Section 447A
16 Counsel for the plaintiffs submitted that the intention of the sole director of the Company failed only because steps to implement that intention were not immediately taken, leading to a doubt as to validity in view of the death of the sole director. It was submitted that the state of the affairs of the Company, the support of the beneficial shareholders and the lack of opposition from any creditor made it appropriate to make an order pursuant to s 447A of the Act to ensure the validity of the appointment of the plaintiffs and that which has been done pursuant to it. Reference was made to Australasian Memory Pty Ltd v Brien (2000) 200 CLR 270 (Brien); Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Portinex Pty Ltd (2000) 156 FLR 453, (2000) 34 ACSR 391 (Portinex); Re Wood Parsons Pty Limited (in liq) (2002) 43 ACSR 257 (Wood Parsons).
17 The first question is in regard to the locus of the plaintiffs. Counsel submits that they fall within each of s 447A(4)(c) and (f). I doubt that an invalidly appointed administrator would be described as an administrator within the meaning of s 447A(4)(c) - compare the careful wording of s 447C. I am satisfied that invalidly appointed administrators who have acted on the basis of the appointment are interested persons within the meaning of s 447A(4)(f). The making of the order sought will directly affect the interests of the plaintiffs. Their legal position as administrators will be secured by an order.
18 The next question is in regard to the power to make the order sought in the present circumstances. Counsel for the plaintiffs is correct in submitting that the decision of the High Court in Brien gives a wide operation to s 447A. He is also correct in submitting that the section was utilised to validate the appointments of administrators in Portinex and Wood Parsons. In each case Austin J expressed reservations about the retrospective operation of orders (Portinex at [30], Wood Parsons at [49]). Merkel J considered those decisions and others which took a less cautious view (eg Shirlaw v Graham [2001] NSWSC 612 and In the Matter of Supreme Imports Pty Ltd (in liquidation); Re De Vries [2001] NSWSC 1209) in Panasystems Pty Ltd v Voodoo Tech Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 428; (2003) 21 ACLC 842 at [17] and [18] in a manner I will follow. An order along the lines sought here is consistent with the orders made validating appointments in other cases. Such an order technically operates only prospectively but the effect of it is that, once made, it is henceforth to be taken that the Act has the effect declared and so operates in respect of actions taken from the nominated date or event. In that sense, it has retrospective effect. I do not read anything in Brien as being to the contrary of that understanding.
19 The next, and most difficult, question is whether the power should be exercised. There are good reasons for taking that course. However, the circumstances of the appointment are troubling. McDonald made a deliberate decision to date the documents on the day of the death of Ted Rear. That gave the impression that the documents were signed, or at least became operative, on that day and during the lifetime of Ted Rear. That impression would tend to deflect inquiry as to the validity of the appointment. The inference is open that the matter would not have come into the open or this application made had it not been for the questions raised by the solicitor for SDS. There is much to be said for the view that it would be wrong to give the imprimatur of the Court to such conduct, particularly in the absence of a contradictor.
20 However, I came to the conclusion that making the order was in the interests of shareholders and creditors (including employees) and that the purposes of Pt 5.3A of the Act would be best served if it were made. The Company was trading but there was a real possibility that it was insolvent. That was not desirable. It may well be that sale of the business as a going concern would be in the best interests of all concerned. Administration under Pt 5.3A serves that purpose by enabling business to continue whilst the position is urgently investigated and analysed and alternatives proposed for the future of the Company. That process is well advanced. The second meeting of creditors will take place in the near future. There has been no suggestion from any creditor (including SDS) that the plaintiffs are not carrying out their duties in a competent and professional manner. It would be potentially disruptive to the affairs of the Company for there to be the capacity to challenge the validity of that which has occurred in the administration to date.
21 There are various mechanisms by which creditors, ASIC and the Court can supervise an administration. There is a committee of creditors (s 436F). The meeting of creditors decides the future of the company, assisted by a report from the administrators (ss 439A, 439B, 439C). The Court has wide powers of supervision and control (eg ss 447A, 447B, 447D and 447E), together with the power of removal (s 449B). Furthermore, creditors and the Court have control over the remuneration of administrators (s 449E). ASIC and other bodies may have disciplinary functions in relation to professional persons such as the plaintiffs. In my opinion, the shareholders, creditors and ASIC are better placed to assess the issues at stake, including the circumstances surrounding the purported appointment of the Administrators, than the Court.
22 I therefore determined that an order pursuant to s 447A should be made in slightly modified form, but on the condition that the members of the committee of creditors and ASIC be provided with a copy of these reasons.
23 That conclusion made it unnecessary to determine whether a declaration should be made pursuant to s 1322(4) of the Act. All I need say is that I would have required powerful persuasion to find the requirements of that provision satisfied in the circumstances of this case.
24 I expressly determined that there should be no order made by the Court as to the costs of this proceeding. The plaintiffs were responsible for the circumstances giving rise to the application. The question of costs is best left for the creditors to decide.
I certify that the preceding twenty-four (24) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Gyles.