No prima facie case or serious question to be tried
26 None of the contentions or submissions advanced by the applicant provide a basis, or even an arguable basis, for restraining the Minister from carrying out his duty to remove the applicant from Australia pursuant to s 198 of the Migration Act.
27 The applicant's main argument hinged on the fact that he had lodged a request for Ministerial intervention that had not yet been considered or determined. The fundamental problem for the applicant, however, is that the Minister is not obliged to consider, let alone act upon, that request. In those circumstances, it cannot be the case that in the mere making of a request for Ministerial intervention could somehow prevent or even delay the Minister from carrying out his duty under s 198(6) of the Act.
28 In BJM16 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship & Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 995, Rares J effectively dismissed an argument similar to that now advanced by the applicant. In rejecting the argument, his Honour said (at [36]):
… it is difficult to think that the Parliament intended that it was possible for an unlawful non-citizen to delay the performance of an officer's duty to remove him or her merely by making, or because he or she has made, an application for the Minister to exercise a personal power such as that in section 48B.
29 His Honour also reasoned as follows (at [46]-[47]):
Moreover, the Parliament has made clear in s 48B(6) that the Minister does not have any duty to consider under s 48B(1) whether to exercise the power to lift the bar, whether or not he is requested to do so by the non-citizen, any other person, or in any other circumstances. In this context, if the appellant's argument were right, an officer would be prevented from removing him under s 198(6) for an indefinite period because, ultimately, the Minister may or may not decide to consider whether to exercise his personal power, including after the Department has pursued a process, such as in the Guidelines, to process whether, in accordance with the Minister's instructions, the request should or should not be put before him.
Because the Minister's powers under s 48B and its analogues are both personal and non-compellable, a person seeking their exercise will not be able to seek a writ of mandamus to require the Minister to make a procedural or substantive decision on a request such as one under s 48B(1). Therefore, the unlawful non-citizen could be held indefinitely in immigration detention until the request is determined, notwithstanding the express terms of ss 197C and 198(6) that require the person's removal as soon as reasonably practicable in circumstances where Australia's non-refoulement obligations in respect of the unlawful non-citizen are irrelevant to the performance of that duty.
30 I am not persuaded that Rares J was wrong, let alone plainly wrong in arriving at that conclusion. In those circumstances, I should follow his Honour's judgment. In any event, in my view his Honour was correct in finding that the mere making of a request for Ministerial intervention cannot qualify or restrict the duty under s 198 to remove an unlawful non-citizen from Australia.
31 The applicant's second contention may be dealt with shortly. The problem for the applicant is that his claim that if he was returned to Malaysia, the local authorities or police would harm him because they wanted to take his land, was the subject of his original protection visa application. The delegate and the Tribunal refused to grant the applicant a protection visa despite that claim. The applicant's judicial review challenges to the Tribunal's decision were also unsuccessful, including his most recent attempt to challenge the decision in the FCF Court. There is, in all the circumstances, no proper basis for this Court to revisit this claim in the context of an application for an interlocutory injunction.
32 Much the same can be said concerning the applicant's third contention. The applicant's claim that he fears that he will be harmed if returned to Malaysia on account of his bisexuality was not a claim he made in support of his original protection visa application. He did, however, unsuccessfully raise it in the context of his recent application in the FCF Court. Justice Goodchild found that it provided no basis for the applicant's extension of time application to file a further judicial review application, or his application for an interlocutory injunction. Putting that to one side, the mere fact that the applicant has, in recent times, advanced a further claim relating to his fear of harm cannot provide a basis for preventing or delaying the Minister in carrying out the duty to remove the applicant pursuant to s 198 of the Migration Act. That is all the more so given that the applicant is currently not able to make a further application for a protection visa based on this new claim and there is no sound or reasonable basis for expecting that the applicant will necessarily be permitted to lodge a new application.
33 It should also be noted that, while it may perhaps be accepted that the Minister has not yet considered the request for intervention under s 46B of the Migration Act, officers of the Department recently conducted a "non-refoulment obligations assessment" regarding the applicant. It is open to infer that the officer considered the applicant's recent claim that he fears harm in Malaysia on account of his sexuality. The officer concluded that "removal of the applicant would not be in breach of Australia's non-refoulment obligations".