Pecuniary penalties
12 The maximum penalty for each contravention of ss 21 and 50 of the Australian Consumer Law is $1.1 million for a body corporate and $220,000 for a natural person: s 224(3) of the Australian Consumer Law.
13 The ACCC seeks the imposition of the following pecuniary penalties:
(a) in relation to each of the second, fifth and sixth respondents: $500,000 (ie, a total of $1.5 million);
(b) in relation to each of the seventh to eleventh respondents: $100,000 (ie, a total of $500,000); and
(c) in relation to Mr Harrison: $400,000.
14 Thus, in relation to the corporate respondents, the ACCC seeks penalties totalling $2,000,000.
15 On the other hand, the Harrison parties submit as follows:
(a) in relation to the corporate respondents, an appropriate range for total penalties is $150,000 to $200,000; and
(b) in relation to Mr Harrison, it is open to the Court not to impose any penalty. If the Court determines to impose a penalty, an appropriate penalty range would be $25,000 to $35,000, together with an extended period of 12 months to pay.
16 Under s 224(2), there are certain matters to which regard is to be had in determining the appropriate penalty. The principles relating to determination of civil penalties are well established: see, in particular, Trade Practices Commission v CSR Ltd [1991] ATPR 41-076 at 52,152 to 52,153 per French J; NW Frozen Foods Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (1996) 71 FCR 285 at 292 per Burchett and Kiefel JJ; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Singtel Optus Pty Ltd (No 4) (2011) 282 ALR 246 at [11] per Perram J; Singtel Optus Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2012) 287 ALR 249 at [61]-[63] per Keane CJ, Finn and Gilmour JJ; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v TPG Internet Pty Ltd (2013) 250 CLR 640 at [65]-[66] per French CJ, Crennan, Bell and Keane JJ. The process to be applied in arriving at a particular penalty figure was considered in the context of criminal sentencing in Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357. The same process is also applicable to the assessment of pecuniary penalties in the present context: see Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Excite Mobile Pty Ltd (No 2) [2013] FCA 1267 (Excite Mobile) at [13] per Mansfield J. Submissions by the regulator as to quantum can be received by the Court: Commonwealth v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate (2015) 326 ALR 476 at [1], [60], [61] and [64] per French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Nettle and Gordon JJ, at [68] per Gageler J, at [79] per Keane J.
17 Having regard to the matters specified in s 224(2) and applying the principles set out in the cases referred to above, the following matters are noted in relation to the contraventions by the second, fifth, sixth, eighth, ninth, tenth and eleventh respondents:
(a) The size of each of the contravening companies is small (see Ex A35 at [10]-[20]). The profitability of the companies was modest. The revenue of the business conducted, at various times, by one or more of the companies was between about $80,000 and $100,000 per month (that is, between about $1 million and $1.2 million per year). The profit of the business was, at most, around 10% of revenue, being about $8,000 to $10,000 per month, or about $100,000 to $120,000 per year. The Harrison parties contend that the profitability of the companies was effectively halved due to the conduct of wholesalers, but I do not think that it is necessary to come to a concluded view on this submission. If size is considered by reference to the number of customers, the companies had a relatively small number of customers. For example, at the time of the second transfer there were about 1,900 customers.
(b) The contravening conduct was serious, deliberate and extended over a period of about two to three years. The circumstances in which the relevant acts and omissions took place are described in the Reasons: see, in particular, the Reasons at [125]-[127].
(c) The contraventions arose out of the conduct of senior management. Mr Harrison, the sole director of the companies, was 'hands on' in managing their day-to-day operations and was intimately involved in their conduct.
(d) The contravening conduct was not ad hoc, but systemic and planned. The pattern of conduct, involving unauthorised transfers and unjustified threats or demands, was repeated several times. This demonstrates an absence of a corporate culture of regulatory compliance.
(e) The contravening companies have not shown a disposition to co-operate with the authorities responsible for the enforcement of the Australian Consumer Law in relation to the contravention. Although it appears that the parties reached an 'in principle' settlement of the proceeding before trial, this was not finalised and hence the matter went to trial. That said, I do not accept the ACCC's submission that the respondents "prolonged the trial" by, among other things, "taking many procedural points (eg objections to evidence)". To the contrary, I consider that the respondents conducted the trial in a helpful and efficient manner.
(f) There is no evidence to suggest that any of the contravening companies has previously been found by a court in proceedings under the Australian Consumer Law to have engaged in similar conduct.
18 One of the matters specified in s 224(2) of the Australian Consumer Law is "the nature and extent of the act or omission and of any loss or damage suffered as a result of the act or omission". It is important, here, to focus on the conduct found to have contravened the Australian Consumer Law. The system of conduct found to have contravened the Act is set out at [125] of the Reasons. The key elements of the system or pattern were: the transfer of consumer contracts from one Harrison Company to another without the customer's consent; the failure to notify the customer of the transfer; save in relation to the second transfer, the adoption of the same trading name before and after the transfer; at least in the case of the third and fourth transfers, the sending of invoice documentation in substantially the same form before and after the transfer; and the 'transferee' company demanding payment of an early termination fee (or threatening to impose such a fee) if the customer wished to end a contract early. It is not clear how many customers were affected by the system of conduct or pattern of behaviour. On the basis of information in the eCollect database, it appears that eCollect pursued at least 100 customers who had been subjected to transfers for amounts totalling more than $100,000. It may be inferred (based on the number of customers and the amount involved) that many of these customers were the subject of the contravening system of conduct or pattern of behaviour. Further, there are likely to have been other customers affected by the system or pattern (for example, where one of the contravening companies itself demanded payment from the customer).
19 Both the ACCC and the Harrison parties made submissions regarding the 'course of conduct' principle, which may be of assistance in determining the appropriate penalty: see Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Hillside (Australia New Media) Pty Ltd trading as Bet365 (No 2) [2016] FCA 698 at [24]-[25] per Beach J; approved in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Reckitt Benckiser (Australia) Pty Ltd [2016] FCAFC 181 at [141] per Jagot, Yates and Bromwich JJ.
20 In the present case, where the allegation was that each company engaged in a system of conduct or pattern of behaviour, it is appropriate to view the conduct of each company as a single course of conduct. I would apply this approach, not only to the fifth, sixth, eighth, ninth, tenth and eleventh respondents, but also to the second respondent. Although the second respondent engaged in the conduct in relation to all four transfers (not just one transfer), the system or pattern was the same, making it appropriate to treat its conduct as a single course of conduct. Similarly, I would treat Mr Harrison as having been knowingly concerned in a single course of conduct.
21 Although some of the companies contravened s 50 as well as s 21 of the Australian Consumer Law, given the considerable overlap in the acts or omissions constituting the contravening conduct, it is not necessary to consider this conduct separately for the purposes of imposing penalties on the relevant companies. This is consistent with the approach taken both by the ACCC and the Harrison parties in their submissions.
22 Taking into account the matters discussed in [17]-[21] above and having regard to the need for general and specific deterrence, I consider the appropriate penalties in relation to the second, fifth, sixth, eighth, ninth, tenth and eleventh respondents to be as follows:
(a) in relation to the second respondent: $50,000;
(b) in relation to the fifth respondent: $50,000;
(c) in relation to the sixth respondent: $50,000; and
(d) in relation to each of the eighth, ninth, tenth and eleventh respondents: $12,500 (making a total of $50,000).
23 The rationale for imposing a lower penalty on each of the eighth, ninth, tenth and eleventh respondents is that, under the fourth transfer, the business was in effect transferred to these four companies rather than (as with the earlier transfers) transferred to a single company. Accordingly, the size of the business and the extent of the contraventions is only (approximately) one quarter of the size and scope. This is consistent with the approach of the parties in their submissions.
24 I note that the total of the above penalties is $200,000. This represents considerably more than one year's profit of the business that was, at various times, owned or operated by the respondents.
25 The penalties sought by the ACCC seem to me to be disproportionate to the size of the companies and the nature and extent of the loss caused by the contravening conduct. In this regard, it may be that the penalties sought by the ACCC were formulated by reference to the total number of customers whose contracts were transferred from one respondent to another without their consent (Transferred Customers), and the amounts paid by those customers after the transfers. The conduct found to have contravened the Australian Consumer Law was, however, more specific than that. It did not affect all Transferred Customers, only those where the 'transferee' company demanded payment of an early termination fee (or threatened to impose such a fee) if the customer wished to end a contract early.
26 I am mindful that, in fixing an appropriate penalty, the size of the companies is only one factor to which regard is to be had. Another important consideration is the need for general deterrence: see Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Leahy Petroleum Pty Ltd (No 2) (2005) 215 ALR 281 at [9] per Merkel J; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v High Adventure Pty Ltd [2006] ATPR 42-091 at 44,564 per Heerey, Finkelstein and Allsop JJ; Director of Consumer Affairs Victoria v Hocking Stuart (Richmond) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2016] FCA 1435 at [14]-[20] per Middleton J. I am comfortable, however, that total penalties of $200,000 are substantial penalties that will have a general deterrent effect.
27 Finally, having regard to the 'totality principle', I consider the total penalty that I propose to impose on each company to be appropriate as a total amount.
28 In relation to Mr Harrison, many of the matters set out above are also relevant. In addition, the following matters are noted:
(a) The evidence indicates that he has only limited assets (see Ex A35 at [25]-[28]).
(b) There is no evidence that he has previously been found by a court in proceedings under the Australian Consumer Law to have engaged in any similar conduct.
(c) I found that he had knowledge of each of the matters that made the conduct unconscionable: see Reasons at [136]-[137].
29 Taking these matters into account, and having regard to the need for general and specific deterrence, I consider an appropriate penalty to be $50,000. This is slightly more than proposed by Mr Harrison and significantly less than that proposed by the ACCC. I do not think an amount of $35,000 is sufficient for the purposes of general and specific deterrence, given the seriousness of the conduct and given Mr Harrison's role in relation to that conduct. On the other hand, a penalty of $400,000 would be 'crushing' for Mr Harrison given his limited means. In deciding that a penalty of $50,000 is appropriate, I have taken into account the impact of the other orders to be made, including the injunctions (dealt with above) and the disqualification order (dealt with below).
30 As noted above, Mr Harrison has sought a period of 12 months to pay any penalty imposed on him. Rather than deal with this submission on the basis of the limited material before the Court, I propose to order that the penalty be paid with 30 days, or such other period as the Court may determine, and to provide that Mr Harrison can apply within a limited period of time to have the time period for payment extended. Such an application would need to be supported by proper material.