(2006) FLR 303
Fardon v Attorney-General for the State of Queensland (2004) 223 CLR 575
[2004] HCA 46
Hore v The Queen
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Catchwords
(2006) FLR 303
Fardon v Attorney-General for the State of Queensland (2004) 223 CLR 575[2004] HCA 46
Hore v The Queen
Judgment (8 paragraphs)
[1]
Introduction
This judgment resolves an application brought pursuant to the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) (the Act) by the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth (the plaintiff) for the imposition of an extended supervision order (ESO) of 12 months upon Mr Ibrahim Ghazzawy (the defendant).
For the following reasons, I do not consider that the "fulcrum test" in s 105A.7A(1)(b) of the Act (the section) has been fulfilled, with the result that the application is rejected.
[2]
Background
A sketch of the matter as it stood in December 2023 is to be found in my preliminary judgment of that time granting a renewable interim supervision order (ISO) against the defendant: see Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of Australia v Ghazzawy [2023] NSWSC 1527. Of course, I mention that only for the convenience of the reader and in order to avoid a measure of fruitless repetition of factual or evaluative matters that were not subsequently the subject of dispute before me. Self-evidently, events have moved on since then, the evidence before me is different, and so also is the applicable fulcrum test.
As discussed in that judgment and the remarks on sentence of Bellew J (see R v Ghazzawy [2017] NSWSC 474), when he was aged 18 and for practical purposes bereft of a criminal record, the defendant, under the pernicious influence of a group of older men, contributed to a joint document that discussed ways of committing a terrorist attack in Australia. At the time, he was committed to violent jihad, and the ideology of the so-called Islamic State (IS). Under discussion were such matters as partisan war against the government of this nation in rural New South Wales, an armed attack on Lithgow Correctional Centre, and on a police headquarters in Sydney: see s 105A.6B(1)(g) of the Act.
The offenders were arrested before any such action occurred. The defendant was charged with making a document connected with preparation for a terrorist act contrary to s 101.5(1) of the Act, an offence for which the maximum penalty is imprisonment for 15 years. He pleaded guilty to that offence, and after a successful appeal against sentence was subject to a head sentence of imprisonment for 8 years with a non-parole period of six years, the former of which recently expired on 9 December 2023, and the latter of which expired some time ago, on 9 December 2021.
In the proceedings on sentence, an important part of his plea in mitigation was his susceptibility to the adverse influence of the other offenders. In the remarks on sentence of 8 May 2017, the learned sentencing judge emphasised that, "It is not correct to say that a plea of guilty by the offender constitutes a sign of a movement away from extremist views … The offender's plea may be an indicator of some move away from his previously held beliefs, but that can only be regarded as being the position on a cautious basis" (R v Ghazzawy at [73]): see s 105A.6B(1)(h) of the Act.
For the majority of his sentence, the defendant was detained in the High Risk Management Correctional Centre (the Centre) at Goulburn. Inevitably, his living conditions were not only very constrained, but also many, if not most, of the other prisoners in the Centre were also persons accused or convicted of terrorist offences that were motivated by Islamic extremism.
For a significant portion of his time in custody he was an angry, embittered young man. Later, there was a mellowing, and a readiness to accept rehabilitative measures, including regarding deradicalisation: see s 105A.6B(1)(e) of the Act. By the time of his release, he had been held in main discipline.
Having said that, it is clear that he remained and remains close to persons who themselves have been convicted of like offences, including indeed some, at least, of his co-offenders. Furthermore, it was and is clear that he had taken steps to "get around" the prison rules about contact with persons in the community. That included what I have called the "two phone method" of the defendant telephoning from prison an approved person, who then placed their mobile phone next to another one, whereby the defendant could surreptitiously have a conversation with an un-approved interlocutor. I hasten to add, however, that none of that contact (or indeed any approved contact over the years placed before me) demonstrated a communication to do with Islamic extremism.
The defendant was not released to parole on 9 December 2021, or at any subsequent time, at the least partly because of the difficulty of him demonstrating exceptional circumstances for the purposes of s 19ALB(1) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth).
Shortly before his entire sentence expired late last year, I granted the application for an ISO, which has been renewed more than once, and the last of which must expire in accordance with statute on 8 March 2024. As can be seen from my earlier judgment, I was particularly troubled then by his approach to prison discipline at the crucial stage when his release was imminent. I also focused on the broadly contingent nature of the test for imposing an ISO.
Since his release, the conduct of the defendant has been constructive and compliant: see s 105A.6B(1)(f) of the Act. He has complied with the panoply of conditions that I imposed, and indeed he himself brought to the attention of the authorities an inadvertent breach that he had incurred. Quite apart from that, he has commenced to re-integrate into the community with the help of his family and others. In particular, there is nothing to suggest that he has sought to "get around" his supervision by way of the ISO.
At the hearing of the application, two experts were called to give detailed oral evidence: Dr Eagle, forensic psychiatrist, called by the plaintiff; and Mr Sheehan, forensic psychologist, an expert appointed by me at the time of the imposition of the ISO. The latter had provided a single written report, and the former a number of them. Their written and oral evidence, whilst undoubtedly important, is not determinative, and forms merely part of all of the evidence that I need to consider (see Tcpt 111(34)-(45)): see s 105A.6B(1)(b)-(c) of the Act.
In response to the application, the position of the defendant in written submissions may be summarised as follows:
1. The defendant's criminal history, beyond the single instance of offending for which the application relates, is non-existent. The offence was committed when the defendant was 18 years old, and, while the seriousness of such offending was conceded, the offence itself was merely preparatory in nature.
2. The defendant has generally been of good behaviour in custody. His classification was progressively downgraded over the course of his sentence, to the point where he was offered "C" Classification in April 2023 and given the opportunity to move to a minimum-security facility.
3. During his time in custody, the defendant also actively participated in offence-specific and general courses. His participation levels were submitted to be "overwhelmingly positive".
4. There is no dispute that the defendant has been compliant with all conditions of the ISO that I imposed and that has been renewed.
5. No evidence suggests that the defendant currently holds any "extreme views" or is otherwise "radicalised" in any way. He has demonstrated a positive shift in his thinking about his faith, and readily acknowledges that his past offending was based on a misapprehension of Islam, in combination with other factors such as grievances held towards the Australian Federal Police (AFP) at the time. There is nothing to suggest these grievances are ongoing, or that the defendant is likely to act on any such grievance.
6. The defendant has no mental health impairments or psychological issues that might impede his ability to re-integrate into the community. Similarly, he has no known problems with alcohol or illicit drugs.
At the hearing, it was accepted more generally for the defendant that all mechanistic statutory preconditions for the imposition of an ESO had been established. I interpolate that I accept that concession, and accordingly will not discuss them further, but will simply focus upon the fulcrum test.
Regarding that test, I understood the position of the defendant to be as follows. Inevitably, there is some risk of the defendant committing a serious offence to be found in Part 5.3 of the Act (subsequently, unless further discrimination is necessary, simply "an offence"). But I could not be satisfied, it was said, that any such risk is unacceptable.
Furthermore, if I were satisfied that the fulcrum test had been established, there remained a vestigial, minor dispute about one or two conditions.
Finally, if the plaintiff were to succeed in these civil proceedings, no order for costs was sought against the defendant; if the plaintiff were to fail, however, it was agreed between the parties that the defendant should have his costs.
[3]
Statutory test discussed
The salient parts of the section containing the fulcrum test are as follows:
105A.7A Making an extended supervision order
(1) A Supreme Court of a State or Territory may make a written order under this subsection, in accordance with sections 105A.7B and 105A.7C, if:
(a) any of the following applies:
(i) an application is made in accordance with section 105A.5 for an extended supervision order in relation to a terrorist offender;
(ii) an application is made in accordance with section 105A.5 for a continuing detention order in relation to a terrorist offender, and the Court is not satisfied as mentioned in paragraph 105A.7(1)(b) or (c) (or both);
(iii) the Court has reviewed under section 105A.12 a continuing detention order in relation to a terrorist offender and the Court is not satisfied as mentioned in paragraph 105A.12(4)(a); and
(b) after having regard to matters in accordance with section 105A.6B, the Court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities, on the basis of admissible evidence, that the offender poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious Part 5.3 offence; and
(c) the Court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that:
(i) each of the conditions; and
(ii) the combined effect of all of the conditions;
to be imposed on the offender by the order is reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted, for the purpose of protecting the community from that unacceptable risk.
…
(Emphasis added)
Accordingly, breaking down the test into its discrete components for ease of analysis, I must reach the following state of mind in order to impose an ESO:
1. Affirmative satisfaction;
2. On the balance of probabilities;
3. Whilst reflecting on s 140 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) (this aspect does not appear in the section of course, but it was explicitly agreed between the parties as applicable to the proceedings) (Tcpt 110(33)ff);
4. On the basis of admissible evidence (as opposed, I infer, to mere supposition, speculation, or emotional reaction on my part);
5. That the offender poses a risk;
6. Of committing an offence to be found in the Part under discussion that carries a maximum penalty of imprisonment for 7 years or more (see s 105A.2 of the Act); and
7. That risk is, to my evaluation, unacceptable.
Discussing the elements of the fulcrum test a little more deeply, it was submitted for the plaintiff that, due to the breadth of the section, and the absence from it of any temporal connection between the diminution of liberty by way of any ESO and the satisfaction of the existence of a risk of the necessary type, I could impose an ESO of 12 months' duration, even if I felt that the risk might develop, not during the currency of the ESO, but rather only months or even years after that time (see Tcpt 164(1)-(49), and, extracted below, 216(32)ff):
BEGBIE [senior counsel for plaintiff]: The first matter is the question of the construction of the provision in relation to whether the risk must manifest in the period of the ESO … I have addressed your Honour on the meaning of the statutory text. Your Honour, I think, made the same point around s 105A.7A(4)(d), that was the other provision that Mr Broadbent [counsel for defendant] took you to. That is absolutely correct. Just like 7A(2)(b), there is no time limit on that, and your Honour cannot read that in when it's not there. Nothing in the context tells you that there's a limit of that kind in your Honour's assessment.
HIS HONOUR: Yes.
BEGBIE: In fact, the context includes these two important matters. The first is that if there was to be a further enduring risk, even let's say beyond the three years, the answer to that is not under the statutory regime to say, well, there's nothing I can do about it … It's to impose the ESO, and at the end of that three years the minister will have to make an application, if it's available, to deal with such risk as exists beyond it. Or if the three years have dealt with the risk, that's the end of the matter. Conversely, unless a person is on that ESO, an ESO can't be sought. So the context really says that this is the means for dealing with it.
(Emphasis added)
But I do not accept that submission, for the following reasons.
First, it is true that the section is "open textured" in that way, as is s 105A.7A(4)(d) of the same Act. It does not in its terms require that temporal connection. But reflecting not only on the text of the Division as a whole, but also its context and purpose, I cannot accept that I could (by way of hypothetical example) impose an ESO of three years upon a defendant who I believed posed an unacceptable risk of deteriorating slowly to the point of committing an offence only 15 years into the future.
To provide a more compelling example, founded upon extinguishment of liberty as opposed to its diminution: reflecting on s 105A.7(1)(b) of the Act - which also possesses no temporal connection between the imposition of an order and the posing of the risk in question - I cannot accept that I could impose a continuing detention order (CDO) of three years upon a defendant who I was not satisfied presented a risk of committing an offence during that period, but rather presented a risk of committing an offence many years thereafter.
In short, there is no doubt that the Act alters traditional understandings of bases for imposing conditional liberty, even incarceration, at the conclusion of one's term of imprisonment, and without the commission of a further offence. But I cannot accept that the Act goes as far as the plaintiff contends.
Secondly, statutory regimes analogous to this one exist, as I understand it, in many if not all of the States and Territories of Australia. Some have existed for as long as two decades: see Fardon v Attorney-General for the State of Queensland (2004) 223 CLR 575; [2004] HCA 46. At my invitation, a search was undertaken by both legal teams for any decision that interpreted any such regime in accordance with the submission of the plaintiff. None could be found, including regarding the particular provision under consideration.
Thirdly, in accordance with the long-recognised principle of legality most recently discussed by the High Court in Hore v The Queen; Wichen v The Queen [2022] HCA 22 (15 June 2022), if such a remarkably prophylactic regime were the objective intention of the Commonwealth Parliament, one would expected it to have said so explicitly here. But it has not.
In short, in my opinion component (5) of the fulcrum test set out by me at [20] above must be understood as "poses a risk within the next 12 months" (bearing in mind the length of the ESO for which the plaintiff contends). That is the way in which I proceed to analyse the evidence.
[4]
Acceptance of many submissions of plaintiff
Turning now to that topic, and examining it through the prism of the submissions made for the plaintiff: in short, many of those submissions I accept, as follows.
First, on the evidence placed before me it is impossible to determine whether, in truth, when the defendant was intercepted at an airport many years ago and effectively prohibited from departing Australia, he was trying to travel overseas for legitimate or illegitimate purposes (Tcpt 116(14)). But the point is well made for the plaintiff that, even if in early 2014 he was seeking merely a holiday in North Africa with a friend, it is not easy to accept that that prohibition on its own led to him becoming a radicalised Islamic extremist who committed the index offence in December of that same year (Tcpt 116(26)). And I also accept the submission that such "grievance based reasoning" - spoken of in the report of Ms Kocak, forensic psychologist, as long ago as April 2020 - would present a risk factor if engaged in again by the defendant in the future, whether regarding perceived wrongs inflicted upon him that are acute or chronic.
Secondly, assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of what Dr Eagle called the "public policy" issue (Tcpt 46(3)ff) of placing the young defendant in the Centre with other radicalised prisoners is not my task. I am called upon only to reflect upon what role that plays, along with all of the other evidence, in establishment of the fulcrum test founded on risk. In that regard, I accept that for many years, the defendant has been close to such persons; that he is very close to some of them; that if unconditionally at liberty, one can expect that he will have intentional contact with at least a few of them; and that he will also have passing or fleeting contact with some such people, bearing in mind the cultural and social milieu in which he moves. All of that is obviously troubling. Of further concern is my acceptance of the proposition that, for a time at least, he sought to downplay the truth of the extent of his surreptitious contact.
Thirdly, despite the passage of years, his natural maturing, the rehabilitative work he has undertaken, and my acceptance that as at today he is not a radical person, I also accept even so that the defendant retains a general character trait of susceptibility to the influence of others. I also accept that his offences against prison discipline are some evidence of that, albeit not overwhelmingly so when seen in the context of prison culture (see Tcpt 122(15)).
Fourthly, the role of his family in his future is an equivocal one. On the one hand, they constitute a generally protective factor, for many undisputedly pro-social reasons. On the other, I accept that the role that they played in circumventing prison rules regarding telephone contact is concerning.
Fifthly, it is not to be forgotten, in reflecting upon the future, that it has been conclusively established (not least by a plea of guilty and a plea in mitigation) that, in December 2014, the defendant did indeed play a role in the creation of a joint document with the intention of working towards the commission of horrific acts of political violence. In other words, the submission of the plaintiff in support of satisfaction of the existence of a risk of the commission of such an offence in the future does not materialise from thin air; it is based upon the proven commission of just such an offence by the defendant in the past (see Tcpt 114(9)ff).
Sixthly, I accept that, if placed upon an ESO, the defendant could be practicably and reasonably managed in the community as a result: see s 105A.6B(1)(d) of the Act. So much is based not only upon the affidavit evidence placed before me, but also upon the successful operation of the ISO over the past many weeks.
Seventhly, it is common sense, and well-established at law in any event, that the unacceptability of a risk must be measured not only in terms of the possibility or probability of it coming to fruition, but also in terms of the gravity of the consequences of it doing so: see, for example, in a different but analogous statutory context, State of New South Wales v Norstead (a pseudonym) (Final) [2023] NSWSC 524 at [12]-[15] (Rothman J). Patently, the consequences of an offence against the Part can be catastrophic, and that must be weighed in my evaluation (Tcpt 166(13)-(40)).
Eighthly, both experts have posited a mechanism whereby the defendant could come to present a risk of offending again: his family not operating sufficiently in practice to protect him from deterioration; he remaining susceptible to outside influence; coming under such an influence; developing a grievance against Australian society or polity based on some adverse development in his life (such as losing his job in circumstances where he believed it was the result of prejudice, being racially or religiously vilified on the street, and so forth); he becoming embittered again; becoming attracted to violence again; and he deciding to adopt it. That thesis, I accept, is not an unrealistic one. But whether it fulfils the requirements of the fulcrum test is another matter entirely.
[5]
Countervailing findings
All of that, I accept, argues in favour of satisfaction of the fulcrum test. Other evaluations, however, argue to the contrary. They are as follows.
First, I reject the submission of the plaintiff that the risk could arise without the necessity of at least a measure of re-radicalisation on the part of the defendant (Tcpt 217(35)ff). I appreciate that the definition of the offences under consideration is a broad one. But I do not accept, on all of the evidence before me in this particular matter, that the defendant could deteriorate from his current positive and cooperative state of mind to such a degree as to commit such an offence, without coming under the influence of an Islamic extremist again. I respectfully regard the thesis that he might commit the kind of offence under consideration without that process having first occurred as not founded in the practical realities of this matter.
Secondly and relatedly, I accept the sincerity of the defendant in his deradicalisation, the deterrent effect that one might expect eight years of continuous custody to possess, the effectiveness of the rehabilitative work he did in prison, and the very sound response on his part to the conditions of the ISO. I did not understand either expert to be of a contrary opinion as to that current state of affairs.
Thirdly, the expert evidence, in my respectful opinion, supported only to some degree the imposition of an ESO, for the following six reasons.
The limitations of predictions of risk of recidivism presented by any individual, even when able to be based upon robust statistical or actuarial materials, are well-known (Tcpt 36(9)).
Here, a statistical or actuarial analysis was not in fact available in any event, because of the nature of the offending (Tcpt 94(30)ff).
Each of the experts used the factors considered in the leading study of terrorist recidivism as nothing more than an aid to memory, or a series of topics to be reflected upon (Tcpt 37(30)-(43), 40(17)-(24)). And the validity of that underlying study is itself in question (Tcpt 67(25)-(40)).
In this context, neither expert was comfortable ascribing a quantitative category such as low, medium, high, or extreme risk to the defendant.
Each of them spoke instead in terms of realistic possibilities, that idea having first been expressed in the report of Mr Sheehan of 11 February 2024 at [77] (see Tcp 62(40)ff).
Significantly, although Mr Sheehan did not clearly do so, in my opinion Dr Eagle embraced an important dichotomy (Tcpt 64(22)-(36)):
HIS HONOUR: Can I just summarise my own understanding to make sure I've got it straight. From your perspective, Dr Eagle, speaking generically, yes, you accept a realistic possibility that, speaking generically, things could go down a wrong path, but going further and being satisfied - for want of a better word - that it's a realistic possibility that he would commit a serious Part 5.3 offence, you don't fulfill that proposition? Is that what you're getting at?
WITNESS EAGLE: Yes, I don't think it would.
HIS HONOUR: Very well. I just wanted to clarify and express it directly, if you wouldn't mind. Is that your proposition?
WITNESS EAGLE: That's my proposition, your Honour, is yes. I don't think it's good, in my expertise, to say that it's - it is or is not realistic that even given that increased risk scenario, he would then go on to commit that offence.
(Emphasis added)
In other words, my understanding is that the highly qualified, well experienced, and (with respect) eminent forensic psychiatrist called by the plaintiff, who assessed the defendant clinically over some hours, and provided a number of reports about him, was not able to express a state of affirmative satisfaction that the defendant presented a realistic possibility of committing the kind of offence for which the fulcrum test calls. Nor did Mr Sheehan express any opinion in sharp contradiction to that of Dr Eagle.
Contrary to the submission for the plaintiff (Tcpt 162(45)), I do not accept that there was any misunderstanding or problem of terminology in that exchange. As the surrounding transcript shows, those terms were derived from earlier discussion in the report of Dr Sheehan, and in the evidence. Nor was there any examination of the witnesses by either party in response to that evidence directed towards untangling an asserted crossed wire or clarifying possibly blurred phrases.
Inevitably, that state of the expert evidence - absence of positive satisfaction of a different but closely related proposition on the part of Dr Eagle - plays a significant role in my assessment of whether the fulcrum test is established.
Fourthly, as I have said, it is undoubtedly true that the friends and acquaintances of the defendant who have been convicted of terrorist offences are a negative factor, and contact on his part with them surely increases the risk of him committing an offence of the kind under consideration. But it is an objective fact that many such persons are incarcerated, and some of them will remain in prison for many years. It is true that no system of prohibition of contact is foolproof, as the phone contacts from gaol undertaken by the defendant himself demonstrate. But speaking generally, I accept the opinion of Mr Sheehan expressed more than once at the hearing (Tcpt 59, 93-94): contact between the defendant and such persons can be very largely forestalled by prohibitions not upon him, but rather upon them, in all of the ways that a prisoner can be blocked from having contact with a person in the community who is judged to be inappropriate.
In my opinion, to focus upon the risks arising from contact between the defendant and persons who will undoubtedly be in custody until after the putative ESO expires, in some cases very many years after, is to fail to give sufficient weight to those other mechanisms. For that reason, I do not accept the submissions about the gravity of the risks presented by incarcerated friends or acquaintances of the defendant made for the plaintiff at Tcpt 219(4)-220(28).
Fifthly, in similar vein, the defendant has had close contact with common criminals who, I accept, could be counter-productive in terms of him leading a law-abiding life. An example is Mr Robert Saracen (a pseudonym), who has a reasonably serious criminal history, albeit not related to any terrorist offending, and who is not in custody. And I also accept that, in all likelihood, if unfettered by an order, the defendant would have such contact again. But the question is not whether such contact gives rise to a risk of the defendant committing a criminal offence generally. Patently, the focus is upon the risk of committing an offence that falls within the specific Part of the Act setting out terrorist offences. But an offender such as Mr Saracen, and anyone like him, does not present to my mind a realistically established pathway for that occurring. And that is because of my previously expressed finding: any risk in this case must be based upon re-radicalisation of the defendant by the external influence of an Islamic extremist.
In truth, when one subtracts generally from one's reflection potential negative influences who are incarcerated, and potential negative influences who are at liberty but of an irrelevant type, the risk presented by friends and acquaintances certainly remains. But in my opinion, it is much reduced.
Sixthly, I remain of the view expressed in my preliminary judgment that to expect blanket renunciation by the defendant of the use of force in all circumstances is artificial and unrealistic; if anything, such a renunciation, if expressed, would arouse suspicion on my part.
In my opinion, those aspects of the evidence in combination argue against the fulcrum test being established.
[6]
Ultimate reflection on evidence and statutory test, and outcome
Synthesising the aspects of the case for the plaintiff that I accept and do not accept, and the aspects of the evidence that argue against that case, my ultimate evaluation in accordance with the section is as follows.
I am concerned about the development of a risk in the years ahead in the life of the defendant that he may commit an offence against the Part. But I am certainly not satisfied on the balance of probabilities (and bearing in mind the ideas underpinnings 140 of the Evidence Act 1995) of the development of such a risk.
More pertinently: nor am I satisfied of such a risk being posed within the breadth of the temporal reach of currency of the proposed ESO, in accordance with my construction of the fulcrum test.
Contingently, even if I be wrong in that analysis, and such a risk were to be established by careful satisfaction on the balance of probabilities as coming into existence within the next 12 months, for the reasons that I have set out above I am not satisfied of the evaluative proposition that that risk is an unacceptable one.
Finally in this context, I record that I have reflected upon the object of the Division to be found in s 105A.1 of the Act, and have not forgotten that it is the first of the factors mandated for consideration in s 105A.6B(1)(a) of the Act.
For the proceeding reasons, I reject the application and dismiss the summons of the plaintiff.
It follows that the minor dispute about conditions need not be resolved.
It also follows that the plaintiff must pay the costs of the defendant.
Furthermore, the ISO extension that expire tomorrow must be quashed.
Finally, I accept that this outcome - whereby the defendant will have spent eight years in continuous custody for serious offending, followed by a mere three months subject to conditional liberty - is not conducive to his continuing rehabilitation. But that is the consequence of a system of sentence administration that permits parole to be granted only on establishment of exceptional circumstances, combined with a system of imposition of subsequent conditional liberty without subsequent conviction that is - entirely appropriately - based upon a necessary state of mind of affirmative satisfaction of unacceptable risk.
[7]
Orders
1. The amended summons of the plaintiff of 18 December 2023 is dismissed.
2. The ISO extension that expires on 8 March 2024 is quashed.
3. The plaintiff must pay the costs of the defendant of the proceedings before me.
[8]
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Decision last updated: 07 March 2024