16 In my opinion the question should be answered "yes". First, clause 1(1) of the Trust Deed defines "person" to include a company. However, the word "person" where it is used in the expression "the person exercising the power of appointment" is in the circumstances of this case an unambiguous reference to Scott MacRae. The impugned exercise by him of the power to appoint a new trustee is not a purported exercise of the power to appoint himself. If the appointor had been a company the definition of person would have extended to prohibit that company from appointing itself. The reverse does not follow. The fact that Scott MacRae is a person does not therefore mean that he and his company are the same thing by reason of the further fact that the definition of person includes a company.
17 Secondly, the terms of the sub-clause are clear and unambiguous. There is no express prohibition on the appointment of companies of which the appointor is a sole director and shareholder. As Baylily concedes, if the Trust Deed had been intended to include such a provision it could have done so. Single director and shareholder companies were permitted at the time of the settlement: see First Corporate Law Simplification Act 1995, assented to on 17 October 1995.
18 Thirdly, and for the same reason that the terms of the sub-clause are clear and unambiguous, there is no apparent basis to suggest that such an intention should be ascribed to the draughtsman.
19 Baylily's arguments appear to me to be not so much reasons why its proposed interpretation of the Trust Deed should be adopted as complaints about the most likely result of their natural and ordinary meaning. They assume an intention or purpose to deprive an appointor of the power to appoint a corporation, of which he or she may be a sole director and shareholder, simply because the degrees of control exercised by a trustee personally or through the medium of such an entity are likely to be identical. The intention assumed is not obvious in the way suggested. The obvious intention was to prohibit an appointor appointing himself or herself or itself. Nothing going beyond that emerges as obvious to me. Corporations have a distinct legal character, an unremarkable fact recently reaffirmed in Friend v Brooker [2009] HCA 21; (2009) 239 CLR 129. Scott MacRae is not Scott MacRae Investments Pty Ltd and Scott MacRae Investments Pty Ltd is not Scott MacRae.
20 There is nothing that is uncommercial, unreasonable or irrational in Scott MacRae having appointed Scott MacRae Investments Pty Ltd as trustee of the Scott MacRae Trust. Such a course was not expressly or impliedly prohibited by the Trust Deed and there is no obvious reason why it should have been.
Question 2
21 Clause 7(6) of the Scott MacRae Trust Deed is as follows:
"7(6) The power to appoint or remove a trustee may be exercised by memorandum under hand or by deed, and where the trustee is a corporation shall be approved by resolution of its directors. Nothing within this deed shall be taken as limiting the right to appoint a corporation or a resident of a place outside New South Wales or Australia as a trustee of the Trust."
22 Baylily contended that the expression "and where the trustee is a corporation" as it appears in that subsection should be read as meaning "and where the outgoing or incoming trustee is a corporation". This question has attracted Baylily's attention in the present context because as the outgoing trustee its approval of the appointment of Scott MacRae Investments Pty Ltd as the new trustee was not sought.
23 In my opinion the expression refers only to an incoming trustee. First, the reference is to the singular "trustee" and not the plural "trustees". Secondly, an incoming trustee could not be appointed without its consent. Thirdly, and decisively, any other meaning would hand to an outgoing corporate trustee the power to veto or fetter the appointor's exercise of the power to appoint a new trustee. Such an apparently or at least potentially irreconcilable conflict would be inimical to the orderly conduct and administration of the trust.
24 I would answer this question "yes".
Question 3
25 It follows from the answers to questions 1 and 2 that the answer to question 3 is "no".
Question 5
26 Baylily conceded that if the answer to question 3 was "no", then the answer to question 5 must also be "no".
Question 6
27 Baylily contended that if it remains the trustee of the Scott MacRae Trust then it would be justified in defending the proceedings, but conceded if it were no longer the trustee that any decision by it to defend the proceedings would be a commercial decision for it to make and not a question properly the subject of judicial advice. I agree.
Conclusion
28 In the circumstances I answer the questions as follows:
1. Yes.
2. Yes.
3. No.
5. No.
6. Not answered.