Applicant A200 of 2003 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs
[2004] FCA 547
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Federal Court of Australia
Decision date
2004-05-05
Before
Selway J
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Judgment (12 paragraphs)
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT 1 The applicant arrived in Australia by boat on 11 November, 2000. He was an 'unlawful non citizen' for the purposes of the Migration Act, 1958 (Cth) ('the Act') and was taken into detention. On 13 November he was interviewed by a Departmental officer (the initial interview). On 27 March 2001 the applicant applied for a protection visa. In order to obtain such a visa the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs ('the Minister') had to be satisfied that the applicant is a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol: s 36(2) of the Act. In general terms the Minister had to be satisfied that the applicant was a 'refugee' as defined in the Convention being a person who: '… owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reason of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.' 2 That application was considered by a delegate of the Minister who refused it on 19 April 2001. The applicant sought to have that decision reviewed by the Refugee Review Tribunal ('the Tribunal'). On 15 June 2001 the Tribunal confirmed the decision of the delegate. The applicant sought a review in this Court of that decision pursuant to s 476 of the Act as it then was. That application was dismissed on 5 December 2001: Applicant A v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1723. The applicant appealed from that decision, but his appeal was dismissed on 25 June 2002: WADA v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 202 (WADA). It is clear from that decision that the issues raised by the applicant (who was unrepresented) in those proceedings related to the factual findings by the Tribunal, the adequacy of the translation of his interview with the Tribunal and the alleged failure of the Tribunal to take a statement of a person that the applicant had identified as someone who might assist his case. 3 The applicant's claim for a protection visa was summarised by the Full Court in WADA: 'The appellant claimed to have a well-founded fear of being persecuted if he should return to Iran, by reason of his being an Arab Iranian, with past involvement in a political movement aimed at securing a separate Arab State and promoting Arab language and culture. His claims were stated in some detail in an interview with an immigration inspector on his arrival in Australia, a written application for a protection visa, written submissions in support of the application, a record of interview with an officer of the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, written submissions in support of his application to the Tribunal and oral evidence to the Tribunal at a hearing on 6 June 2001. The claims are set out in considerable detail in the reasons for decision of the Tribunal. For present purposes, it is not necessary to do more than summarise them. The appellant was born at Ahwaz in Iran, and lived there until he left Iran in September 2000. He claimed that Arabs are deprived of their rights and cannot practise their customs freely in Iran. They cannot study in Arabic. While he was at University, the appellant wrote articles about Arabs and their violation of rights. He was detained for four days, accused of instigating Arab nationalism and was released after signing an undertaking. In 1997, he became associated with Khalgh Arab, an organisation fighting for the independence of Khuzestan, a province in the south of Iran in which Ahwaz is located. He was arrested in 1998. During his military service, he began organising political activities aimed at achieving social justice and Arab freedom. He and some friends established a group, linked with an Arab activist. In July 1999, there was a meeting between city authorities and citizens to discuss the problems of Ahwaz. The meeting became unruly. Security forces raided the meeting and arrested the appellant and others. The appellant was detained for ten months, but was released because there were no allegations against him other than trouble-making at the meeting. The appellant's group became involved in holding meetings, writing slogans and preparing leaflets and articles. They revealed information about an oil pipe explosion and the confiscation of Arab farmers´ land. They instigated and helped in a strike. They had articles printed in an Ahwaz newspaper about oppression of Khuzestan Arabs. In 2000, they began a campaign against confiscation of Arab farmers´ lands for the building of a power station. This led to a blockade of the site. That night the appellant was at a meeting in a house, which was raided by authorities. He escaped over rooftops, evading shooting. He escaped by swimming in a river. After five days he managed to reach his uncle's house. He learnt that two of his friends were killed in the clashes, everyone at the meeting was arrested and the authorities were after him. He decided to flee the country. His uncle helped him. He used a people smuggler and a false Iraqi passport.' 4 The Full Court also dealt with the findings and conclusion of the Tribunal. It will be necessary to consider these in more detail below. However, by way of background it is sufficient to refer to the following in the Full Court's reasons: 'The Tribunal accepted that the appellant is an Iranian National and an Arab. It found, however, that he had fabricated claims in an attempt to bring himself within the definition of a refugee. It did not find him to be a credible or a reliable witness. The Tribunal found the appellant to be a well-educated man, apparently from a fairly affluent background, who speaks Persian, Arabic and reasonably good English. There was nothing in the way he gave evidence before the Tribunal to suggest that he is naive, deficient in understanding or easily intimidated. He impressed the Tribunal as a person who would ask questions to clarify the situation, if he were unsure of what he was being asked. In the light of these findings, the Tribunal rejected the appellant´s claims that he had been involved in political activities in Iran, had been imprisoned because of them, had narrowly avoided being arrested and had left Iran illegally. In his interview at the airport on arrival, the appellant had said that he had not been involved in any political activities or with any political groups. He also said that he had left Iran using a genuine Iranian passport. The appellant gave several reasons for the discrepancy between what he said at that interview and his later claims. The Tribunal rejected all of them.' 5 The applicant sought special leave to appeal to the High Court from the Full Court's decision in WADA. That application was dismissed on 24 October, 2003: see [2003] HCATrans 442. 6 In the interim, and following the decision of the High Court in Plaintiff S157/2002 v The Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476, on 30 April, 2003 the applicant instituted proceedings in the High Court seeking orders for prohibition, certiorari, mandamus and other relief against the Tribunal and the Minister. By consent that application was remitted to this Court in August, 2003. 7 The grounds of the amended application that is now before me raise three issues. First it is argued that the Tribunal's finding that the applicant could have obtained a false passport unlawfully was in breach of the rules of procedural fairness in that the applicant was not given an opportunity to comment on the facts that supported that finding. Second, it is said that the Tribunal was in breach of the rules of procedural fairness in making credit findings based upon an incorrect understanding of what had been said at the entry interview. Third, the applicant alleges that the Tribunal breached the rules of procedural fairness in that a fair minded observer would apprehend that the Tribunal may have prejudged some of the country information before it. 8 These grounds raise different issues from those that have been previously raised in the proceedings which resulted in the decision of the Full Court in WADA. Nevertheless, it is at least arguable that the current proceedings could be dismissed by reason of an Anshun estoppel: see SZBJM v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 404. It is also possible that the proceedings could be dismissed for delay in instituting them in the High Court. The applicant says that an Anshun estoppel is discretionary and in the circumstances of this case should not be applied. He also says that the exercise of the discretion whether or not to grant the relief sought by the applicant should not result in the refusal to grant relief by reason of delay in this case. The Minister takes no point in relation either to the Anshun estoppel or to delay. The Minister is content for the issues raised in these proceedings to be considered on their merits. In light of the Minister's position and in view of the discretionary power in the Court to deal with the matter notwithstanding the previous proceedings, I am prepared to consider the issues raised in the Amended Application on their merits.