Applicant M171/2003 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural &

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

MOORE J 29 On 2 July 1998, the applicant lodged an application for a protection visa. The application was refused by a delegate of the respondent on 21 July 1998 and that decision was affirmed by the Refugee Review Tribunal ("the Tribunal") on 21 January 1999. It is unnecessary to detail all the procedural steps taken by the applicant to challenge, by way of judicial review, the decision of the Tribunal. It is sufficient to note that an application for an order nisi was filed in the High Court on 27 May 2003 which was subsequently remitted to this Court. 30 That application was ultimately dealt with by Merkel J on 5 December 2003. His Honour adopted the approach, reflected in procedural orders he made, that it was appropriate that the matter be dealt with as an application for an order nisi only. To this end, his Honour made an order that O 51A r 5(1) of the Federal Court Rules not apply. The substantive order his Honour made was that the application for an order nisi be refused. The transcript of the proceedings on 5 December 2003 reveals that his Honour concluded, on the material filed by the applicant in support of the grant of an order nisi, no arguable case was disclosed. The transcript also reveals that his Honour intended the order to be interlocutory and the applicant could commence fresh proceedings if there was a point of substance to be raised. 31 The applicant filed a notice of appeal against the judgment of Merkel J on 23 December 2003. The respondent filed a notice of objection to competency on 22 January 2004. On 11 March 2004, the applicant filed an application for an extension of time to file and serve a notice of appeal and for leave to appeal. 32 The order made by Merkel J was interlocutory. It is necessary for the applicant to apply for leave to appeal within 21 days of the order being made unless compliance with the rule imposing that time limit (O 52 r 5(2)) is dispensed with by the Court. I would extend time (by dispensing with the requirement to file within the specified time: O 52 r 5(3)) but refuse leave. I would extend time because the applicant sought to appeal within time but did not follow the appropriate procedure for challenging, by way of appeal, an interlocutory order. I would refuse leave to appeal because any appeal would have no prospects of success. 33 The application for the order nisi filed on 27 May 2003 in the High Court took the form of an affidavit. Annexed to that affidavit was a draft order nisi alleging the Tribunal did not accord him natural justice, that it constructively failed to exercise jurisdiction in several particularised respects, its decision was unreasonable in a Wednesbury sense, it erred in law, it acted in bad faith or for an ulterior purpose and did not follow procedures required by the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). None of these allegations were particularised. Nothing in the body of the affidavit provided a factual foundation for any of the allegations. Accordingly, Merkel J was correct in refusing the order nisi. Any appeal from his Honour's interlocutory order should fail. 34 I would dispense with the requirement that the application for leave to appeal against the judgment of Merkel J of 5 December 2003 be filed within 21 days, I would refuse leave to appeal and I would order the applicant to pay the respondent's costs. 35 Since preparing these reasons I have had the opportunity of reading the reasons for judgment of Gray J in a draft form. I wish to make the following further observations. 36 The operative order made by the primary judge was to refuse the application for an order nisi. He made two ancillary orders, orders 1 and 2, which had the effect of raising the application for an order nisi as the first matter his Honour needed to address. Probably the better view is that he also decided not to adjourn the proceedings in the face of the applicant's submissions about being in the process of seeking the assistance of the Victorian Bar. Circumstances can arise where the Court or Tribunal is obliged to adjourn a matter even though no formal application for an adjournment is made (as is the case here): see Sullivan v Department of Transport (1978) 20 ALR 323 at 343 per Deane J. 37 It is probably appropriate to approach the matter on the footing that the substantive order (to refuse or dismiss the application for an order nisi) could be impugned on the basis that it should not have been made (a matter already addressed) or it was made in circumstances where the appellant was denied procedural fairness. As to the former proposition, the primary judge was, as I have already indicated, entitled to make the order he did. 38 The issue of whether there was a denial of procedural fairness might arise in two ways. The first would flow from the primary judge altering the basis on which the matter was proceeding by varying the orders made by Marshall J with the result that he heard, on 5 December 2003, the application for an order nisi. In my opinion, the approach of the primary judge was, in this respect, reasonably open. Marshall J had made directions designed to expose the case the applicant wished to maintain. Both contentions of fact and law and affidavits in support of those contentions had to be filed by the applicant. Neither step was taken. In those circumstances the primary judge was confronted at the directions hearing on 5 December 2003 with a situation where the appellant had articulated no case of substance even though the orders of Marshall J were intended to achieve that result. It was open to the primary judge to alter the procedural course of the proceedings determined by Marshall J. As a result of the conduct of the appellant, the objectives Marshall J had sought to achieve had not been achieved. That is not to say, the primary judge might not have adopted another course. The primary judge could have, for example, fixed the matter for a hearing of the type contemplated by O 51A r 5(1), though if the applicant had taken no steps to articulate a case, there would have been a real prospect that the entire application would have then been dismissed. However it does not appear to me that the exercise of the discretionary power to alter the procedural course of the proceedings by making the order under O 51A r 5(2), miscarried. 39 As to the second possible basis on which there might have been a denial of procedural fairness, the primary judge was entitled to refuse to adjourn the proceedings. The applicant simply indicated he was seeking the assistance of the Victorian bar. There was no material before the primary judge to suggest that the applicant had a case which a member of the Bar might formulate in clearer and more compelling terms. It may be accepted that assistance from the Bar might have resulted in a case being identified which, to that point, the appellant had been unable to articulate at all. However the primary judge was not obliged to grant the adjournment on that assumption. It was open to him, as a matter of discretion, to follow the course he did. I certify that the preceding eleven (11) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Moore.

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

EMMETT J: 40 I have read the reasons of Gray J in draft form. I do not agree that there was any error on the part of the primary judge. No leave to appeal should be granted. 41 In the course of the hearing before the primary judge, the appellant made statements from the Bar table that his former solicitors, Adrian Joel & Co, who are in Sydney, had lodged a class action on his behalf in the High Court but that he could no longer afford those solicitors and was 'looking for someone in Victoria'. He said that, at first, he was refused, but that the Victorian Bar now had 'the whole file with audio tapes' and that he was waiting for an answer from them. While it may be implicit in those statements that the appellant wanted more time, he made no formal application for an adjournment of the hearing. 42 The primary judge appears to have taken the view that, in order to afford the appellant the opportunity of getting advice and pursuing his claim, if it had any merit, he would order that O 51A r 5(1) of the Federal Court Rules not apply to the case. His Honour then proceeded to make an order refusing an order nisi with costs. Such an order was interlocutory. His Honour's clear intention was that the matter would be disposed of at that time because, on the material before his Honour, it was completely without merit. Nevertheless, by making an order that r 5(1) did not apply, his Honour was also leaving open the possibility that, having obtained legal advice, the appellant might be able to demonstrate some basis for constitutional writ relief. He would probably not be barred from commencing a further proceeding in that event. An examination of the material before his Honour makes it amply clear why his Honour considered that the appellant's claim was quite without merit. 43 The applicant is a national of Pakistan, whose claim for a protection visa was based on race and political opinion. He undertook secondary education and completed a diploma in computer science in Pakistan before coming to Australia on a student visa in early 1997. However, the appellant made no claim to refugee status until some eighteen months after his arrival in Australia. He lodged an application after having been detained by officials from the Department for a breach of visa conditions and after cancellation of his student visa. 44 The Tribunal in its reasons of 21 January 1999 noted that, while in detention, the applicant initially stated that he had no refugee claims and that he would depart Australia voluntarily. He said that he could return to Pakistan, that he sought to stay in Australia only temporarily and that he had never committed any offences against the laws of 'another country'. He stated that his purpose in travelling to, and staying in, Australia was to study, and that he wished to remain for a further six months so that he could complete 'a short course'. When asked if he thought he 'may suffer unreasonable hardship' due to any cancellation of his visa, the appellant made no allusion to any refugee claims. He agreed that he had a right of return to Pakistan and made no reference to any issue of asylum when asked if there was anything he wished to add before the conclusion of the interview with the Department. 45 The Tribunal observed that the applicant was apparently in breach of his visa conditions from soon after his arrival in Australia. He did not attend his study course as required. In flouting the conditions of his visa, the appellant left himself at risk of being returned to Pakistan. He not only took no steps to regularise the situation, but failed to raise any Convention related reason for remaining in Australia when he was detained and faced repatriation, notwithstanding the later claim of having fled Pakistan in order to seek asylum. 46 The Tribunal observed that, while the appellant may have been advised by other inmates that he could avoid the prolongation of his detention by delaying any formal application for a protection visa, that did not preclude him from giving honest answers to questions asked of him regarding, for example, any hardship he may face in Pakistan. The Tribunal considered that the appellant had a history of saying whatever suited his purpose at the time. 47 Upon consideration of the whole context of the appellant's situation, the Tribunal did not find it plausible that, having fled Pakistan in order to seek refugee status in Australia, the appellant would take no steps at all to seek that status until faced with an imminent prospect of deportation. The Tribunal concluded that the appellant's delay in making an application for asylum, his expressed intention to depart Australia voluntarily and the content of his interview in relation to the cancellation of his visa were inconsistent with a subjective fear of persecution in Pakistan. 48 When the appeal was called on for hearing, the appellant indicated that the Victorian Bar had declined to assist. Accordingly, there is nothing before the Court to suggest that there is the slightest substance in any claim by the appellant. In the draft order nisi filed in the High Court on behalf of the appellant at some time in 2003, in excess of three years after the Tribunal's decision, relief was claimed on the basis that the Tribunal: · made its decision in circumstances that amounted to a failure to accord the appellant natural justice; · failed to exercise its jurisdiction by failing to take into account relevant considerations; · constructively failed to exercise its jurisdiction because it was affected by an error of law; · improperly exercised power because the decision was affected by bad faith or bias or was made for an ulterior purpose or was not made in accordance with the procedure set out in the Act; · made a decision that was so unreasonable that no reasonable decision maker could have made it. 49 Those complaints were not supported by any particulars. The appellant has at no stage advanced any possible ground on which constitutional writ relief might be contemplated, much less granted. It is demonstrably patent that there is nothing of any substance whatsoever in the appellant's claim as formulated so far. The primary judge acted with complete propriety in the manner in which he dealt with the matter. I certify that the preceding ten (10) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Emmett.

Associate: Dated: 24 August 2004 The Appellant appeared in person Counsel for the Respondent: R Knowles