· Grand Reef is a very fluid situation.
Our equity base is also depleted from the trading losses already booked and it will diminish further if these disputes settle below book value.
The severe erosion of our equity will affect our banking relationship and our other capabilities. I doubt, for instance, whether we will be able to get Home Owner's Warranty for Hillsdale because we will be expected to provide updated financial data by the time we have to lodge our application.
In addition, there remain issues which have yet to be fully recognised:
· the ultimate loss on Alexis;
· the final outcome on Victoria Gardens.
These would appear to be worse than the estimates that we are currently using by at least $0.5 million. The Donvale project in Melbourne is also of great concern: our most recent invoice was rejected in part and there appears every prospect of a looming dispute.
Tom, I have notified you of many, if not all, of these issues on several prior occasions. Whilst I respect your optimism for the future, that optimism does not generate funds. Indeed, we fail to meet every projection which flows from that optimism, and the situation only gets worse.
The company's balance sheet needs to be strengthened. We have few options as to how this is done. In my view, you have to consider whether you are able or willing to support Austin by using your personal means. This is entirely your decision. If you choose to support the company, you need to act quickly and I am happy to assist in that exercise.
It is important that you have no doubt as to my position on these matters. I hope you understand that I am having great difficulty in serving as an officer of the company at this time. I should like to discuss this with you, to see if we can find a solution that works for us both."
18 I have noted that Austin did not have any bank overdraft facility. It did, however, have two facilities against which it was able to obtain the issue of performance bonds. By May 2003, those facilities had been fully utilised, with the result that new work undertaken was confined to work not requiring a performance bond.
19 I have also mentioned capitalised legal expenses. These were included as "unbilled work in progress" when there was little, if any, prospect of full recovery. In a similar way, work done on unapproved variations was included in "work in progress" without regard for any likelihood that the variations would be approved and paid for. In both these areas, assets were overstated.
20 In evidence is a quantity of material about legal proceedings, ranging from proceedings in the New South Wales Court of Appeal to claims under common money counts in the Magistrates Court of Queensland, the District Court at Penrith, the Local Court at Orange, the Local Court at Parramatta, the District Court at Sydney and the Melbourne Magistrates Court. There are also five statutory demands under the Corporations Act and a significant number of letters of demand. All these processes and demands relate to the period relevant to the present inquiry.
21 Austin's principal bank was Westpac Banking Corporation. In September 2003, Mr Gervay and Mr Gale met with officers of Westpac following transfer of responsibility for the relationship within the bank to Mr Reynolds. According to a letter from Mr Reynolds to Mr Gervay dated 8 September 2003, that transfer was a response to Austin's having provided to the bank financial and trading information for the six months to May 2003 which caused the bank to conclude that shareholders' funds had reached "a dangerously low level". The letter referred to Mr Gervay having reported further losses in June and July 2003 and an expectation of profit for the period Augusts 2003 to April 2004. The letter referred to the bank's decision to commission a review of Austin's financial position by external accountants.
22 I return now to the "indicia of insolvency" identified by Palmer J in Lewis v Doran (above) and consider them in turn, using the same numbering:
1. There is no real evidence of dishonoured cheques. As I have mentioned, however, cheque issue was managed in such a way that large numbers of cheques were held back.
2. There is evidence of suppliers having insisted on COD terms. My attention was drawn to COD supply of welding services in August 2003 and bricks in November 2003.
3. I was not taken to evidence of post-dated cheques, but the practice of holding back cheques involves the same strategy and the same effect. As to "rounded sum" cheques (indicating a likelihood of part payment only), I was directed to a significant number of examples in July, August, September, October and November 2003.
4. As for special arrangements with creditors, there are examples of instalment arrangements with DMG and Pioneer (the latter negotiated under threat of recovery proceedings) in July and December 2003 respectively.
5. Mr Gale's memorandum (see [17] above) is probably the best illustration of difficulties with timely production of audited financial information.
6. In relation to unpaid group tax, payroll tax, workers compensation premiums or superannuation contributions, I was referred to Mr Hutchison's finding that, as Austin accounted for GST on an accrual basis, it was claiming GST credits for payments made to creditors, even though the payments had not been made (because the cheques had been held back). This resulted in underpayment of GST.
7. The deteriorating relationship with Westpac has been mentioned.
8. The numerous debt recovery actions and statutory demands have been mentioned.
23 In the light of the evidence to which I have referred, Mr Hutchison reached a conclusion expressed as follows in his report:
"From my analysis of the affairs of Austin as detailed in this report, it is my opinion that the company was insolvent from at least March 2003 and continued to be insolvent until my appointment as Administrator on 31 December 2003."
24 I am satisfied that, at each and every point during the period to which the separate question relates, cash and other liquid assets of Austin were always insufficient to meet debts due and payable and to become due and payable in the immediate future. I am also satisfied that the insufficiency was not a temporary or transient problem but a deep-seated and continuing disability. Profitability did not exist so as to represent a source of likely eventual resolution. Nor is there evidence that there were external sources on which Austin could draw. There was an endemic shortage of working capital and an inability to pay debts as and when they fell due. I am thus of the view that Mr Hutchison's opinion is well founded and supported by the evidence, so far as the period covered by the separate question is concerned.
25 My own review and assessment of that evidence, as well as the analysis, discussion and conclusion in Mr Hutchison's report, lead me to answer the separate question as follows:
"Yes, Austin Australia Pty Limited was insolvent at all times during the period commencing 30 June 2003 and ending 31 December 2003."
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