Characterisation of Supply
29 We are not here concerned with whether a supply occurred on entry into a contract (cf., Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Reliance Carpet Co Pty Ltd (2008) 236 CLR 342; Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Qantas Airways Ltd (2012) 247 CLR 286) or even with the characterisation of that supply it if did occur. We are here concerned with the character of a supply made as a result of performance of the terms and conditions of a contract. The terms and conditions are the instrumentality through which the supply is made, but the text of these terms and conditions is not conclusive of the character of the supply that is made; that will depend as much on the manner of performance of those terms and conditions as the text of the terms and conditions themselves; it will also depend on the commercial or business purposes, discerned objectively, of those who have entered into the relevant contract.
30 The primary judge found (at R [80]) that it was not in dispute that the Tourplan contracts did not provide expressly that ATS would itself provide the Products or that ATS would ensure that they were provided by the Australian Providers; there was no such term in the terms and conditions on the web-page linked to the Agent area of the ATS website (defined in R [22] as the "Terms and Conditions"). But the primary judge was of the view (at R [89]) that a term was implied into the contract between ATS and the NR Travel Agents that ATS provided or ensured provision of the Products to the NR Tourists. According to her Honour, such a term fulfilled each of the requirements as set out in BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings (1977) 180 CLR 266 at 283 to be so implied and reflected the way in which the contracts were performed.
31 On the appeal, ATS assailed the primary judge's view that a term was to be implied into the contract between ATS and the NR Travel Agents that ATS promised the provision of the Products by the Australian Providers to the NR Tourists. It did so on the basis that none of the requirements laid down in BP Refinery were fulfilled - it was not reasonable and equitable; it was not necessary to give business efficacy to the contract; it was not so obvious that "it goes without saying" that ATS would make such a promise; it was not capable of clear and certain expression; and it would be in contradiction of an express term of the contract.
32 I do not think it is necessary for me to decide this particular issue for two reasons. First because, in my view, it was not necessary to the primary judge's conclusion on the characterisation issue; in my view, it was open to the primary judge to come to the characterisation conclusion her Honour did without recourse to an analysis of whether the contract between ATS and the NR Travel Agents contained a term, express or implied, that ATS promised the NR Travel Agents that the Australian Providers would provide the Products to the NR Tourists. At the end of the day, her Honour found, as a fact, and without confinement to the terms of the contract between ATS and the NR Travel Agents, that that was the proper characterisation of the supply. I will endeavour to explain below why I am of the view that it was open to her Honour to find as she did.
33 Secondly, I do not think it is desirable, in the interests of certainty of application of a revenue statute, for the characterisation of a supply made by performance of an executory contract, to depend upon whether or not a term can be implied into the contract, unless it is absolutely essential to give business efficacy to the contract. In this day and age, revenue statutes are inherently complex, and the GST Act is certainly no exception. The concept of a "supply", as defined in s 9-10 of the GST Act, is fundamental to the operation of that Act and has greatly contributed to that uncertainty, both in terms of identifying whether a "taxable supply" has occurred (Qantas Airways Ltd), but more importantly, on the premise that a supply has occurred, in determining how that supply is to be characterised (Travelex Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2010) 241 CLR 510). Resort to jurisprudence in contract law to imply a term into a contract does not contribute to an aspirational hope, let alone a confident expectation, of certainty of application going forward.
34 At R [94] the primary judge observed:
The Commissioner, perhaps recognising that the contract between ATS and the NR Travel Agents does not contain the additional express term, and contending that the characterisation of the supply is not always answered by a mere contractual analysis, submits that the "substance, purpose and commercial reality of the transactions" was that ATS promised the NR Travel Agents that the NR Tourists would be provided with the Products by the Australian Providers in accordance with the bookings made by ATS.
35 In response to this submission, her Honour observed (at R [104]):
While the contractual terms are an important part of the characterisation of supply under the GST Act, regard must also be had to the substance, purpose and commercial reality of the transactions, including such aspects of the transactions that are necessary to understand them, as to which the contract is silent.
36 By way of further response, her Honour observed (at R [112]):
ATS was paid by the NR Travel Agent once it had made the specified bookings. However, it only paid the Australian Provider once the Products were provided to the NR Tourist. ATS submits that this involved the Australian Provider fulfilling its promise to ATS and thereby providing its Product to ATS. This characterisation does not, in my view, address the reality of the situation whereby, so far as the Australian Provider was concerned, the Products were provided on ATS' instruction, for the person nominated by ATS and, upon delivery of the Product and notification of that fact to ATS, ATS paid for the Product. All the Australian Providers' dealings were with ATS. While, as ATS emphasises, the Tourplan contract does not provide expressly that ATS would itself provide the Products, or would ensure that they were provided by the Australian Providers, the fact is that the only party able to ensure that provision was ATS.
37 In my view, the primary judge was entitled to conclude as her Honour did at R [122] and [123] (see [11] above). Both before the primary judge, and on appeal, ATS sought to assail those conclusions by reference to a perimeter confined to the Terms and Conditions, said to represent the four corners of the contractual relationship between ATS and the NR Travel Agents. Like the primary judge, I reject that submission. The Terms and Conditions clearly did not represent all the terms and conditions of the contract between ATS and NR Travel Agents, and no evidence was adduced by ATS that would lead one to infer, from the manner in which ATS and the NR Travel Agents performed their contractual obligations, nor from the factual matrix constituted by the entirety of the arrangements, that the conclusion of the primary judge did not accord with the commercial reality of the transaction.
38 While the issue of identification of whether or not a supply is made may be a question of law or, perhaps more correctly, a mixed question of fact and law, see the definition of "supply" in s 9-10 of the GST Act in [21] above, the issue of characterisation of the supply in a particular case, in other words the process of deciding what was supplied, is undoubtedly a question of fact. In many cases the task of characterisation will be easy; in others, it will be hard.
39 In determining the character of a supply - what was really supplied? - pursuant to performance of an executory contract, a court is not to be "handcuffed" by the terms embodied in the four corners of the contract, the more so if those terms and conditions do not represent all the terms and conditions of the contract; or where the contract is but one link in a chain of contracts, the performance of each being related to, if not dependent on, performance of the immediately preceding contract; or where, by reference to the factual matrix of the entirety of the arrangements, the commercial or practical reality points to the conferral or provision of a supply which goes beyond the conclusion that might otherwise be drawn from a confined analysis of the terms and conditions of one contract in that chain.
40 Undoubtedly, where the supply is made pursuant to the performance of a stand-alone executory contract between B and C which is totally unrelated to any other contract either B or C has entered into, an analysis of the terms and conditions of that contract will shed considerable light on the character of the supply made between B and C. Where, however, the supply is made pursuant to the performance of an executory contract between B and C which is related to a contract between A and B; to a contract between C and D; and to the consumption by D of what A provided B, it could not, at least in my view, be seriously denied that in determining the character of the supply from B to C one could not have regard to matters standing outside the contract between B and C, in particular, to the terms of the contract between A and B, between C and D and to the consumption by D of the contractual promise from A to B in determining the characterisation of the supply from B to C.
41 As the issue of characterisation is a question of fact, one is reminded of what has been said in other revenue law contexts on questions of determination or characterisation. The determination of the "source" of an item of income has been described as "a practical, hard matter of fact". That is the well-known phrase used by Isaacs J in reading the judgment of the High Court in Nathan v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1918) 25 CLR 183 at 190. What is less known are the words used by the Court in the passage which immediately preceded that phrase at 189-190:
The Legislature in using the word "source" meant, not a legal concept, but something which a practical man would regard as a real source of income. Legal concepts must, of course, enter into the question when we have to consider to whom a given source belongs. But the ascertainment of the actual source of a given income is a practical, hard matter of fact.
42 In the same context, is the following passage from the reasons of Burchett J in a Full Court of this Court in Thorpe Nominees Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 19 ATR 1834 at 1846:
Practical reality is not a test so much as an attitude of mind in which the court should approach the task of judgment. Reality, like beauty, is often in the eye of the beholder (cf the commens [sic] made by J D Jackson in an article in 51 Mod LR 549 at 557 et seq). What the cases require is that the truth of the matter be sought with an eye focused on practical business affairs, rather than on nice distinctions of the law. For the word "source", in this context, has no precise or technical reference. It expresses only a general conception of origin, leading the mind broadly, by analogy. The true meaning of the word evokes springs in grottos at Delphi, sooner than the incidence of taxes. So the exactness which the lawyer is prone to seek must be consciously set aside; indeed, with respect to a choice between various contributing factors, it cannot be attained. The substance of the matter, metaphorically conveyed when we speak of the source of income, is a large view of the origin of the income - where it came from - as a businessman would perceive it.
43 It is true that the word "supply" is defined in s 9-10 of the GST Act whereas, as Burchett J observed in Thorpe Nominees, the word "source" has no precise or technical reference, but the determination of the characterisation of the supply in a case such as the present is as much a matter of practical or business reality as the determination of the origin of income - where it comes from - in a case of the kind before the Full Court in Thorpe Nominees.
44 Questions of characterisation also arise in determining whether an outgoing is on capital or revenue account. As Sir Owen Dixon, albeit in dissent, said in Hallstroms Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1946) 72 CLR 634 at 648:
What is an outgoing of capital and what is an outgoing on account of revenue depends on what the expenditure is calculated to effect from a practical and business point of view, rather than upon the juristic classification of the legal rights, if any, secured, employed or exhausted in the process.
45 Thus, I am of the view that, having regard to the matters listed by the primary judge at R [125], it was open to her Honour to find that the supply made by ATS to the NR Travel Agents was to be properly characterised as a promise by ATS that ATS would ensure that when the NR Tourists came to Australia they would be provided with the Products the NR Tourists had paid for, and that there was no error on the part of her Honour in so finding.