Operational Manager" or, later, as General Manager. It is possible that he did have such knowledge. It is equally possible that he did not. The evidence suggests that Mr Adams' involvement in the SensaSlim business did not extend to the selling of franchises but was largely in relation to dealing with Area Managers, after their appointment, and to other operational aspects of the business. 743. I am not satisfied, therefore, that the applicant has established that Mr Adams was knowingly concerned in or party to the contraventions I have found at [578]-[579]. 61 With respect to Mr Boyle, the applicant alleged in para 166 of the statement of claim: 166. By reason of the matters referred to in paragraphs 28 and 78 to 80 above (including matters referred to in the paragraphs referred to therein), the conduct by Boyle alleged at paragraph 78 was misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive in contravention of s 52 of the TPA (in respect of conduct occurring prior to 1 January 2011) and s 18 of the ACL (in respect of conduct occurring on or after 1 January 2011). 62 At [804]-[806] of the principal reasons, I found: 804. The applicant alleges that Mr Boyle contravened s 52(1) of the Act and s 18(1) of the Australian Consumer Law as a principal by representing in emails and telephone communications with Area Managers, potential Area Managers and third parties that the person they were communicating with as "Peter O'Brien" was Mr O'Brien whereas, in fact, those persons were communicating with Mr Foster: SOC para 166. The applicant alleges, therefore, that, by this means, Mr Boyle concealed Mr Foster's involvement. 805. In this connection, the applicant points to: • Mr Boyle's email communications with Mr McGettigan and Ms Briscoe, respectively, in which he referred to "Peter" so as to suggest to Mr McGettigan and to Ms Briscoe that, in relation to SensaSlim, he or she was dealing with Mr O'Brien when in fact he or she was dealing with Mr Foster; • the "Welcome letters" which referred to the addressee having impressed Peter O'Brien when in fact the person impressed was Mr Foster. In this connection, I have found that Mr Boyle signed the "Welcome letter" to Mr and Mrs Evans. 806 I am satisfied that, on these occasions, Mr Boyle knowingly represented Mr Foster as being Mr O'Brien, with a view to concealing Mr Foster's involvement in the SensaSlim business. However, in my view, Mr Boyle's conduct in that regard is properly attributable to SensaSlim. Here, Mr Boyle was acting for SensaSlim as its representative in relation to either its actual or future trading activities. His acts were SensaSlim's acts. Mr Boyle was not acting in a personal capacity independently of SensaSlim itself. I repeat the observations I have made at [678] above. In my view, this conduct (which took place before 1 January 2011) is properly attributable to SensaSlim and would have constituted a contravention by SensaSlim of s 52(1) of the Act, had it been pleaded. However, that allegation does not appear to have been pleaded. I should add that I am satisfied that Mr Boyle was knowingly concerned in and party to that conduct although, once again, that allegation also does not appear to have pleaded. Therefore, I am not satisfied that the contravention pleaded in paragraph 166 of the statement of claim has been established. 63 I did consider the question of Mr Boyle's accessorial liability in relation to the contravention I found against SensaSlim arising under para 111 of the statement of claim, based on the case put to me at trial. 64 In that connection, the applicant pleaded in para 167 of the statement of claim: 167. Further and in the alternative, Boyle was knowingly concerned in or a party to the contraventions of s 52 of the TPA and/or s 18 of the ACL by Sensaslim alleged at paragraph 111 (for the conduct alleged at paragraph 78 and 80), within the meaning of s 75B(1)(c) of the TPA, the definition of "involved" in s 2 of the ACL and s 232(1)(c) of the ACL. Particulars (i) The applicant relies on the matters pleaded at paragraphs 28 and 78 to 80 above (including matters referred to in the paragraphs referred to therein). (ii) Boyle's knowledge can be inferred from the matters referred to at paragraphs 6, 77 and 78 above (including in the particulars to those paragraphs). 65 At [807] of the principal reasons, I found: 807. The applicant also alleges that Mr Boyle was knowingly concerned in or party to SensaSlim's contravention I have found at [579]: SOC para 167. However, that finding is based on SensaSlim's publication and provision of the Disclosure Document. There is no evidence that Mr Boyle was involved in the publication or provision of the Disclosure Document to prospective franchisees or, indeed, that he knew its contents. I am not satisfied, therefore, that the applicant has established that Mr Boyle was knowingly concerned in or party to the contravention I have found at [579].

Consideration 66 As I pointed out at [544] of the principal reasons, a person cannot be liable as an accessory to another's contravention unless the other's contravention has first been established. In that connection, any liability on the part of an alleged accessory must be referrable to the principal contravention pleaded and found, not to some other acts or omissions that might be contraventions, had they been pleaded: R v Goldie; Ex parte Pecklum [1937] 59 CLR 254 at 259-260. The critical question is: what is the contravention that, relevantly, was found against SensaSlim? On the present application, this raises the question: what is the case that the applicant pleaded and brought at trial against SensaSlim in relation to its concealment of Mr Foster's involvement in the SensaSlim business? 67 The essence of the applicant's submissions in the present application is that its case under para 111 of the statement of claim was not one based on SensaSlim's concealment of Mr Foster's involvement through its non-disclosure of that involvement in the Disclosure Document when it was obliged to do so because of the requirements of the Franchising Code and because of Mr Foster's "notoriety". Rather, it says that its case, and only case, under para 111 of the statement of claim was that SensaSlim concealed Mr Foster's involvement through the acts of Messrs Foster, Adams and Boyle representing in emails and by telephone that Mr Foster was Mr O'Brien, and by Mr O'Brien permitting Mr Foster to make his (Mr Foster's) representations in that regard. 68 I do not accept that, at trial, the applicant advanced its case against SensaSlim in the latter way. I am in no doubt that the case it advanced against SensaSlim was that SensaSlim concealed Mr Foster's involvement by failing to disclose that involvement in the Disclosure Document, when it was required to do so by the Franchising Code and because of Mr Foster's "notoriety". At trial, the applicant said that it was this conduct that constituted contraventions of both s 59(2) and s 52(1) of the Act. 69 In this connection, I have set out my understanding of para 111 of the statement of claim, read in light of paras 28 and 78-80, insofar as those allegations concern SensaSlim's concealment (as opposed to the personal respondents' concealment) of Mr Foster's involvement, and understood in light of the case against SensaSlim advanced in submissions. I have set out in full the written submissions that the applicant advanced in support of its case under paras 110 and 111 of the statement of claim. I have summarised the oral submissions made on behalf of the applicant in that regard. I do not accept that the applicant relied on a substratum of fact for its case based on contravention of s 52(1) that was distinctly different from the substratum of fact on which it based its case of contravention under s 59(2). Each contravention was plainly put as one arising from SensaSlim's failure to make disclosure in the Disclosure Document of Mr Foster's involvement in the SensaSlim business. The applicant did not advance a case that the acts of the personal respondents particularised in para 78 of the statement of claim were to be taken as acts of SensaSlim, as opposed to those of each personal respondent as a principal. As I have noted, para 79 of the statement of claim, which is picked up in para 80, can only be referable to SensaSlim. 70 Indeed, the submission now made by the applicant that its case in relation to para 111 of the statement of claim was advanced only in relation to the conduct of the personal respondents and had nothing to do with SensaSlim's failure to make disclosure in the Disclosure Document, is not only inconsistent with the way in which it put its case at trial, but also inconsistent with para 79 of the statement of claim itself which, as particularised, directly addresses SensaSlim's disclosure obligations arising under the Franchising Code and allegedly arising from Mr Foster's notoriety. 71 Moreover, the construction which the applicant now seeks to place on the contravention alleged in para 111 of the statement of claim is inconsistent with a declaration it asks the Court to make (draft declaration 3), namely: …that Sensaslim, in trade or commerce in contravention of section 52 of the TPA and section 18 of the ACL, engaged in conduct that was misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead and deceive by failing to disclose to Area Managers, Foster's involvement of the conduct of the Sensaslim business in circumstances where Area Managers deciding whether to participate in the Sensaslim Franchise had a reasonable expectation that Foster's involvement would be disclosed. 72 In its written submissions in support of that declaration, the applicant specifically relied on para 79 of the statement of claim. It accepted - indeed, advanced the case - that para 79 is cross-referenced in para 111 of the statement of claim. I refer, in that regard, to the annotations provided by the applicant to the draft orders it proposed. In the course of oral submissions at the hearing of the present application, I pointed out to the applicant what I perceived to be the inconsistency of its position in seeking a declaration in those terms, based on para 79 of the statement of claim, while at the same time arguing that the contravention of s 52(1) it had advanced at trial under para 111 of the statement of claim was a different case based on the active concealment by the personal respondents (and hence by SensaSlim) of Mr Foster's involvement in the SensaSlim business (ie, a case that had nothing to do with para 79 of the statement of claim): T23-24. The matter was left on the basis that the applicant would consider its position in that regard. However, no submission in reply was made to address that apparent contradiction. 73 At the hearing of the present application, the applicant drew my attention to two matters in the submissions it advanced at trial. First, it pointed to the reference in sub-para 5d of its written submissions quoted at [22] above. In that sub-paragraph, the applicant referred to the fact that Mr Foster represented himself in emails and on the telephone as "Peter O'Brien". The applicant submitted that this indicates that the case it was advancing at trial was that SensaSlim concealed Mr Foster's involvement in the business by reason of Mr Foster misrepresenting himself as Mr O'Brien. I do not accept that submission. In that part of its written submissions at trial, the reference to Mr Foster's conduct is made in support of the factual proposition that Mr Foster controlled and directed the SensaSlim business. In turn, that proposition was made to advance the proposition (stated in para 4 of the submissions quoted at [22] above) that Sensaslim was required under the Franchising Code "to provide certain disclosure in relation to its associates and officers" (i.e., in the Disclosure Document). Thus, sub-para 5d of the written submissions provides no substantive support for the case which the applicant now seeks to make. The reference to Mr Foster's conduct was directed to another matter - the need for Mr Foster's involvement to be disclosed in the Disclosure Document. 74 Secondly, the applicant pointed to the statement in para 9 of the submissions quoted at [22] above in which it stated: People such as Mr James would not have become involved if they knew Foster was involved. 75 The applicant submitted that this statement was a direct reference to an email communication between Mr Adams and Mr James. It then suggested that, in this part of the submissions, it was enlivening the particulars given in para 78 of the statement of claim with respect to Mr Adams. 76 I do not accept that submission. There are a number of reasons why the submission cannot be correct. The reference in the quoted submissions to "people such as Mr James", is one made in relation to the general proposition that Area Managers deciding whether to purchase a SensaSlim area had a reasonable expectation that Mr Foster's involvement would be disclosed. This is another allusion to para 79 of the statement of claim. The applicant's written submissions at trial continued: The Franchising Code specifically required it as did Foster's notoriety, especially in relation to weight loss products. In failing to disclose Foster's involvement SensaSlim contravened section 52 of the TPA. 77 Further, a footnote to "people such as Mr James" makes perfectly clear that the applicant was referring to the following evidence given by Mr James at [48] of his affidavit, which was that, had he known that Mr Foster was involved in the SensaSlim business, he (Mr James) would never have become involved in the business because of Mr Foster's reputation: Prior to my involvement with Sensaslim, I was aware of Peter Foster and knew that he had a reputation as a con-man. I knew that he was involved some sort of scandal involving Cherie Blair. Had I known of Mr Foster's involvement in Sensaslim, there is absolutely no way I would have become involved with Sensaslim. I would not have given the business 2 cents. 78 As given, this evidence was not related to any email communication between Mr Adams and Mr James. The email communication referred to by the applicant was well after Mr James became involved in the SensaSlim business as an Area Manager. 79 As I have already remarked, contrary to the submissions the applicant now makes, at trial the applicant specifically confined its case against SensaSlim under para 111 of the statement of claim to a contravention of s 52(1) of the Act. It abandoned any reliance on s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law. At [574] of the principal reasons, I specifically noted that the case had been so confined in the course of submissions. By confining its case in this way, the applicant placed a temporal limitation on the conduct that it advanced as constituting a contravention under para 111 of the statement of claim. The conduct which it now seeks to argue was captured by para 111 of the statement of claim (namely, the active concealment by the personal respondents of Mr Foster's involvement, as particularised in para 78 of the statement of claim), extends beyond that temporal limitation. On the other hand, as I remarked in [574] of the principal reasons, the reliance only on s 52(1) of the Act can be understood on the basis that there was no evidence to suggest that the Disclosure Document was issued at a time that would have attracted the operation of s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law. 80 In the present application, the applicant points to those paragraphs of the statement of claim where it alleged that each personal respondent was knowingly concerned in, or party to, the contravention pleaded in para 111 of the statement of claim: see SOC paras 127, 146, 152 and 167. It seeks to draw support from those paragraphs to suggest that the case pleaded in para 111 of the statement of claim concerned subject matter different to that which I have found. 81 I do not think that the pleading of those particular paragraphs provides the support for which the applicant contends. It may be accepted that those paragraphs refer to paras 78 and 80 of the statement of claim. They also refer to "the matters pleaded at paragraphs 28 and 78 to 80" of the statement of claim. But, as I have sought to explain at [15]-[20] above, while paras 78 and 80 refer compendiously to the respondents, it is necessary to tease out of them the specific conduct allocated to SensaSlim, and the specific conduct allocated to the personal respondents, as principals. 82 At the end of the day, the applicant's reliance on the paragraphs of the statement of claim pleaded against the personal respondents in respect of their alleged accessorial liability simply begs the question of what was pleaded against SensaSlim in para 111. Further, and critically, nothing pleaded with respect to each personal respondent in those paragraphs can alter the way in which, relevantly, the applicant put its case under para 111 against SensaSlim at trial. In light of the case that the applicant put against SensaSlim under para 111, I found that SensaSlim had contravened s 52(1) of the Act. 83 Whilst the pleading can be read with an eye to the applicant's present construction of para 111, that construction was not put to me at trial. The applicant's submissions at trial (see [21]-[30] above) both advanced and confirmed the construction upon which I proceeded in the principal reasons, as explained in [521] and [546] thereof: see [32] and [33] above. 84 For these reasons, I am not persuaded that, in relation to para 111 of the statement of claim, the applicant advanced a case against SensaSlim at trial that has not been addressed and determined in the principal reasons. I have considered the accessorial liability of the personal respondents by reference to the contravention I have found against SensaSlim arising under that paragraph. If I am in error in the contravention I have found, or in dealing with the accessorial liability of the personal respondents on that basis, then the applicant's recourse is to seek appellate correction. 85 I should add for completeness that no application has been made by the applicant to re-open its case.

The form of the declarations to be made 86 The applicant provided a draft of 32 declarations which it said should be made. The draft included proposed declarations against SensaSlim (draft declaration 2), Mr Foster (draft declaration 16), Mr O'Brien (draft declaration 26), Mr Adams (draft declaration 29) and Mr Boyle (draft declaration 30) which were specifically proposed by the applicant in relation to the case which the applicant says I should have considered, but did not consider, against SensaSlim under para 111 of the statement of claim for contravention of s 52(1) of the Act. For the reasons I have given above, I am not satisfied that the case now advanced by the applicant was the case that it pleaded and advanced at trial against SensaSlim in that regard. For that reason, I am not prepared to make those particular declarations. 87 I have considered and determined in favour of the applicant the case pleaded under para 111 of the statement of claim that was advanced by the applicant against SensaSlim at trial. However, the applicant does not wish to pursue declaratory relief - and, I assume, any other relief - in respect of the contravention of s 52(1) of the Act that I have found in that regard: T22-23. Relatedly, at [677] of the principal reasons, I found that Mr Foster was knowingly concerned in, and party to, SensaSlim's contravention of s 52(1) of the Act which I had found at [579] of the principal reasons. I made a similar finding against Mr O'Brien at [722]-[726] of the principal reasons. The applicant does not wish to pursue declaratory relief in relation to that conduct as well. 88 Draft declaration 3 sought by the applicant sits in a curious position. That draft declaration does reflect the contravention of s 52(1) of the Act I have found against SensaSlim in respect of the non-disclosure of Mr Foster's involvement in SensaSlim. However, the applicant has made clear that it does not wish to pursue declaratory relief based on the contravention of s 52(1) I have found, because to do so would be inconsistent with the position it has advanced at the present hearing: T22-23. 89 Apart from these matters, I have a number of concerns about the form of the declarations sought by the applicant. I drew attention to some of these concerns in the course of the hearing of the present application: see T19-30. I do not propose to detail or discuss these concerns in these reasons. They are numerous and little point would be served in doing so. In general, they relate to the proper identification of the contravening conduct I have found. 90 Mr Boyle also provided a draft of the declarations which, he submitted, were in appropriate form, if declarations were to be made against him. I am not satisfied that those draft declarations adequately capture the conduct for which I have found Mr Boyle to be liable. 91 Nevertheless, in formulating the declarations which I think should be made, I have been assisted by the applicant's draft orders and Mr Boyle's draft orders.

Conclusion and disposition 92 I am satisfied that it is appropriate make declarations with respect to SensaSlim's contraventions and in respect of the personal respondents' involvement in those contraventions. The power of the Court to make binding declarations of right is expressed in s 21 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). There is no doubt that the Court has power to make declarations in relation to conduct that contravenes a statutory provision. 93 A significant discretionary consideration in relation to the granting of a declaration is whether it will have utility. I am satisfied that the granting of declarations in the present case will have utility. A number of contraventions of the Act and the Australian Consumer Law were alleged. Not all were established. Different forms of conduct were involved. It is desirable that the specific liabilities found, in terms of primary liability and accessorial liability, should be identified. It is convenient to do so in light of the fact that the applicant also seeks penalties and other relief with respect to those liabilities: Rural Press Limited v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2003) 216 CLR 53 at [95]. 94 Further, this proceeding has a special character because it involves the protection of the public. It is in the public interest that the Court indicate the result of the applicant's case by making an order binding on the parties thereto: Tobacco Institute of Australia Limited v Australian Federation of Consumer Organisations Inc (No 2) (1993) 41 FCR 89 at 100, 106 and 107; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Dataline.net.au Pty Ltd (2005) 236 ALR 665 at [58]-[59]; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v P & N Pty Ltd (2014) ATPR ¶42-460 at 17. This is especially so where, as here, the proceeding is complex and the reasons for judgments are, necessarily, lengthy. Further, the granting of declarations will mark the Court's disapproval of the conduct involved: Tobacco Institute at 100; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Chaste Corporation Pty Ltd (in liquidation) [2005] FCA 1212 at [150]. I certify that the preceding ninety-four (94) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Yates.