Applicant A376/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT 1 The applicants comprise a family of husband, wife and child, who arrived in Australia on 28 October 2000, and on 12 December 2000, lodged an application for a protection (class XA) visa. On 9 February 2001, a delegate of the Minister ('the respondent') refused the application, and the applicants' application for review of that decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal ('the RRT') was refused on 30 May 2002. 2 On 13 December 2002, that is, more than six months after the adverse decision of the RRT, the applicants filed an application in the High Court of Australia for the constitutional writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, pursuant to s 75(v) of the Constitution in respect of the RRT's decision dismissing the applicants' respective claims for protection visas. The following grounds were relied upon: (i) breach of the rules of natural justice occurring in connection with the making of the RRT decision; (ii) the making of an error of law, whether or not the error appears on the record of the RRT decision; (iii) non-observance of procedures required by law in connection with the making of the RRT decision; (iv) improper exercise by the RRT of the power conferred by the enactment in pursuance of which it was purportedly made; (v) absence of evidence or other material to justify the making of the RRT decision; (vi) the RRT decision was otherwise contrary to law. 3 The application was accompanied by an affidavit of a South Australian solicitor Mark Wallis Clisby sworn on 12 December 2002, to which was attached the RRT decision and a draft order purportedly based on relief of the foregoing descriptions. 4 On 7 February 2003, further proceedings in the High Court application were remitted by a justice of the High Court to the South Australian Registry of this Court. 5 On 21 July 2003, Selway J made the following orders: (i) The applicants, by 29 August 2003: (a) If any extension of time within which to commence the proceedings be required, file and serve a notice of motion, returnable at the next directions hearing, seeking an extension of time together with an affidavit by the applicant personally explaining the reasons for the delay in commencing the proceedings, and deposing to the reasons why an extension of time should be given; (b) file and serve an amended application specifying precisely the error or errors upon which the decision under review was challenged. (c) file and serve any further affidavit material required to lay the foundation for the allegations made by the amended application. (d) file and serve an outline of submissions. (e) file and serve a memorandum stating: · the State or Territory in which the applicants were residing; · whether the applicants wished to be present at the hearing of the application; · whether the matter was one that could be transferred to the Federal Magistrates Court; · whether the applicants object to a transfer of the application to the Federal Magistrates Court and, if so, the grounds for objection. (ii) In the event that an extension of time was to be sought, that the respondent be at liberty, within 2 weeks of receiving the notice of motion, to file and serve an affidavit in opposition to the extension of time. (iii) Within 3 weeks of receiving the applicants' amended application and supporting material pursuant to Order 1 above, that the respondent: (a) file and serve any affidavits in reply; (b) file and serve submissions in reply. (iv) A directions hearing be fixed for Friday, 12 September 2003 at 9.00am. (v) In the event that Order 1 is not fully complied with, the applicants be called upon at the adjourned directions hearing to show cause why the matter should not stand as dismissed. (vi) Liberty to apply. 6 Notice of those orders were apparently sent to Mr Clisby. However on 8 September 2003, a 'Notice of Acting in Person' signed by the applicant husband in person was produced to the Court. Also on 8 September 2003, the applicants filed an amended application for constitutional writs, which specified three grounds for purported justification of the grant of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in precisely (ie inclusive of grammatical etc errors) the following text: '(i) The Tribunal denied procedural fairness and natural justice as in Muin and in other following cases: WAEJ v Minister for Immigration & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 161 WAGU v Minister for Immigration & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 912 WACO v Minister for Immigration & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 171. Particulars In its decision on page 23 the Tribunal refers to country information that it obtained after the decision of the Delegate. However it did not provide this adverse information to the Applicant to respond to it. These information are the following: (a) US Department of State 2002, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2001 - India, March Section 2d (b) On page 24.20 of the decision the Tribunal refers to another Country Information, which is adverse to the Applicant. This information is as follows: (UK Home Office 2001, Indian Assessment. October, part 5.2.6) "throughout India it… [is] very easy to obtain false documents". (c) On page 18 of the decision the Tribunal refers to yet another Country Information, which is adverse to the Applicant. This information is as follows: Human Rights Watch World Report 2001 Had the Tribunal sent this application to me before the hearing I could have got my advisers to research relevant information or I myself would have researched closely relevant information and provided to the Tribunal to balance that information. Failure to do that was a failure to provide natural justice as dealt with in the cases stated above. S 422B of the Migration Act does not apply here as the application to RRT decision was made before 4 July 2002. (ii) The Tribunal took the view that almost all the documents provided were forgeries however it did not put to the applicant each document and ask his response. The Tribunal thus denied procedure fairness to the applicant Particulars Newspaper report which claims that he was wanted by the police (page 23.70) Letter from Punjab Human Rights Commission (page 24.65) (iii) The Tribunal did not consider relevant information: Yusuf Particulars Statutory Declaration from Hargurmail Sunner in support of the applicant husband's claims. Letter from Dr R Dinakar (page 12.90).' 7 On 12 September 2003, Lander J transferred the proceedings to the New South Wales Registry of this Court and on 17 October 2003, I ordered the applicants to file and serve written submissions by 12 November 2003. That order was not complied with. On 17 November 2003, Silva Solicitors of Pendle Hill in the State of New south Wales filed a notice of appearance. 8 There is an additional history of intervening litigation between the parties, which may be traced to the circumstance that the applicants had previously failed in their applications for judicial review before the Federal Court by way of challenge to the very RRT decision, which they seek to set aside in these proceedings. Those applications for judicial review were filed in this Court as long ago as 23 July 2002, and were discontinued on 28 August 2002 by the filing of a notice of discontinuance. Nevertheless on 11 September 2003, the applicants served on the respondent a notice of motion seeking an order that the notice of discontinuance 'be and is hereby withdrawn'. After certain defaults by the applicants in prosecuting their motion to withdraw the notice of discontinuance, Beaumont J on 31 October 2002 dismissed the motion but allowed the applicants a period of three weeks to file and serve written submissions outlining the substantive basis for the making of the orders sought in the notice of motion. No such submissions were ever filed or served, and approximately six weeks later, the applicants commenced the present proceedings in the original jurisdiction of the High Court, to which I have earlier referred. 9 Putting to one side potential questions of issue or Anshun estoppel, by virtue of the failure of the applicants to prosecute their application in accordance with the orders of this Court in respect of the original proceedings referred to in [8] above, the present proceedings were commenced out of time in any event for the purposes of any grant of mandamus pursuant to Order 55 Rule 30 of the High Court Rules, which provides: 'Time 30. An application for a writ of mandamus, or an order in the nature of mandamus, to a judicial tribunal to hear and determine a matter shall be made within two months of the date of the refusal to hear or within such further time as is, under special circumstances, allowed by the Court or a Justice.' Allowing for the deemed period of notification of the RRT's written reasons for judgment, the application for constitutional writs was commenced about five months after the RRT's decision and therefore approximately three months beyond the time allowed for in Order 55 Rule 30. No extension of time pursuant to Order 55 rule 30 was sought. 10 The applicants presently seek nevertheless an enlargement of time so as to render the constitutional writ of mandamus available to them, should the Court ultimately be persuaded that one or more of the substantive grounds relied upon in the amended application referred to in [6] above are made out. In Re Commonwealth of Australia (Department of Defence); Ex parte Marks (2000) 177 ALR 491, McHugh J considered whether an applicant's inability to obtain favourable legal advice constituted a special circumstance warranting an enlargement of time where a period of more than one year had elapsed between the decision challenged and the commencement of the proceedings for the constitutional writs in the High Court. In refusing to enlarge the period of time, McHugh J set out the following guiding principles (omitting formal parts at 495-6): 'In Gallo v Dawson, I said that the grant of an extension of time under O 60 r 6 is not automatic. This is as true of an application for constitutional relief under s 75(v) as it is in respect of an appeal. I also said that, when the application is for an extension of time in which to file an appeal, it is always necessary to consider the prospects of the applicant succeeding in the appeal. A similar inquiry must be made when the application is for an extension of time in which to commence s 75(v) proceedings to quash an act, decision or judgment. A "case would need to be exceptional" before the time for commencing proceedings was enlarged by many months. The explanation for such a delay is also a relevant consideration. … An extension of time for seeking relief against a decision or judgment can only be granted if it is necessary to do justice between the parties. That means that it is necessary to have regard to the history of the matter, the conduct of both parties, the nature of the litigation and the consequences for the parties of a grant or refusal of the extension. Where an applicant seeks the issue of the constitutional or prerogative writs, a further factor must be considered. Those writs are directed at the acts or decisions of public bodies or officials, and the public interest requires that there be an end to litigation about the efficacy of such acts or decisions. In that respect, the present case, although important to the applicant, is not as important as many other cases… Independently of the merits of the case, I find it difficult to see how a person who, with knowledge of the decision, delays 17 months before seeking relief could ever be granted an extension of time to quash such a decision unless some conduct of the respondent or the public body or official had brought about the delay. As the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council said in Ratnam v Cumarasamy, "[t]he rules of court must prima facie be obeyed". The time for seeking certiorari is six times, and the time for seeking mandamus is twice, the period in which an application for special leave to appeal to this Court can be brought against a judgment or decision. The periods for applying for certiorari and mandamus give a person affected by an adverse decision or judgment ample time in which to commence proceedings in this Court. In all but very exceptional cases, they should be rigidly applied when, as here, more than one year has elapsed between the decision and the commencement of proceedings in this Court. An applicant's inability to obtain favourable legal advice is not a ground for extending the time for seeking mandamus or the ancillary writ of certiorari. Upon the expiry of the time for the issue of a constitutional writ against a decision or judgment, the respondent has a vested right to retain the judgment or decision. Its rights should not be dependent on whether the applicant can at some future time obtain a favourable legal opinion that he or she has an arguable case. In addition, the efficacy of public acts, decisions and judgments cannot be the hostage of an applicant's search for favourable legal advice. In all but exceptional cases, the inability of an applicant to obtain favourable advice within the two month period for mandamus and the six month period for certiorari is a strong indicator that he or she has no case for relief. That is the case here. The applicant has no arguable case for relief. If it should turn out that, by reason of negligent advice, an applicant was deprived of the right to quash a decision or to have it made or to have some duty carried out, the applicant will have his or her remedy against the lawyer or lawyers concerned.' 11 In support of the applicants' case that an enlargement of time ought to be granted, the applicants relied upon the affidavits of the husband applicant sworn respectively on 8 September 2003 and 3 December 2003; the latter being assembled after the conclusion of the hearing on 19 November 2003, in response to my invitation to the applicants to further elaborate upon the facts and circumstances so briefly and equivocally stated in the affidavit of 8 September 2003. The affidavits allege that a barrister briefed to represent the applicants 'did not carry out his duties properly', because he failed to lodge submissions and affidavit evidence in time or at all, and to attend at a directions hearing on 25 October 2002, and to appear at the hearing of the matter on 30 October 2002. It is also suggested that the barrister acted improperly by advising the applicants to withdraw the Federal Court application for judicial review, yet then providing advice to the applicants to the effect that the application may be reinstated. The affidavit sworn 3 December 2003 continued (literally) as follows: '7. Due to… non-compliance of Federal Court directions and Orders I have been denied an opportunity to advance my case. 8. I therefore lodged my application at High Court because I felt aggrieved that I could not get the RRT decision reviewed. I could not lodge an appeal with the Full Court because there was effectively no federal Court decision dealing with the RRT decision. The only way was is to set it heard at the High Court at first instance… 8. I therefore feel that I have not deliberately or negligently delayed commencing proceedings but chose the path that would hopefully give me relief rather promptly.' 12 The applicant husband has not addressed in his respective affidavits the fundamental detail required to support the serious allegations he makes. He has not for example disclosed the terms of the retainer by the applicants of the barrister, and in particular the scope of the brief, and whether any fees were already due and owing at the time the barrister was required to perform the work. The applicants have not adduced any evidence from the barrister or the solicitor who presumably had the care and conduct of the proceedings on behalf of the applicants at the relevant time. Moreover I would observe that the affidavit filed in support of the applicants' application in the High Court of Mark Wallis Clisby being the solicitor then acting for the applicants, did not draw attention to the allegations of the applicant husband that the barrister appearing in the Federal Court proceedings had not undertaken his brief within the ambit of his instructions, and had therefore deprived the applicants of an opportunity of advancing their application for judicial review. Indeed the first time the applicants sought to rely on the supposed misadventures of the barrister in aid of the grant of an enlargement of time in favour of the applicants was after 21 July 2003, when Selway J prompted the applicants to file a notice of motion and affidavit in support of such an extension. The explanations proffered by the applicant husband are unpersuasive, given their lack of specificity and corroboration, and of any explanation of the delay in raising the issue which had not previously been pursued in aid of the s 75(v) application filed in the High Court. All those shortcomings were evident, despite the applicants having the benefit of legal representation. 13 Although the applicants submitted that prohibition would be sufficient without any order for mandamus, the respondent contended that in any event, an enlargement of time should not be granted in respect of mandamus for the following reasons cumulatively: (i) the merits of the applicants' case were weak; (ii) the conduct of the applicants were inappropriate in commencing and discontinuing and later re-agitating and then abandoning proceedings; and (iii) there is a public interest that there be an end to litigation, especially in the context of the acts and decision of public bodies. For the reasons advanced by the respondent, an enlargement of time should be refused. That this result should follow is strengthened by the circumstance that the application is devoid of merit and must be dismissed in any event. What follows therefore are my reasons for dismissing the substantive application. 14 The factual circumstances giving rise to the respective claims for refugee status are set out in the RRT's decision and I adopt them for the purposes of the following summary. The applicant husband claimed to be a member of the All India Sikh Students Federation ('AISSF'), and said that he was responsible for organising rallies and distributing promotional material. He claimed that between 1994 and 2000, he was arrested 'countless' times and tortured in custody. He said that on all occasions he was released, because of bribes paid to the police, or because of protests by prominent members of his village. The applicant husband stated that he left India because of problems with police, and that this was the sole reason for his departure. 15 The RRT member explored the applicant husband's claim that he was a member of the AISSF. The applicant husband had said that he 'maybe' joined the AISSF in September 1992, although he was confused about the standing of the AISSF with the authorities. He claimed that his involvement with the AISSF extended to distributing letters through villages which advocated the boycott of the 1991 and 1995 elections. He said that these activities were illegal. The applicant husband conceded however that he was an ordinary member and not a 'big leader', of the AISSF. 16 When questioned by the RRT about the 'countless' arrests to which the applicant husband claimed he was subjected, he said that he was first arrested in February 1994, and that the police tortured him and sought to learn the names of 'others'. He said that he was arrested again in April and June of the same year and in 1995, and was beaten. He said that he was charged in 1994 and 1999, although he had no documentary proof of the charges, and in any event did not even state what the charges were. The applicant husband maintained that because of the arrests, he went into hiding in New Delhi for 'maybe' three years, returning to the Punjab in 1997. 17 The applicant husband next recounted to the RRT an episode occurring on 6 July 1999, which he claimed to stand out in his recollection. He said that he was beaten unconscious while in custody, resulting in a broken finger and ankle, but was not sure of how long he was kept in custody. The RRT duly noted however that the applicant husband's account was vague, confused and inconsistent with the claims articulated in the protection visa application. 18 The RRT took into consideration the documents the applicants submitted on 21 September 2001, which comprised the following: (i) A copy of a letter to the applicant dated 3 March 2001 from a legal firm signed by Muhtar Singh Sidu, which replied to the applicant husband's inquiry about cases pending against him, and advised that 'warrants have been issued', and that his family had been harassed by the police in the course of their search for the applicant husband; the letter advised that the applicant husband's life was in danger, and that he should not return until advised; (ii) A copy of a letter from the secretary of AISSF, Amristar, dated 23 December 2003, which particularised the applicant husband's record kept by the police for his AISSF activities and advising that it was not safe for him to return because of indictments against him under the Penal Code; (iii) A copy of a warrant for the arrest of the applicant dated 31 March 2001 and signed by a judicial magistrate with an illegal stamp; (iv) A copy of a medical certificate dated 6 July 1999 stating that the applicant was in hospital between 6 and 30 July 1999 for treatment of 'multiple injuries to his body'; (v) A copy of a character certificate relating to the applicant wife; (vi) A copy of a certificate stating that the applicant husband completed a training course as a diesel mechanic; and (vii) Several reports on the security and human rights situation in the Punjab. 19 The RRT asked the applicant husband about the letter from the AISSF. His response was recorded as being confused and incoherent, a conclusion undoubtedly drawn from the applicant husband's inability to explain how it was that a letter from the AISSF dated 23 December 2000 could identify an arrest warrant for him which was dated some two week later, namely 6 January 2001. The RRT decision continued as follows: '… Nor was it clear how the warrant reached the applicant who had left India on 27 October 2000, some months before the AISSF letter is dated. Again, the answer as to why or how the AISSF letter assessed that the applicant was in danger was confused and incoherent. At one point the explanation was based on advice from the applicant's solicitor at another point it was related to the general observation that 'most members' had left the country or had been killed. The explanation as to why the police 'raided' the applicant's house 'daily' after he left the country was incoherent to the point where, after considerable effort, I am still unable to reach an understanding of the claimed events. The applicant's explanation of how he came by the original of the arrest warrant, issued months after his departure from India, was so confusing as to leave me without a coherent understanding. For example, when I put to the applicant husband that according to the independent information the original of a warrant is held by the police until a person is taken into custody, his answer was confused; he said that it was mailed to him by his brother yet he claimed to be 'in daily contact' with his legal adviser. Notwithstanding continuous contact with his legal adviser, he could not recall clearly the nature of the two of the three charges contained in his arrest warrant.' 20 When asked if he feared returning to India and if so, the basis of his fear the applicant husband responded by stating that he believed that his life would not be safe, and that the Shiv Sena might inform the police as to his whereabouts. The RRT enquired of the applicant husband whether he could relocate outside the Punjab; his answer was as follows: '… while he had lived in New Delhi for three years, he did not feel safe there and that he had been "arrested" at the check point between New Delhi and the Punjab.' 21 It is further recorded in the RRT decision that the following country information was put to the applicant husband: (i) The security situation in the Punjab had greatly improved; the applicant husband said the problem continued after 1995, and that people were still arrested; and (ii) That Sikh activists without a leadership profile could live safely; the applicant husband's answer was not coherent, in that he claimed that 'old' members were still subject to arrest, that members like him were less involved, but that he felt unsafe because 'big leaders' used to come to his home. 22 The applicant wife also appeared before and testified to the RRT, and the various claims made in support of her application for refugee status were considered. The RRT asked the applicant wife about her claimed fear of harm because of her husband's links to the AISSF. She maintained that he had been arrested on many occasions, and said that she feared that this would be repeated if she returned to India. Although the applicant wife was not a member of the AISSF, she was deeply troubled with the treatment of her husband by the police. She claimed in her application for a protection visa to have been also threatened by the police; however the RRT regarded that claim as vague and incoherent. 23 Relocating outside the Punjab or otherwise returning to India was said to be of great concern to the applicant wife. She said that she feared her husband could be arrested and killed by the police and linked such fear to having learned, a week prior to giving evidence, that her husband's name and photograph had appeared in a newspaper and that this would endanger him. The applicant wife was unaware however of the paper which published the report. 24 It is apparent that the following country information was duly put to the applicant wife: (i) Sikh activists without a leadership profile can live safely in the Punjab; the applicant wife said in response they could not live there because of their problem with the police; and (ii) Asylum seekers can return safely to India; the applicant wife said that they feared returning for the reasons already stated. 25 The findings and reasons of the RRT for affirming the decision of the respondent are comprehensive. The RRT was satisfied that the applicants are nationals of India but found the applicant husband to be an unsatisfactory witness, and his evidence to be permeated by contradictions, vague propositions and implausible assertions. The RRT cited as an example the fact that the applicant husband claimed to have been arrested between 1994 and 2000 on 'countless' occasions due to his membership of the AISSF, when in fact the country information confirmed that internal security in the Punjab had improved greatly since the mid-1990s, and that ordinary members of the AISSF were not at risk in the years following the 1984-1994 counter insurgency. 26 As indicated already, in support of the suggestion that the applicant husband was at risk of persecution in the Punjab, a document which purported to represent a warrant for the arrest of the applicant husband was provided to the RRT. The RRT found that the warrant was not authentic, and said as follows in that regard: 'A letter from the AISSF dated 23 December 2000 informs the applicant husband of the warrant yet that warrant is dated some two weeks after the date of the letter. Again, the applicants submitted the original of the warrant, whereas the independent information states that the original of a warrant is kept by the police until the person concerned is taken into custody. For these reasons I find that the applicant husband and wife are unreliable witnesses whose claims, in large part, have been invented and who have submitted fabricated documentary evidence to the [RRT].' 27 The RRT accepted the applicant husband's claim that he was an ordinary member of the AISSF and that his activities comprised electoral campaigning work in the villages. However because there was no evidence before the RRT that such electoral activities were illegal, the RRT did not accept that the applicant husband's work led to any adverse interest of the authorities. Moreover, the RRT was not satisfied on the evidence before it that the applicant husband's membership of the AISSF, and his associated activities, caused him to suffer harm from the police. 28 In respect of the applicant husband's claim to have been arrested and mistreated 'countless' times, the RRT was not disposed to the view that the applicant had a profile of interest to the security authorities or that he was arrested and mistreated on the occasions he claimed. The reasoning of the RRT in that regard is extracted as follows: '… For example, the claims of mistreatment by the police as claimed at the PV application do not accord with the claims at the hearing. The evidence of the witness supporting the claimed arrests and mistreatment between 1994 and 2000 were also vague and lacking in the command of detail expected from one claiming to be well appraised of the events. For example, the witness could not recall the number of arrests in 1994 nor the dates on which they occurred. The witness was also unclear as to whether the applicant husband was harmed because of his membership of the AISSF or because of the activities he had undertaken. Furthermore, I find it implausible that the applicant would have been arrested repeatedly for membership of a legal organisation and for participating in political campaign activities when there is no evidence before me to indicate that the claimed activities were illegal. Though claiming to have been repeatedly arrested over a six year period, there is no evidence that charges were laid while the applicant husband was in India. This would indicate that the police had no evidence and thus further undermines the claims of persistent arrests and mistreatment…' 29 Additionally, the RRT did not accept that certain photographs depicting an injured male foot, ankle and upper torso, were authentic. As the RRT said: 'I have stated at the hearing that the photographs do not establish the subject, the time of the injuries, how the injuries were inflicted and by whom. Neither the applicant husband or his adviser attempted to offer evidence to establish a clear link between the photographs and the applicant husband's claim.' 30 The authenticity of the newspaper report, which stated that the applicant husband was wanted by the police, was similarly rejected by the RRT as lacking authenticity. The RRT said: '… I do not accept the article as authentic for several reasons. First, the translation does not state the name of the publication from which the submitted 'news cutting' is alleged to have come. Second, I find it implausible that a brief report of a bank robbery would also identify the applicant husband merely because he was a "companion" of the robber. Third, the article claims that… is a "prominent leader of Sikh Students' Federation [sic] who has taken part in several terrorist related activities" while the applicant has made no claim to a leadership position or of participating in terrorist related activities. Fourth, the applicants' statutory declaration claims that the article identifies the applicant husband as having "an outstanding warrant" whereas as (sic) the article does not make that claim. Fifth, the applicant wife claimed at the hearing that the article has a photograph of her husband whereas the article does not.' 31 The RRT made the following additional adverse findings against the applicant husband: (i) The letter from the applicant husband's legal adviser stating that it is not safe for him to return to India was a fabrication; the letter was dated three days before the date of the warrant, and it is easy to obtain false documents 'throughout India', and several other documents submitted by the applicant were not authentic; and (ii) The applicant did not have a well founded fear of persecution in respect of his claim to fear harm from 'Hindu fanatics'; although mentioned in the protection visa application, the claim was not developed and was speculatively narrated. 32 The RRT next considered the applicant wife's claims that she had been beaten 'many times' and that the police had threatened to kill her and her children, not because of anything she had done, but because of her husband's membership of the AISSF. The RRT explained its reasons for rejecting the applicant wife's claims as follows: '… While she was vague about the times the claimed harm occurred, she claimed that they happened in conjunction with her husband's arrests. As I have not accepted that her husband was harmed as he claims, it follows that I do not accept the applicant's claims of harm which she said was due to the interest of the police in her husband. Furthermore, her claims are not supported by the independent information cited above. I also note that while she claims the police also threatened to harm her children, she left the country without her eight year old daughter who was left behind in the care of her Grandmother. The applicant wife's claim rests very substantially on the claims of her husband's claims of harm. As I have found that the applicant husband has not suffered the harm he claims and that he does not face a real chance of persecution if he returns in the foreseeable future, it follows that I am unable to be satisfied that the applicant wife faces a real chance of Convention persecution if she returns to India now or in the foreseeable future.' 33 Finally in relation to the applicant child, the RRT observed that no specific Convention claims were made by or on behalf of the applicant child and that the fate of his application rested upon the outcome of the parents' application. Because the RRT had determined that the applicant husband and wife did not satisfy the criteria for a protection visa, it followed that the applicant child should similarly be refused a protection visa. 34 The applicants challenged the RRT's decision on the basis that they were denied natural justice. This claim is based on an apparent failure of the RRT to afford the applicants an opportunity to respond to adverse country information which comprised: (i) US Department of State 2002, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2001 - India, March Section 2d; (ii) UK Home Office 2001, Indian Assessment - October, part 5.2.6; and (iii) Human Rights Watch World Report 2001. 35 As the respondent correctly submitted, the short answer to the applicants' complaint is that they have not tendered any evidence about what was put, or not put, to them, in the course of the RRT hearing, and that in the absence of any such evidence, this ground must fail. 36 In any event, it is sufficiently apparent that 'the rules of natural justice do not require the [RRT] to reveal to an applicant that it intends to act on information that is in the public domain or on information of which the applicant is or should be aware' (Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs & Ors; Ex parte Cassim (2000) 175 ALR 209 per McHugh J at [22]). Here, the US State Department Report for 2002 in relation to India adverted to the fact that it would be difficult for a person to leave India on a passport in their own name if the person was wanted by the authorities. That proposition was brought to the applicants' notice in the decision record of the respondent dated 9 February 2001, which stated: 'No-one of concern to the authorities and for whom an arrest warrant was in force would be able to leave the country either undetected or by bribery.' Accordingly, there is no substance in the applicants' complaint that they were unaware of such information and that therefore, they were deprived from commenting upon it before the RRT. 37 The UK Home Office 2001, Indian Assessment was relied upon by the RRT in support of the view that false documents are easily obtained in India. As the respondent correctly submitted, the point made by the RRT was an obvious one, and it is difficult to accept at face value, and indeed without any probative evidence to the contrary that the applicants were unaware of this. There was clearly no 'novelty' or 'surprise' which relevantly confronted the applicants (Re Minster for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs: Ex parte 'A' (2001) 185 ALR 489), given that the reasons of the RRT make it abundantly clear that at the time of the hearing, it questioned the genuineness of certain documents, and moreover invited the applicants to provide the originals of the following materials: (i) Statement from the AISSF; (ii) Arrest warrant for the applicant husband; (iii) Statement from the Dayanand Medical College; and (iv) Statement from the office of Mr S.H. Mukhtiar. 38 Similarly, the applicants' complaint that they were denied procedural fairness, due to the RRT having regard to the Human Rights Watch World Report 2001 for India, is misconceived, given that this report had been provided to the RRT by the applicants. 39 There is no merit in the applicants' complaint that '[t]he [RRT] took the view that almost all the documents provided were forgeries [and yet] did not put to the applicant each document and ask his response'. The relevant documents specified in the particulars consist of a letter from the Punjab Human Rights Commission and a newspaper article stating that the applicant husband is wanted by the police. It is instructive to observe that the letter from the Punjab Human Rights Commission was not found by the RRT to be a forgery, and in relation to the newspaper article, there is no evidence before the Court as to precisely what was said about it at the RRT hearing, though there was some discussion of it at least by the applicant wife. I accept the respondent's submission therefore that this absence of evidence is sufficient to dispose of the applicants' allegation. 40 In any event, as the respondent submitted, the RRT was under no obligation to put to the applicants matters which affected their credibility, and it was for the respective applicants to tender whatever evidence they wished, and then for the RRT to determine whether it accepted that the claim or claims propounded had been established (Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S154/2002 [2003] HCA 60 per Gummow and Haydon JJ at [57]; Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510 at 576). 41 Finally, the applicants submitted that the RRT failed to consider a statutory declaration from Hargurmail Sunner in support of the applicant husband's claims, and a letter from Dr R Dinakar who, if I might say so, had no direct knowledge of any relevant fact, and described the applicant husband's fears of persecution as 'delusions'. It was not suggested by the applicants that the RRT was bound to take these documents into account, and in any event the applicants' submission cannot be supported even at a factual level given, that the RRT expressly referred to, and implicitly took into account, those two documents. Furthermore, it is not surprising that the RRT did not address the same at any length, given that they both lacked any meaningful or useful content. 42 In the result, the applicants' application must be dismissed. Even if the same had been made on a timely basis in respect of mandamus, no relevant error in the RRT's reasons for decision, or in its conduct of the review of the decision of the Minister's delegate, has been exposed. I certify that the preceding forty-two (42) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Conti.