REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
1 On 14 August 2009, I made a number of declarations and granted orders in the nature of injunctions in respect of conduct in contravention of the Spam Act 2003 (Cth) (Spam Act) by:
· Mobilegate Ltd - the First Respondent (Mobilegate);
· Winning Bid Pty Ltd - the Second Respondent (Winning Bid);
· Mr Simon Anthony Owen - the Fourth Respondent (Mr Owen);
· Mr Tarek Andreas Salcedo - the Fifth Respondent (Mr Salcedo); and
· Glenn Christopher Maughan - the seventh respondent (Mr Maughan).
At the same time I gave directions in respect of the filing and service of material relating to civil penalties in respect of those contraventions. I appointed today as the date for hearing in respect of penalty matters.
2 These reasons for judgment should be read in conjunction with those which I delivered on 14 August 2009: see Australian Communications and Media Authority v Mobilegate Ltd A Company Incorporated in Hong Kong (No2) [2009] FCA 887.
3 Pursuant to the directions given on 14 August 2009, the Australian Communications and Media Authority (the Authority), as Applicant, served upon the Respondents, which and whom I have mentioned, written submissions together with affidavits to be relied upon in respect of penalty or otherwise identified affidavits in respect of which reliance was to be placed. For their part none of the named Respondents has chosen to appear today. That, of course, is their perfect right.
4 One of them, Mr Salcedo, did, though, choose to correspond with the Registry of the Court. He did this by a letter dated 28 September 2009 received by the Registry that day. That letter now forms part of exhibit 2. A subsequent exchange of correspondence occurred as between the Registry and Mr Salcedo on the subject of whether it was his intention that the letter stand as his submissions in relation to the penalty hearing.
5 In the letter, which I record expressly I have taken into account, Mr Salcedo makes a number of assertions in relation to his involvement with corporate contraventions. Those assertions, at least on one view, are not consistent with the judgment entered against him by default. He has not applied to set aside the default judgment. It would be subversive of the process of justice to afford such assertions weight.
6 I should also record that another of the Respondents of interest today, Mr Owen, filed with the Court an affidavit pursuant to orders ancillary to injunctive orders of a Mareva nature which it became necessary to make as a sequel to the default judgment entered on 14 August 2009. Mr Owen has not sought to rely upon that affidavit in relation to penalty. While, properly, the Authority has noted the existence of that affidavit, its position is that it does not accept the evidence given in that affidavit in relation to Mr Owen's financial position. Rather, were the affidavit to be relied upon by Mr Owen in relation to any question touching upon penalty, the Authority would seek to cross-examine Mr Owen in respect of that to which he deposes in that affidavit. Mr Owen has not sought to rely upon the affidavit in relation to penalty. In that circumstance I pay no regard to the affidavit.
7 What remains for determination in respect of Mobilegate, Winning Bid, Mr Owen, Mr Salcedo and Mr Maughan is the question of the amount, if any, that ought to be imposed by way of penalty in respect of the contraventions which are the subject of judgment in default.
8 There can be no question that the contraventions require the imposition of a penalty and a very substantial penalty indeed. The conduct concerned constitutes a series of contraventions of s 16 of the Spam Act. That section materially prohibits the sending, or causing to be sent, of commercial electronic messages that have an Australian link and that are, in effect, unsolicited.
9 Provision is made by s 24 of the Spam Act for the imposition of pecuniary penalties by way of civil penalty if this Court is satisfied that a person, ie, a body corporate or an individual, has contravened a provision such as s 16. If so satisfied, the Court may order the person to pay to the Commonwealth such pecuniary penalty in respect of each contravention as the Court determines to be appropriate. Read in isolation, that provision might be thought to provide for unlimited penalisation of contraventions. However, provision is made by s 25, for what are to be the maximum penalties for contraventions of civil penalty provisions such as s 16.
10 Section 24(2) of the Spam Act sets out, in a non-exhaustive way, a number of matters to which the Court should have regard in determining the pecuniary penalty to fix. I shall return in some detail to the considerations specified in s 24(2), insofar as they relate to the circumstances of this case, in a moment. For the present, it might be observed that the considerations specified in s 24(2), save for that in para (e), bear a strong resemblance to those found in s 76 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (Trade Practices Act). Section 24(2)(e) provides that if the Court considers that it is appropriate to do so, whether the person has previously been found by a court in a foreign country to have engaged in any similar conduct, is a relevant consideration. That sub-section articulates overtly a consideration which would, in any event, be relevant. It is further a consideration which, though not expressly articulated in s 76 of the Trade Practices Act, would be relevant to a penalty proceeding under that Act in particular circumstances.
11 As it happens, a court in a foreign country has not found the Respondents concerned to have engaged in any similar conduct. There was, at one stage though, a disposition on the part of the Authority to rely upon findings and penalties in respect of conduct in the United Kingdom by one of the Respondents of concern today. In the end though, that particular disposition did not manifest itself in evidence before me in relation to proceedings abroad, nor had evidence in relation to such proceedings proposed to be relied upon been served upon the Respondent concerned, as the interlocutory directions in respect of the penalty proceeding would have required. At best, it would seem that the conduct concerned was what one might term parallel in time to that the subject of Australian regulatory interest. Had there been evidence of prior findings in respect of prior conduct, ie, conduct prior to the alleged contraventions, those findings would have had a particular relevance in terms of assessing the gravity of the later Australian-related conduct.
12 As things stand, and in the absence of evidence, I expressly do not take into account any matter touching upon any alleged conduct in the United Kingdom. Rather, I approach the matter on the basis that none of the Respondents have been the subject of adverse findings abroad.
13 The Authority put forward that the conduct concerned in itself, insofar as it related to Australia, was of such gravity that, in a relative sense, parallel, as compared with prior, conduct abroad would not materially affect any question as to penalty. It expressly sought the deletion of reference in its written submissions to such conduct.
14 It is not impossible to conceive how parallel conduct might yield a view as to whether one should regard Australian-related conduct as but an isolated geographic aberration. It might also yield a view as to the overall worth of a Respondent. Nonetheless, it is in this case only the Australian-related conduct that I take into account, and I do so, in the end, at the invitation of the Authority.
15 The Authority's stance, in my respectful opinion, reflected a very proper approach for an agency of the Commonwealth to take in circumstances where a particular Respondent had not appeared before the Court.
16 In summary, the contraventions of s 16 which are established are contraventions which involve the sending of unsolicited short message service - SMS messages - to the mobile telephones of users who have been deceived, inveigled even, into providing their mobile telephone numbers to representatives of either Mobilegate or, as the case may be, Winning Bid, under the belief that they were corresponding with individuals seeking to meet them and to form relationships via dating websites.
17 In fact, these users of the mobile telephones were the prey of Mobilegate or, as the case may be, Winning Bid. Those users were targeted via fabricated dating website profiles. That targeting was at the heart of a scheme, the design of which was to cause those mobile telephone users to exchange SMS messages using premium telephone numbers operated on behalf of either Mobilegate or Winning Bid. The users were charged amounts of up to $5 per message. There is some evidence before me as to amounts derived by Mobilegate and Winning Bid through this particular scheme. I shall detail that shortly.
18 In an interlocutory judgment which I delivered on 22 May 2009, I observed that:
The use of trickery to prey for reward upon the lusts or emotional vulnerabilities of others is hardly a vice confined to modern times. What modern times do offer, for those disposed to such a vice, are new means of prey, the internet, and the mobile telephone.
The corporate Respondents, Mobilegate and Winning Bid, and those of the individual Respondents with which I am concerned today, Messrs Owen, Salcedo and Maughan, might aptly be described as predators on the emotionally vulnerable for reward. That is a particularly vile form of behaviour.
19 The Spam Act provides for the imposition of penalties which, in the application of that Act to the circumstances of this particular case, are substantial indeed as to their maximum. It is necessary to relate in a little detail how that transpires, having regard to s 25. For a corporate entity which has not been found previously to have contravened the Spam Act the maximum penalty as provided for by s 25(3) is 100 penalty units per single contravention, or if the Court finds that the body corporate has on a particular day committed two or more contraventions, 2000 penalty units. For an individual who has not previously been found to have contravened the Spam Act the maximum penalty as provided for by s 25(4) is 20 penalty units per single contravention, or if the Court finds that the person has on a particular day committed two or more contraventions, 400 penalty units.
20 The Spam Act incorporates by reference the meaning given by s 4AA of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) to a penalty unit. It is there provided presently that a penalty unit is $110. By a process of mathematics one therefore derives that the maximum applicable penalty per day on which more than one contravention is found to have occurred is $220,000 in the case of a body corporate and $44,000 in the case of an individual.
21 In this particular case, many days are involved in which contravening conduct occurred. That has a corresponding effect on the theoretical maximum penalty applicable in respect of the contraventions.
22 On the evidence to hand, so far as Mobilegate is concerned, it appears - and this is as best an approximation as I can make - that the number of days on which two or more contraventions occurred was 331 days. In all, were one to assess a theoretical maximum in respect of Mobilegate, one would derive a maximum penalty under the Spam Act of something in excess of $72 million.
23 As to Winning Bid, the approximate number of days on the evidence in terms of best estimation on which two or more contraventions occurred was 187 days. Again, in terms of the theoretical maximum in respect of the contraventions, the subject of default judgment, the maximum penalty applicable in respect of Winning Bids conduct would be $40 million.
24 It is a possible but in the end only a theoretical exercise to look to maximums which might be applicable under s 25 in respect of those individuals who have been adjudged to be parties to corporate contravening conduct.
25 I shall make some reference to authority touching upon maximum penalty in a moment. For the present it is instructive to consider both individually and then in their totality the particular individual considerations specified in s 24(2) of the Spam Act save of course for that specified in s 24(20(e) to which I have already made reference. Before so doing it is helpful to reflect upon some general principles which are pertinent, in my opinion, to the imposition of pecuniary penalty.
26 There is but one directly applicable authority in respect of the Spam Act and the imposition of penalties under that Act. That is a judgment delivered by Nicholson J in Australian Communications and Media Authority v Clarity1 Pty Ltd (2006) 155 FCR 377 (Clarity1). One finds, with respect, in his Honour's judgment in Clarity1 a very helpful collation indeed of relevant principle.
27 It is apparent from Clarity1 that Nicholson J was of the opinion that assistance was to be derived in terms of principle from judgments delivered in respect of civil penalties imposed under the Trade Practices Act. I respectfully agree with this approach.
28 To that end, the following general principles are pertinent:
1. the size of the contravening company;
2. the deliberateness of the contravention and the period over which it occurred;
3. whether the contravention arose out of the conduct of senior management in a corporation or at a lower level;
4. whether the corporation has a culture conducive to compliance with the Act, as, for example, evidenced by educational programs and disciplinary or other corrective measures which are taken institutionally in response to an acknowledged contravention;
5. whether the respondent, be it corporate or individual, has cooperated with the authorities responsible for the enforcement of the Act in relation to the contravention;
6. (and this may be part of the size of the corporation, where it is a corporate respondent), the financial position of the contravener and its, his or her capacity to pay;
7. the deterrent effect, both specific and general, of the proposed penalty;
8. the totality principle; and
9. parity and, I think, also relativity of penalty, with other respondents, having regard to individual circumstances of involvement in a contravention.
29 There are other statements in authorities under the Trade Practices Act which are, in my opinion, germane in relation to the imposition of penalty in respect of Spam Act prosecutions.
30 Thus, under the Trade Practices Act, it is relevant to take into account whether the conduct that contravened the Act was systematic, deliberate or covert: see J McPhee and Son (Australia) Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2000) 172 ALR 532 at [158].
In this case, the contravening conduct might aptly be described by each of those adjectives. In other words, it was systematic, it was deliberate and, materially, covert in terms of the ability of those mobile phone users preyed upon to ascertain readily the identity of their predator if they were disposed to seek recourse to the courts to recover moneys lost. I shall elaborate a little further on that aspect in a moment.
31 Again, in terms of Trade Practices Act authorities, there is useful guidance on the role of both specific and general deterrence in the imposition of penalties. In Trade Practices Commission v Mobil Oil Australia Ltd (1985) 4 FCR 296 at pages 297 to 298, Toohey J, then a judge of this Court, remarked:
The penalty should be such as to deter not only the particular offender but others who may be disposed to engage in prohibited conduct of a similar kind.
32 That, in my opinion, is a particularly weighty consideration in relation to Spam Act contraventions. This case discloses on the evidence that while it is possible for a regulatory authority, through diligent investigation, to detect not only those corporations but those individuals involved in contraventions, the task is not an easy or an inexpensive one. It consumes public resources which might otherwise usefully be deployed to other ends. That being so, penalties in respect of contraventions must be such as to deter the unscrupulous from taking a calculated business risk. In other words, in my opinion, penalties must be of such an order that having regard to particular gains which might be involved, it is in effect commercial suicide to seek those gains via contraventions of the Spam Act.
33 Sentiments such as these are evident in prior authority.
34 In NW Frozen Foods Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (1996) 71 FCR 285 at pages 294 to 295 (NW Frozen Foods), a Full Court opined:
The court should not leave room for any impression of weakness in its resolve to impose penalties sufficient to ensure the deterrence, not only of the parties actually before it, but also of others who might be tempted to think that contravention would pay …
35 To like effect is the following observation of Selway J in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v McMahon Services Pty Ltd (2004) ATPR 42‑031 at [15]:
The penalty must be sufficiently high that a business, acting rationally and in its own best interest, will not be prepared to treat the risk of such a penalty as a business cost.
36 Of course, a penalty should not be so high as to be oppressive, but it is important in this regard to recall exactly what is meant by that sentiment. That was, with respect, aptly and accurately stated by Merkel J in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Leahy Petroleum Pty Ltd (No 2) (2005) 215 ALR 281 (Leahy Petroleum (No 2)) at para 9 as follows, (and this is a reference to observations made by Smithers J in a case, Trade Practices Commission v Stihl Chain Saws (Australia) Pty Ltd (1978) ATPR 40-091, which had been referred to by Burchett and Kiefel JJ in NW Frozen Foods):
I therefore respectfully agree with the observation of Smithers J, referred to by Burchett and Kiefel JJ in NW Frozen Foods, to the effect that, a penalty that is of no greater than is necessary to achieve the object of general deterrence, will not be oppressive.
37 I intend to follow those general principles in relation to the imposition of penalty.
38 Also of great importance in a case such as this, where daily penalties accumulate, is the totality principle. I shall have a little more to say about that shortly.
39 As I have mentioned, there is but one earlier authority dealing directly with the Spam Act: Clarity1. The utility in that case is for its collation of principle in relation to the imposition of penalty. I have drawn upon that collation in making the statements already given with respect to principle. It is not, though, a case uncritically to apply as a comparative. The circumstances of that case were different to those of the present. The Respondents concerned are to be dealt with by reference to their particular contravening conduct.
40 This is not one of those cases of the kind encountered in the State criminal courts where, by reference to a high volume of analogous criminal conduct, it is possible to set, and then for sentencing judges to have regard to, particular benchmarks derived from guidance given by a Court of Appeal. I have already referred to theoretical maximums that one might derive in respect of the corporate Respondents, and to the ability to make an estimation of theoretical maximums in respect of individuals. In Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357 Gleeson CJ and Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ, in relation to maximum sentences said at [30]:
Legislatures do not enact maximum available sentences as mere formalities. Judges need sentencing yardsticks. It is well accepted that the maximum sentence available may in some cases be a matter of great relevance. In their book Sentencing, Stockdale and Devlin observe that:
"A maximum sentence fixed by parliament may have little relevance in a given case, either because it was fixed at a very high level in the last century … or because it has more recently been set at a high catch-all level … At other times the maximum may be highly relevant and sometimes may create real difficulties …
A change in a maximum sentence by Parliament will sometimes be helpful [where it is thought that parliament regarded the previous penalties as inadequate]."
41 And then at [31]:
It follows that careful attention to maximum penalties will almost always be required, first, because the legislature has legislated for them; secondly, because they invite comparison between the worst possible case and the case before the court at the time; and thirdly, because in that regard they do provide, taken and balanced with all the other relevant factors, a yardstick.
42 I turn to look at particular factors designated in s 24 as relevant. Obviously enough, these factors are measured against the matters pleaded in the statement of claim, and the evidence upon which the Authority seeks to rely and of which notice has been given to the particular Respondents; in particular, affidavits of Mr Weber, filed on 12 May, 13 May, and 21 May 2009.