32 Of course, I have not had the benefit of hearing the evidence of the witnesses and it would not be open for me to take a different view to that of the Commissioner in these preliminary proceedings. However, in reviewing the Commissioner's own assessment of the competing evidence, it does appear to me that there is at least some room to doubt that the relevant findings of fact were open on the evidence before him.
33 I am also satisfied that the appellant has raised a serious issue in this appeal concerning whether the standard of proof applicable in unfair dismissal cases extends to a requirement that there needs to be "substantive" evidence produced by an employer, for an allegation of assault by an employee to be proved. Given this matter, it cannot, in my opinion, be absolutely certain that the appellant has no prospects of success with the appeal.
34 Further, given the seriousness of the allegation against the respondent; namely, that he assaulted another ambulance officer during the course of his public duties and potentially risked the care of an injured client, I accept the appellant's contention that serious public interest considerations arise in this case.
35 The appellant also complains that there was other evidence before the Commissioner which dealt with the respondent's past conduct and which would appear from the Commissioner's decision that he didn't mention; let alone consider, or have regard to.
36 The appellant further argues that since the Commissioner's decision, the appellant has become aware that the respondent has been suspended from his duties as a Volunteer Rescue Officer and is subject to investigation for inappropriate and/or improper conduct similar to that which led to his termination by the Ambulance Service of New South Wales. It was said that in these circumstances, it would be contrary to the public interest for the respondent to be reinstated as an ambulance officer pending determination of this appeal.
37 While the nature of these allegations against the respondent are not entirely clear to me (and would amount to nothing if he is ultimately exonerated), I would concede that further allegations against him which have led to his suspension from the Volunteer Rescue Association, do ground some basis for the appellant's concerns which weighs the balance of convenience in its favour.
38 Ms Brus submitted that as the respondent has made no attempt to secure alternative employment since his dismissal (which I note was some 20 months ago), that he would be no worse off if he was not reinstated pending the outcome of the appeal. I accept Mr Murphy's argument that the respondent's focus has been on his reinstatement. Nevertheless, there is some force to Ms Brus's submission, particularly when considered in light of the appellant's concession concerning back pay and any other orders the Full Bench might make in the event the appeal is unsuccessful.
39 For all these reasons, I am satisfied that the appellant has demonstrated it has an arguable case and that the balance of convenience favours the granting of the stay on conditions.
40 The appellant conceded that in effectively balancing the interests of the parties in a fair and reasonable way, it would not oppose the payment of the amount of the back pay ordered by the Commissioner, subject to the amount being repaid if the appeal is successful. In this regard reference was had to Kelso and Bellambi. I note that there was no suggestion that the respondent would be unable to make such a repayment. I accept that in the interests of justice and in balancing the interests of the parties, this concession was appropriately made and the stay should be conditionally made on those terms. The appellant shall be required to pay the respondent the amount ordered by the Commissioner in order (c). If the appeal succeeds, the sum will be repayable.
ORDERS