12 The Crown Advocate submitted that the power conferred by s 16(3) to renew an interim detention order does not extend to making an extended supervision order under s 8(3). In his submission the plain wording of subsections 16(3) and 8(3) is that the power to renew is confined to renewal of an interim detention or supervision order as the case may be. In the view that I have come to, it is not necessary to determine the scope of the power to renew interim detention orders. Accepting without deciding, that the Act permits the Court in determining an application under s 16(3) for the renewal of an interim detention order to impose an interim supervision order, in my opinion, it would not be appropriate to do so in this case.
13 The evidence upon which the plaintiff principally relies is summarised in the judgment of the Court of Appeal at [64] to [81]. It is more fully set out in the judgment of Hoeben J (as their Honours noted at [61]). It is not necessary to repeat the material in these reasons. The opinions of Dr Allnutt and Professor Greenberg are broadly consistent with the opinions expressed by Ms Bel, Mr Bright and Dr Lenning concerning the risk of re-offending.
14 Professor Greenberg observes that the defendant falls in the high-risk category by reference to the STATIC 99 measure, the most commonly and widely used instrument used for assessing risk for sexual re-offence. Professor Greenberg assessed the defendant on 24 April. He considers that the defendant's risk factors include substance abuse. He notes that the defendant has had difficulties with alcohol and other substances during his periods of freedom in the community.
15 Dr Allnutt also assessed the defendant on 24 April. He saw him again at the Long Bay complex on 10 May. Dr Allnutt expresses concerns based among other things on the defendant's history of coping with stressors by the use of alcohol. Dr Allnutt, by reference STATIC 99 measure, considers the defendant to be in the higher risk group of sex offenders. He considers that there is reason to be concerned about the defendant's capacity to adhere to a compliance regime.
16 The Court of Appeal discussed the approach to the making of interim detention orders at [43] - [46]. I proceed upon the basis that there is no presumption in favour of maintaining the status quo and equally that there is no warrant for discounting the unchallenged evidence which in this case points to risk-avoidance at the interim stage. I do not draw the inference that if the defendant were released on an interim supervision order he would be subject to constant physical surveillance. I do not know what, if any, measures the Commissioner of Corrective Services would implement in this respect.
17 Section 11 of the Act provides that an interim supervision order may direct an offender to comply with such conditions as the Court considers appropriate, including (but not limited to) directions requiring the offender to do or refrain from doing the things specified in subparas (a) to (j). It was not suggested that the Court's powers to impose conditions on an interim supervision order would extend to a condition having the effect of subjecting the offender to 24-hour physical surveillance.