Pecuniary penalty
5 Section 224(1) of the ACL empowers the Court to impose a pecuniary penalty for a contravention of s 29 of the ACL. The maximum penalty at the time of the contraventions was $1.1 million per contravention: s 224(3) of the ACL. The ACL does not empower the Court to impose a pecuniary penalty for a contravention of s 18 of the ACL. Section 224(2) provides that, in determining the appropriate pecuniary penalty, the Court must have regard to all relevant matters, including:
(a) the nature and extent of the act or omission and of any loss or damage suffered as a result of the act or omission;
(b) the circumstances in which the act or omission took place; and
(c) whether the person has previously been found by a court in proceedings under ch 4 or pt 5-2 of the ACL to have engaged in any similar conduct.
6 Other matters that will usually be relevant include:
(a) the size of the contravening company;
(b) the deliberateness of the contravention and the period over which it extended;
(c) whether the contravention arose out of the conduct of senior management of the contravener or at some lower level;
(d) whether the contravener has a corporate culture conducive to compliance with the ACL as evidenced by educational programs and disciplinary or other corrective measures in response to an acknowledged contravention;
(e) whether the contravener has shown a disposition to cooperate with the authorities responsible for the enforcement of the ACL in relation to the contravention;
(f) whether the contravener has engaged in similar conduct in the past;
(g) the financial position of the contravener; and
(h) whether the contravening conduct was systematic, deliberate or covert:
Trade Practices Commission v CSR Limited [1990] FCA 521; (1991) ATPR 41-076 at 52,152-3; NW Frozen Foods Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [1996] FCA 1134; 71 FCR 285 at 292 per Burchett and Kiefel JJ (Carr J agreeing at 299); Singtel Optus v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (No 4) [2011] FCA 761; 282 ALR 246 at 251 [11].
7 The process of fixing the amount is not an exact science and, in each case, is undertaken instinctively, not mathematically, by synthesising all relevant factors into an overall figure: Singtel Optus Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2012] FCAFC 20; 287 ALR 249 (Singtel FCAFC) at 263 [54], citing Middleton J in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2010] FCA 790; 188 FCR 238 at 282 [250]-[251].
8 The primary purpose of the imposition of a pecuniary penalty is to act as a specific deterrent to the contravener and as a general deterrent to others who might be tempted to contravene the law: Commonwealth v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate [2015] HCA 46; 258 CLR 482 (FWBII) at 506 [55] per French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Nettle and Gordon JJ (Gageler J agreeing at 511 [68], Keane J agreeing at 513 [79]); ABCC at 88 [98]; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v TPG Internet Pty Ltd [2013] HCA 54; 250 CLR 640 (TPG Internet HCA) at 659 [65] per French CJ, Crennan, Bell and Keane JJ. The specific and general deterrent effect of pecuniary penalties is achieved by putting a price on a contravention that is "sufficiently high" to deter repetition by both the contravener and would-be contraveners: FWBII at 506 [55] per French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Nettle and Gordon JJ (Gageler J agreeing at 511 [68], Keane J agreeing at 513 [79]). In Singtel FCAFC, in a passage at 265 [62]-[63] approved by the High Court in TPG Internet HCA at 658-9 [64] and [66], the Full Court explained the need to ensure that the penalty in such cases "is not such as to be regarded by that offender or others as an acceptable cost of doing business" and will deter those engaged in trade and commerce "from the cynical calculation involved in weighing up the risk of penalty against the profits to be made from contravention". In Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Reckitt Benckiser (Australia) Pty Ltd [2016] FCAFC 181; 340 ALR 25 (Reckitt Benckiser), the Full Court also emphasised the primacy of deterrence where there is a potential distortion of competition in the market on the part of the contravener, who gains an unfair advantage over competitors who complied with the law. As the Full Court stated at 54 [151], "the greater the risk of consumers being misled and the greater the prospect of gain to the contravener, the greater the sanction required, so as to make the risk/benefit equation less palatable to a potential wrongdoer and the deterrence sufficiently effective in achieving voluntary compliance".
9 Where there are a number of contraventions that are considered to form part of a single course of conduct, then an overall penalty may be assessed on that basis: Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Cahill [2010] FCAFC 39; 269 ALR 1 at 12 [39]. The ACCC submitted that there are three courses of conduct: the "website conduct", comprising the Representations made to consumers on the Kogan website, which had 631,743 unique visitors during the Tax Time Promotion; the "eDM conduct", comprising the Representations made in 25,696,963 eDM messages (being 12 separate eDM messages or between two and four eDM messages per day) sent to approximately 10,136,450 subscribing consumers, of whom 3,367,910 consumers opened the email eDM messages; and the "SMS conduct", comprising representations sent by SMS messages to 930,142 subscribing consumers. The ACCC submitted that grouping Kogan's conduct in this way took into account the factual interrelationship in the Representations made to each consumer and the overlap between the Representations, while recognising the deployment of different media with different characteristics. I do not accept that contention. Albeit that the Representations were deployed through three different media, the contravening conduct was not qualitatively different in nature nor legally and factually distinct and should be viewed as a single course of conduct.
10 The ACCC argued that a number of factors pointed to the need for a penalty that is sufficient to deter Kogan from engaging in similar conduct in the future. In particular, it was argued:
(a) the contravening conduct was serious and extensive and caused financial and non-financial harm to consumers and competitors;
(b) Kogan's conduct is recent and the conditions in which the relevant conduct occurred continue to exist; in those circumstances, there remains the potential for consumer harms from conduct of a similar kind;
(c) the decisions leading to Kogan's conduct were made intentionally by senior management and with the knowledge that the Tax Time Promotion may be understood in the way described by the Representations;
(d) Kogan is a significant entity that is experiencing considerable growth from its online retail business and makes substantial profits; in those circumstances, a penalty commensurate with the modest profit Kogan claims it earned from the entire promotion would clearly be inadequate to secure deterrence and could be seen to be simply a cost of doing business such that the risk of engaging in the wrongdoing was a business risk worth taking;
(e) despite the ACCC previously bringing concerns of a similar nature to Kogan's attention, it either ignored those concerns or its compliance measures and culture were insufficient to prevent the contravening conduct in this case; and
(f) Kogan has expressed no contrition for its conduct and, to the contrary, has exhibited at best a failure to engage with, and at worst a blatant disregard for, the circumstances that led to the contravening conduct in this case.
11 The ACCC further argued that a number of matters point to the need for a penalty which will strongly deter other businesses which may be minded to contravene in a similar way. It was submitted:
(a) first, the online retail industry in which Kogan operates is very large with many major competitors; it involves the supply of consumer goods that are required by most Australians and involves significant consumer expenditure. It can readily be inferred that consumers have increasingly relied on online retail in the COVID-19 environment. Coupon code promotions are commonly used by other major retailers, including eBay, Amazon and Alibaba. As such, the potential for misrepresentations to cause widespread harm to consumers in that industry, and the potential gains to be made from them by such businesses, are both significant and real;
(b) secondly, if misrepresentations in the online retail industry are not seen to attract sufficient penalties, consumer confidence in the industry will be undermined. This will in turn undermine market efficiency, which depends upon consumer confidence in being given reliable, truthful and accurate information. It may also harm compliant businesses, which may wrongly be assumed by consumers to operate in a like manner. That is particularly so in circumstances where, absent ongoing price monitoring by consumers and/or the ACCC, pricing misrepresentations of the nature in this case are difficult to detect;
(c) thirdly, the Court must leave no room for the impression that it is worth online retail businesses courting the risk of contravention (because it may not be detected or because the penalties could be treated as a mere cost of doing business or are less than the cost and effort of developing a strong compliance program and culture). This requires a penalty of a sufficient size to send a strong deterrent message which will prevent any cynical profit/risk calculus. A sufficient penalty sends the required warning to other online retail businesses that they cannot, by non-compliance, gain a competitive advantage over those who do comply and invest in developing a strong compliance program and culture.
12 As these reasons develop, I do not accept all the claims made by the ACCC supporting its case for a penalty of $2 million to achieve the primary purpose of specific and general deterrence.